


CANADA'S ROAD *to* *the* PACIFIC WAR

INTELLIGENCE, STRATEGY, AND THE FAR EAST CRISIS



TIMOTHY WILFORD

STUDIES IN CANADIAN MILITARY HISTORY

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Canada's Road to the Pacific War
Intelligence, Strategy, and the Far East Crisis

Timothy Wilford



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To my parents,
who provided all the opportunities

In honour also of all Canadians
who served the Allied cause during the Second World War

A Mari usque ad Mare

*I know that with supplies cut off, Japan must lose in the end
but there will be again an appalling sacrifice of life before she does,
and a world left more than ever in ashes.*

WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE KING, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA,

27 NOVEMBER 1941

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Preface

THE PACIFIC WAR, ALSO known as "The War against Japan" during the Second World War, was waged throughout the Far East and the Pacific in regions as diverse as the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australia, the mid-Pacific, and the North American coastline. In recent times, however, it has sometimes been called "the forgotten war." One military museum I visited not long ago used that very expression in its information card on the conflict. It is difficult to imagine that anyone could ever forget a conflict that claimed millions of lives, ended in nuclear attacks, and gave rise to several new political regimes in the Far East. The Pacific War transformed the conflict that the Allies first faced in 1939. It created conditions that led to the formation of the Grand Alliance between the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and a host of other "United Nations." It led to the destruction of the Japanese Empire. It was instrumental in America's rise as a global power. Most certainly, the Pacific War and its origins are worthy of study.

If the Pacific War is fading from memory, then Canada's participation in that conflict is likely altogether forgotten in some quarters. Canada is not usually seen as a Pacific power, and yet it collected Pacific intelligence for the Allies, immediately declared war on Japan when hostilities broke out, sacrificed many men in the defence of Hong Kong, participated in Allied campaigns against Japan in the Far East, and interned the entire Japanese Canadian community. For these reasons, the Pacific War is an important part of Canadian history.

This study of Canada and the Far East crisis in 1941 originated with several questions that I had about Canadian intelligence operations in the Pacific, Canada's role as Britain's senior ally, its relations with Japan, and its treatment of the Japanese Canadian community. Having completed several studies on pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence, with a particular emphasis on the Anglo-American dimension, I wanted to know more about Canadian intelligence and strategy during the Far East crisis. This book attempts to show how Canada became involved in the Pacific War. It looks closely at how Canada formed its Far East policies with respect to domestic issues. It also examines Canada's role within the British Commonwealth and within the Anglo-American alliance that emerged in 1941.

In this book, I argue that Canada was better prepared for the Pacific War than was previously thought, due to effective intelligence reporting, careful strategic assessments, and full participation in the emerging Anglo-American alliance. As we shall see, Canada planned for action in both Southeast Asia and the North Pacific. In support of its central thesis, this book draws on a wide range of archival sources from Canada, Britain, and the United States. Relevant testimony and accounts from former participants in wartime covert and intelligence operations have also been considered. The views of other historians are examined, and suggestions for further research as well as comments on methodological problems facing historians of the Second World War are offered. The principal object of this book, however, is to show how Canada, a minor Pacific power, maintained a high level of awareness and met its Allied commitments during a crisis that ultimately led to war in the Pacific.

Acknowledgments

SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE GREATLY assisted me in my endeavours. I wish to thank the many archivists who offered their assistance during my pursuit of documents concerning Canada, the Far East crisis, wartime intelligence operations, and Allied strategic planning. In particular, I wish to thank archivists at Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa, Ontario), the Directorate of History and Heritage (Ottawa, Ontario), the Queen's University Archives (Kingston, Ontario), the St. Catharines Museum (St. Catharines, Ontario), the Public Record Office (Kew, Surrey, UK), the Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge, UK), the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum (Hyde Park, New York), and the National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland).

I have also benefited from conversations and correspondence with several scholars and veterans who shared their views. In particular, I wish to thank historians Richard Aldrich, Antony Best, Douglas Ford, Stephen Harris, Gerhard Krebs, Tosh Minohara, Dean Oliver, and Galen Perras. Furthermore, I wish to offer my gratitude to several Canadian, British, and American veterans of war-time intelligence who spoke to me about their experiences.

This book, though completed as a new project over the past two years, originated from doctoral research conducted at the University of Ottawa. Once again, I wish to thank my thesis examiners, including Antony Best from the London School of Economics, as well as Richard Connors, Jeffrey Keshen, Eda Kranakis, and Brian Villa, all from the University of Ottawa. Their helpful comments and observations formed the basis of several revisions that I made to the original manuscript. Special thanks are extended to Professor Villa, who not only assisted in guiding that earlier project to its successful completion but also offered the benefit of his expertise and experience. On many occasions, he generously discussed his own research into prewar intelligence and the origins of the Pacific War. His helpful insights, as well as our two co-authored articles, have been cited in this book.

I wish to thank the Taylor and Francis Group for its permission to draw on my published article "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl Harbor," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, 4 (Winter 2002): 131-64.

Illustrations add lustre to any historical work. I express my gratitude to Library and Archives Canada, the US Naval History and Heritage Command, and the US National Archives and Records Administration for their superb photographs. I also thank the Russian Archives for its momentous photograph of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke signing the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Adrian Simpson of Communications Security Establishment, Canada, generously provided a rare wartime photograph of Canadian codebreakers at work. Stephen Harris and his team at the Directorate of History and Heritage did me a similar service when they located two photographs of Canadian servicemen important to this study.

Funding is vital to the arts, and this project could not have proceeded without institutional support from within Canada. I am grateful to the Canadian War Museum for accepting my work as part of its military history series and for providing financial assistance.

Terry Binnersley brought the benefit of her extensive editing experience to this project when she carefully examined an earlier draft of the manuscript. I offer my thanks for her poignant observations and suggestions regarding style, form, and clarity.

I am indebted to the editorial team at UBC Press for its assistance in guiding this work to publication. Emily Andrew, in her capacity as senior editor, provided tremendous support during the commissioning of this project. The two peer reviewers selected by the Press offered many helpful suggestions for improvement, all of which were used to enhance the final manuscript. At the last stage of the publishing process, the production editorial team, including Megan Brand, editor; Frank Chow, copy editor; and Dianne Tiefensee, proofreader, worked diligently to improve the presentation of the book.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Laura, and our children, William and Elizabeth, for their steadfast support during the completion of this book.

A Note on Names

WHENEVER JAPANESE NAMES ARE cited in this book, the family name precedes the given name, as is common in Japanese usage. For example, Tojo Hideki became Prime Minister of Japan in October 1941. The same applies to Chinese names. Asian place names follow the usage common to English-speaking commentators of the period, so, for example, Chungking and Tientsin are used instead of the more recent Chongqing and Tianjin. Similarly, "the Far East" is used to denote the region now known more commonly as East Asia.

Abbreviations

ABC-1	American-British Conversations, signed 27 March 1941 in Washington, DC
ABC-22	American-Canadian extension of ABC-1, signed 28 July 1941 in Montreal
ADA Plan	Anglo-Dutch-Australian Plan, created in February 1941
ADB	American-Dutch-British Conversations, signed 27 April 1941 in Singapore
ABCD powers	American, British, Chinese, and Dutch powers
BAD	British Admiralty Delegation (Washington, DC)
BCATP	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
BSC	British Security Coordination
CHATFOLD	Canadian reporting system for shipping intelligence
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations, USN (Washington, DC)
COI	Coordinator of Information (Washington, DC)
COPC	Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, RCN (Esquimalt)
D/F	Direction finding
DMO & I	Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Canadian Army (Ottawa)
DND	Department of National Defence (Ottawa)
DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence (British and Commonwealth)
DOT	Department of Transport (Ottawa)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FECB	Far East Combined Bureau (Singapore)
FEDO	Far East Direction-finding Organisation (British Commonwealth)
FEI	Far Eastern Intelligence (a section of FIS)
FIS	Foreign Intelligence Section (RCN)
GC&CS	Government Code and Cypher School (Bletchley Park and London)
GNP	Gross national product


HF/DF	High-frequency direction finding
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
IAE	A Japanese consular code
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee (British)
JN-25B	The principal Japanese naval operational code, known also as the 5-Numeral code or AN-1 code
MI5	British home-security intelligence
MI6	British foreign intelligence
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NID	Naval Intelligence Division (British and Commonwealth)
NRC	National Research Council (Canada)
NRMA	National Resources Mobilization Act (Canada)
NSHQ	Naval Service Headquarters, RCN (Ottawa)
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence, USN (Washington, DC)
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, USN (Washington, DC)
OP-20-G	Intelligence Section of the USN Office of Naval Communications
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (Washington, DC)
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence (US-Canadian)
PNIO	Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation (British Commonwealth)
PURPLE	The American term for the principal Japanese diplomatic code
Radar	Radio detecting and ranging
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCCS	Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCNVR	Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
R/E	Range estimation
RFP	Radio fingerprinting
RN	Royal Navy
RNR	Royal Naval Reserve

RNVR	Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
SOE	Special Operations Executive (British)
TINA	An operator-analysis technique whereby an operator's Morse-keying style is recorded for use in later reidentification
ULTRA	British term for intelligence derived from cryptanalysis
USN	United States Navy
VESCA	British and Commonwealth reporting system for shipping intelligence
W/T	Wireless telegraphy
"Y" Station	British or Commonwealth cryptanalysis centre

Canada's Road to the Pacific War



Map of the Far East and the Pacific, 1941



Introduction

ON 7 DECEMBER 1941, Canada was immediately drawn into the Pacific War following Japan's devastating attacks on Malaya, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Wake Island, Guam, and Pearl Harbor. Its battalions in Hong Kong represented commitment to the British Commonwealth and Empire. The disaster in the Far East suggested that Canada and its allies were quite unprepared, yet on the very first day of the Pacific War, Canada became the first nation in the world to declare war against Japan. A week earlier, according to one account, Canada had also made plans to close down its air force recruiting program in the United States in anticipation of a Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor. As well, Ottawa had considered the "wholesale" internment of Japanese Canadians well before the Far East crisis. As a minor Pacific power, it is possible that Canada received sufficient incoming intelligence to make strategic decisions with confidence. Perhaps the Dominion was not at all indifferent to Far East affairs, even though Britain had long ago turned over to the United States most responsibility for delicate diplomatic negotiations with Japan. Canada's position within the emerging Anglo-American alliance also paved the way for its timely reaction to the mounting crisis with Japan.

Historians specializing in the Second World War have often characterized Canada as an Atlantic power and have tended to ignore its role in the Pacific. Indeed, Canada has often been characterized as a very minor component of the Anglo-American alliance that emerged in 1941. In fact, however, a range of primary sources, including contemporaneous war records, internal histories, memoirs, and postwar accounts from former participants in wartime intelligence operations, suggest that Canada was better prepared for the Pacific War than was previously thought.

In 1941, Canadian intelligence staff and strategists worked closely with their Allied and American counterparts to prepare for war with Japan. Canada monitored Japan's preparations for war and participated in Allied-American conferences on the Far East crisis, using multiple intelligence sources to optimize strategic planning. As the Far East crisis developed, Canada sought to avoid conflict with Japan until American participation was assured, but it fully anticipated action in Southeast Asia and the North Pacific, and made various preparations for national and imperial defence.

Diplomatic tensions between Japan and the West had their origins in disagreement over the destiny of China and the control of resources in the Far East. Japan had begun its conquest of Manchuria in 1931 and its lengthy war in China in 1937. Although Canada, along with other members of the League of Nations, failed to intervene in the Sino-Japanese War, tensions escalated after war broke out in Europe in 1939. The new conflict created dangerous alliances: on 27 September 1940, Japan joined the Axis powers in the Tripartite Pact, and on 13 April 1941 entered into a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June, some Japanese militarists considered launching their own attack against that country, but an Imperial Conference on 2 July favoured waiting to see the war's outcome. On 24 July, however, Japan occupied southern French Indochina, and two days later Canada participated in an Allied-American freeze of Japanese assets, supposedly to deter further aggression.

Yet Japan would not withdraw from either French Indochina or China and saw the asset freeze as a provocation. Loss of access to all of its assets held in the US and Allied nations deprived it of about 75 percent of its overseas trade and nearly 90 percent of its imported oil. In August, Japanese military officials decided to forgo operations against the Soviets, but began planning for a possible southward advance against European colonial possessions, notably the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies.¹ They prepared plans to neutralize the only two obstacles to Japanese expansion: the British base at Singapore, which could be attacked via Malaya, and the American base at Pearl Harbor, which could be attacked with aircraft carriers.

Despite these plans, Japan continued diplomatic engagement with the West. Prince Konoye, who had served as Japan's "moderate" Prime Minister since July 1940, sought a rapprochement with the American, British, Chinese, and Dutch (ABCD) powers but was rebuffed in Washington. Consequently, on 17 October, General Tojo Hideki, representing the interests of Japanese militarists, replaced Konoye as Prime Minister. An Imperial Conference on 5 November called for the continuation of war plans but set 25 November as a deadline for negotiations, a deadline that was later extended to 2 December. Accordingly, the Tojo government sent special envoy Kurusu Saburo to Washington, where he joined Japanese Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo in a final attempt to prevent conflict between Japan and America. The Kurusu Mission offered US Secretary of State Cordell Hull two different plans as compromise solutions.² On 22 November, Hull drafted a *modus vivendi* (temporary accord) based on the second plan, but Washington rejected it after consulting with the Allies. Finally, on 26 November, Hull issued a note to Japan that contained terms unacceptable to the Tojo government: an end to hostilities in Asia, recognition of China, and international

access to Asian markets. On 7 December, Japan offered its deadly response, launching multiple attacks across Southeast Asia and the North Pacific.

Meanwhile, throughout the Far East crisis in 1941, Canada and the Allies had strengthened economic and military ties with the US. In March, the US Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which ensured that American material aid would reach Britain and the Allies, and in April the Hyde Park Declaration, a US-Canadian economic agreement, provided a means for the Allies to pay for such material.³ The US also provided Atlantic convoy patrols to help protect supply shipments to the Allies. Several joint-defence agreements between American and Allied staff officers followed, all of which contained provisions for a war against Japan: the American-British Conversations (ABC-1); the American-Dutch-British (ADB) Conversations; and the US-Canadian ABC-22 agreement, which built on ABC-1. Furthermore, US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in August aboard warships off Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, and decided on mutual war aims, which formed the basis of the Atlantic Charter. By the time hostilities broke out in the Pacific, Allied and American interests had become inextricably bound.⁴

Besides participating in Allied-American conferences, Canada's preparations for a possible war in the Pacific included collecting shipping intelligence for the Commonwealth, improving its coastal defences, registering Japanese Canadians, and sending troops to Hong Kong. Despite these preparations, Canada and its allies found themselves at a great disadvantage when the failure of American-Japanese diplomacy led to Japan's attacks throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It is still unclear to what extent these attacks might have been anticipated. Historians continue to discuss what Allied intelligence services knew before the Pacific War, how the Far East crisis developed, and why it led to the Japanese onslaught of 7 December 1941.

Other Historians' Views

Canada's response to the Far East crisis may be best understood through a detailed study of the intelligence operations and strategic planning that preceded the outbreak of war. The intelligence dimension is a field of inquiry that expands with each new archival release. Historians studying British intelligence have tended to favour the view that incoming reports pointed to a Japanese first strike on targets in Southeast Asia rather than in the North Pacific. These accounts also show that the Allies underestimated Japanese capabilities due to inaccurate strategic presumptions and a belief that the Japanese were racially inferior. One dissenting work argues that British intelligence predicted the Pearl Harbor attack but that Churchill withheld the information from Roosevelt to ensure America's entry into the war. Another work considered anecdotal

sources pointing to British foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack and the likelihood that London warned Washington, but concluded that the attack was still a surprise due to overwhelming intelligence pointing to a first strike in Southeast Asia.⁵

Works studying American intelligence collected before Pearl Harbor are prolific, to say the least. Traditional interpretations range from the belief that Pearl Harbor was not a predictable event to the more nuanced view that some incoming reports pointed to the attack but were overlooked in the face of numerous reports about Japanese interest in Southeast Asia. Revisionist works, drawing on recent archival releases and anecdotal accounts, argue that American intelligence, derived principally from intercepted Japanese communications, did reveal the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. The revisionists appear to have built a more convincing case, given that most of the current traditionalist writing on the subject is mere rebuttal and is not usually based on original research.⁶

Canadian intelligence operations have received comparatively less attention, but have been skillfully surveyed in some works. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) intelligence network has been examined in specialist studies. The reinforcement of Hong Kong with Canadian battalions has been portrayed not only as a politically expedient decision but also as a failure in British intelligence that resulted in unnecessary tragedy. Some works have explored the origins of Canadian signals intelligence, concluding that these operations were quite undeveloped at the war's beginning, but later improved as they were integrated into Allied networks. Historians have also studied the wartime role of British Security Coordination (BSC), which conducted intelligence operations in both Canada and the United States under the leadership of William Stephenson. They have shown how Canada supported BSC in its staffing, field operations, and activities at Camp X, the covert training facility near Whitby, Ontario.⁷

Allied strategy during the Far East crisis has also been the subject of numerous studies. British policy has often been seen as an exercise in avoiding conflict with Japan until American participation could be assured. To this end, historians have emphasized how Britain withdrew from negotiations with Japan after the asset freeze so that the US could assume greater responsibility for the outcome of the talks. Many historians have analyzed British and American deterrent measures against Japan, arguing that economic sanctions and Allied troop placements in Southeast Asia were intended to prevent war rather than to precipitate it. In contrast, one study argues that Roosevelt viewed Soviet participation as vital to the war's outcome, and that he baited Japan to drive south for resources, thereby preventing it from attacking northern objectives in Siberia.⁸

Canadian strategy has been explored in both specialist and general works. Historians have noted that Canada avoided entering into Anglo-American

power struggles over the destiny of the Far East, but supported Allied deterrent measures against Japan. Indeed, Ottawa's decision to reinforce Hong Kong has been seen as an expression of Allied solidarity – a political move that appeared to have deterrent value at the time. Historians have also explained how Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King planned for a war of limited liability and often relied on his civilian ministers rather than the Chiefs of Staff to define military policy. Some have observed that as the Far East crisis developed, the Prime Minister considered using Pacific Coast defence as a means of avoiding a conscription crisis at home: conscript troops could be sent to British Columbia rather than to battlefields overseas. Military studies have not only commented on Canada's air, naval, and land preparations on the Pacific Coast but have also critiqued the long-held Allied view that Japan could "island-hop" through the Aleutians and attack the North American coast. Furthermore, historians have considered the plight of Japanese Canadians who were interned after the outbreak of war in the Pacific, even though they were innocent of any misconduct. This action has been attributed to the racist attitudes that prevailed in wartime Canada.⁹

Many historical works have provided an excellent overview of Canada's war-time intelligence capabilities and strategic planning. Canadian intelligence in the early war years, however, is usually characterized as having been in its formative phase. Although a few studies have considered Canada's role as a Pacific power, they have not focused on Canadian decision making on the eve of the Pacific War. With the benefit of recent archival releases, a more detailed account of Canada's response to the Far East crisis in 1941 may now be offered to complement existing studies.

The Methodology of This Book

This book offers a new interpretation of Canada's response to the Far East crisis through an examination of Canadian intelligence operations and strategic planning from December 1940 to December 1941, the period during which Japan's relations with the West rapidly deteriorated. During that time, Canada collected important intelligence concerning Far East affairs from several domestic and external sources. Apart from assessing the capabilities of intelligence networks that operated in Canada, it is essential to examine any incoming intelligence that informed Canadian decision makers, with respect to its veracity, completeness, timeliness, compatibility with other Allied sources, and racial biases. The intelligence reports considered in this book include not only those pertaining to Japan and Southeast Asia but also those pertaining to the United States and its support for the Allies. The Allies regarded American intervention as crucial to resolving both the Far East crisis and the European

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War. Furthermore, for a better understanding of Canada's role within the developing Anglo-American alliance, Canadian strategies and observations concerning the Far East – including diplomatic, political, economic, and military decisions – must be examined in relation to Allied-American planning.

This book also raises questions about the selection of evidence. At present, historians of the Second World War are still not privy to the entire range of relevant documents. A great number of papers have been released, but some file collections remain closed and others are censored. Personal testimony and accounts from veterans of wartime operations offer further historical insight, but are they an acceptable substitute for withheld contemporaneous documents? It is important to discuss why certain documents continue to be withheld and how historians may deal with the evidence available.

Some wartime intelligence documents may be related to current national security issues. A Canadian military report made that point in August 1945 when it justified the need to preserve all wartime codebreaking secrets, or "ULTRA":

No possible excuse must be given to the Germans or the Japanese to explain away their complete defeat by force of arms ... the uncanny success of ULTRA would offer them just such an excuse ... We need ULTRA for knowledge of German and Japanese Underground and Diplomatic activities ... Other enemies may arise in the future – were they to know what had been achieved by ULTRA in this war they would be on their guard lest the same thing befall them.²⁰

The report also emphasized how the development of the atomic bomb made communications intelligence even more vital as a means of preventing catastrophe. Clearly, government authorities were not going to release documents concerning wartime intelligence activities for some time. These activities were not regarded as "history" but, rather, as ongoing current affairs.

A Canadian research report written in October 1946 also underscored the importance of wartime communications intelligence, explaining how success in reading "large parts of the enemy's most secret communications" affected the war's outcome: "As a result, it is no exaggeration to say (in fact it has been said by Winston Churchill and other allied leaders) that the war was materially shortened and thousands of lives saved by this means."²¹ Communications intelligence was no doubt essential to Allied success, and government authorities wished to protect their intelligence secrets. For historians of the Second World War, however, the task is daunting. When do wartime secrets cease to have value in current affairs? When do wartime secrets become "history"? If recent archival releases are any guide, we may observe that, although many documents are

released after fifty years, the most sensitive may be withheld on a discretionary basis for some time to come.

One explanation for official policy regarding archival releases is offered in the Radcliffe Report, prepared by a British government committee in 1976: "Government is not to be conducted in the interests of history. That is an obvious proposition. But if that is so, the historian cannot have as of right a smooth highway constructed for him through the intricate paths of public administration and statecraft. He must make the most of his sources as he can find them." Implicit in these remarks is the prospect that government documents are not always released to provide the most complete account of past events, but rather to provide an acceptable record for public consumption, one that ratifies or justifies past decisions. In his book *Reflections on Intelligence*, R.V. Jones, a British scientist and intelligence specialist, comments on archival practices and offers a partial solution to the historian's difficulty by suggesting that memoirs could be used to complement the uneven release of government documents.¹²

Memoirs and testimony are essential elements of any historical inquiry, but they appear to take on greater importance in inquiries concerning sensitive wartime topics. Quite often, historians approach their subject with a deeply ingrained belief in the superiority of the document in the archives and the comparatively low status of personal testimony, especially if the latter is reliant on long-term memory, which is imperfect. Sophisticated historians, however, have accepted that there are occasions when personal testimony might well be preferred to the official record. David Reynolds, one of the foremost historians of our time, has made that point elegantly. He described a British Cabinet meeting attended, most unusually, by Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal envoy. With the Cabinet meeting seemingly over, everyone rose, collected their hats and coats, and began to leave. Hopkins was swept onward to his next venue. The British Cabinet members then sat down, minus Hopkins, to discuss sensitive issues, including the Far East, that were kept from the ears of their American guest. Reynolds described the Cabinet agenda as "bogus" and the conclusions as "terse," since they do not record the deception, whereas personal records apparently illuminate what really happened. In this case, the personal testimony of two witnesses, Hugh Dalton and Alexander Cadogan, appears to offer greater insight than the material from the archives.¹³

It is important that historians studying wartime events compare and contrast archival material with all relevant anecdotal sources. With certain topics, however, we are unlikely to be in a position to choose between archives and recollection for some time. For example, considering the controversial question of whether or not British intelligence predicted the Pearl Harbor attack, any British

warnings would probably have been passed to the Canadians and the Americans through BSC, but the relevant archives are currently closed. It is therefore essential for historians to consider testimony from veterans of wartime intelligence and covert operations.

In terms of primary sources, which form the basis of this study, material has been drawn from archives in Canada, Britain, and the United States. These sources include wartime government documents, intelligence reports, and personal papers, as well as postwar internal histories, personal correspondence, and memoirs. Canadian archival sources include Department of National Defence (DND) files; Canadian army, navy, and air force intelligence summaries; External Affairs files; the W.L. Mackenzie King papers/diaries; the C.G. Power papers; and the Murton A. Seymour papers. In particular, the ministerial papers of W.L. Mackenzie King, C.G. Power, J. Ralston, N. Robertson, and O.D. Skelton have been considered, along with Mackenzie King's correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt. Some references have also been drawn from Vancouver newspapers published in 1941, and the author has had other Canadian wartime documents declassified under the Access to Information Act (Canada). British archival material is drawn from Admiralty papers, Intelligence records, Cabinet papers, the Winston S. Churchill papers, the Julian E. Ridsdale papers, and the Stephen Roskill papers. American archival sources include several collections of United States Navy records, as well as the Franklin D. Roosevelt papers and the John Toland papers.

Published collections of primary sources have also been considered. Government publications include *The Canada Year Book 1941* (1941) and *Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1939-41* (1976). Japanese plans have been consulted in *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, ed. Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon (2000). Useful references for the study of Mackenzie King's diaries were found in *The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 1: 1939-44*, ed. J.W. Pickersgill (1960). Besides examining correspondence files in archival collections, the author has made use of the wartime correspondence of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt provided in *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball (1984).

Along with the many secondary sources that have been consulted, several general histories of the Second World War have been used as reference texts. These include Akira Iriye's *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (1987); Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard's *Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War* (1989); Gerhard L. Weinberg's *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (1994); *Oxford Companion to World War II*, ed. I.C.B. Dear (1995); and Robert Smith Thompson's *Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia* (2001).

The chapters of this book emphasize different elements of the Canadian experience during the Far East crisis. Chapter 1 surveys the relationship between the Pacific powers from 1922 to 1940, discusses Canada's response to Far East affairs during this period, and provides a historical context for the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 assesses the capabilities of the Allied intelligence networks that operated in Canada before the Pacific War. Chapter 3 explains how Canada developed its initial Far East strategy in the context of Allied discussions over the containment of Japan during the eventful months of December 1940 through July 1941. Chapter 4 discusses specific diplomatic and deterrent actions that Canada took to avoid confrontation with Japan throughout 1941. Chapter 5 relates how Canada reassessed the Far East crisis in the aftermath of the American-led freeze of Japanese assets, an action that could either deter or provoke Japan. Chapter 6 considers Canada's defence strategy with respect to its own coastline and the North Pacific. Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive study of Canada's observations and strategy during November 1941, when diplomacy failed and the Pacific powers made further preparations for war. Chapter 8 explores Canada's final observations and strategy on the eve of the Pacific War, and comments on the immediate aftermath of Japan's decision to strike. The conclusion to this book discusses the significance of Canada's response to the Far East crisis and addresses new findings, the relationship between intelligence and strategy, the extent of Canada's participation in Allied strategy, alternative traditionalist and revisionist interpretations, and suggestions for further archival research.

Now, however, we must turn to the very origins of the Far East crisis in order to provide a broader context. It is important to understand the relationship between the Pacific powers in the eventful years following the Great War of 1914-18, for in this period, crucial decisions that affected arms limitations, defence spending, territorial expansion, and international trade also led to a crisis of epic proportions.

Prelude to War: Canada and the Pacific Powers, 1922-40

YEARS OF RIVALRY BETWEEN Japan and the Western powers preceded the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Until the end of the Great War, Britain courted Japan and even supported the development of its navy. In the aftermath of that conflict, however, both Britain and the United States sought to limit Japan's naval power and to curb its influence in the Far East. Throughout the 1930s, when Japan waged brutal wars of conquest in Manchuria and China, its alienation from the West became almost complete. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain's commitments in Europe compelled the US to assume responsibility for limiting Japan's expansionism.

Many factors contributed to the crisis that preceded the Pacific War. Although a complete history of prewar diplomacy and strategy is beyond the scope of this book, it is important to understand the origins of the conflict that resulted in the Far East crisis in 1941.¹ To that end, this chapter begins with a portrait of the Pacific powers – Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth. Japan is considered in the context of Far East affairs from 1922 to 1940 in order to establish a foundation for the portraits that follow. Next, Canada's response to Far East affairs during this time period is surveyed. As we shall see, conflict between Japan and the democracies resulted from a long-festered diplomatic crisis over the destiny of China and the control of resources in Southeast Asia.

A Portrait of the Pacific Powers

Early on, Japan had impressed the Great Powers with its new imperial might. In 1895, it demonstrated its military strength when it successfully fought China over control of Korea, although the resulting treaty, which the Great Powers moderated, limited Japan's territorial acquisitions to Port Arthur, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands.² Britain wanted Japan as an ally to check German and Russian aspirations in the Far East, and in 1902 the two countries formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Japan subsequently received British support for the development of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which in 1904-5 impressed the Great Powers with its victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur. In 1910, Japan was able to

annex Korea, perhaps as a result of its victory over Russia in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in 1911, and the British Empire traded with Japan under the terms of an Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Japan sided with Britain in the Great War, and in 1919 received German concessions in the Pacific, known as the "Mandated Islands," including the Caroline, Marianas, Marshall, and Palau Islands. In 1920, Japan took control of Sakhalin south of latitude 50°N. To foreign observers, the Japanese Empire was expanding at an alarming rate.

At that point, Britain and the United States sought to limit Japan's naval power and territorial ambitions. In 1922, at a naval conference held in Washington, Britain, the US, Japan, France, and Italy signed the Washington Naval Treaty, which fixed British, American, and Japanese naval tonnages in a 5:5:3 ratio, meaning that Japan could expand its navy to only 60 percent of the size of either the Royal Navy (RN) or the United States Navy (USN). Essentially, the treaty replaced the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance with international naval arms limitations. Japanese strategists criticized the new arrangement, particularly when they later discovered that during the negotiations leading up to it, the Americans had decrypted Japanese messages revealing how much Japan was willing to concede in terms of naval power. Herbert Yardley, head of the "Black Chamber," an American cryptanalysis unit funded by the US Army and State Department, revealed those decryption successes in his book *The American Black Chamber*.³ At the same naval conference in 1922, Britain, the US, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China signed the Nine-Power Treaty, which guaranteed that China would not be invaded. Furthermore, in 1930, Japan, the US, Britain, France, and Italy signed the London Naval Treaty, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. Japan would now be watched quite carefully.

On the domestic front, Japan had gradually evolved into a centralized military state. Its 1889 Meiji Constitution had established a constitutional monarchy, but Japanese militarists loyal to Emperor Hirohito, who came to power in 1926, now appeared to be exerting increasing influence over the Tokyo Diet (parliament). Political assassinations occurred throughout the 1930s and the Japanese Army sought to create a "national defence state," known as *Kokubo Kokka*. Between 1934 and 1937, electricity, oil, rice production, and shipbuilding came under government control. In March 1938, Japan invoked the National General Mobilization Law, which was a total war measures act. In August 1939, it enacted the Major Industries Association Ordinance to control strategic industries. In October 1940, Japanese militarists created the Imperial Rule Assistance

Association as a Nazi-style organization, although civilian politicians moderated its influence, and in the following January the Greater Japan Youth Corps was formed to offer military training to youth.⁴

Building a military state also taxed Japan's economy. From 1931 to 1939, the country's military spending increased from 29 percent of its total expenditures to 72 percent. Between 1936 and 1940, its inflation rate was 75 percent, compared with 25 percent in Britain and 2 percent in the US. It was self-sufficient in rice, importing only a fifth of the total amount required for its 70 million people, but not in strategic materials such as nickel, tin, bauxite, rubber, and oil. Notably, Japan's annual petroleum production was about the same as the *daily* production of the US. Consequently, it had to import nearly 70 percent of its oil from the US. It was also dependent on American trade in other respects: over 40 percent of its exports went to the United States and over half of its imports came from there. Thus, the Japanese Empire faced a currency crisis, relied on imported strategic materials, and could also have a potential trade deficit, depending on the US response to its expansionist policies. Japanese militarists believed, however, that wars of conquest would provide the necessary resources for independence. They eschewed free trade with all nations, which the US advocated under its "Open Door" economic policy. From the militarists' perspective, the US advanced such a policy only because it could compete easily in a free market, having already secured its continental resources; Japan would now do the same.⁵

To build its empire, Japan expanded into Southeast Asia while shifting its alliances. In September 1931, the Japanese staged an incident at Mukden in northern China as a pretext to invade Manchuria, which it subsequently conquered and renamed "Manchukuo." This violated the Nine-Power Treaty, which protected China from invasion, but control of Manchuria offered Japan mineral resources, a strategic buffer against the Soviet Union, and, more grimly, a remote place where it could develop chemical and biological weapons. In March 1933, following the Manchurian Incident, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations; in 1934, it abrogated its naval treaties with the West, notably the Washington Naval Treaty that had placed Japan in an inferior naval position with respect to Britain and the US. In November 1936, Japan joined Germany and Italy in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, ostensibly as a means of containing the Soviet Union, which had offered increasing support to China.⁶

Next, Japan sought control over China. In July 1937, Japanese troops attacked Chinese forces at the Marco Polo Bridge southwest of Peking in an action known as the China Incident, thus beginning the lengthy Sino-Japanese war. Japanese strategists had long seen territorial expansion in Southeast Asia as a means of providing national security and economic benefits.⁷ China could "buffer" Japan

against Soviet threats and also provide iron, coal, and agriculture. Japan's war in China was both costly and brutal: Western commentators were shocked at the Rape of Nanking and other atrocities.⁸ China attempted to improve its security with the 1937 Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, but what it really needed was supplies. Britain kept the Burma Road open as a route for Western aid to reach China, since Japan controlled the coastal areas and ports. The United States, in the midst of the Great Depression, showed restraint in its response, but it deplored Japan's actions in China and expressed outrage in December that year when a Japanese plane bombed the American gunboat USS *Panay* on the Yangtze River. The US responded with speeches and economic sanctions, but its efforts at peaceful coercion succeeded only in convincing Japanese militarists that it lacked the will to wage a lengthy war in the Far East.⁹ Ultimately, nearly a million Japanese and about 10 million Chinese would perish in the eight-year war.

In addition to its war in China, Japan embarked on other imperial adventures in the region. In 1939, it acquired Hainan and the Spratly Islands without much effort. During the Tientsin Crisis of June to August 1939, Japanese forces successfully blockaded the British Concession at Tientsin in protest over Chinese assassinations of Japanese officials.¹⁰ Japan was also displeased that China's Nationalist government had deposited its silver reserves in banks at Tientsin. Japan and Britain finally came to terms over Tientsin, but Japan had demonstrated its ability to intervene in European-controlled areas of China. From May to September 1939, however, Japan became embroiled in a costly campaign against Soviet forces along the Manchurian border in the Nomonhan Incident, which the Soviets referred to as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Under any name, the border clash ended in defeat for Japan: Mongolia remained unconquered, Japanese forces sustained about 28,000 casualties compared with the Soviets' 9,000, and Japan was left with more military debt. Japan temporarily redirected its efforts to the south.

On the eve of the Second World War, Japan possessed powerful armed forces, with about 5 million people in service. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) consisted of six separate armies: the General Defence Army, the Korean Army, the Kwantung Army (based in northern China), the China Expeditionary Army, the South Expeditionary Army, and the Formosan Army. Japanese troops were also supported by about 1,500 army combat aircraft. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), third-largest in the world, consisted of the Combined Fleet, the China Area Fleet, and the Naval Stations. Before the Pacific War, the IJN had 10 battle-ships, 10 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers, 112 destroyers, 65 submarines, and 156 other vessels, in all nearly 1.5 million tons of shipping.¹¹ Over 1,500 navy combat aircraft supported its operations, and the IJN had developed the most advanced

oxygen-fuelled torpedoes in the world. In overall offensive capability, the Japanese Fleet temporarily eclipsed that of the US. As an expansionist power, Japan had invested heavily in naval development at a time when the US had limited its peacetime defence spending. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, Congress often failed to approve President Roosevelt's requests for naval funding.¹² It is likely that this lack of political resolve to increase US naval power further emboldened Japan.

For Japan, the war in Europe not only created new alliances but presented new opportunities for continued expansion in the Far East. After June 1940, when Germany defeated the Allies in Western Europe, Japan considered acquiring more influence and territory. In July, it put pressure on Britain to close the Burma Road, which stayed closed until October: Britain wished to avoid provoking Japan while facing Germany alone in Europe. During an Imperial Conference that month, General Tojo Hideki proposed cutting off all Western aid to China and absorbing European Far East possessions into Japan's "New Order," although Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku cautioned that such expansion would bring war with America. In August, Japan advanced the idea of a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" to legitimize its imperial designs over South-east Asia. On 23 September, it occupied bases in northern French Indochina, strategically threatening Western supply lines to China via the Burma Road. When the United States imposed an embargo on iron and scrap steel against Japan three days later, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke responded by bringing Japan into the Axis orbit. On 27 September, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, pledging mutual defence in the event of an attack on any member by a neutral country, except the Soviet Union. Japan hoped that the pact would deter Britain and the US from blocking Japanese expansionism, but in response the US expanded its navy, provided more funding to the Chinese Nationalists, and strengthened its unofficial alliance with Britain and the Netherlands East Indies. In Japanese eyes, those actions constituted provocation.¹³

China deserves due consideration as a Pacific power because it tied up so many Japanese forces that might otherwise have been deployed elsewhere across the Far East and the Pacific. In 1937, when the China Incident began, China had a population of 480 million people, 85 percent of whom lived in rural areas, a gross national product (GNP) that was less than a quarter of the United States', and two ruling factions – the Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang, under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party under Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Before the Japanese invasion, the Nationalists had been fighting a bitter struggle against the Communists, who in 1934-35 had

retreated in the six-thousand-mile "Long March" to Shensi province. This civil war was interrupted by the Japanese onslaught: in 1937, Chiang's coalition forces of 1.5 million men and Mao's forces of 40,000 (a number that would grow to over 760,000 by 1941) faced a common enemy. In 1938, Chiang moved his government from Nanking to Hankow and finally to Chungking, while Japan installed a puppet regime in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei. From 1937 to 1941, China suffered nearly 2.5 million casualties, but tied up at least 2 million Japanese troops.¹⁴

In terms of aid for China's cause, Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, offered material support to Chiang (rather than Mao, whom he distrusted) until about 1940, when Stalin became concerned about inciting Japan and weakening his own resources. Prior to the Pacific War, China began to receive American Lend-Lease aid, mostly through the Burma Road, which Britain kept open except for the period from July to October 1940. China's strategy relied on maintaining material support from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain; keeping the Burma Road open; and coaxing the Great Powers into a formal alliance or declaration of war against Japan.

The Netherlands East Indies, an archipelago colony of about 70 million people, exerted a disproportionate influence over Far East affairs due to its material resources, strategic location, and intelligence activities. Existing as a separate Dutch entity after the fall of the Netherlands in Europe, it was rich in rubber, tin, and oil, making it an important Allied resource but a potential Japanese target. In terms of its strategic location, the NEI included territory located across the Strait of Malacca from Singapore, along with an island chain extending east to the north Australian coastline. It had an important intelligence centre in Bandung, Java, known as *Kamer 14*, which broke Japanese codes and produced direction-finding reports on Japanese vessels operating in the Far East.¹⁵ In support of its intelligence activities, it had a submarine fleet that could monitor Japanese naval activity. After the outbreak of the European War, the NEI participated in all Allied conferences on Far East affairs and shared intelligence estimates with Anglo-American authorities through its representatives in Washington and London. The NEI sought formal assurances of active support from the Allies and the Americans in the event of war with Japan.

The Soviet Union posed a direct challenge to Japan's aspirations, although events in Europe would later direct most of its resources away from the Far East. The Soviet Union's GNP was about a third of America's, but it had over 8 million square miles of territory, eleven republics, and 170 million citizens. It could potentially place and support large armed forces in its Far East provinces,



W.L. Mackenzie King and Franklin D. Roosevelt at a meeting in Quebec, 31 July 1936. King courted the favour of the US President in the prewar years, but always kept a watchful eye on Canadian sovereignty. *Library and Archives Canada, C-016768*.

provided it was not engaged along its European frontiers. In 1939, the Red Army was 3 million strong. The Soviet Navy, though not nearly as large as the Imperial Japanese Navy, consisted of four fleets: the Pacific, Polar, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. On the eve of the Pacific War, Soviet coal, oil, and steel production far eclipsed Japan's domestic output. Soviet strategy involved containing Japan, which it did in 1939 when Soviet forces checked Japan's attempted advance into Mongolia. The Soviet Union faced a serious threat from Nazi Germany, however, and commitments to the European War would subsequently demand a Soviet *détente* with Japan.¹⁶

The United States was the Pacific power that many counted on to resolve the Far East crisis. In terms of prewar national strength, it had a population of 133 million, armed forces of over 1.3 million, and a GNP of about \$120 billion, about six times greater than Japan's national income.¹⁷ Its production figures were far higher: US steel production was five times greater, coal production seven times greater, and automobile production eighty times greater than Japan's.¹⁸ The US supplied Japan with nearly 70 percent of the oil it needed. In addition, it produced

nearly five times more merchant ships and over five times more aircraft than Japan in 1941. Both American and Japanese strategists knew that the US could defeat Japan in a long-term conflict due to its superior resources and production capacity.

Even so, the United States' avowed neutrality and limited defence development during peacetime had suggested that it might stay out of a long-term conflict, a prospect that Japanese strategists depended on in their planning. US Neutrality Acts had been passed in 1935-37 to maintain US neutrality and to prevent the sale of US arms to belligerents. A powerful isolationist lobby opposed President Roosevelt's increasing support for the Allied cause. The lobby, led by organizations such as aviator Charles Lindbergh's America First committee and congressmen such as Senator Burton K. Wheeler, argued against American participation in the war. As late as October 1941, one opinion poll showed that 79 percent of those polled wanted the US to stay out of the European War, while 43 percent believed that it should not act against Japan unless that nation attacked US territory or interfered with US supplies.¹⁹ Furthermore, the United States had not developed its full military capability. Roosevelt had failed to attain his defence-spending goals throughout the 1930s due to the effects of the Great Depression and isolationist pressures. On the eve of the Pacific War, the US spent about 10 percent of its GNP on defence, compared with Japan's expenditure of over 70 percent. US forces had only about a quarter of the number of service personnel that Japan had. Although the US Navy was a two-ocean force of nearly 2,000 ships, it had fewer aircraft carriers than the Japanese Navy. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, US economic leverage appeared to influence Japan more than any threat of US military power, which had yet to reach its potential.

Meanwhile, the Roosevelt administration tried to achieve its objectives through economic sanctions and deterrent measures. Economic measures had been considered as early as 1938, when US military officials switched their "Orange Plan" concerning Japan from a defensive to an offensive strategy, which included a military and economic blockade of the country.²⁰ In January 1940, the US allowed its commercial treaty with Japan to expire, and nine months later imposed an embargo on iron and scrap steel.

Roosevelt and his team also took actions that benefited the entire Allied community. In August 1940, Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King concluded the Ogdensburg Agreement, which pledged their two nations to create a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) for continental defence.²¹ Through Ogdensburg, the US extended its Monroe Doctrine to Canada: European infringement, particularly by the Axis powers, would not be tolerated

anywhere in the Americas. That year, the US Neutrality Acts were also modified to permit "cash-and-carry" sales, which meant that the Allies could purchase US arms if they arranged their own shipping. Particularly displeasing to the Axis powers and Japan, the US and Britain concluded the "destroyers-for-bases" deal on 3 September 1940.²² Under the deal, Britain would receive fifty US destroyers in exchange for leasing various British bases located in the Caribbean, Atlantic, and Newfoundland to the United States. Later that month, the Roosevelt administration introduced peacetime conscription through the Selective Service System (the draft). The US armed forces would now expand in preparation for possible conflict.

Unlike America, Britain could not afford to face Japan alone because of its commitments in Europe. On the eve of the Pacific War, Britain had a population of 47 million, over 3 million of whom were serving in its armed forces, and a GNP about a third that of the United States.²³ Britain's aircraft production trebled in 1940-41 and its Royal Navy was still the largest in the world, but its hold over its global empire was tenuous at best because its armed forces were committed to European and Atlantic operations. None knew this better than Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had assumed office in May 1940. Accordingly, Britain's Far East strategy adapted to the new conditions of total war. In the past, its strategy in the event of war with Japan had involved diverting warships to the Far East for a decisive confrontation with the Japanese Fleet while containing the German Navy in Europe. Following the fall of France, however, Britain had to adopt a defensive strategy, avoiding conflict with Japan because it could no longer dispatch significant naval forces to the Far East.²⁴ Moreover, some British strategists realized that the strength of Singapore was overrated. A War Cabinet report of 5 August 1940 revealed Britain's vulnerability in the Far East, but worse yet, a copy of that report reached Japan after the sinking of the SS *Automedon*, a British merchant ship carrying important documents to Singapore.²⁵ On 11 November, a German merchant raider sank the ship and captured the documents, which the Germans shared with the Japanese a month later. Britain's opponents were now aware of its weakness in the Far East.

British strategy with regard to Japan appeared to involve a combination of deterrence, encirclement, and US participation. In November 1940, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare produced a report concerning Japan's economic position in the event of war.²⁶ Notably, the report considered the possible impact of economic sanctions and active participation by the US. In December, British officials invited their US and Allied counterparts to participate in secret discussions about the economic encirclement of Japan. For Allied commentators of the period, encirclement referred to the complete economic or strategic isolation of Japan as a means of forcing it to terms, or possibly to war. A precarious policy

at best, encirclement straddled the fine line between deterrence and provocation. In the same month, British and US staff officers planned an Anglo-American Naval Conference to discuss cooperation in the Pacific.²⁷

The British Commonwealth of Nations also tried to fulfill British strategic requirements in the Far East, but remained very cautious. Apart from Eire (known as the Irish Free State until 1937), the Dominions supported Britain's war effort: Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada each had something to offer in terms of strategic planning, material support, or defence responsibilities in the Far East. Australia feared Japanese expansionism and had every reason to support Britain. Before the Pacific War, it had a population of 7 million, several hundred thousand soldiers, and a GNP of over \$4 billion.²⁸ When the war began, it had nearly two hundred combat aircraft and a navy consisting of six cruisers, five destroyers, and two sloops. Australian troops later reinforced Singapore, Malaya, and several South Pacific islands. Prior to conflict with Japan, Australia had created a Combined Operational Intelligence Centre and operated naval radio monitoring stations at Canberra, Darwin, and Melbourne. Robert Menzies, who led the United Australia Party and served as Australia's Prime Minister from April 1939 to August 1941, advocated full support for British defence in the Far East, and also invited American participation. His successors, Arthur Fadden and then John Curtin, also adopted this position. All told, Australia's contribution to British defence in the Far East included troop reinforcements, naval and air patrols, and intelligence gathering.

New Zealand, Australia's close ally in wartime, had a population of 1.63 million, about 80,000 servicemen, and a proportionately smaller GNP. It began the war with a navy consisting of two cruisers, two escort vessels, and one minesweeper. It had, however, contributed significant funds to the construction of the Singapore naval base and later sent airmen to Malaya. It also sent troops to Fiji and Fanning Island, a cable station located between Hawaii and the Cook Islands. New Zealand maintained close contact with Britain and its allies, although it had no legations in Canberra, Washington, or Ottawa until 1942. Peter Fraser, who led the Labour Party and became Prime Minister in March 1940, pledged his country's full support for Britain's cause. Like Australia, New Zealand provided troop reinforcements and participated in naval patrols and intelligence gathering.²⁹

South Africa played a minor role in supporting Britain's Far East operations through its participation in strategic planning and intelligence gathering. It did not commit troops to the Far East because it was already supporting the Allied armed forces in Egypt and the Middle East.³⁰ While not a Pacific power in its own right, South Africa had two useful resources with respect to the Far East crisis: Prime Minister Jan Smuts and an intelligence network. Jan Smuts had

been one of Britain's principal adversaries in the Boer War, but through the course of two world wars proved to be a staunch ally. Commonwealth leaders, notably Churchill, respected Smuts's long political experience and his informed opinion on strategic matters. In terms of intelligence gathering, South Africa was part of Britain's Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation and collected information on ship movements, particularly with regard to vessels bound for the Far East.

Canada, the principal subject of this study, served as Britain's senior ally until the United States entered the war. By 1941, Canada had a population of about 11.5 million, about 490,000 serving in its armed forces with 100,000 abroad (when the war in Europe began, there had been fewer than 9,000 regular service personnel), and a GNP of \$8.28 billion, which was about fourteen times less than that of the United States.³¹ The war had greatly affected Canada's economy: from 1939 to 1941, the GNP increased by almost 50 percent, steel production almost doubled, imports and exports approximately doubled, and the cost of living increased by nearly 18 percent. Canada had financed \$905 million of Britain's war expenditures, an amount that would continue to increase under the Hyde Park Declaration. As of August 1941, Canada was producing about 40 aircraft per week (over 2,000 per year) and had built 800 infantry tanks, 1,000 cruiser tanks, and over 130,000 army vehicles. The Dominion had spent \$320 million on shipbuilding, specializing in corvettes and minesweepers, which substantially increased its naval strength. Indeed, the RCN had begun the European war with only six destroyers and four minesweepers, but could now look forward to having over a hundred corvettes for convoy duty. Canada's Pacific naval forces prior to the war with Japan included two armed merchant cruisers, three corvettes, six minesweepers, one battle-class trawler, four armed yachts, and twenty-nine "Fishermen's Reserve" vessels.³² Canada also operated the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), which in September 1941 had 90 schools, 124 establishments, and about a hundred airfields across Canada. At that time, Canada paid nearly two-thirds of the plan's total costs and supplied 80 percent of its trainees. The circumstances of war had compelled Canada to abandon its normal role as a minor power.

Even so, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada and leader of the ruling Liberal Party, was determined to fight a war of limited liability. In contrast, the opposition Conservative Party campaigned for a total war effort, a position that Mackenzie King's own Department of National Defence privately accepted.³³ Mackenzie King, however, who served as his own Secretary of State for External Affairs, exerted great control over Canada's foreign policy, which he usually formulated with an eye on domestic palatability. Notably, the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA), introduced in March 1940, established

conscription for home defence but not for overseas duty, which was still voluntary. The Prime Minister had to placate Quebec, where many French Canadians opposed serving overseas in a British war. His powerful "Quebec lieutenants," Associate Defence Minister C.G. "Chubby" Power and Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe, worked tirelessly to keep Quebec on board with the Dominion war program. In addition, King and his civilian advisors often emphasized the need for home defence to avoid a confrontation over conscription for overseas service. The Prime Minister famously declared: "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription." This is not to say that Canadians failed to volunteer for overseas service: eventually hundreds of thousands did so. As the crisis in the Far East developed, however, defending the Pacific Coast provided another excuse to keep troops in Canada.³⁴ In terms of Far East strategy, the Mackenzie King government offered tacit support for Britain's defence of the Far East and the Pacific, but for the moment wished to avoid war with Japan.³⁵

The Pacific powers were locked into a pattern of alliances and strategies that made conflict in the Far East a likely outcome. Japan wanted to end the China Incident on its own terms while acquiring resources in Southeast Asia that did not depend on trade with the democracies. To that end, it increased ties to the Axis powers and later adopted a policy of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. China encouraged the US and the Allies to provide it with material aid and to declare war on Japan, while it was in Allied interests to keep China in the war because it tied up so many Japanese forces. The Soviet Union first sought to contain Japanese expansionism but later pursued *détente* as the war in Europe advanced eastward: the democracies would have to check Japanese expansionism on their own. The NEI needed assurances of Allied support in the likely event that Japan invaded its territory to take its oil and other resources. Isolationist sentiment compelled the American leadership to avoid direct intervention unless the Japanese struck first against US targets. Britain desperately required active US participation in the European war and now considered the Far East crisis as a possible means of achieving that objective. To that end, encirclement and provocation of Japan would be more effective than deterrence. The Dominions supported Britain in the interests of imperial solidarity and collective security in the Far East. The stage was set for an international contest over mastery of the region.

Canada and Far East Affairs, 1922-40

Well before the start of the Pacific War, Canada had approached Far East affairs with caution, as it approached foreign affairs in general. In 1922, Mackenzie King, as the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister, minimized Canada's role at the Washington conference on naval arms reduction because he was more

focused on Canadian unity than on Canada's role as a partner in a reformed British Empire. In 1925, he appointed Dr. Oscar D. Skelton, who embraced isolationism and nationalism as twin ideals, as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, a position Skelton held until his death in January 1941. Between 1927 and 1929, the Mackenzie King government established legations in Washington, Paris, and Tokyo, but in 1932, during the single term of Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, caution prevailed again when Canadian delegates at the League of Nations avoided criticizing Japan's actions in Manchuria and supported compromise over punitive measures. Canadian delegate C.H. Cahan delivered a speech that was somewhat sympathetic to Japan, in agreement with current British policy and Bennett's own views. Furthermore, Canada refrained from supporting Britain's short-lived arms embargo against Japan in 1933.³⁶

When Mackenzie King returned to power in 1935, he continued to avoid confrontation in foreign affairs and formed policy with due consideration for both British and US views. Lester B. Pearson, at that time an External Affairs official who worked with the League of Nations, perhaps best explained the reasons for such an approach to Canadian policy making when he wrote in 1935: "Canada's position becomes impossible if Great Britain and the United States drift apart on any major [Far Eastern] issue ... Canada is a British Dominion. She is also an American State. She cannot permit herself to be put in a position where she has to choose between these two destinies. Either choice would be fateful to her unity; indeed to her very existence as a State."³⁷

Mackenzie King did not have to make difficult choices, however: Britain, the US, and other members of the League of Nations dared not intervene in the Sino-Japanese War in the age of appeasement leading up to the European War. Indeed, in response to the rise of military regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, King supported British-sponsored appeasement in Europe. Although he expressed some concern over Japan's growing power, in 1937 his government refrained from imposing sanctions against that country over its war in China.³⁸ In June of that year, Canada participated in British talks concerning a proposed "Pacific non-aggression pact," but the initiative came to nothing.³⁹

Yet, discussions did ensue over the need to defend the Pacific Coast. In August 1936, at Chautauqua, New York, President Roosevelt gave his "Good Neighbour" speech, which King believed was meant to warn Japan away from North America. Roosevelt later spoke to King about an Alaska Highway project to improve Pacific Coast defences in case of war with Japan, but the Prime Minister's military advisors rejected the idea because it compromised Canada's neutrality in the event of a US-Japanese war. Undaunted, Roosevelt met with BC Premier T.D. Pattullo in September 1937 to discuss Pacific Coast defence. Although Pattullo favoured the Alaska Highway project, the Dominion government still



Staff of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, 1929. From left to right: Kenneth Kirkwood, Hugh Keenleyside, Herbert Marler (Canadian Minister), J.A. Langley. Keenleyside served as Canada's first chargé d'affaires in Tokyo and later advised External Affairs on matters of Far East policy. *Makita Kogabo, Ueno, Library and Archives Canada, PA-120407.*

said no. In August 1938, during a speech at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Roosevelt even pledged US support for Canada if another empire attacked it – some thought that the President had Japan on his mind as much as Germany. Ottawa did not completely neglect the issue, however: in 1936, Canadian military officials gave defence of the Pacific Coast a higher priority than defence of the Atlantic Coast. In February 1938, they planned to provide strong air/land/naval defences on the Pacific Coast as a deterrent measure that would enable Canada to remain neutral in the event of a US-Japanese war. That year, King expressed the need to reinforce the Pacific Coast with more destroyers, and in 1939 four of Canada's six destroyers were based on the Pacific Coast. According to Canadian strategists, the growing menace of Japan necessitated strong defences along the Pacific Coast, whereas Britain's Royal Navy could adequately defend all approaches to Canada in the Atlantic.⁴⁰

In the summer of 1939, when the Tientsin Crisis heightened the possibility of war between Britain and Japan, Canadian intelligence staff prepared for increased surveillance of Japanese transmissions. In late July, Canadian naval authorities in Esquimalt, BC, informed Ottawa that the "Mexican Government W/T Station" had recently transmitted messages to Tokyo in "Japanese Morse," which the Esquimalt station would attempt to intercept. In view of this, the British Admiralty reminded intelligence staff in Ottawa and Hong Kong that the installation of a "high speed recorder" at Esquimalt would enable the station to intercept important traffic between Japan and North America. The Admiralty also requested that Esquimalt forward any Japanese military traffic not required in London to Hong Kong. On 1 August, British intelligence staff in Hong Kong informed Esquimalt and other Pacific monitoring stations that Japanese naval call signs had changed but that several had already been identified; all Pacific stations were requested to identify the new call signs of Japanese warships. The Esquimalt station, eager to participate, requested that the Admiralty identify which "Japanese military frequencies" it was to monitor. Furthermore, in mid-August, British intelligence staff in Hong Kong sent the entire Pacific intelligence community a report that included a Japanese call sign list as well as information on Japanese ships, bases, air squadrons, and naval intelligence. On the eve of the Second World War, Canada and the Allies were monitoring all activities in the Pacific region quite carefully.⁴¹

Canadian officials also considered defence strategy. On 24 August 1939, not long before Canada declared war on Germany, Skelton sent King a note concerning "Canadian War Policy," in which he emphasized the need to defend Canada's coasts: "The defence of Canada should be put in the foreground ... We cannot in this war ignore the Pacific as we did in the last."⁴² Skelton also prioritized the deployment of the armed forces: wherever possible, air power would be deployed first, followed by naval power and then by land forces. Skelton wanted to minimize both casualties and public criticism. His note foreshadowed the approach that the Mackenzie King government would take in determining Canada's war policy: domestic defence would be used as a means of keeping some troops in Canada, and the Department of External Affairs, rather than the Chiefs of Staff, would often set war policy.

Some officials wanted to cultivate Japan as an ally. On 3 September, Hugh L. Keenleyside, a policy advisor in External Affairs who had formerly served as Canada's first *chargé d'affaires* in Tokyo, shared his own views on the forthcoming war in a memorandum to Skelton. Keenleyside believed that the Allies had to obtain either the "benevolent neutrality" or the "active assistance" of every nation not associated with the enemy powers, particularly the United States and Japan. He emphasized Japan's new position in the world:

The importance of Japan as the possessor of the third largest navy in the world, as the only major power in Asia and the Western Pacific, as the home of one of the greatest merchant fleets in existence, as a strong industrial nation, as the possessor of a highly efficient army, based on a healthy population of over seventy million people, and as the inveterate opponent of the U.S.S.R., (which is now apparently prepared to cooperate with Germany) can hardly be exaggerated.⁴³

Keenleyside recommended appointing a new Canadian minister to Japan, since almost two years had passed since the former minister returned to Canada. Ultimately, Canada relied on a *chargé d'affaires* at its legation in Tokyo, although some correspondence continued to refer to that individual as "Minister."

During the period of the "Phoney War," when Canada and the Allies were officially at war with Germany but faced no immediate threats in Western Europe, Far East issues continued to command attention. In January 1940, Canada restricted nickel and wheat shipments to the Soviet Union, and in April restricted nickel shipments to Japan. Economic sanctions were imposed because those powers were regarded as potential enemies. British authorities also wanted to hold up shipments to Japan as a "bargaining counter" in negotiations with Japan over the creation of British "contraband-control bases" throughout the Pacific. In March 1940, however, Canada rejected Britain's request for the RCN to board and examine a Soviet vessel suspected of carrying war materials to Germany via Vladivostok because such action might provoke the Pacific powers. Mackenzie King was concerned that the Soviet Union, possibly in combination with Japan, might threaten Canada's Pacific Coast in the event of war. In April, Canadian officials even had to consider the impact on Far East affairs when they met a British request to establish a base in Greenland to protect its cryolite mines, which were essential for aluminum production. US authorities argued that Japan might regard such an action as an excuse to occupy the NEI. Despite King's assurance to Roosevelt that Canada had little interest in Greenland, Canadian defence ministers planned to use a civilian vessel to transport a paramilitary force there, so as not to alarm the Americans. Two months later, however, when the plan was executed, the US State Department protested on other grounds: Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, did not want Canadian economic influence over Greenland. Perhaps the Americans had used Japanese encroachment in Southeast Asia only as a pretext.⁴⁴

As early as February 1940, Canadian officials had noted that Japan appeared to be making special preparations in anticipation of war in the Pacific. They intercepted a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Vancouver that contained the following text (according to one translation):

We are concerned over possible eventualities in Japanese-American relations as they affect the disposition to be made of Japanese nationals and persons of Japanese descent residing in Hawaii and the coast states. All things considered, the prospect is not promising. In the case of Japanese among those residing in the localities mentioned who desire to remove elsewhere, it will of course be appropriate at some time to comply (with that desire).⁴⁵

If Japan was considering evacuating Japanese nationals resident in Hawaii and along the Pacific Coast, then war might be near. At Skelton's request, External Affairs sent a copy of the message to the Canadian Legation in Washington, where it was passed on to the US State Department for comment.⁴⁶ The State Department, however, "was not inclined to take the matter very seriously."⁴⁷ For the moment, Canadian officials would wait and see.

The fall of France in June 1940 placed Far East affairs in quite a different light. Until then, British strategists believed that three checks against Japanese aggression were already in place: the war in China, the Soviet Union, and the presence of the US Navy in the Pacific.⁴⁸ Now they feared that the German defeat of the Allies in Western Europe would incite the Japanese to further encroachment in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Japan now demanded that Britain withdraw its troops from Shanghai and close both the Burma Road and the Hong Kong frontier, cutting off supply routes to Nationalist China. Worse yet, in late June, Canadian officials received a British aide-memoire that not only revealed Britain's vulnerability in the Far East but also suggested two possible courses of action: negotiate a new Far East settlement with Japan or impose a full US-led embargo against Japan and dispatch ships to Singapore.⁴⁹ The latter action could either deter Japan or cause war. British Ambassador to Japan Sir Robert Craigie believed that a joint Anglo-American initiative might restore peace to China and keep Japan neutral in the present war. In contrast, a Foreign Office report suggested that economic sanctions might provoke Japan into attacking targets throughout Southeast Asia to seize resources.⁵⁰ All told, the reports reaching Canada indicated that defeat in Europe had placed the Allies in a precarious position in the Far East.⁵¹

In July, Canadian officials spoke with their British counterparts about the new Far East crisis. Early in the month, Skelton learned from the Canadian Legation in Washington that Cordell Hull had assured British Ambassador Lord Lothian that the USN would not move its Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic without informing Britain in advance.⁵² Three weeks later, Keenleyside informed Skelton that he regarded Lord Lothian's proposed Allied-American oil embargo against Japan as "absurd": "If the United States placed an embargo on oil, the Japanese would move into the Netherlands Indies at once. The British would be in no

position to do anything, and the Americans would probably do nothing except express moral disapproval.”⁵³ Keenleyside emphasized that Canada and Britain must *not* participate in such an action. Similarly, Mackenzie King did not comply with Britain’s request for further Canadian economic sanctions against Japan as long as the Burma Road remained closed. Canadian officials would not consider any action that could precipitate war in the Pacific without full Anglo-American support.

The new crisis prompted External Affairs to produce a report called “Notes on Far Eastern Situation” and to draw several conclusions. At present, Japan remained deterred by the US Pacific Fleet and stalemate in China, but in the event of war would probably attack the Malay Straits Settlements, Indochina, Hong Kong, and possibly the NEI. Canadian strategists did not think it likely that the Japanese would land on the Pacific Coast of North America. Britain did not want war with Japan because it wished to retain Singapore and Hong Kong. The United States was sympathetic to China but, because of isolationist sentiment, would not protect Singapore, Hong Kong, or even the Philippines, a US possession. Australia was exposed in the Far East and might be willing to make concessions to Japan. In Canada, there was public sympathy for China and resentment of the fact that Japan still received limited shipments of Canadian nickel, zinc, and lead used in its war against China, including attacks against Canadian missionaries. The report concluded that Canada and the British Commonwealth could not fight a two-front war without US support, and that the Allies therefore had to avoid war with Japan lest they face further defeat in Europe.⁵⁴

As autumn approached, Canada faced two more developments in the Far East. On 14 September, near the island of Oshima, a Japanese naval plane accidentally dropped a “practice bomb” on the Canadian Pacific liner *Empress of Asia*, injuring four Chinese seamen and slightly damaging the ship.⁵⁵ Yoshizawa Seijiro, who had replaced Baron Tomii Shu as Japanese Minister to Canada, offered profuse apologies on behalf of Tokyo: the incident was not akin to the bombing of the USS *Panay* three years earlier. Skelton briefly considered how opposition parties in Ottawa might exploit the incident: “We will have some bright C.C.F. man saying that this bomb was made out of Canadian copper or nickel.”⁵⁶ The incident was quickly forgotten, however, in light of a more serious development: on 27 September, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In response, Prime Minister King strongly urged British authorities to reopen the Burma Road when the temporary Anglo-Japanese agreement expired on 18 October.⁵⁷ In his correspondence with London, King usually refrained from commenting on Far East affairs or other elements of grand strategy, but, in his estimation, Japan had gone far enough.

Canada and the Allies discussed several contingency plans in response to the Tripartite Pact. On 2 October, Canadian officials learned that Cordell Hull believed that the new alignment would "inevitably" draw the United States into the war, although not in the Far East in the near future.⁵⁸ Hull could foresee a long-distance US blockade against Japan. The next day, Canadian officials received a British report on reactions to the Tripartite Pact.⁵⁹ According to the report, the US pledged to resist Japanese aggression and maintain its material support for Britain, whereas China believed that Japan would push southward and urged Britain to allow the Burma Road agreement to expire. Britain advocated further economic sanctions against Japan and planned to impose a full economic blockade against Japan in the event of war.

Canadian officials who supported Allied objectives could take pride in the fact that Canada had already imposed the strictest sanctions against Japan. Not only had it restricted shipments of aluminum, cobalt, copper, lead, and nickel to Japan but it was also considering imposing a wheat embargo in the near future⁶⁰ and had steadily reduced its imports from Japan. In addition, Ottawa considered the prospect of a declaration of war. On 11 October, Prime Minister King responded to a British query about Canada's intentions and assured British officials that Canada, like Britain, would declare war against Japan in the event of a US-Japanese war.⁶¹ The Prime Minister had sent instructions to the Canadian Legation in Tokyo regarding steps to be taken in the event of war with Japan, and he learned on 19 October that "Anglo-Dutch-American technical conversations" would be held to discuss the possibility of joint defence against Japanese aggression.⁶² In brief, Canada did not seek war with Japan at this point, but fully anticipated that eventuality.

Canadian officials had also examined the "problem" of the Japanese Canadians on the Pacific Coast. Discrimination against all Asians had long been practised in Canada, particularly in British Columbia, where many had settled.⁶³ In 1858, the first Chinese "coolies" arrived in the province to work on mines and railways, but in 1886 anti-Chinese riots broke out and a head tax was imposed on Chinese immigrants. The first generation of Japanese immigrants to Canada, the *Issei*, arrived as early as 1877 and settled mainly on Vancouver Island and in the Fraser Valley area of British Columbia, working as labourers in several industries but principally as fishermen. Chinese and Japanese workers were not allowed to vote and were excluded from most professions. Restrictions were imposed on Japanese immigration in 1907. Worse yet, in July that year, the Trades and Labour Council in Vancouver established the Asiatic Exclusion League, committed to driving Asians out of the province: a month later, league members attacked Asian-owned businesses in Vancouver's Chinatown and Japantown, resulting in several violent riots. East Indians fared no better at the time. In 1908, an

amended Immigration Act imposed a head tax on Sikhs in British Columbia and required immigrants travelling from India to Canada to arrive by continuous ocean passage, an impossible feat at the time. Anti-Sikh racism reached its peak in 1914 when Sikhs arriving by ship were denied entry to the Vancouver harbour: their ship, the *Komagata Maru*, was later towed out to sea by a Royal Canadian Navy vessel while thousands of Anglo-Canadians cheered from the shore. Finally, in 1923 the Chinese Immigration Act effectively ended Chinese immigration to Canada, and in 1928 further immigration restrictions were imposed on the Japanese.

By 1940, however, Japan's war against China had made the Japanese community a particular object of contempt in British Columbia, where about 22,000 Japanese and 45,000 Chinese resided: all Japanese immigration to Canada was halted that year. In June, Baron Tomii, the Japanese Minister to Canada, complained to Skelton about anti-Japanese remarks made by Alderman Halford D. Wilson of Vancouver.⁶⁴ During a speech, Wilson had claimed that Japanese residents would be a greater menace than other "aliens" on the Pacific Coast in the event of a US-Japanese war. Keenleyside later sent Skelton a memorandum on the subject, complaining that Wilson was simply using racism to gain "political favours." According to Keenleyside, the RCMP and local city council in Vancouver could deal with any potential problem. He had also advised Vancouver Mayor James Telford, a socialist, to avoid confrontation with Wilson on the city council because Wilson might offer a racist response, such as claiming that "the Socialists and the C.C.F. are in favour of having white girls raped by the 'Japs and Chinks.'" In essence, External Affairs had to balance the rights of Japanese and Chinese Canadians against the reality of racist sentiment among the public and its elected provincial politicians.

Later in the year, Canadian officials made other decisions with respect to the Asian community. In September, the Cabinet War Committee acceded to BC Premier Pattullo's request that Canadians of Japanese and Chinese origin not participate in military training. In a memorandum prepared for Skelton, Keenleyside protested the decision, noting that Pattullo's primary concern was that "Orientals" might become eligible for other rights and privileges of citizenship. Keenleyside believed that a great majority of Asians were good citizens and wanted to serve their country, a view that Skelton shared, according to a memorandum he later sent to Mackenzie King. Despite such opposition within External Affairs, in late October the Prime Minister informed Pattullo that Japanese and Chinese Canadians were to be excluded from compulsory military training. External Affairs continued to work for some basic rights, however. Throughout October, there was much discussion over the prospect of removing Japanese Canadians through compulsory or voluntary repatriation, but the



O.D. Skelton (left) and Lester B. Pearson return to Canada from Britain aboard a Cunard ship in the early 1930s. Skelton, who upheld Canadian isolationism and nationalism as twin ideals, served as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1925 until his death in early 1941. Pearson, who later liaised with Allied intelligence services on behalf of External Affairs, was one of Skelton's first recruits. *Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd., Library and Archives Canada, PA-117595.*

Dominion government would not give in to provincial demands. On 30 October, for example, Skelton informed the mayor of Nanaimo, BC, that he rejected the mayor's suggestion that all people of Japanese origin in Canada be deported. Instead, Skelton wanted to encourage good citizenship among Japanese Canadians. In November, Keenleyside even sent a three-man commission to the Pacific Coast to study the Japanese Canadian situation. By late 1940, Canadian officials had considered the "problem" of Japanese Canadians in the event of war, but had shown restraint with respect to repatriation and internment.⁶⁶

In terms of Canadian decision making, by early 1941 an expanded team of statesmen and officers was helping the Mackenzie King government face the challenge of war. The Prime Minister corresponded regularly with the British High Commissioner in Canada (Sir Gerald Campbell and, after March 1941, Malcolm MacDonald), who passed on important updates from the Dominions Office in London. Norman Robertson took over as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs after Skelton's death in January 1941. Within External Affairs, Hugh Keenleyside served as a policy advisor, while Lester Pearson supported intelligence activities and liaised with the armed services. C.D. Howe, an American industrialist, served as Minister of Munitions and Supply. Colonel J.L. Ralston served as Minister of National Defence, with support from several Associate and Deputy Ministers: C.G. "Chubby" Power served as Associate Minister of National Defence and Minister of National Defence for Air, while Angus L. Macdonald served as Minister of National Defence for Naval Services. Like Britain, Canada had three Chiefs of Staff: Air Marshal L.S. Breadner, Chief of Air Staff; Rear-Admiral P.W. Nelles, Chief of Naval Staff; and Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, Chief of General Staff.

The Dominion could also count on its staff serving abroad. In Washington, several diplomats and officers represented Ottawa, including Leighton McCarthy, Canadian Minister to the United States; H. Hume Wrong, Counsellor to the Canadian Minister; and attachés from all three Canadian armed forces. In London, Vincent Massey served as High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain and passed on important information from British officials, including Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary. Lester Pearson also served in London until his recall to Ottawa in early 1941. More controversially, Pierre Dupuy served as Canadian chargé d'affaires in Vichy France: the Allies wanted to maintain "back-channel" communications with the Vichy government. In Tokyo, E. D'Arcy McGreer served as the Canadian chargé d'affaires and acting Minister to Japan. With respect to the Far East crisis, the team awaited incoming reports about ongoing discussions with the Allies and the Americans.⁶⁷

To summarize Canada's response to Far East affairs in the interwar period from 1922 to 1940, Canada, like its partners in the League of Nations, avoided responsibility and adopted an appeasement strategy with respect to Japan. Throughout the 1930s, as Japan consolidated its control over Manchuria and coastal China, Canada failed to impose economic sanctions or other punitive measures. It did, however, adopt a new defensive strategy with respect to its Pacific Coast and, at Britain's request, also monitored Japanese naval and military communications at its Esquimalt station. Clearly, emphasizing Pacific Coast defence and undertaking intelligence measures were more politically convenient and cost-effective than direct intervention in the Far East.

With the outbreak of war in Europe, however, the Far East commanded more attention, particularly after the Allied defeat in Western Europe in June 1940. The Mackenzie King government favoured a war of limited liability that would retain some troops for domestic defence along the coasts and reduce casualties through the use of air and naval power before large land forces were committed. Yet Canada participated in Allied economic sanctions against Japan, notably trade restrictions on strategic metals. In response to the Tripartite Pact, Canada also prepared contingency plans for a possible war with Japan and, in October 1940, considered a declaration of war, withdrawal of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, and the future treatment of Japanese Canadians. The Prime Minister himself believed that war with Japan was increasingly likely. Canada exhibited anxiety over the Far East crisis and could not remain indifferent to its outcome. Significantly, Canada and the Allies realized that they had to avoid conflict with Japan until active US support was assured, but in late 1940 there was still no sign of such support.

Conclusions

Questions regarding Canada's response to the developing Far East crisis may now be considered in a broader historical context. It is clear that by 1941 the Pacific powers were locked into a pattern of alliances and strategies that made war in the Pacific very likely. Japan refused to withdraw from China and continued to develop its weapons arsenal and pursue expansionist policies. In response, the United States and the Allies imposed trade sanctions against Japan, which Japanese leaders saw as a provocation. These sanctions also sharpened Japan's awareness that the necessary resources might be obtained from the vulnerable colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, notably the Netherlands East Indies. The Soviet Union pursued a containment policy against Japan until the European War impaired its ability to intervene in the Far East. Britain accepted US leadership in Far East affairs because it could no longer defend its possessions there, and sought active US participation in the war against the Axis. For

Britain, early deterrent measures against Japan bought time, but encirclement of Japan might be more effective in provoking a confrontation and bringing the full might of the United States into the war on the Allied side. Canada sought to avoid entanglement in Far East affairs, particularly before active US participation was assured, but was committed to cooperation with the British Commonwealth and to imperial defence.

The Far East crisis raised certain questions that Canadian and Allied intelligence staff sought to answer. Would economic sanctions deter Japan from further expansionism or encourage it to go to war? What was the nature of Japan's relationship with the Axis powers and the Soviet Union? Would Japan pursue northern or southern objectives? What military targets would Japan attack in the event of hostilities with the democracies? How could the US be persuaded to support the Allies as a co-belligerent? Canadian officials required current information in order to analyze these pressing issues and to develop effective strategies. To determine whether informed decision making was even a possibility, it is important to examine the intelligence framework that existed in Canada in 1941.

2

The Allied Web: Intelligence Networks in Canada before the Pacific War

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN WARTIME intelligence activities, particularly in the early war years, has often been portrayed as marginal at best. Until recently, the security classification of relevant wartime files has obscured the extent to which Canada cooperated with British Commonwealth networks following the outbreak of the Second World War. This chapter draws on a variety of archival and secondary sources to show how Allied intelligence networks operated in Canada before the Pacific War and how Canada developed its own networks. To begin, a survey of British and Commonwealth intelligence networks operating before the Pacific War provides a broad context and demonstrates the extent of Canada's participation. British Security Coordination (BSC) operations are then discussed, with particular reference to Canada's support for that organization. Next, a survey of Canadian intelligence operations from 1939 to 1941 reveals the scope of Canada's commitment to information gathering. Finally, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) intelligence network in 1941 is examined as the network that provided Canada with most of its information. Together, these surveys also reveal the extent to which Canadian intelligence staff liaised with their Anglo-American counterparts and show that Canadian and Allied decision makers had access to information as a result of constant vigilance in the Pacific throughout the Far East crisis. In fact, Canada was an integral part of an Allied intelligence system that tracked Japanese ships, intercepted and decrypted Japanese messages, coordinated espionage, and established ties with the US intelligence community before the Pacific War.

A Survey of British and Commonwealth Intelligence Operations in the Pacific, 1924-41

British intelligence began monitoring the Pacific soon after the Great War. In 1924, Paymaster-Lieutenant Eric Nave, an Australian naval officer who served in the Royal Navy (RN), began intercepting Japanese communications at Britain's China Station, which operated in Singapore and Hong Kong. A year later, the RCN established a direction-finding (D/F) station at Esquimalt, British Columbia, to serve with the British Admiralty's Pacific network. In 1935, the British established a cryptanalysis unit in Hong Kong, along with an intercept station at nearby Stonecutter's Island. Significantly, the Far East Combined

Bureau (FECB), based initially in Hong Kong and previously known as the Combined Intelligence Bureau, decrypted Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and even predicted the Sino-Japanese War of 1937. At that time, Shanghai was also a centre of British intelligence-gathering activities. Meanwhile, in Britain, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), with branches in London and Bletchley Park, provided more advanced decryption services, while the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as SIS or MI6, produced and distributed estimates based on diplomatic, human, and communications intelligence. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), created in 1936, held meetings in London attended by various representatives of the intelligence branches, but had not yet achieved the authority that it would enjoy by the end of the Second World War.¹

At a relatively early stage, Britain and the Commonwealth revised and expanded their pattern of intelligence gathering in Asia and the Pacific. In August 1938, the FECB moved to Singapore since Hong Kong was seen as vulnerable or even indefensible, and improvements were made to Singapore's Kranji radio intercept station. This station would become part of a network that included Stonecutter's Island, the China Station, Australian naval bases and ships, and New Zealand stations, as well as sites at Nauru Island, Esquimalt, and Bombay, all of which supported FECB wireless telegraphy (W/T) intelligence. W/T intelligence included direction finding, traffic analysis (the study of call signs, traffic volume, and address headings), and cryptanalysis, a task usually performed by special "Y" committees. Out of fifty-nine naval D/F stations worldwide, fourteen directly supported the FECB. Regarding the North Pacific, in August 1939 Canadian naval authorities responded favourably to the Admiralty's request that the Esquimalt D/F station intercept as much Japanese naval traffic as possible. To this end, construction began on new "Y" and high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) facilities at Gordon Head, near Esquimalt. As well, both the FECB and the GC&CS, despite staff shortages, began to make headway in decrypting two new Japanese codes introduced in 1939: the "Type B" diplomatic code, later named PURPLE by the Americans, and the 5-Numerals code, a Japanese general-purpose naval code later named JN-25 by the Americans.²

British, Commonwealth, Dutch, and US service groups increasingly shared intelligence as the crisis developed in the Far East. Strategic assessments and intelligence reports were already being exchanged within the British Commonwealth: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa all contributed to Britain's Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation (PNIO) and Far East Direction-finding Organisation (FEDO).³ By late 1940, US intelligence officers began cooperating with their British counterparts, largely because of Roosevelt's complete support for such activities. By March 1941, that cooperation extended to the exchange of US PURPLE decryption machines for British in-



The Royal Canadian Navy wireless station at Gordon Head, BC, March 1942. Gordon Head intercepted Japanese traffic for the Admiralty's Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-188814.*

formation about JN-25B, a new code that had been introduced on 1 December 1940 as the second version of JN-25. In May, the FECB in Singapore – which was already exchanging information with *Kamer 14*, an NEI cryptanalysis unit in Bandung, Java – began cooperating in May with Station C (“Cast”), a US Navy communications intelligence station in Corregidor, Philippines. By mid-spring, intelligence services in Australia, Singapore, and the NEI were using direct radio links to communicate with each other, an arrangement that Corregidor would soon join.⁴

W/T intelligence, cryptanalysis, and direct observation of ship movements yielded results. In June 1941, British intelligence reported fully on the organization of the Japanese Fleet, although the report was not as detailed as one produced by the US Navy (USN) at that time. The RCN tracked all merchant vessels travelling to and from the Americas, using information collected from around the world. Indeed, the RCN shipping intelligence network probably surpassed BSC as the largest foreign intelligence service operating within the United States.

Naval Headquarters in Ottawa issued intelligence reports about ship movements to service groups located throughout the British Commonwealth and Empire as well as the US. Australian Naval Intelligence, which reported its findings to the FECB, tracked Japanese ships and read Japanese weather reports, movement reports, consular messages, and the "Mandated Island code"; New Zealand intercept stations also supported those activities. The FECB, assisted by Paymaster-Lieutenant Eric Nave and an Australian professor, appears to have decrypted some Japanese naval messages transmitted in JN-25B. According to some accounts, US and Allied cryptanalysts could partially read JN-25B on a current basis by November 1941. For example, early that month, the FECB informed London that "Y" intelligence, likely JN-25B, had revealed that the majority of the Japanese Combined Fleet, including five carriers, was still at Kure in Japan. A shortage of Allied Japanese-language staff, however, imposed limits on JN-25B intelligence, which may have served more as a means of corroborating direction-finding and traffic analysis, than the Allies' principal source of information on the Japanese Navy.⁵

In 1941, British intelligence also benefited from important technological advances in radio surveillance. Range estimation (R/E) enabled radio operators to estimate the range of an intercepted signal through the use of an oscilloscope. Most significantly, R/E could determine a position along a single bearing, without the need for multiple-bearing fixes or triangulation. Alternatively, R/E could help to confirm existing multiple-bearing fixes. British Admiralty reports confirmed that R/E was accurate to within 10 percent over a working range of 500 to 3,500 miles. Various stations in the Admiralty network experimented with R/E, but there is no available record to show whether or not the Esquimalt station used the technique in 1941.⁶

Another new technique was radio fingerprinting (RFP), which identified radio transmitters by their operating characteristics. Most transmitters had unique waveform "signatures" that defied both code and call sign changes. The suspected transmitter signal was displayed as a waveform on an oscilloscope and photographed so that it could be compared with waveform photographs of known radio transmitters as an aid to reidentification. This technique was seen more as means of corroborating other radio intelligence than as an independent source of information. Several British stations benefited from it, including Singapore, although Canadian stations did not receive RFP equipment until after November 1941.⁷

Radio operators under surveillance could also be identified by their Morse-keying style, using a method of paper-tape recording known as TINA. An operator's keying style was as distinctive as his handwriting. Allied W/T interceptors already listened carefully to the "fist" of foreign operators and could

often identify distinctive keying styles by ear. TINA refined that process by recording Morse-keying on inked paper tape, resulting in an undulating ink line that revealed the particular keying style. The term "TINA" came from an abbreviation of "Serpentina," an expression that had been used before to describe the undulating ink line. Some British stations experimented with TINA, but Canadian stations did not receive the equipment until after December 1941. British intelligence used it along with R/E and RFP to support standard W/T intelligence and "Y" cryptanalysis.⁸

By late 1941, Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa was studying the technical aspects of radio transmissions. In particular, it reported on the characteristic "tone" or "note" of radio transmitters as an aid to equipment alignment, an approach that anticipated the future use of RFP for such work. NSHQ also collected "cosmic data" for the Admiralty so that radio propagation could be predicted according to changing conditions in the ionosphere: on a daily basis, British and Commonwealth stations used coded messages to exchange data concerning ionospheric layers, virtual height, and critical frequencies. In terms of mid-Pacific radio reception, on 11 November NSHQ ordered the Gordon Head W/T station to "listen out for Honolulu W/T station for one week and report readability."⁹ A fortnight later, FECB Singapore reported that Gordon Head D/F bearings taken on Japanese fixed stations from July to October showed a good degree of accuracy. Technical tests were essential to reliable global communications and surveillance.¹⁰

In the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific, NSHQ tightened its communication links with London and Washington. Messages exchanged between Ottawa, London, and Washington between 28 November and 5 December concerned improving the security of "Most Secret" messages; using NSHQ as a teletype hub for incoming messages addressed to Washington; employing Canadian networks for certain communications between Whitehall and the US Naval Operations office (OPNAV); and establishing teletype links between NSHQ and the Admiralty's delegation in Washington.¹¹ These measures suggest that Canada and the British Commonwealth were anticipating the United States' active participation in the war and recognized the need for solid communications.

British Security Coordination

In New York, British Security Coordination played a vital role in Allied intelligence operations. In the spring of 1940, Stewart G. Menzies, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), also known as "C," appointed William Stephenson head of British intelligence activities in America. Stephenson, a wealthy Canadian businessman from Winnipeg, had made many contacts

throughout Europe and America before the war and was a personal friend of Winston Churchill. His mandate was to "assure sufficient aid for Britain, to counter the enemy's subversive plans throughout the Western Hemisphere ... and eventually to bring the United States into the war."¹² In January 1941, Stephenson began working as head of BSC, and in April established a BSC office in Room 3603 on the thirty-eighth floor of the International Building at Rockefeller Center, New York. Stephenson, codenamed "Intrepid" because that was his New York cable address, used "British Purchasing Commission" as a front name for BSC, and also used British passport control offices throughout the world as a cover for BSC intelligence operations.¹³ In the Americas, BSC represented the interests of MI5, MI6, the Naval Intelligence Division (NID), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and Scotland Yard.

BSC operated on a massive scale. Stephenson's organization conducted covert diplomacy, produced covert propaganda, ran political warfare against isolationists, and managed anti-isolationist front groups in the US. It collected shipping and port-security intelligence, and planned sabotage and subversion activities. Furthermore, BSC sent raw intelligence to London, produced forgeries in Toronto, and created Camp X (codenamed "Special Training School 103") in Whitby, Ontario, which in 1941 ran an international Allied communications network.¹⁴

Stephenson also received help from US interventionists. With Roosevelt's cooperation, he helped create two important US intelligence organizations: the Coordinator of Information (COI) office under William J. Donovan, who later became the first chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Rockefeller Office, which dealt with Latin American affairs, particularly economic warfare against pro-German businesses in South America. Donovan, who opened a COI office at Rockefeller Center in August 1941, maintained close contact with Stephenson: records show that they corresponded on at least thirty-six occasions between 18 August and 7 December 1941. Other powerful friends of BSC in the United States included President Roosevelt and his son James, presidential speechwriter Robert Sherwood, White House confidante Ernest Cuneo, millionaire Vincent Astor, and columnists Walter Lippmann and Walter Winchell. In essence, Roosevelt and other US interventionists not only tolerated BSC's presence in New York but also helped the organization achieve its objectives.¹⁵

Canada's relationship with BSC was very close, but clandestine at all times. Stephenson recruited BSC staff from the civil service in Ottawa with help from External Affairs officials, including Lester Pearson and Thomas Stone. Another important Stephenson contact in Ottawa was Charles Vining, who was a friend of Defence Minister James Ralston, among others. Stephenson also worked

through External Affairs offices in the US, and BSC liaised constantly with officials in Ottawa, New York, Washington, and London. Canadian officials, however, sometimes avoided discussing BSC plans with Mackenzie King, who did not approve of British-led operations in his country. Historian David Stafford has remarked that Canadian officials entrusted with intelligence matters adopted the following principle with respect to their Prime Minister: "Knowledge if necessary, but not necessarily knowledge."¹⁶

In terms of operations in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police assisted BSC in creating the Station M forgery workshop and laboratory in Toronto, which operated under the cover of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Canadian professor Benjamin deForest Bayly organized the Camp X telecommunications centre in 1941, and by the year's end had established the powerful Hydra radio transmitter there, complete with Telekrypton cryptographic machines. Camp X details were kept from Mackenzie King, and no Canadian Cabinet records mention Camp X during the period in late 1941 when it was being completed: secrecy meant success in covert operations and intelligence.¹⁷

With respect to the Far East crisis, BSC adopted a two-pronged strategy, trying to undermine Japan's relationship with the Axis while portraying Japan to the American public as an aggressor nation. In an attempt to break German-Japanese cooperation in 1940-41, BSC used publicity in the American media, as well as channels into Japan, to plant information suggesting that a "German Fifth Column" operated in Japan. The second strategic element was boosted in the autumn of 1941, when Singapore authorities sent BSC a copy of a secret Franco-Japanese agreement that gave Japan economic control over French Indochina. Stephenson noted that BSC passed on the political ammunition to Roosevelt and the State Department: Cordell Hull planned to use it against Kurusu Saburo, the Japanese special envoy to Washington, after which time the information could be made public. At BSC's request, Roosevelt even sent two high-powered radio transmitters to Singapore through the Lend-Lease program so that the Malaya Broadcasting Corporation could air pro-British propaganda in the Far East. BSC also received Donovan's assistance in securing air time on at least two American commercial radio stations for the purpose of undermining Japan. It used US news agencies to spread anti-Japanese propaganda that "had the appearance of news originating from strictly US sources but which was directed to targets outside the United States."¹⁸

According to Stephenson, BSC also tried to rig US opinion polls in an attempt to break isolationism: "Unknown to the public, the polls of Gallup, Hadley Cantril, Market Analysts Inc., and Roper were all done under the influence of

dedicated interventionists and British intelligence agents.”¹⁹ Stephenson thought that such support would help Roosevelt influence Congress:

In FDR the British and their interventionist allies were confronted with a president who was, in his own devious way, extremely sensitive to public opinion and would not move without it. The president, though by nature a procrastinator, was just as anxious to aid the British as they were to gain aid; corroborative public opinion polls would help get needed measures through Congress.²⁰

To that end, BSC did its best to convince Americans that Germany, Italy, and Japan posed a threat to their security.

Although Stephenson's account does not demonstrate how successful British agents were in influencing the polls, it appears that in late 1941 some polls began to show a more interventionist outlook towards Japan, if not Europe. For example, Hadley Cantril's poll in October 1941 indicated that as many as 34 percent of those polled now believed that Japan had “already gone far enough” and needed to be checked with an ultimatum backed by the threat of war.²¹ Another 43 percent believed that America should not take action against Japan *unless* that nation attacked US territory or interfered with US supplies. Compared with previous polls, these results indicated greater public support for US intervention in the Pacific. In contrast, 79 percent still wanted the United States to stay out of the war against Germany and Italy. For Stephenson's team, the Pacific might still provide a back door for America's entry into the war, particularly if Japan attacked US targets.

A Survey of Canadian Intelligence Operations, 1939-41

Early in the war, Canadian authorities tried to ensure that sufficient resources were allocated to intelligence operations. The RCN participated in the Admiralty's global intelligence network, including PNIO and FEDO, and monitored naval and maritime traffic at its Atlantic and Pacific stations. It kept card files on Japanese, German, and Italian merchant ships, and relayed shipping intelligence to the Admiralty through the VESCA and CHATFOLD information networks. In addition, the Esquimalt station monitored the positions and call signs of Japanese warships for the Admiralty. The RCN D/F network also received support from stations operated by the army, air force, and Department of Transport (DOT). In July 1939, Commander Eric S. Brand, RN, arrived in Ottawa to assume his new position as Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) within the RCN's Naval Intelligence Division (NID), which gave him responsibility for monitoring merchant shipping and convoys. In September, he received assistance from Lieutenant-Commander John M.B.P. (Jock) de Marbois,

RNR, who was placed in charge of W/T interception within the Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS). De Marbois, a former languages teacher at Upper Canada College, was later supported by Lieutenant C.H. Little, his former pupil. Together, Brand, de Marbois, and Little ensured that a Far East Intelligence (FEI) section was established within FIS. In late 1939, Colonel Maurice Pope, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO & I), supported the army's Rockcliffe station, an experimental W/T intercept post in Ottawa, and became involved in wiretapping telegram messages. Pope also wanted to expand cryptanalysis operations in Canada but was initially rebuffed by British authorities, who regarded his initiative as competition rather than cooperation.²²

In 1940, the command chain developed as intelligence operations expanded. In February, F.E. Jolliffe, Canada's Chief Postal Censor, visited Britain to tour British postal censorship operations. Following this visit, Major O.T. Raynor, a British liaison officer, was assigned to Canada to advise on censorship activities. In the spring, the Canadian Aircraft Detection Corps increased surveillance along the Pacific Coast, and the RCN in Esquimalt worked with the Army's Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS) on communications intelligence. Significantly, the RCN sent daily summaries of Japanese ship movements to FECB Singapore and weekly summaries of the same to the China Station. By the summer, the Gordon Head station, which already served in the Admiralty's Pacific network and communicated directly with the Whitehall W/T station, began using its new HF/DF equipment and became linked to cable stations, including the Harman D/F station in Canberra, Australia. In late 1940, intelligence authorities in Ottawa and Bermuda fought over control of the Atlantic D/F network, but Brand and de Marbois maintained Canada's independence in that field. At this time, Lieutenant E.M. Drake, RCCS, assumed command of the Rockcliffe station and Lieutenant-Colonel W.W. Murray transferred from censorship duties to Army W/T intelligence. Meanwhile, the National Research Council (NRC), led by C.J. Mackenzie, received about \$1 million in corporate donations for ongoing military research, including communications intelligence projects.²³

In early 1941, officials in Ottawa pushed for the creation of a Canadian cryptanalysis unit, and even approached Washington for assistance.²⁴ In January, Hugh Keenleyside of External Affairs suggested that funding be provided for a centralized unit. To this end, the University of Toronto recommended in April that Professors H.S.M. Coxeter and Gilbert de Beauregard Robinson assist with a new NRC-sponsored cryptanalysis unit. The next month, Coxeter and de Beauregard Robinson met in Washington with General Joseph Mauborgne, head of the US Army Secret Intelligence Service, who had already considered an earlier Canadian request for assistance. E.M. Drake (now promoted to

captain) had visited Mauborgne in November 1940 without informing his intelligence counterparts in External Affairs. These multiple requests drew comment in Washington, according to a later report that explained how Mauborgne was very interested in the inquiries "but was a little puzzled that a second approach should be made by Canada ... He also mentioned that South Africa had consulted him on a similar project, and remarked on the apparent unwillingness of the U.K. to cooperate with the Dominions in such activities."³⁵ Given that Britain regarded Canada's codebreaking initiatives as competition, it is understandable that the Canadians sought US support.

Despite British reservations, Mauborgne assisted the Canadians by referring them to Herbert O. Yardley, the brilliant American cryptanalyst. It is likely that Mauborgne was trying to get rid of Yardley, who was seeking work in Washington. After all, Yardley's 1931 publication *The American Black Chamber* had revealed US codebreaking successes against Japan and created a huge security risk for Washington. Yardley had published the book quite legally, but intelligence officials remained unimpressed. Moreover, it was rumoured that Yardley had offered assistance to the Japanese not only in the early 1930s but also in 1940, while still working for the Chinese government in Chungking. Nonetheless, his expertise as a cryptanalyst, along with his recent referral by Mauborgne, made him appealing to the Canadians.³⁶

In June 1941, External Affairs made important strides in the formation of the new Canadian cryptanalysis centre, codenamed the "Examination Unit." The NRC would set up the unit, which would focus on Japanese, German, and Vichy traffic, while External Affairs would continue to arrange staffing and resources. External Affairs had arranged for the services of Yardley, who would lead the Examination Unit for a period of six months commencing on 9 June, working with two Canadian mathematicians and several translators.³⁷ He would report to the unit's Supervisory Committee, which included External Affairs and NRC staff. In a Most Secret letter, Mackenzie King explained Yardley's role to Vincent Massey:

It is his intention to concentrate his efforts at first on Japanese interceptions and on enemy intelligence codes. A considerable number of these latter are picked out of the air by our monitoring stations, originating in the United States and Mexico particularly, and Naval Intelligence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have already made some progress in decyphering them.³⁸

Yardley had recently completed two years of service with the Chinese government in Chungking, and was well placed to begin work on Japanese decrypts for Ottawa.

Under the pseudonym "Herbert Osborn," Yardley reported to the NRC on the Examination Unit's first month of operation. He noted that on 9 June the unit received rooms 202 and 203 of the NRC Annex building on Montreal Road in Ottawa, where staff included his secretary, a mathematician, a German translator, two RCMP officers, an RCCS officer, a telegraph censor, and a Post Office representative. Yardley's secretary and lover, Edna Ramsaier, brought to her job the benefit of her experience with Japanese traffic in Washington. Yardley also received Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Flying Officer Francis Henry, who translated Japanese for the unit. Most importantly, the unit now received intercepted messages, including: "(a) Suspicious letters held by the Postal Censor. (b) Japanese Diplomatic messages from the Chief Telegraph Censor from 1939 to date. (c) Current Japanese Diplomatic messages to various Japanese Diplomatic Agencies throughout the world, intercepted by the Navy. (d) Messages from unauthorized stations intercepted by the R.C.C.S."²⁹ In addition, the Esquimalt station provided Yardley's group with raw intercepts of diplomatic traffic between Japan, Mexico, and Germany. Yardley also reported that his Japanese linguist could read the Japanese diplomatic messages – both past and current traffic.³⁰

In August, the Examination Unit expanded its Japanese decryption activities. A husband-and-wife team, the Coltons, were appointed to the Japanese diplomatic section. British intelligence sent details of several Japanese "low category systems," or straight-book codes, as well as one transposition system, later designated as "JAE."³¹ Later in the month, Lester Pearson reported to Vincent Massey that "the Unit is producing results of high value to our Intelligence Services and we are now on the point of substantially increasing its output as we have added some Japanese [censored] translators to the staff."³² Pearson, who wanted to close the existing gaps in message decryption, also requested more support from British cryptanalysts, who already decrypted a certain proportion of Japanese messages intercepted in Canada. Massey served as a middle man in that respect: he passed on intercepts from Canada to Britain, and passed on the resulting decrypts from Britain to Canada.

By mid-September, Yardley was able to report positive results in decrypting one of the Japanese diplomatic codes: "About 75 percent of each message can now be read. Beginning November 1st, we plan to hand in current translation; in cases where too many code words still remain unidentified we will hand in resumes which will clearly give the subject matter under discussion."³³ Ultimately, Yardley's team provided Canadian intelligence staff with a modest but useful collection of translated Japanese messages in late 1941.

Unfortunately for the Canadians, Yardley had to go. Commander Alastair Denniston, operational head of Britain's GC&CS under Menzies, visited Ottawa



The Examination Unit at work decrypting enemy messages in this rare photo taken in early 1942 at its headquarters on Montreal Road in Ottawa. *Courtesy of Communications Security Establishment, Canada.*

in September and insisted that Yardley leave for security reasons. The British and the Americans continued to regard him as a huge security risk, despite his brilliance as a cryptanalyst. Would he compromise Canadian (and therefore Allied) intelligence security? In late November, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson expressed his concerns in a letter to Hume Wrong at the Canadian Legation in Washington:

As far as both the British and the Americans are concerned, the only replies which we have been able to get so far to our enquiries as to why Yardley is not trusted make vague and unsatisfactory references to the book which he published ... The British even go to the point of wanting Yardley out of Ottawa before their Cryptographer arrives here.³⁴

Robertson asked Wrong in the same letter whether the US War Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) might provide Canada with

confidential information, almost as recompense for Yardley's imminent departure.

Lester Pearson even visited Washington from 26 to 28 November in an attempt to reach an understanding about Yardley with the Americans. In support of that endeavour, Lieutenant Little, RCN, and Captain Belben, RN, flew from Ottawa to join Pearson in Washington. Despite meetings with OPNAV staff, War Department staff, cryptanalyst William Friedman, and Admiral Leigh Noyes, Pearson and his colleagues could not salvage Yardley's career with the Examination Unit. Almost as an epitaph to that career, Pearson wrote to Massey on 9 December: "So far as our experience with Osborn goes we have found him industrious, reliable, and most efficient. He has built up what we think is a successful, if small, organization here and has inspired in them an unusual sense of loyalty to the work they are doing."³⁵ Although Yardley had to go, he had created the nucleus of an effective Canadian cryptanalysis unit.³⁶

Considering Japanese naval traffic, it appears that the Examination Unit had made only limited progress by December 1941. Late in the month, Captain Drake issued a memorandum on Yardley's report about relevant traffic: "At present there is very little information available on Japanese Battle communications such as procedure signals, frequencies, type of cipher etc."³⁷ Drake believed that the lack of available traffic prior to hostilities had hindered the unit's progress, but he hoped for a solution of Japanese naval codes and a better understanding of Japanese communication systems now that Esquimalt could intercept large quantities of naval messages. His hopes were realized in the spring of 1942, when Esquimalt intercepted "a considerable volume of Japanese naval traffic," which was sent to US and British authorities for decryption.³⁸ It is likely that the Examination Unit had attempted to decrypt Japanese naval traffic during the Yardley period but achieved its greatest success in solving diplomatic messages.

Apart from developments in Canadian cryptanalysis throughout 1941, measures were being taken to expand the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Section. In August, Lieutenant J.R. Foster, who served in the FIS, visited Britain, where he toured Marconi research laboratories as well as Admiralty W/T and "Y" stations. As of early December, the FIS operated five "Y" stations and fifteen HF/DF stations across Canada. Its D/F staff received instructions from the Admiralty's NID 9 section and exchanged D/F bearings and intelligence with D/F groups in Britain, Bermuda, Freetown, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Moreover, all FIS D/F bearings were shared with the Admiralty, and FIS Pacific Coast D/F bearings were also shared with FECB Singapore. In terms of staff, the FIS included 17 officers and 180 telegraphers, who worked on W/T intelligence, D/F analysis, D/F field maintenance, technical research, staff train-

ing, and Far East intelligence. Significantly, the Far East Intelligence section not only collected D/F and communications intelligence on vessels plying the Far East and Pacific waters but also translated Japanese, Chinese, and Korean traffic received from "Y" stations and cable sensors.³⁹

Growing links with American and British service groups improved the processing of intelligence. Throughout 1941, Canadian authorities ensured that close links were maintained between External Affairs and the Examination Unit in Ottawa; BSC in New York; the Canadian Legation, the British Embassy, and US authorities in Washington; the Canadian High Commission and British authorities in London; and all three Canadian armed services. In February, Lester Pearson requested British support for the decryption of telegrams intercepted in Canada.⁴⁰ A month later, Norman Robertson assured Lieutenant-Colonel W.W. Murray, then serving as DMO & I in Ottawa, that Canadian-intercepted telegrams were being sent to London. Following the American-British Conversations (ABC-1) in late March, Canadian and US naval intelligence officers exchanged visits to Ottawa and Washington to learn of each other's operations. The Roosevelt administration tolerated Canadian intelligence-gathering operations in the United States, where these activities continued under the cover of Canadian "shipping control." In July, Robertson informed the Canadian Legation in Washington that the Examination Unit was now deciphering "considerable numbers" of messages intercepted in Canada, and that most messages related to shipping and were being sent directly to Washington from the DNI in Ottawa.⁴¹ The next month, Pearson asked Massey in London to secure more British help in message decryption and to continue exchanging Canadian intercepts for British decrypts. By late 1941, in anticipation of implementing the American-Canadian extension of ABC-1 (ABC-22), Canadian Pacific Coast stations shared intelligence concerning ship movements with their US counterparts. Such cooperation enhanced the RCN's ability to provide important information on the Far East crisis.

Other correspondence referred to links with BSC. The Examination Unit shared its intelligence reports with BSC in New York, and sometimes with other organizations in the US, but Ottawa wanted to prevent the wide distribution of these reports in order to avoid political problems with American authorities. In a letter to Thomas A. Stone of External Affairs in late September, Director of Naval Intelligence Captain Brand recommended that the unit pass on its reports *only* to BSC. Several days later, Stone replied that he had spoken with Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, who was then in Washington, about wide distribution of Examination Unit reports in the US, noting that Murray expected to see Lieutenant Little in either Washington or New York so that the question could be settled. For security reasons, however, the Supervisory Committee of the

Examination Unit had *not* told Yardley that Little was sending copies of the unit's bulletins to BSC. As a result, whenever BSC asked the unit for additional information about message decryption, its requests came in with no name attached. Other letters establish that Captain K.J. Maidment served at BSC as a form of liaison officer to Ottawa intelligence authorities, and that NSHQ passed on BSC intelligence to other Commonwealth countries. BSC was clearly part of the Ottawa information loop.⁴²

The Royal Canadian Navy Intelligence Network in 1941

The RCN network, which served as Canada's principal intelligence service in 1941, rivalled BSC in both size and scope. Early that year, the RCN already had the beginnings of a substantial radio intelligence network. On 13 February, Rear-Admiral Percy W. Nelles, Chief of Naval Staff, RCN, produced a Most Secret report entitled "H/F D/F and 'Y' Organization in Canada and Newfoundland," offering an impressive list of HF/DF facilities in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and British Columbia (a total of forty operators and twelve receivers), as well as "Y" facilities in Newfoundland, Ontario, and British Columbia (a total of fifty-two operators and twenty-seven receivers).⁴³ In terms of reporting structure, all "Y" stations were given assignments according to Admiralty instructions, and each D/F and "Y" station sent weekly or monthly reports to NSHQ, which passed on reports to the Admiralty. Japanese intercepts were sent to both the Admiralty and the FECB in Singapore. In terms of administration, NSHQ in Ottawa had three officers and two civilians working on W/T and "Y" intelligence, with technical help from the DOT and scientific advice from the NRC. The RCN continued to build on this foundation throughout the year.

Captain Brand outlined major developments in Canadian naval intelligence in his annual report for 1941. The Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was now organized into nine sections: Main Office, General Intelligence Section, Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS), Far Eastern Intelligence Section, Sea Transport Section, Mercantile Movements Section, Routing and Convoy Section, Naval Distributing Authority, and Staff Officer Control Section. The FIS, now exclusively responsible for D/F and W/T intelligence, was divided into six sections after reorganization, including enemy "Y" traffic, D/F plotting, Far Eastern Intelligence (FEI), technical research, D/F field officers, and an operators' school.⁴⁴ Notably, "Far Eastern" intelligence was now studied at two levels: within a principal section of NID, and within a subsection of FIS. Brand also reported that by the end of 1941 the RCN had three Pacific D/F stations in British Columbia, as well as eight Atlantic D/F stations located in Newfoundland, Nova



Captain Eric S. Brand, RCN, served as Director of Naval Intelligence in Ottawa. His monthly intelligence reports drew upon press reports, postal/cable censorship, wireless intercepts, and D/F tracking. *Library and Archives Canada, PA-204258.*

Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba.⁴⁵ Seven "Y" stations were located in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and British Columbia.

In terms of censorship activities, Brand's organization increased telephone/telegraph censorship and handled 263 tons of mail during 1941. The establishment of Berlin-Tokyo airmail connections in the spring of 1941 offered more opportunities for censorship at Vancouver: German airmail sent to the US via the Pacific was subject to Canadian scrutiny.⁴⁶ The Censorship Co-ordination

Committee complemented Brand's activities by issuing censorship directives to radio stations across Canada. Throughout 1941, the committee issued nearly ninety censorship directives, an average of seven or eight per month.⁴⁷ Typically, these directives prohibited the civilian media from discussing troop movements, travel itineraries of political leaders, or information about weather in critical coastal areas.

Brand's annual report also explained reporting structures. Daily summaries of shipping movements were sent to the Admiralty, while the Americans were informed of shipping information through the CHATFOLD system of reporting. For security, messages to the Americans were sent using secret addresses, since the US was still only an unofficial ally (secret addresses ceased to be used following its entry into the war). "Q" messages, along with corresponding "W" messages, provided navigational aid and warnings.⁴⁸ Brand himself communicated with External Affairs, the Department of National Defence (DND), the DOT, the Department of Justice (specifically, the RCMP), the Department of Mines and Resources (which, paradoxically, administered immigration in Canada), the Department of National War Services (which administered public information), the Post Office, and the Department of the Secretary of State (which administered the press censors as well as internment).⁴⁹

Finally, Brand highlighted the many liaisons between Canada, Britain, and the United States throughout 1941. His staff dealt only with the Anglo-American community and had no Japanese contacts: early in the year, Japanese authorities withdrew Commander Youmatsi, the Japanese naval attaché in Ottawa, without replacement. In April, Brand made an important visit to both the US Navy headquarters and the British Admiralty Delegation (BAD) in Washington, where he discussed cooperation between US and Canadian naval control services. A month later, the US naval attaché in Ottawa was given an assistant naval attaché, and in the following months was provided with three additional USN staff members.⁵⁰ In June, the USN appointed a naval observer to Halifax, while the RCN appointed an assistant naval attaché to Washington for improved liaison with the USN. Meanwhile, Brand in Ottawa received a visit from Rear-Admiral John H. Godfrey, DNI (Admiralty), and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Kennedy-Purvis, Britain's Commander-in-Chief in Bermuda. Later in the summer, Brand met with Vice-Admiral H.R. Moore, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Trade). Admiral Charles Little and Captain Belben, both of the Royal Navy, visited NSHQ in November to discuss plans to be made with US authorities; towards the end of the year, Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Eldon Manisty, RN, visited Ottawa and Washington to discuss his navy's trade organization. It is quite clear from Brand's report that his naval intelligence organization was in no way isolated from the Anglo-American community.⁵¹

Conclusions

Canada benefited from participation in several intelligence networks before the Pacific War. As a member of the Commonwealth's PNIO and FEDO, Canada exchanged valuable information on Pacific shipping, including D/F intercepts and call signs, and supplied the Admiralty with ionospheric data to assist with radio propagation studies. In late 1941, Canada received new RFP and TINA equipment to assist with transmitter and operator identification, although the equipment came too late for use against prewar Japanese signals. BSC, which received full support from External Affairs and the DND, operated a forgery workshop in Toronto, developed a communications network at Camp X, collected intelligence on the Axis powers, including Japan, sought to counter US isolationism, and served as a liaison between British intelligence authorities and their counterparts in Ottawa and Washington. Canadian intelligence networks employed techniques such as wiretapping, postal censorship, press and trade analysis, radio interception, and cryptanalysis. The Examination Unit, supported by both the NRC and External Affairs, began decrypting Japanese, German, and Vichy French traffic in the summer of 1941, although the expedient of employing Herbert Yardley later proved to be an embarrassment, considering how he was viewed by the British. As we have seen, the RCN network included a Foreign Intelligence Section, a Far Eastern Intelligence Section, three Pacific D/F stations, eight Atlantic D/F stations, and seven "Y" stations, receiving support from several ministries as well as the NRC, the RCCS, and the RCAF. Furthermore, the RCN operated a worldwide shipping intelligence network for the Admiralty that in 1941 likely surpassed BSC as the largest foreign intelligence service operating within the United States. Significantly, the RCN established important liaisons with intelligence authorities in both Washington and London.

It must be emphasized that Canada was *not* operating on the periphery or margin of Allied intelligence operations on the eve of the Pacific War, as is often portrayed. Canadian cryptanalysis was still in its formative phase at this time, but many of the other intelligence activities were quite well developed. It is true that Canada's intelligence networks did not reach their peak performance until later in the war, but it would be incorrect to assume that these networks were merely in their infancy in 1941. One look at the thousands of RCN dispatches produced daily throughout 1941 should dispel such a notion. Canadian intelligence reports were not simply a product of informed opinion but were based on analysis of detailed information. Furthermore, Allied networks often compensated for any deficiencies in Canada's domestic networks. Britain, in particular, had every interest in keeping its senior ally well inside the Allied information loop, even if it sometimes regarded Canada's codebreaking efforts as competition rather than cooperation.

Having established the capability of Allied and Canadian intelligence networks in operation before the Pacific War, we now turn to the question of how Canadian decision makers used incoming information to develop their strategies. In the early months of the Far East crisis, Ottawa carefully monitored Tokyo's actions and took great interest in secret Allied-American conferences on the Pacific question.

3

Developing a Far East Strategy, December 1940 to July 1941

AS EARLY AS OCTOBER 1940, the Mackenzie King government planned for a possible confrontation with Japan. Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers compelled the government to consider economic sanctions, Pacific Coast defences, the treatment of Japanese Canadians, and the withdrawal of the Canadian Legation from Tokyo. Planning intensified after December, when Britain proposed economic and naval conferences with participation from the Commonwealth and the United States.

This chapter considers how Canada and its allies developed a Far East strategy during the initial months of the Far East crisis. Canada participated in Allied-American conferences that addressed the prospect of deterrence or even war against Japan: the Princeton Conference in December 1940 and the Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference that evolved into the American-British Conversations (ABC-1) between January and March 1941. Canada also collected intelligence and considered strategy in the period leading up to the Far East war scare in February. Finally, it made several observations during the critical months from March to July, a period that witnessed the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Japan's move into southern French Indochina, and the US-Allied freeze of Japanese assets. Throughout all the stages of planning from December 1940 to July 1941, Canada monitored Anglo-American discussions and participated in deterrent measures in support of Britain, but adhered to its strategy of avoiding confrontation with Japan.

The Princeton Conference

On 7 and 8 December 1940, unofficial representatives from Canada, Australia, Britain, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), and the United States attended a confidential "Far Eastern policy" conference held in Princeton, New Jersey. Notable among US representatives was Charles Lindbergh, the celebrated aviator and isolationist.¹ Brooke Claxton, Member of Parliament for St. Lawrence-St. George, who often participated in wartime intelligence assessments, represented Canada. In February 1941, Claxton sent a report to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson and Mackenzie King, describing the conference as "off-the-record." In his report, entitled "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Pacific," he explained that participants sought to develop a

"positive, coordinated policy in the Far East representing a united front of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and their *de facto* allies."² These allies included the NEI, China, and the Soviet Union. The conference also considered the effect of the Far East on Britain's position in Europe, the extent to which Britain and the United States had common interests in the Far East, and whether or not Allied action could oppose Japanese aggression to "pave the way for a genuine New Order" in the Far East.

According to Claxton, representatives began by summarizing the vital interests of the Pacific powers. Japan wanted to occupy bases in French Indochina, gain influence in Thailand, impose economic demands on the NEI, and bolster puppet regimes in China. It was also wary of Germany's objectives in the Far East. Australia, New Zealand, and the NEI wanted territorial security. Canada had no vital interests, but stood with the Commonwealth as a belligerent and supported the United States in terms of continental defence. Britain saw conflict with Japan as a threat to success in the European War, which was its primary objective. The United States sought security for the Philippines, independence for China, and free trade in the Far East, although American isolationism limited the attainment of these goals: "Public opinion is not prepared in advance to fight for anything. Most people are supporting embargoes against Japan and credits in China in the belief that this does not mean war."³

The report recorded several conclusions. Although representatives hotly debated appeasement of Japan as a way of buying time, they ultimately decided that it was not a viable option. On the other hand, a complete Allied embargo against Japan would probably lead to war rather than bring Japan to terms. They concluded that an economic blockade would be more likely to defeat Japan, since Japan had sufficient resources for only one to two years of war, provided it did not seize the NEI, which was considered unlikely because of strong US-NEI air power and submarine forces. Nor could Japan seize Singapore by land, because of British strength. Moreover, the presence of the US Navy fleet in Hawaii and the placement of US Navy ships in Singapore would threaten Japan's lines of communication. According to Claxton, representatives agreed that war against the NEI would not bring in the US, although war against the Philippines probably would. On the vexing question of colonialism, many believed that European regimes in the Far East would not be maintained in their status quo because the trend was towards "progressive liberation" and "de-imperialisation." Hence, the US would not be defending former European interests.⁴

Conference representatives also offered suggestions for concerted action. Japan could be offered long-term economic concessions in return for withdrawal from empire in Asia. The United States could offer independence for the Philippines, support for improved living standards in the Far East, free trade

without US military or commercial domination, and recognition of Japan as a Great Power. Furthermore, the Pacific powers could seek to sign a twelve-month non-aggression pact. If Japan persisted in pursuing empire, then the Pacific powers could still impose an economic blockade and prepare for war: preparations might include staff negotiations, an exchange of military experts, and US naval support in Singapore. Again, it was not anticipated that Japan could win such a war, due to its limited resources and to Allied strength.⁵

The Princeton Conference provided Ottawa with a survey of informed opinion regarding the Far East crisis, including both interventionist and isolationist views. Canadian representatives could place their own nation's interests in the context of the greater Allied-American community. A look at this forum also reveals just how perceptive some observers were in late 1940, since most of their predictions came true, even though they underestimated Japan's ability to seize American, Dutch, and British possessions in the short term. Significantly, the Princeton Conference enabled the Allies and the Americans to discuss Pacific matters in a discreet, informal way, before they undertook official conversations.

The Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference That Became ABC-1

Following the Princeton Conference, Canadian officials gained access to high-level Anglo-American strategic planning. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), along with External Affairs, used the services of the Canadian Legation in Washington to monitor plans for a proposed Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference. In a "Most Secret" telegram of 23 December 1940, the Legation informed External Affairs that the proposed conversations, which had been planned as early as 6 December, concerned "naval matters in the Pacific" and required full secrecy, according to the British Embassy.⁶ Appropriately, Britain would send two naval representatives "fully camouflaged" to Washington. Initially, the State Department wanted to limit the talks to US and British representatives because it feared that wider participation would be dangerous, considering Japan's standpoint on encirclement. The British Embassy, however, encouraged Canada to send a "fully camouflaged naval officer" to Washington to act as both observer and consultant. Apparently, Australia was already sending an observer and both New Zealand and the NEI would soon be invited to do likewise. The British Embassy promised to confer with US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles about the proposed agenda and report back to the Canadian Legation.

On Christmas Eve, the Canadian Legation reported the results of these discussions to Ottawa. The proposed conference on Pacific affairs would now encompass military, air, and naval defences, meaning that Britain would send

camouflaged army and air officers along with naval personnel. Welles promised to consult the President and US naval authorities about the prospect of inviting observers from Canada and other interested governments, although he "further emphasized importance of secrecy from internal as well as Japanese stand-points."⁷ Clearly, the State Department did not want the talks to upset either American isolationists or Japanese diplomats. In particular, the proposed conversations had to avoid any appearance of "encirclement" of Japan, despite the fact that all Allied Pacific powers were being invited.

Telegrams exchanged between Washington and Ottawa in January 1941 revealed more conference details. A telegram arriving mid-month noted that President Roosevelt had no objection to a camouflaged naval observer from Canada. As well, Britain was sending representatives camouflaged as members of the British Purchasing Commission, a ruse that had been used in 1940 and would continue to be used throughout 1941. For example, William Stephenson's British Security Coordination (BSC) often "covered" people as members of either the British Purchasing Commission or British Passport Control. At month's end, External Affairs informed the Canadian Legation that Commander P.B. (Barry) German, serving the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa, would join the Washington conference as the Canadian observer. German would travel as a shipping broker appointed to the staff of J.B. Carswell, a liaison officer with the Department of Munitions and Supply. German was an excellent choice because he served in Jock de Marbois's Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS) and since 1940 had specialized in processing intelligence concerning Japan. A telegram sent in reply told Ottawa that US authorities would be informed of German's arrival and noted that British observers were arriving with Lord Halifax.⁸

On 31 January, Commander German sent his first report from Washington to Rear-Admiral P.W. Nelles in Ottawa, noting that the staff conversations had begun two days earlier, and that British representatives had shared details of the talks with both him and his Australian counterpart, Commander Henry Burrell of the Royal Australian Navy. Apparently, the conference "observers" were rapidly becoming participants. German referred to the complete secrecy surrounding both the talks and the personalities involved: both Admiral Harold R. Stark, US Chief of Naval Operations, and General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, emphasized secrecy for "internal political reasons." German explained that the basis of the talks was the "most satisfactory distribution" of US and British Commonwealth forces in the event of the United States' entry into the war. Initially, the main focus of the talks was Pacific defence.⁹

German's subsequent reports, which were sent to both Rear-Admiral Nelles and Norman Robertson, revealed that the talks now covered a wider field than



Captain P.B. "Barry" German (left) with his son Sub-Lieutenant A.B.C. "Tony" German at Esquimalt naval base, ca. 1944. In early 1941, Barry German attended the Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference in Washington and kept Ottawa informed of all developments, including the meeting's transition into a more comprehensive Allied plan, known later as ABC-1. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage 2, A.B. (Tony) German Biographical File, RCN Photo by Lt. Black, RCNVR, F-3582. Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2010.*

was originally conceived. He expressed some regret on 1 February that the services had to consult with politicians on some questions, but reported that the defence agenda might now expand beyond its original purpose: "It would appear that the discussions will broaden out and not only primarily include the Pacific and Far East."¹⁰ Three days later, he reported that some tentative agreements had been reached "regarding disposition of the U.S. Pacific and Asiatic fleets, but the limit of U.S.A. operations west of Honolulu would appear to be very much in abeyance."¹¹ US naval dispositions in the North Atlantic were also a topic of interest. Far East questions, German explained, were to be "allowed to simmer for a short period." On 6 February, he reported that the talks had moved on to discussing strategy in the Mediterranean and Europe, the defence of Malta, and General Francisco Franco's rejection of German proposals, but that Pacific defence was still on the table: "In event of war with Japan, it appears that until we have liquidated our commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean we cannot afford to reinforce our present strength in Far East (this is small) to any extent. This immediately ties in with the problem or discussion of U.S. Pacific fleet and its limits of operations to westward of Honolulu."¹² Still, German emphasized that the Americans were against any move west of Hawaii.

Conference representatives soon made several important strategic assessments. On 8 February, German observed that the British preferred reinforcement of the US Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines because they thought that the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was not sufficient to threaten Japan; they believed, however, that the Americans were more likely to support Britain in either the Atlantic or the Mediterranean than in the Pacific. Significantly, German commented on the vulnerability of the Philippines:

Further regarding staff conversations, it appears to be established the Philippines would go, to be retaken later, and that USA forces would retire on Hawaii. The Philippines limited defences are such that they could only be held for a few weeks against a determined Japanese attack ... Additional defence measures at Manila cannot be provided owing to material commitments to British and because of possibility that such action would precipitate immediate war with Japan.¹³

Apparently, the Americans were prepared to sacrifice the Philippines in the early stages of a war against Japan. Pacific Coast defences in North America were also considered: German collected information on US defences at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians for the benefit of the RCN in Esquimalt.¹⁴

British strategists constantly emphasized the need to reinforce Singapore, hopefully with US support, and to reinforce this point, the Chiefs of Staff in London conveyed lobbying instructions to British, Canadian, Australian, and

New Zealand representatives. Commonwealth members were to urge the need for US naval cooperation in the Far East, particularly in Singapore, which had to be retained as a naval stronghold against Japan. German offered Ottawa the following explanation on 11 February: "The U.K. staff is informing U.S. delegates from every conceivable angle how retention of Singapore is of major or vital importance, and it is hoped the U.S. attitude may swing to some extent from their Hawaii base attitude."⁵ According to Rear-Admiral Roger Bellairs's reports to the British Chiefs of Staff, however, which German reviewed each day, the Americans did not alter their position.

German's reports to Ottawa in mid-February suggested that the Americans were reluctant to see Singapore as an essential element in the strategy of war against the Axis powers. According to US strategy, the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii would not only protect the Pacific Coast of North America but also "contain" the Japanese from operating against Malaya. The Americans emphasized that reinforcing the Philippines would serve "no useful purpose in the event of war," but they encouraged the British to reinforce Singapore with capital ships. US representatives believed that Japan should be kept out of the war, but not appeased. British strategists considered the security of Singapore to be second in importance only to that of Britain itself, and forecast the probability of Japanese land or air attacks against Malaya, the NEI, or the Philippines. Churchill even sent Roosevelt a message emphasizing the strategic importance of Singapore, although his "political" involvement in the conference displeased US military representatives. Eventually, the British Chiefs of Staff instructed their representatives in Washington to stop pressing the Americans for support in Singapore. Instead, German reported, Britain was prepared to send more capital ships to Singapore on the arrival of more US ships in British waters. As far as US naval support in the Pacific was concerned, the British were forced to rely on the deterrent value of Pearl Harbor.⁶

By the end of February, most of the issues raised at the conference regarding Pacific defence had been decided. Commander German confirmed that the US Navy would continue to base its main force at Pearl Harbor rather than Manila, and that reinforcement of Singapore was a British responsibility. He also discussed a US staff report stating that, unless the United States was already at war with Germany and Italy, it was unlikely to declare war on Japan for attacks against French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, or the NEI. The same report expressed the opinion that the Philippines and Guam could probably not be held against a full-scale Japanese attack. German reported that British and US representatives agreed with the assessment that Japan could probably occupy most European and US possessions in Southeast Asia in the early stages of a military campaign. Furthermore, he confirmed that the main US objective

was now the defeat of Germany and its allies. The Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference, which in December 1940 had been conceived as a forum to discuss the containment of Japan, had evolved into a more comprehensive defence agreement to be known as ABC-1. The presence of Commander Barry German in Washington as a camouflaged observer and consultant enabled Canadian authorities in Ottawa to monitor the evolution of Allied-American strategic planning at a critical stage.¹⁷

Canada's View of Events Leading Up to the February War Scare, December 1940 to February 1941

In the winter of 1940-41, as Canada and the Allies deliberated over the possibility of war breaking out in the Far East, the Dominions Office in London and the Canadian Legations in both Washington and Tokyo provided most of the information that informed Canadian decision makers.¹⁸ Many incoming reports consisted of observations and subjective assessments made by local diplomatic staff, while others included intelligence summaries derived from decrypts of foreign diplomatic traffic. Ottawa also received the Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report from the colony's staff intelligence officer on a monthly basis. These reports provided summaries of Far East events along with brief analyses. Together, the daily diplomatic reports and monthly updates from Hong Kong gave Ottawa officials a useful summary of current affairs in the period leading up to the February war scare.

Intelligence arriving in Ottawa from December 1940 to February 1941 offered commentary on Far East alliances, Anglo-American deterrence, and Japanese movements in Southeast Asia. Many of the diplomatic messages focused on the progress of Japan's foreign policy and associations. For example, on 11 December, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs O.D. Skelton received an important update from H.F. Feaver of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo.¹⁹ Feaver reported on conversations between Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador to Japan, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, who had offered assurances that Japan would not go to war with the British Commonwealth. According to Feaver, Craigie had reminded Matsuoka that Japan's assistance to the Axis freed Britain to offer similar assistance to Japan's enemy, China: in that regard, Feaver reported, Britain had provided a £10 million loan to Chungking. He advised that Craigie had recently changed his stance from supporting the "appeasement school" to taking a firmer position against Japanese militarism, and now seemed closer to the views of Joseph C. Grew, US Ambassador to Japan.²⁰ Feaver summarized the prevailing thought within the diplomatic community: if the Axis powers dominated in Europe, then Japan would rely on US apathy and take the NEI before Germany could; but if the Axis failed, then Japan would still drive south

in a final attempt to gain resources, spurred on by Japanese militarists. He continued: "It is highly probable that the armed forces would prefer to risk national 'hara-kiri'."²¹ Finally, he suggested that Japan was seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in order to achieve its aims.

The Dominions Office in London also provided Canada with the latest information on Far East alliances. A circular sent to Ottawa in December reported that the Soviets intended to adhere to the 1937 Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and that a Japanese delegation (possibly a naval team) had visited Germany under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Italy, Japan's other partner in the Tripartite Pact, was not forgotten: according to a message on 15 January, Japan was shipping petroleum and mechanical transport to ports in Italian Somaliland. A fortnight later, London reported that a Far East crisis might break out soon and that a Japanese advance might be synchronized with a German attempt to invade Britain. Moreover, Craigie believed that Germany was exerting great influence over Japanese policy.²²

Reports from Tokyo and London in February examined Japan's Axis ties and imperial designs. E. D'Arcy McGreer, Canadian chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, informed Ottawa of Japan's Axis connections, its designs on both Malaya and the NEI, and attempts to establish an authoritarian system through institutions such as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. London informed Ottawa that the *Asaka Maru*, a Japanese vessel under naval ensign bound for Lisbon, which carried a Japanese naval mission heading to Berlin, was due to pass through the Panama canal the following month. Another report outlined Craigie's conversations with Matsuoka, who argued that the US Lend-Lease Bill (which would benefit China by the summer) might constitute an "attack" within the meaning of the Tripartite Pact. London also informed Ottawa that Matsuoka proposed to visit Moscow in March to conclude the new Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, before proceeding to Berlin. Chungking sources believed that Japan, following its success in securing the Soviet-Japanese Fishing Treaty, was now seeking Soviet permission to transport goods to Europe via Siberia.²³

The Hong Kong intelligence report also discussed Japan's foreign entanglements. In January, it indicated that Japanese naval forces had moved from the Hong Kong area down towards Saigon as Tokyo took more interest in French Indochina "under the pretext of mediation in the Franco-Thai war." The report hinted at a possible war between Japan and the Anglo-American powers due to Matsuoka's "verbal bellicosity," Allied aid to Chiang Kai-shek, steady German pressure, and Prince Konoye's lack of control over Japanese extremists.²⁴

It was clear to Allied observers that deterrent measures had to be considered in light of Japan's current foreign policy. As early as 13 December, Mackenzie King received a London telegram that revealed how British officials in

Washington were trying to convince the Americans to reinforce the Philippines since no US forces were being sent to Singapore. In response, the State Department not only informed the British Embassy that the Philippines were receiving US Navy submarines and naval bombers but also stressed that Britain should reinforce Singapore with fighter planes. In late January, External Affairs learned that the US was relocating its Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor that month, a move that might help deter Japan from making a move in Southeast Asia. A follow-up message provided more details of the mid-Pacific relocation and confirmed that the US Asiatic Fleet would remain in Manila to provide naval deterrence, since it was rumoured that Japan had recalled its ships to harbour. The Hong Kong intelligence report for February confidently opined that British reinforcements in Singapore and Malaya, US reinforcements in Guam, and NEI resistance to Japanese diplomatic overtures had collectively dissuaded Tokyo from advancing its "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." As a result, it noted, Tokyo now focused more on Thailand and Indochina.²⁵

Meanwhile, Ottawa learned about Roosevelt's views on the American role in deterring Japan. On 14 February, London reported on Lord Halifax's conversation with Roosevelt eight days earlier. The President had made it clear that US public opinion would prevent him from declaring war if Japan attacked Anglo-Dutch possessions: as a result, a US declaration of war would result only from an attack against US possessions. The President did discuss, however, the possible deterrent value of reinforcing the Philippines with submarines: Japan must be made to believe that US neutrality was not assured if the NEI were attacked. Finally, Roosevelt had characterized any US involvement in a Pacific conflict as a "holding war" because the main battle would be in Europe and the Atlantic.²⁶

In contrast, later that month, London gave details on Winston Churchill's interview with the Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, in which the Prime Minister stated that Britain disapproved of Japan's actions in China but would remain neutral.²⁷ Churchill had reminded the Ambassador that it was not in Japan's interests to enter a war against the United States and Britain, and had also argued that the Tripartite Pact was not to Japan's advantage. The Ambassador assured Churchill that Japan would not attack British, Dutch, or Australian territory, and that it had signed the Tripartite Pact to limit the possibility of conflict.²⁸ All told, these messages demonstrated that neither Washington nor London would act unless Japan attacked their respective territories in the Far East. It was clear to Canadian observers that potential deterrent measures were undermined by a lack of Anglo-American unity.

Despite the various schemes to deter Japanese expansionism, Ottawa received increasingly disturbing updates on Japan's troop and naval movements in the

Far East during this period. On 7 February, London informed Ottawa that a Japanese advance into British territories and the NEI might occur within two weeks. The intelligence was based on Craigie's reports, intercepted telephone conversations, and observations regarding the cancellation of certain Japanese ship sailings. A few days later, London sent more of Craigie's reports, in which he highlighted Japanese press statements about troop movements near Hong Kong. He surmised that Japan might demand an early surrender of the port as a prelude to a southward drive, a move that might be less provocative to the Americans than immediate threats to Singapore. Craigie also mentioned the possibility of a German-brokered Soviet-Japanese agreement, which would free up Japanese troops for other operations. Finally, in mid-February, London warned Ottawa that Japan might increase its hold on French Indochina to secure "strategic facilities" in Thailand, where it would be able to launch air attacks against Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, as well as conduct land attacks against Malaya. Accordingly, an Australian brigade was being sent to Malaya and the commitment of Indian troops was also being considered as tensions continued to mount.²⁹

Throughout the period leading up to the February war scare, reports from London, Washington, Tokyo, and Hong Kong provided Ottawa with a survey of possibilities in the Far East. Japan might soon strike southward, given that it was now strengthening its Axis ties and contemplating a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Washington and London were considering troop and naval placements throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific as deterrent measures. In terms of possible Japanese moves, the war scare gave rise to rumours of southern advances, ship recalls, activity near Hong Kong, and an interest in Thailand. But how did Canadian strategists interpret the incoming intelligence about potential Japanese expansionism, and what plans, if any, did they make for a possible outbreak of hostilities?

External Affairs officials drew several conclusions about the Far East crisis in January. They considered the Soviet Union a greater factor than Germany in terms of influencing Japan's intentions and actions: the Soviets could limit Japan's freedom to operate in the Far East in a way that Germany could not. Japan continued to monitor the European War with great interest, however, since Germany's performance in the conflict could undermine Britain's strength in the Far East. In terms of Allied deterrence, the British Commonwealth had to take responsibility for reinforcing British possessions in Southeast Asia because US regional support was limited to the Philippines, although the recent movement of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor might make Japan think twice. Nevertheless, Skelton took the precaution of informing the Canadian Legation

in Tokyo that the Argentine Legation might be requested to protect Canadian interests in the event of war between Canada and Japan.³⁰ Skelton did not believe that war was absolutely certain, according to his response in late January to Feaver's report from Tokyo: "Our own feeling here has been that Japan was not likely to take on a new war unless Britain suffered serious reverses, and assurances were given of Russia's benevolent neutrality. In a situation that is so fluid, it is difficult however even to frame hypotheses."³¹ Skelton's remarks were well considered but non-committal. Canada would have to watch for further indicators in the Far East as the situation developed.

During the February war scare, Ottawa made more decisive plans. Hugh Keenleyside, who believed that the Far East crisis was approaching a climax, informed Norman Robertson early in the month that Canada had to provide the very best diplomatic representation to Japan while economic sanctions continued. Shortly afterwards, Robertson reminded Prime Minister King that the number of Canadian nationals in Japan and in Japanese-controlled areas had fallen from 483 to 177; more than half of those remaining were Roman Catholic priests and nuns who wanted to remain no matter what developed. Robertson expressed great concern over future evacuation, given that trans-pacific shipping had been reduced. More alarming, on 14 February, Ottawa received a report from Craigie in Tokyo that discussed the protection of British interests in the Japanese Empire in the event of war. Craigie, like Skelton a month earlier, advocated using Argentina as an agent to protect British interests. Finally, at month's end, rumours of war subsided. From the Canadian perspective, the February war scare involved cautious diplomacy, ongoing economic sanctions, and plans for possible evacuation from Japan rather than concrete military preparations. At this point, the Canadians functioned more as observers than participants, although forthcoming events would soon demand more in the way of planning and action.³²

Intelligence Available to Canada, March-July 1941

From March through May, incoming intelligence dealt mainly with Japan's domestic politics and foreign alliances, as well as Allied assessments of Japanese plans and capabilities. In terms of Japan's domestic politics, several reports alluded to the tensions existing within Japanese society and its leadership. On 1 March, E. D'Arcy McGreer in Tokyo reported on Japan's new National Defence Security Act, which was imposed to tighten security. A month later, he informed Ottawa of Japan's crackdown on missionary activities, including the arrest of thirteen missionaries for alleged anti-Japanese activities in Korea. McGreer also commented on the Japanese press, which expressed right-wing views of Japan's



Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke signs the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in Moscow, 13 April 1941. Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stands to his left. The pact meant that Japan was now free to pursue southern objectives, notably the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies. *Russian Archives*.

"divine mission" and criticized the Allies for encirclement. In contrast, he noted on 5 April that recent appointments of conservatives to the Japanese Cabinet might elicit unfavourable reactions from aggressive Tokyo lobby groups. On 31 May, McGreer reported that Matsuoka might strengthen his own position through private knowledge of the Hull-Nomura talks, which concerned the restoration of US trade in exchange for Japan's withdrawal from China, although not without opposition: the Black Dragon Society, an ultranationalist group, threatened to assassinate him should he involve Japan in a conflict with the United States. Finally, the Hong Kong intelligence report issued at the end of May indicated that Tokyo revolutionaries might again engage in political assassination. Collectively, these reports made it crystal-clear that Japanese leaders feared ongoing security threats, acts of espionage, and a reactionary public.³³

Intelligence arriving in Ottawa throughout spring also showed that Japan was strengthening its foreign alliances. In mid-March, McGreer reported not only that Matsuoka was leaving for talks in Moscow, Berlin, and Rome but also that

a German mission was due to arrive in Tokyo to lay new economic foundations. A month later, he commented that the local Tokyo press interpreted the new Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement as an effective non-aggression pact that amounted to Soviet recognition of Manchukuo. Japan now had more freedom to operate in the Far East. In late May, London offered Ottawa its own assessment, emphasizing that Matsuoka had ensured Japan's ongoing commitment to the Tripartite Pact while securing a *détente* with the Soviet Union. According to the report from London, Japan hoped to divide America and Britain, prevent Britain from receiving US Navy assistance, and withdraw honourably from China while retaining influence in Manchukuo, Indochina, and Thailand. The report also noted that Japan did not want war with America but was unlikely to settle its affairs in China to Washington's satisfaction. Information arriving in Ottawa made it abundantly clear that Japan sought to improve its bargaining position through improved associations with both the Axis and the Soviet Union.³⁴

Many reports from March through May included Allied assessments of Japanese plans and tactics. In a letter that McGreer passed on to Ottawa in March, Craigie, who still anticipated Japanese aggression, inquired about the arrangements to be made for Japanese and Canadian officials in Tokyo and Ottawa in the event of war.³⁵ External Affairs received a curious report from London in late April that warned of possible Japanese surprise attacks against Singapore and Malaya, which might coincide with a German attack against the Suez Canal. The writers of the report deemed such intelligence questionable, suggesting that it might be the result of Axis deception, but they could not resist speculating: "Any marked German successes in Europe or Africa are however likely to encourage sudden Japanese move southward."³⁶ They noted that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact might also encourage such a move. The Hong Kong intelligence report for April lamented the fact that Japan was now free to expand southward, but reminded readers that Japan could not "safely" conduct operations against Burma, Malaya, or the NEI until it could "liquidate" its China campaign, which was tying up Japanese troops and draining Japan's economy. It was in Britain's interests to see that the war in China continued: "Anything we can do to convince *Chiang Kai Shek* that we regard ourselves in honour bound to help China after defeating Germany, will be amply repaid in ensuring that China will fight on."³⁷ The report also stated that the threat of US support for Britain in the event of a Pacific War might still deter Japan.

In terms of Japan's ability to wage modern war, the Allies underestimated that country's air force. The Hong Kong report described Japanese air power in condescending terms: "The Japanese air staff, unless advised by German experts, is not competent to deal with prolonged or efficient air opposition."³⁸ It stated

that Allied aircraft outclassed those of the Japanese, which had succeeded in China only because of minimal opposition, a view echoed later in other intelligence reports to Canada. These misconceptions arose because Japan's air force still used a number of obsolete aircraft, had been deployed successfully only against China's weak air defences, and had been defeated by Soviet air power at Nomonhan in 1939.³⁹ Furthermore, senior Allied intelligence officers often discounted incoming reports about the superiority of newer Japanese aircraft, even if reported by their junior staff situated in the Far East. The Allied brass harboured racist views towards Asians and therefore underrated Japanese technical ingenuity and flying ability. Despite all reservations about the calibre of Japanese air power, however, Hong Kong commentators believed that Japan would rely on concentrated attacks against Allied aerodromes with "hordes of light aircraft" in the event of war in the Far East.

Later in the spring, Ottawa received further Allied commentary on Japan's strategic plans. McGreer reported in late May on Craigie's views about the Hull-Nomura talks in Washington and related issues.⁴⁰ Craigie agreed with the State Department's view that, if Japan were not entangled in China, it would be able to act elsewhere; conversely, American, Dutch, and British (ADB) regimes in Southeast Asia might benefit from a protracted war in China. Craigie believed that Matsuoka's presence as Foreign Minister ensured pro-Axis sympathies, and warned that the Japanese might see the proposed visit to Japan of US Republican politician Wendell Wilkie as appeasement. In the same month, British commentators in Hong Kong reiterated that Japan could not successfully drive southward until it finished its war in China, although they feared that Japan might initiate a "suicidal war" against the ADB powers if extremists had their way. They noted that the Japanese press had expressed displeasure over Roosevelt's recent "fireside chat" broadcast, in which he "reaffirmed his support of Britain and China in their struggle against the Axis."⁴¹ ADB deterrence and Chinese resistance might still check Japanese expansionism.

Overall, intelligence received from March through May provided Canadian strategists with a renewed understanding of Japan's intentions. Incoming reports alerted the Canadians to ongoing divisions within Tokyo's political spectrum, a situation that might enable the Allies to deter Japan from further encroachment in the Far East. Awareness of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact allowed strategists to reconsider the Soviet Union's role in containing Japan and to reassess the potential threat to ADB possessions in Southeast Asia. Although Japan's military capability was thought to be limited, intelligence concerning Japan's association with the Axis compelled Allied observers to consider the possibility of joint German-Japanese assaults or Japanese expansion in the Far East.

As the summer approached, anticipation of a German attack on the Soviet Union put a new focus on Far East affairs. McGreer reported on 5 June that US Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo advised against denouncing commercial treaties with Japan or blacklisting Japanese firms while delicate diplomatic conversations were in progress in Washington. It is likely that Grew anticipated a German-Soviet conflict and was trying to keep Tokyo on the Anglo-American side. In terms of deterrent measures, Ottawa learned a week later that the Americans were creating an "international air force" for service in China, including a hundred US Tomahawk fighters (which had originally been promised to Britain), along with air crew and maintenance staff. High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain Vincent Massey wrote to Prime Minister King from London on 17 June, reporting that Chungking sources pointed to a southward movement of Japanese warships, and that Lord Halifax would inform Washington of any British diplomatic moves in Tokyo, given the critical situation. On 26 June, four days after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, McGreer reported that "extremist elements" in Japan were meeting to discuss how Japan should respond to the conflict, although McGreer believed that Japan would stay neutral. A few days later, he summarized Japanese press reaction to the German-Soviet war. The editorials expressed surprise at Germany's move, but stated that Germany would probably defeat the Soviet Union within one to two months; Tokyo would have to take time to decide its position.⁴²

The Hong Kong intelligence report that month observed that continued support for China was now even more vital to the Soviet Union's interests. What if Japan violated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact while the Red Army was tied up in Europe? On a positive note, the report speculated that the German-Soviet war might bring about further cooperation between Nationalists and Communists in China. In its view, the current conflict now gave Japan three options: join Germany and take the Soviet Union's Far East provinces, push southward and take the NEI and Indochina, or cut Axis ties and reach an understanding with Britain and the United States (the final option was considered least likely). In terms of Japanese naval movements, great activity had been observed in the waters north of Hong Kong following the breakdown of NEI-Japanese trade negotiations, and a Japanese convoy was sighted heading towards the Pescadores. It appeared that Tokyo was "sabre rattling" in the face of American, British, Chinese, and Dutch (ABCD) encirclement.⁴³

In July, several diplomatic messages pointed to Japanese expansionism and a fresh war scare. McGreer reported early in the month that Japan was considering an extension to its territorial waters. Rather ominously, the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo had evacuated its women and children. On 12 July, Norman Robertson sent Prime Minister King a report derived from US Navy intelligence sources:

all Japanese ships were recalled west of the Panama Canal, and Japan might declare war on the Soviet Union after 1 August; Robertson gave credence to the first item only, however. He also informed the Prime Minister that London had reported a week earlier that 20 July was a probable deadline for Japanese aggression, according to US Navy sources. It was thought that Japan might move north against Siberia, south against the NEI, or southwest through Indochina, the last prospect being the most likely. The Canadian High Commission in Canberra confirmed that judgment when it reported that Japan would drive southward on 20 July and had cancelled shipments of goods to Australia. In addition, London informed Ottawa that Japanese troopships and warships were operating in the South China Sea. Robertson even sent King a situation report on 15 July, indicating that messages from Washington, London, Tokyo, and Canberra all pointed to an imminent Japanese move, probably southward: "A most likely immediate objective would be the seizure of naval bases in French Indo China, followed very promptly by the establishment of a protectorate over Thailand." Most alarming, on 17 July McGreer informed Ottawa that the Japanese Cabinet had resigned the night before and that Japanese forces had begun a large-scale mobilization.⁴⁴

Incoming reports now focused almost exclusively on the prospect of a Japanese advance to the south. Massey reported from London on 22 July that the British War Cabinet believed a Japanese southward strike was imminent. The next day, London sent Ottawa a complete assessment on current affairs: Germany was expected to reach Moscow in three weeks and to take control of western Russia in six to eight weeks, whereas Japan was expected to move southward into Indochina, although Japanese action against the Soviet Union was still a possibility. London offered an update on 24 July: Japanese troop movements and naval activity suggested a movement towards southern French Indochina, particularly Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. It eventually became clear that Japan had indeed begun its occupation on 24 July, just four days after the date that Allied intelligence had predicted.⁴⁵

Diplomatic reports now commented on the implications of Japan's southward advance. In late July, London issued several reports on the military aspects of the advance into southern French Indochina. In a telegram to King from London on 30 July, Massey reported Japan's new demands on other Far East powers: it wanted the Soviet Union to demilitarize Vladivostok and Thailand to become a closer ally. The next day, Massey sent King another telegram, reporting further evidence of intrigue between Thailand and Japan. He also expressed London's disappointment with Washington's mild application of the asset freeze against Japan at a time when Britain was cutting all trade. At the end of July, Canadian officials could take comfort in the knowledge that Canada had always imposed



From left to right at centre: Malcolm MacDonald, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, and Vincent Massey visit the Canadian Army in England in 1941. Massey, Canada's High Commissioner in London, sent Ottawa detailed reports about the war in Europe and developments in the Far East. MacDonald would soon perform that role in Ottawa, where he was sent as Britain's High Commissioner. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, C-064026. Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2010.*

the strictest trade sanctions against Japan and would continue to do so while London and Washington quibbled.⁴⁶

The Hong Kong intelligence report that month confirmed that "the political spotlight in the Far East" had shifted to Indochina, where Japanese forces had occupied southern bases. Once again, British commentators speculated on whether Japan would strike northward or southward, but believed that Japan would approach its decisions with more urgency in light of the recent US-led asset freeze. It was difficult to guess Japan's intentions, since more troop movements had occurred in both Manchuria and Indochina, but commentators remarked that Japanese strategists would be likely to await the outcome of the German-Soviet conflict before choosing which forces to deploy. Just like a

month earlier, Hong Kong faced renewed Japanese naval activity: regular Japanese submarine patrols were operating nearby. It appeared that the ADB powers had to play a waiting game in the Far East, and it was hoped that naval forces in Singapore, Manila, and Pearl Harbor would deter Japan from striking southward.⁴⁷

Finally, a convenient intelligence summary for the March-July period was provided by Colonel Brian Reginald Mullaly, a former military attaché at the British Embassy in Tokyo who later joined the General Staff of Pacific Command, a Canadian Army organization based in Esquimalt. Mullaly produced regular intelligence reports about Far East affairs, combining incoming intelligence with strategic assessments. In his report of 6 August, he confirmed much of the information already in hand at Pacific Command. Reflecting on recent events, however, he foresaw a Japanese campaign against Thailand and thence the Burma Road, noting that Hainan and Formosa had been strengthened. He also believed that Allied oil sanctions might halt a Japanese move southward for a few months, but that a complete US oil embargo would make attacks against the NEI "inevitable," given that Japan had only about a year's worth of oil reserves. In terms of threats to Canada, he suggested that the BC coastline would probably receive only "nuisance value raids" in the event of war with Japan. Mullaly appears to have benefited from his time in Tokyo; his assessment of Japan's motives and actions later proved to be remarkably correct.⁴⁸

All told, intelligence received from March through July provided Canadian strategists with advance warning of several key events, including Japan's détente with the Soviet Union, Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and Japan's entry into southern French Indochina. It was also noted that disagreements in Tokyo, war in China, and even inferior air power might limit Japanese expansionism. Many strategic questions arose during this period: How else might Japan exploit the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and, more recently, the German attack on the Soviets? Could Japan's advance into southern French Indochina be checked with an asset freeze? Would improved Allied defences in the Far East finally deter Japan from making further advances? It became abundantly clear that Canadian decision makers needed to consult with their allies and reconsider their response to Japan.

General Strategic Discussions, March-July 1941

Throughout the spring, officials in Ottawa monitored US-Allied discussions over Japan and participated in Washington conferences. On 27 March in Washington, British and US staff officers signed the ABC-1 agreement, which outlined a joint defence plan to be followed in the event of the United States' entry into either the war in Europe or a war against Japan. In early spring,

Ottawa received word from London that British officials were pressing their US counterparts to adopt a joint Anglo-American declaration that any Japanese move against US, Dutch, and British possessions in the Far East would be considered a *casus belli* (justification for war).⁴⁹ Despite Cordell Hull's personal support for such a plan, the State Department could not offer official endorsement for domestic political reasons. Nonetheless, Ottawa learned that on 27 April, American, Dutch, and British staff officers in Singapore had signed a joint-defence ADB agreement to be followed in the event of war with Japan. Furthermore, in late May, London asked Canada and the other Dominions about possible support for a Dutch initiative to make a public ADB declaration against further Japanese aggression.⁵⁰ Specifically, the Dutch wanted Japan to know that any attack on "the line running from Singapore to Australia via the Netherlands East Indies" would be considered an attack on all ADB powers. Cordell Hull believed, however, that US naval movements would be a more suitable deterrent than public declarations; as a result, Britain and the Commonwealth temporarily shelved the Dutch proposal.

McGreer in Tokyo sent a rather curious message to Mackenzie King in late May, informing him that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was negotiating with Hull without the knowledge of the Japanese Foreign Minister. McGreer, along with Craigie and the Australian Minister to Japan, had sent a telegram to London in which they expressed great concern over these diplomatic activities: if Japan freed its forces in China because of a negotiated settlement with the United States, it might turn them against Dutch or British possessions in the Far East. The Allies obviously preferred that Chiang Kai-shek continue his struggle against Japanese occupation in China.⁵¹

In the first fortnight of June, Ottawa considered Allied agreements with respect to Far East affairs. In a series of Most Secret reports and letters, Mackenzie King discussed the manner in which Canada would implement the ABC-1 agreement when the time came.⁵² He made it quite clear that Canada would act autonomously and not simply as one of four Dominions acting on instructions from Britain. He required that Canada present itself as a sovereign nation during wartime. On 16 June, London informed Ottawa of the various Allied staff talks that had occurred in Singapore.⁵³ In the event of war with Japan, the Anglo-Dutch-Australian (ADA) Plan, created in February for mutual defence in the Far East, promised coordinated control of naval and air power, as well as the demolition of any oil fields that might fall to the Japanese. In April, as noted earlier, the ADB agreement had been signed to prepare plans for military operations in the Far East on the basis of war with Japan. For Canadian officials, knowledge of these agreements was essential because Canada would be expected to support Britain if hostilities broke out in the Far East.

Following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, External Affairs considered the impact of the new conflict on Far East affairs. On 23 June, Keenleyside sent Robertson a report on the possible effects that the German-Soviet war might have on Japanese policy. He began with a disclaimer – "Under its present irresponsible national leadership it is always difficult to speak with assurance about Japanese foreign policy" – then proceeded to assess the possibilities. The Tripartite Pact did not require Japan to declare war on the Soviet Union, although Japan might use the new conflict as an opportunity to take Kamchatka, Vladivostok, the Amur region, and other Soviet maritime provinces, thereby gaining fisheries, oil fields, and strategic advantages in the north. Soviet forces – particularly submarines and bombers out of Vladivostok – would, however, offer great opposition to Japanese forces. Keenleyside also noted that Japan was unlikely to launch simultaneous attacks in the north and the south because it would face insurmountable opposition from the Soviet Union, Britain, and America. He speculated that Japan was more likely to take advantage of the German-Soviet war by minimizing northern troop commitments in preparation for a southern advance. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, along with a "temporizing policy," would, in his view, enable Tokyo "to push southward as far and as fast as possible short of provoking Britain and America to war – and otherwise to await the culmination of events in Europe." Keenleyside concluded that Japan was not ready to fight a major war unless Germany prevailed in Europe.⁵⁴

Another External Affairs report sent to Robertson discussed the possible effects of the German-Soviet war on US policy. The report observed that because "the whole future of the British, Canadian and allied cause" depended on US policy, any developments affecting that policy were of "immediate and vital interest," notably Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. In particular, the report considered the effect that the new conflict might have on American isolationists, who were divided into several groups. "Theoretical isolationists" were opposed to intervention because "democracy would be lost at home in fighting for it abroad." "Defeatist isolationists," like Lindbergh, believed that Adolf Hitler was too strong in Europe. "Pro-Nazi isolationists" would never be swayed in their views. "Anti-British isolationists," like Senator Gerald Nye or the Irish Americans, would also be difficult to convert. "Anti-Communists" might be supportive: even Winston Churchill welcomed the prospect of Soviet participation in a second front in Europe. "Communist isolationists" were most likely to change their views as Moscow's instructions changed; in particular, they would not be likely to exert their considerable influence over the labour force to impede production of US war materials if the Soviet Union remained an ally of Britain. The report concluded that Soviet participation in the war could only help the British, Canadian, and Allied cause.⁵⁵

Later in the summer, an External Affairs report on "Canadian-Russian Relationships" noted that Canadian public opinion had shifted following Germany's attack on Russia. Canadians wanted full diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the release of "anti-fascists" and labour leaders who were being held in internment camps in Canada following a ban against the Communist Party of Canada in 1940. Now the thinking was that Canada should support the Soviet Union because a German victory would expose the Dominion to a Pacific attack. Moreover, the report concluded that it was "a vital Canadian and Allied interest to keep Russia in the war against Germany" because the Eastern Front would become a constant drain on German resources and a launching ground for a final assault. Otherwise, the Allied outlook would be "dark indeed," as Germany might solve its blockade problem, move its vital industries further away from Royal Air Force attacks and "hold Europe for years to come." The comments could not have been more insightful: the Soviets did indeed tie up German troops in a lengthy war of attrition in Eastern Europe, and then made a tremendous contribution to the final assault on the territory of the Third Reich.⁵⁶

In sum, these reports provided Canadian officials with several ready-made conclusions about the effects of the German-Soviet war. Japan would take advantage of the war as much as possible, particularly in terms of a southward drive, but would not engage the Western powers until the war's outcome was more certain. It was in Allied interests to keep the Soviets in the war for as long as possible: Britain could only benefit from an Eastern Front in Europe, and public opinion, particularly on the left, appeared to favour an alliance with the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union on board as an ally, even American public opinion might be swayed to a degree. Canadian officials serving in Washington were also getting the impression that Roosevelt would do his best to support the Soviet Union as a prelude to active American participation in the war.

On the domestic front, Mackenzie King may have used the new crisis to justify his absence from a proposed prime ministers' conference in London: he decided instead to tour Pacific Coast military, naval, air, and industrial establishments. On 25 June, he shared his thoughts with Roosevelt in a letter written on a train bound for British Columbia: "There is no doubt in my mind about the wisdom and necessity of my remaining here at present, if Canadian unity is to be maintained and our war effort to continue to gain the momentum which I hope and believe it will."⁵⁷ The President responded a week later, hinting at US support for the Allies: "I feel that if the Russians should fail to hold out through the Summer, there may be an intensified effort against Britain itself, and especially for control of the Atlantic. We may be able to help a good deal more than

seems apparent today.”⁵⁸ The Soviet Union’s participation appeared to be vital to the war’s outcome.

Canada and the Allies considered another worrisome development that summer – Japan’s move into southern French Indochina. On 15 July, when Norman Robertson informed Mackenzie King that such a Japanese move was imminent, he also reminded the Prime Minister that the Allies, along with the United States, had contemplated a “parallel” export embargo against Japan, including an asset freeze. Five days later, McGreer urged the Prime Minister to announce the appointment of a new Canadian Minister to Japan for “psychological” effect and to encourage anti-Axis elements in Japan. Although his telegram did not mention the subject, McGreer no doubt wanted out of Japan because Japanese authorities had not yet cleared him of espionage charges they had levied against him earlier in the year. Nevertheless, he had to remain in Tokyo because Cordell Hull asked the Prime Minister to maintain existing diplomatic appointments as a show of solidarity for the forthcoming American-led asset freeze against Japan. Ultimately, Canada’s decision to join the asset freeze, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, was declared promptly after it learned of US participation the day after Japan entered southern French Indochina.⁵⁹

Not surprisingly, Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was extremely concerned over that move by Japan. Following this latest push, he corresponded frequently with King, emphasizing the need for US assurances, British capital ships operating east of Suez and in Singapore, and the neutrality of Thailand.⁶⁰ He suggested that all Dominion prime ministers attend the Imperial Conference in London, but King made it clear that he was “needed” in Canada. On 30 July, Menzies contacted the entire British Commonwealth and implored London to encourage Washington to provide assurances of US military assistance in the event of war with Japan, which he believed would deter Japan from initiating such a conflict. If US support was denied, he cautioned, then “Japan will engage in policies from which at a later stage she cannot withdraw without a serious loss of face.”⁶¹ The tone of Menzies’s various missives suggests that Australia was exceptionally vulnerable in the South Pacific; an Anglo-American alliance had to be forged before it was too late.

External Affairs also considered the gravity of the situation in its report on 28 July, entitled “Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan.” The report was the result of a meeting that External Affairs held with a special committee of representatives from various government departments, the armed services, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Once again, Commander Barry German, who had represented Canada at the ABC-1 talks, appeared as a

specialist in Asian affairs. The committee discussed shipping and economic questions, trading with the enemy, financial measures, embargoes, diplomatic questions, censorship, defence measures, internment, and the prevention of race riots. Considering this agenda, it is clear that committee members took the threat of war with Japan quite seriously. They formed several conclusions about actions to be taken in the event of war. Pacific shipping, particularly neutral shipping, would be carefully controlled. The Canadian Parliament would decide on Canada's declaration of war with Japan, even if Britain issued a war telegram stating that Britain was at war with Japan. Finally, "all persons of Japanese race" in British Columbia would undergo compulsory registration, a move that would be extended to other provinces. The committee intended that Japanese nationals in Canada would face the same treatment as German and Italian nationals.⁶²

Viewed critically, the report appeared to reflect the inclinations of the Mackenzie King government. In the event of a Pacific War, control of Pacific shipping, deemed necessary for national defence, would keep Canadian resources in Canada. Ottawa would make independent war declarations in an ongoing display of Canadian sovereignty within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Compulsory registration of Japanese Canadians, and possible internment, would not only match existing conditions for "Axis nationals" across Canada but also satisfy the Pattullo government in British Columbia and public opinion in that province. In wartime Canada, foreign policy and defence measures were often inextricably bound with domestic issues.

Conclusions

Canada studied Allied strategies to contain Japan and had a preference for combined deterrent action as a means of avoiding war. During the Princeton Conference and the Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference, Canadian observers noted that both US and British officials advocated the containment of Japan but wanted to avoid war in the first instance. Initially, economic sanctions and military deterrence were seen as the answers. It became quite evident to Canadian observers that British officials were almost begging their American counterparts to reinforce Singapore as well as Pearl Harbor, although US deterrent measures were restricted to the latter. In terms of incoming information, Canadian strategists learned about the extent of concern over the war scare of early 1941. Despite this, they contented themselves with remaining as observers and made limited plans, which included careful diplomacy, ongoing economic sanctions, and the withdrawal of Canadians from the Far East in the event of war. Subsequently, intelligence sources revealed divisions within the Japanese political spectrum, which suggested that Allied deterrent actions might still be

a viable option. Advance warning of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the German-Soviet war gave strategists extra time to plan for Japan's next expansionist move. Intelligence sources even predicted that move, Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina, which permitted advance planning for an Allied-American asset freeze, one that Canada would fully support. Together, these events compelled Canadian strategists to renew their preparations for war with Japan. Even so, the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King wanted to avoid confrontation with Japan because it feared the prospect of a war without US participation.

In the early months of the Far East crisis, the Pacific powers were able to develop their strategies during a period of relative inactivity and international deadlock, but subsequent developments in the Soviet Union and French Indochina renewed a sense of urgency. In terms of Canada's role as a Pacific power, we must now examine specific actions that Canada took in 1941 to avoid conflict with Japan, even though some of these actions, notably the asset freeze, paradoxically carried the risk of provoking Japan beyond the threshold.

Avoiding Confrontation with Japan: Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Hong Kong

AFTER JAPAN SIGNED THE Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers in the autumn of 1940, the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King was compelled to consider economic sanctions, Pacific Coast defences, the treatment of Japanese Canadians, and the withdrawal of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo. During the Allied conferences that followed, Canada monitored the debate over possible responses, including deterrent actions, encirclement, and war preparations. Besides general strategic discussions, several specific deterrent measures came under close scrutiny by Ottawa in the initial months of the Far East crisis.

This chapter considers how Canada used diplomacy and deterrence to avoid confrontation with Japan in 1941. Critical issues that year included Canada's response to Britain's request for neutral ship inspections in the Pacific, diplomatic replies to Japan's charges of Canadian espionage, ongoing economic sanctions against Japan, and Canada's stationing of troops in Hong Kong. Throughout, Canada continued to adhere to its fundamental strategy: it sought to avoid confrontation with Japan until active US support was assured, but met its commitment to Britain by participating in all measures against Japan that it regarded as deterrence, short of encirclement.

Neutral Ship Inspections

Early in 1941, Whitehall caused much anxiety in Washington and Ottawa over its proposal to intercept neutral vessels on the high seas. On 14 January, London informed Prime Minister King that British officials were trying to persuade Washington to permit British interception of "blockade runners" operating in the Caribbean and the Americas, including Japanese ships. Neither Secretary of State Cordell Hull nor Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles agreed to the British proposal because of the diplomatic risk involved. On 25 January, British officials requested that Canada divert the Japanese vessels *Seia Maru* and *Takaoka Maru* to Vancouver for inspection, since both vessels were suspected of carrying contraband materials for Germany. The next day, Hugh Keenleyside advised Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs O.D. Skelton that such actions could provoke Japan into taking retaliatory measures against Canadian ships. Keenleyside believed that a clear understanding with both Britain and the United States was required, and that E. D'Arcy McGreer in

Tokyo should discuss the matter with US Ambassador Joseph Grew: "Mr. Grew's advice would, in my opinion, be of greater value than that of the British Ambassador."¹

King wrote to the Canadian Legation in Washington at month's end: "We are naturally anxious to prevent contraband from reaching Germany ... We do not wish however to participate in any activity which would result in dangerous developments in the Far East or untoward incidents on our own Pacific coast." He reminded Legation staff that nothing must further antagonize the feelings of many British Columbia residents against the "large Japanese population in Vancouver." Furthermore, he pointed to the lack of Canadian armed ships on the Pacific Coast and the limitations of local "land forces." Clearly, the Prime Minister wanted to avoid any unilateral action against Japanese shipping in the Pacific.²

In February, however, messages exchanged between Ottawa, Washington, and London discussed the interception of Soviet and Japanese ships. Early that month, Britain proposed that Canada intercept the Soviet vessels *Azerbaijan* and *Minsk*, due to sail from San Francisco to Vladivostok with oil thought to be destined for Germany. Another telegram from the Dominions Office in London to King explained just how important it was to intercept Japanese vessels on the Pacific Coast. Reportedly, 80,000 tons of contraband had been shipped to Germany through the Pacific route. Furthermore, Whitehall wanted Canada to intercept the Japanese vessels *Awata Maru*, *Seia Maru*, and *Takaoka Maru* for inspection in Vancouver. Merchant M. Mahoney, Counsellor at the Canadian Legation in Washington, sent two messages to Norman Robertson, who had succeeded Skelton as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, concerning American reactions. Officially, the State Department offered no comment regarding neutral ship inspections occurring outside the "Panama Safety Zone." Off the record, however, Mahoney had learned that some people in Washington, such as economic advisor Herbert Feis, were quite pro-British, while others, such as Justice Felix Frankfurter and special advisor Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, were pro-Russian, the latter favouring "a conciliatory policy" towards the Soviet Union. In other words, the Americans might remain indifferent to British interception of neutral ships as long as the Soviets were not offended.³

Ottawa continued to debate the issue. In a message to Mackenzie King on 11 February, Keenleyside argued that no Soviet ships should be intercepted because the Pacific situation was tense and the Soviet Union might be pushed further into the Axis orbit. Accordingly, two Canadian corvettes near San Francisco were told to stand down. On the same day, the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa advised King to refuse Britain's request due to the risk of war in the Far East as well as "the meagre British naval forces in the Pacific, the inadequacy

of coastal defences in British Columbia, and the presence there of a large Japanese population." That day, King sent a telegram to London outlining the Canadian position, emphasizing "the risk of providing Japan with a possible excuse for retaliatory action, if not a pretext for war," and expressing uncertainty over the US reaction in the event of war between the British Empire and Japan. London persisted, however, and sent a memorandum to Washington concerning Soviet contraband trade to Germany via Vladivostok: if the Canadians would not be swayed, then maybe the Americans would. Later that month, the Canadian Legation in Washington sent Ottawa a copy of London's memorandum, entitled "Exports to Russia." External Affairs in Ottawa noted that the Americans refrained from altering shipping policy despite the memorandum's compelling arguments.⁴

In March, King decided to put an end to the question of neutral ship inspections. British authorities had recently requested that Canada intercept the Japanese ship *Asaka Maru*, which was believed to be carrying Japanese naval personnel bound for Berlin. In his diary entry for 5 March, King commented on the implications of the whole British scheme: "I felt very strongly war was coming between Japan and Britain; that the United States was not likely to go into it immediately ... We must be careful to see that Canada is not made the scapegoat for what will involve both Britain and the United States in a war with Japan."⁵ He would not assent to any scheme that would make Canada responsible for a Pacific War.

In a telegram to London a week later, King explained his position once again:

In view of the continuing uncertainty as to precisely what action the United States Government would take in the event of war between the British Empire and Japan, it appears to us to be of the highest importance, as you have emphasized in your messages regarding the "Asaka Maru," that if war must come with Japan it should be as a result of clear aggression on her part and not under any circumstances attributable to British or Canadian provocation.⁶

Quite craftily, he made one concession to Whitehall in the event of excessive contraband trade, stating that "we are prepared to agree that vessels intercepted by United Kingdom ships in the Pacific may be diverted into Canadian West Coast ports." Mackenzie King and his Cabinet War Committee were unwilling to risk taking overt actions against Japan while US support was uncertain: Washington did not appear eager to enter a Pacific conflict initiated by the British Commonwealth. He gambled that Britain was just as unwilling to take such a risk unless Canada offered more support – no Soviet or Japanese ships were diverted to Canadian ports for inspection.

Dealing with Charges of Espionage

Avoiding confrontation with Japan also meant avoiding diplomatic controversy. One of the more difficult moments in Canadian-Japanese relations began when Japanese authorities accused Fr. Marcel Fournier, a Canadian Dominican priest serving in Hakodate, of lewd acts and espionage. Japanese authorities made frequent accusations against Europeans residing in the Japanese Empire, often focusing on missionaries, who were among the most visible signs of Europe's contact with Asia. McGreer, in his capacity as acting Canadian Minister in Tokyo, sent a telegram on the matter to Mackenzie King in early February 1941: "Father Fournier is being held on sex charges involving a Japanese boy. In addition, he has been most indiscreet in asking questions concerning military movements, although this is of secondary importance. Efforts are now being made to secure his release." In May, McGreer sent King an update: "I was informed that there is concrete evidence of his having been engaged in espionage, and that sex charges are now of secondary importance. The delay in bringing him to trial is due to the fact that some fifty Japanese are involved, and have had to be questioned." Japanese officials claimed that Fournier had committed acts of espionage from September 1938 to July 1940, and had made derogatory remarks about the Japanese Army in China.⁷

By August, the Japanese had implicated McGreer in the espionage charges. Early in the month, Robertson wrote to King: "The Japanese Government, apparently, are about to proceed with the trial of Father Fournier on a charge of espionage, basing their case on a letter McGreer is alleged to have written him, asking him to procure military secrets. The charge is utterly fantastic and the letter a forgery." Japanese police believed that the British Embassy in Tokyo had written the body of the letter but that McGreer had signed it. In Ottawa, Robertson told Japanese Minister Yoshizawa Seijiro that Prime Minister King would speak to him and insist on a withdrawal of the charge along with an apology to McGreer. Meanwhile, King commented on the matter in a telegram sent to McGreer: "Prime Minister will see Japanese Minister tomorrow and insist on withdrawal of allegation of your complicity in so-called espionage activities. In view of critical nature of general situation it has been decided to postpone projected appointment of new minister." McGreer would stay on in Tokyo. The Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa took the case seriously enough to outline the McGreer-Fournier allegations at its meeting of 6 August. A month later, McGreer was cleared of the allegations; Fournier later faced a reduced sentence. Certainly, no evidence exists to support any of the allegations made against Fournier. King had managed to avoid a major diplomatic row with Japan, but the Japanese would continue to be suspicious of state-sponsored espionage by foreigners residing in their country.⁸



E. D'Arcy McGreer (right), chargé d'affaires at the Canadian Legation in Tokyo from 1938 to 1941, rejoins family members in Montreal following his internment in Japan, 26 August 1942. McGreer, who had provided Ottawa with valuable insights into the Far East crisis, was fortunate to be repatriated upon the outbreak of hostilities: the Japanese had accused him of espionage, although the charge was unfounded. *The Gazette (Montreal)*, Library and Archives Canada, PA-108352.

Perhaps as a result of the McGreer-Fournier allegations, Mackenzie King hastened the evacuation of Canadians still living in Japan or in Japanese-controlled areas. In August, McGreer had reported that 296 Canadians, mostly missionaries, were still living in Japan and in the Mukden district of Manchukuo. The next month, King advised McGreer to consult with the British about evacuating the remaining Canadians on incoming vessels, and evacuations occurred throughout September and October. King was not going to endure any further diplomatic or political risks with respect to Canadians residing in the Japanese Empire.⁹

Economic Sanctions against Japan

Canada imposed tough economic sanctions against Japan as part of an Allied effort to halt Japanese expansionism and to avoid future confrontation. As early

as December 1940, Ottawa participated in discussions on the formation of a common economic policy towards Japan. A week before Christmas, G.F. Thorald, an official at the British Embassy in Washington, sent a report on the subject to M. Mahoney, his counterpart at the Canadian Legation. Thorald conveyed Whitehall's view that Japan should be deprived of strategic materials through a common economic policy imposed by the Allies and, if possible, the United States, a plan that Whitehall's Ministry of Economic Warfare had originally formed in November 1940. He reported that the British Embassy had contacted Dr. Hornbeck of the State Department and asked about the holding of talks between the US, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Commonwealth on the subject of "parallel policies." Hornbeck believed that it would be less embarrassing to limit the discussion to the British Embassy and the State Department than to share information among many representatives, because "the Japanese would get to know of it and regard it as a dangerous attempt at encirclement." Other views could be represented in the form of a private panel. Thorald invited the views of the Canadian government and recognized that Canada had already imposed greater export restrictions against Japan than either the United States or the rest of the British Empire. Within a day, Mahoney informed Prime Minister King of the Thorald-Hornbeck initiative. Canadian representatives would later join their Commonwealth counterparts in Washington to discuss the economic encirclement of Japan.¹⁰

British authorities also appealed directly to Ottawa. The British High Commission in Ottawa informed King on 20 December that "Empire Governments" were in general agreement about Far East economic policy. The Commonwealth could impose export controls on trade with Japan while soliciting US co-operation. Apparently, US and British officials had addressed these issues as early as 22 October 1940. King was also given a "blockade list," which itemized all materials and commodities that might be denied to Japan through export controls. A week later, the British High Commission informed him that iron and steel scrap exports to Japan from all parts of the British Empire had been halted on the pretext of Allied needs. The Prime Minister was asked whether Canada would adhere to the "blockade list" but this was unnecessary: he and his External Affairs staff were committed to full economic sanctions against Japan. It was a measure that would please both Whitehall and anti-Japanese protesters in British Columbia while leaving Canada's export trade relatively unaffected.¹¹

Canadian officials later discussed the manner in which a common economic policy could be applied against Japan. From Washington, Hume Wrong, Counsellor to the Canadian Minister, reported to King on 13 February 1941 that the Americans were now more interested in the scheme. He also passed on

Whitehall's request that the Canadian government enter into discussions with the Commonwealth and the United States. Wrong reminded the Prime Minister that Canada's strict export controls against Japan would not be likely to require further adjustment. At the same time, he echoed Hornbeck's concern over the need for discretion: "The preservation of secrecy is obviously of great importance in order to avoid giving new occasion to stimulate Japanese complaints of encirclement. In consequence, it is necessary to avoid anything in the nature of a conference, and to keep the conduct of the discussions on the plane of informal negotiations." King replied on the same day, pointing out that Canada and the US were now coordinating export policies to a greater degree and that, in his view, other governments would probably have to come up to Canadian levels of control. He also advised against NEI participation in the initial round-table discussions, due to critical conditions in the Far East. Finally, he cautioned that US agreement to a common economic policy would best be achieved through ad hoc discussions with experts rather than through the pursuit of a clear statement of US policy. Mackenzie King knew better than anyone else how to exercise the fine art of political persuasion.¹²

Underscoring the importance of economic sanctions, in mid-February London sent Ottawa a report on "Japan's Economic Position in the Event of War," written by the Ministry of Economic Warfare three months earlier. The report summarized Japan's available currency exchange, food supply, textiles, chemicals, coal, iron, steel, metals, alloys, machinery, shipping, and fuel. It estimated that Japan annually consumed 4 million tons of petroleum for civilian use and another 2 million tons for military use. It was thought that the Japanese Navy would need 4 million tons annually to wage war in the Pacific. Significantly, Japan imported about four-fifths of its required petroleum, principally from the US. The report also analyzed two hypotheses: (1) the US enters a war against Japan and applies both military and economic pressure, and (2) the US does not enter a war against Japan but applies economic pressure. If the US did enter the war, Japan's food, iron, and steel would be adequate for one or two years, but its petroleum stocks would last for only nine months of active warfare. Under these conditions, Japan would face increasing economic problems after the first year of war and disastrous problems before the second year was out. If the US did not enter the war, Japan's food, iron, and steel would be more secure but its petroleum stocks would still not last, provided that the NEI oil refineries would be destroyed before being conquered. Ongoing Anglo-American embargoes would stress Japan's currency situation despite its continued trade with South America. From the British perspective, economics appeared to suggest that US military involvement was essential in a war against Japan.¹³

Meanwhile, Canada had become embroiled in a "wheat crisis" with Japan. Months earlier, it had restricted shipments of strategic metals to Japan, notably copper. The question of controls on wheat had been raised in October 1940, when both Japan and the Soviet Union had asked to buy Canadian wheat. On 31 January, Robertson sent King a memorandum on Canada's export policies as compared with those of Britain, Australia, and the US, concluding that Canada had imposed the strictest trade sanctions against Japan. The very next day, Keenleyside sent another report that made a strong case against restricting wheat exports to Japan; he reminded the Prime Minister that Canada already had the strictest policy against sending war materials to Japan and that critical diplomacy with that country might suffer if more controls were imposed. Despite this, when Japan ordered 20,000 tons of wheat on 3 February the shipment was delayed, and a week later the Cabinet War Committee raised questions about an earlier sale of 50,000 tons of Canadian wheat to Japan. This earlier shipment was delayed until Cabinet informed the Wheat Board of its views. Finally, on 13 February, Cabinet imposed export permits to restrict such trade. Thus, despite Keenleyside's initial opposition, a total of 70,000 tons of Canadian wheat was denied to Japan.¹⁴

For its part, Tokyo applied diplomatic pressure. On 10 March, McGreer informed King that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had lodged an official complaint about Canada's export policies. Japanese officials wanted Ottawa to grant export permits for 70,000 tons of Canadian wheat that had been ordered by the Mitsubishi Company, arguing that wheat was not a war material and that Japan was suffering from food shortages while Canada had surplus grain. McGreer explained that the surplus wheat was reserved for northern China, to which the Japanese replied that northern China was in the same economic bloc as Japan. Canadian export restrictions against Japan remained in effect.¹⁵


Japanese protests continued into April, when King found a compromise solution. To begin with, he met with Japanese Minister Yoshizawa, who complained that all trade with Canada had effectively ceased: wheat, wood, and strategic metals, namely, copper, were all restricted. King explained that he had to prevent trouble in Vancouver, where locals were protesting against the loading of cargo for Japan. He also reminded Yoshizawa that Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke's visits to Berlin, Rome, and Moscow had hardened Allied feelings towards Japan. Moreover, he claimed that both McGreer and British Ambassador to Japan Sir Robert Craigie believed that Canada's position was being misrepresented in Tokyo. In response, Yoshizawa pointed to radical elements in Japan that thought the British Empire was trying to starve Japan. Finally, King and Yoshizawa spoke briefly about the need to prevent the outbreak of war.¹⁶

Next, King spoke to all Members of Parliament from British Columbia, both Liberal and opposition, explaining how it was necessary to continue trade sanctions against Japan in support of British policy, particularly since Canada had recently rejected Britain's proposal to intercept neutral vessels in the Pacific. The Prime Minister and the MPs reached a compromise: Japan would receive a final wheat shipment of 70,000 tons because those orders had been placed just before Canada imposed export permits. Canadian farmers would profit in the short term and British Commonwealth policy would be honoured in the long term. King shared the welcome news with Yoshizawa, but emphasized that war must be avoided. He warned that any Japanese attack against British possessions might provoke a US response. American sentiments were divided over active participation in the Atlantic, but a Pacific War would be likely to change matters. King reported that Yoshizawa was inclined to agree. Once again, the Prime Minister had manoeuvred Canadian foreign policy to meet domestic needs while maintaining visible support for British objectives.¹⁷

After speaking to Yoshizawa, King reassured London that Canada was on board with strict export controls. In late April, he informed London of his talks with Yoshizawa, emphasizing that he had justified Canada's export controls as a necessary means of avoiding protests in British Columbia. He reminded London that Canada's export controls against Japan, the strictest in the Commonwealth, included copper, lead, nickel, mica, cobalt, and scrap metal, not to mention wheat and wood. He also advised consultation with the Americans and suggested that Britain abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. In early May, he reaffirmed his views in a secret telegram to London. For the moment, Mackenzie King appeared to be London's "little soldier" in Ottawa; he had exceeded all British expectations in terms of economic sanctions against Japan. If compliance with British policy did not undermine Canadian domestic priorities, Whitehall could count on Mackenzie King.¹⁸

In conversations with their Allied counterparts, Canadian officials now considered imposing even stricter economic sanctions against Japan. Such a move would be the next step in isolating Japan, although some thought it was premature. In early June, McCreer reported from Tokyo that Craigie and the Australian Minister to Japan were in agreement with US Ambassador Grew's advice against imposing further economic measures while American-Japanese talks in Washington were in a delicate phase. McCreer did say, however, that his fellow diplomats believed that a common economic policy against Japan should be formed so that it could be readily applied when the time came.¹⁹

That moment arrived when Japanese forces moved southward in French Indochina. As we have seen, Robertson informed King on 15 July that such a move was imminent and that, in response, the Americans and the Allies were



In the summer of 1941, the prime ministers of the British Dominions debated the possible outcomes of their asset freeze against Japan. All urged caution, but still considered sending more troops to the Far East as a deterrent measure. They are shown here at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, 1 May 1944. From left to right: Mackenzie King (Canada), General Jan Smuts (South Africa), Winston Churchill (Britain), Peter Fraser (New Zealand), and John Curtin (Australia). Library and Archives Canada, C-068672.

considering imposing a parallel export embargo and asset freeze against Japan.²⁰ Robertson believed that such actions would not be significant for Canada because Canadian export controls were already strict and Japanese assets held in Canada were quite small. Nonetheless, he arranged to delay "all Japanese applications for the withdrawal of capital from Canada" over the next few days.²¹ Furthermore, External Affairs informed the Dominions Office that the Canadian government had agreed to allow Britain to give Japan notice of termination of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. King even told London on 23 July that he supported the Allied plan to participate in the proposed US

asset freeze against Japan "for political and psychological reasons."²² He also promised to consider imposing restrictions on future Japanese imports under the terms of Canada's War Exchange Conservation Act.

Other parties, however, wanted to delay action until US support was assured. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies informed the Commonwealth on 23 July of the absolute need for US commitment to sanctions against Japan. On the same day, the Canadian Legation in Washington told Ottawa that the Americans wanted to wait for Japan to strike: "United States Government do not propose to take action until they are satisfied Japanese have committed overt act in Indo China." These delays irritated Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in London, who vented his frustration a day later in his diary: "These stupid Dominions of course get cold feet, and don't want to freeze Japanese assets without an assurance of support from [the] U.S. They must know that they can't get this." Anyone reading American press reports knew that Washington had to tread carefully because it understood the risks involved in a full asset freeze. A few days earlier, Roosevelt had said at a press conference that cutting all oil shipments to Japan would be likely to lead to war in the Pacific. On the evening of 24 July, however, the day Japan began its occupation of southern French Indochina, the Americans finally announced an official asset freeze against Japan, effective 26 July.²³

Canada was the first Allied nation to announce its support for the US-led initiative. On 26 July, Ottawa informed Tokyo that it was terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which had been in effect with Britain since 1911 and with Canada since 1913: this treaty would cease to have effect in twelve months' time. Canada would not suffer economically from its immediate response: an External Affairs report sent to Mackenzie King confirmed that Canada's support for the asset freeze would be more psychological than material because, quite apart from strict export controls, Canada's imports from Japan had been reduced to a minimum over the past three years. Between 1939 and 1941, exports to Japan had fallen by 95 percent and imports by 52 percent. Effectively, Ottawa had already shut off Japanese trade. Indeed, Canada could only benefit from the asset freeze, since America would now be responsible for any ensuing breach with Japan.²⁴

Not surprisingly, Yoshizawa requested an immediate interview with King to protest Canada's actions. On 27 July, at the Prime Minister's Kingsmere estate, Yoshizawa expressed his grief over Canada's support of the Anglo-American asset freeze and asked whether Canada had acted on its own. King confirmed that Canada had participated in Allied discussions about collective security but that the final decision had been Canada's. Yoshizawa justified Japan's expansionism: Japan was denied raw materials from the American, Dutch, and British

(ADB) powers, particularly Dutch oil and rice, and could have concluded the China Incident if that nation had not received unfair assistance from Britain and America. He compared Japan's occupation of French Indochina with the US occupation of Greenland. Furthermore, he emphasized that Japan had not received advance warning of Hitler's plan to attack the Soviet Union. Mackenzie King deflected Yoshizawa's criticisms and reminded him that Japan would suffer through its association with Nazi Germany. The Yoshizawa-King talks illustrated the profound differences in viewpoint between Japan and the Western powers. Japan believed that it had been unjustly encircled and deprived of resources, whereas the West saw economic sanctions as an appropriate response to Japan's brutal war in China and its occupation of French Indochina. It was a recipe for war in the Pacific.²⁵

Over the next two months, Canadian officials ensured that the asset freeze would bite. On 5 August, Yoshizawa requested assurances from Ottawa that Japan would receive payment for goods in transit from Japan to Canada. Ultimately, some payments were made, but no further imports were permitted. On the same day, Robertson informed King that Cordell Hull wanted Canada to reconsider its decision to appoint a new minister to Japan. Hull believed that Tokyo might interpret such an action as a sign of "divergent views" among the nations participating in the asset freeze, particularly Canada and the US. He emphasized that King's relationship with Roosevelt allowed for the " frankest exchange of views." What Hull did not know was that King faced another diplomatic problem with Japan. As we have seen, the Japanese government had not only accused McGreer and Fr. Fournier of espionage but also attempted to implicate the British Embassy in Tokyo. King appeared to believe that McGreer would be cleared and that the asset freeze had to take precedence. He bowed to Washington's request and kept McGreer in Tokyo as a show of Allied solidarity. In September, Yoshizawa finally acknowledged Canada's refusal to permit Japanese cargo vessels to call at British Columbia. Later in the month, the Prime Minister underscored the point when he told Yoshizawa that the SS *Boris*, a cargo ship bound for Japan carrying 7,400 tons of scrap metal belonging to the Mitsui firm, would have its cargo unloaded and sold, possibly in Canada or the US. Canada's participation in the asset freeze was complete.²⁶

Meanwhile, the Dominions Office sent Ottawa a revised estimate of Japan's economic condition with the Allied asset freeze in full effect. Once again, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had considered all aspects of Japan's industrial and raw-material production. Its report stated that Japan produced enough food to be self-sufficient for two to three years, produced about 9 million tons of steel annually, and produced 1 million tons of oil out of 7 million tons required annually for a full war footing. It estimated that Japan had sufficient oil stocks

to engage in full war for ten to twelve months. It noted that in response to Allied economic sanctions, Japan was improving its blast-furnace capacity, mining in Manchukuo, and machine-tool production. Japan could also rely on Chinese and Korean labour in the event of war. It could not completely replace the resources it had lost through the asset freeze, however, and, in any case, could not match Allied oil and steel production. The United States alone produced ten times as much steel and iron as Japan. Japan was reportedly under economic strain due to its war in China, maintenance of the Manchukuo Army, reduced export trade, and expanding industries, including raw-material production. Specifically, it laboured under the economic drain of its own military might, including the army's twenty-two divisions stationed in China, the navy's acquisition of resources and merchant shipping, and the estimated 2 million men serving in Japan's armed forces. From the Allied perspective, if the asset freeze failed to deter Japan from aggression, then economics would limit the duration of a war that Japan could wage.²⁷

Historians continue to question the motives behind the US-led asset freeze, which many regard as the turning point in the Far East crisis. For example, Michael Barnhart argues that the Americans initially feared provoking Japan into further expansion but by July 1941 believed that such expansion was inevitable and imposed the freeze to slow Japan's progress.²⁸ According to this view, the Americans believed that it was too late for effective deterrent measures. In contrast, Waldo Heinrichs argues that the Roosevelt administration instituted the freeze to provoke Japan into moving south against resource-rich targets in Southeast Asia instead of moving north against the Soviet Union: Roosevelt regarded Soviet participation as crucial to the war's outcome in Europe and wanted to safeguard its interests.²⁹ Heinrich regards the asset freeze as an act of willful provocation.

As we have seen, however, some Allied and American commentators of the period believed that the asset freeze would either bring Japan to terms or compel it to go to war. This assessment proved to be rather insightful, given that Japan later considered both options. We also know that in August and September 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoye sought to renew US-Japanese negotiations but was rebuffed by Roosevelt. In November, the Tojo government offered to withdraw a limited number of troops from China in exchange for a resumption of trade. It was only after the Americans rejected the proposal on 26 November (owing to grave concerns over China's plight) that Japan proceeded with its war plans, which had been prepared well in advance in anticipation that the US-Japanese negotiations would fail. It seems that the asset freeze enabled the Americans to influence the timing of war with Japan, although with more control than Barnhart has suggested. It is beyond the scope of this book

to examine Heinrich's view that Roosevelt chose to bait Japan into a southward drive, but he presents a tenable argument that few historians have challenged. Finally, we may conclude that Ottawa regarded the asset freeze as a means of deterring Japan in accordance with Allied strategy and as a basis for increased US intervention in Far East affairs, which posed little economic or political risk to Canada.

Hong Kong as a Deterrent Factor

Military deterrence in the Far East was another consideration, and the question of Hong Kong had been debated for quite some time in British circles. According to historian Brereton Greenhous, some British strategists considered the defence of Hong Kong a matter of honour, despite the colony's vulnerability. In 1938, for example, Britain's Cabinet Committee for Imperial Defence debated the matter in light of the Sino-Japanese War: "Our prestige in the Far East would seriously suffer if we showed ourselves ready to surrender the Colony to Japan without striking a blow in its defence."³⁰ In February 1939, the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that in the event of war, it was "almost certain that Japan would attack Hong Kong," but strategists had to decide whether or not the colony could be defended.³¹ In August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff reinforced the opinion that the colony had to be held as a matter of honour, even if losses were minimized by limiting troop placements: "Hong Kong is not a vital interest and the garrison could not long withstand Japanese attack ... In the event of war, Hong Kong must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible. We should resist the inevitably strong pressure to reinforce Hong Kong."³²

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff debated the issue in January 1941. Churchill opposed the reinforcement of Hong Kong:

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us, there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale ... We must avoid frittering away our resources on untenable positions. Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous.³³

Some of the service chiefs disagreed, however. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, wanted a larger garrison in Hong Kong: "It seems no longer a question of reducing our losses in Hong Kong but of ensuring the security of places that will be of great value in taking

offensive action at a later stage of war."³⁴ Brooke-Popham argued that two extra battalions would make Hong Kong more defensible, encourage China in its resistance to Japanese aggression, and serve as a strategic deterrent to Japan. Rear-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff at the Admiralty, believed that Hong Kong could be "properly defended with 15-inch guns and everything else we can put there."³⁵ Despite Churchill's views, there was a growing view in certain quarters that Hong Kong just might be defensible.

Canadian involvement in Hong Kong really began in the late summer of 1941. In August, Major-General A.E. Grassett, a Canadian who had served as Commanding Officer of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force since November 1938, retired from his Hong Kong command and returned to London via Ottawa. Several years earlier, he had agreed that the defence of Hong Kong involved unjustifiable risks, but he had changed his opinion in 1939, arguing that defence was now viable due to inferior Japanese military training.³⁶ In Ottawa, Grassett expressed these views to his old classmate at Royal Military College of Canada, Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, Chief of General Staff. According to Crerar, Grassett informed him that "the addition of two or more battalions to the forces then at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it."³⁷

In London, Grassett asked the British Chiefs of Staff about a Canadian contribution to Hong Kong. Major-General Sir John Kennedy, Director of Operations, opposed sending reinforcements, but his peers did not share his view. On 10 September, the British Chiefs of Staff finally agreed to Grassett's proposal, believing that two or more battalions "would have a very great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and it would show Chiang Kai-shek that we really intend to fight it out at Hong Kong."³⁸ The Chiefs also thought that Canadian reinforcement of Hong Kong would complement British-Australian reinforcement of Malaya and American reinforcement of the Philippines: together, these moves might serve to deter Japan from further expansion. In this way – in a move that was more political than military in nature – the plan to send Canadian reinforcements to Hong Kong was born. The plan initiated by Grassett and backed by the British promised to provide deterrent value while maintaining British honour and prestige at an outpost in the Far East.

All that was lacking was official Canadian assent to an official British request. On 19 September, the Dominions Office sent External Affairs a formal request for two Canadian battalions to be sent to Hong Kong. The request explained that the reinforcements would "increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the actual numbers involved" and boost morale in the Far East, while providing reassurance to Chiang Kai-shek that Britain intended to hold

Hong Kong.³⁹ C.G. "Chubby" Power, acting Minister of National Defence in J.L. Ralston's absence (he was on holiday in the United States), along with Lieutenant-General Crerar, agreed to Britain's request. At a Cabinet War Committee meeting on 23 September, Prime Minister King received their recommendations. The next day, Crerar wrote to Ralston that "the dispatch of troops was ultimately a political as well as moral decision" and that it was "an important link in imperial co-operation."⁴⁰ During a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 2 October, King was reluctant to agree with the plan, which he thought might later be used as an argument for overseas conscription, but the urgency of Britain's request compelled him to reconsider.⁴¹ The fact that Canada had recently rejected Britain's request for Canadian troop reinforcements in North Africa also put pressure on Canadian officials. That same day, External Affairs informed the Dominions Office that Canada had officially agreed to Britain's request.

Although it is tempting to condemn Canada's judgment about sending reinforcements to Hong Kong in light of the tragedy that followed, the decision must be viewed in its proper context. As we have seen, a growing number of British and Canadian strategists saw deterrent value in Hong Kong, even up to the autumn of 1941. This is not necessarily surprising: the asset freeze raised the risk of war, but some thought that it might still bring Japan to terms. The Allies were well aware that the Konoye government had sought to renew negotiations with Washington in August and September. Deterrence seemed a viable option when the decision was made.

Canadian military officials created "C" Force, two battalions comprising 1,975 Canadian soldiers from the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers regiments, to serve in Hong Kong. Chubby Power had a personal interest in the selection of the Royal Rifles from Quebec: his own son served in that regiment. Brigadier J.K. Lawson was appointed commander of "C" Force. On 16 October, the Directorate of Military Intelligence in Ottawa sent Lawson the latest intelligence reports from Shanghai and Hong Kong along with information on the Japanese Army.⁴² After brief preparations, the contingent set sail from Vancouver on 27 October aboard HMT *Awatea* and HMCS *Prince Robert*, arriving in Hong Kong on 16 November.

As the Far East crisis unfolded in November, British and Canadian officials tried to rationalize using Canadian soldiers to reinforce Hong Kong. Early in the month, the British Chiefs of Staff sent Brooke-Popham a message in which they evoked the themes of Allied deterrence, British honour, and imperial solidarity:

It has now become possible for USA and ourselves to take a more forward line in the Far East ... Our reinforcement of Hong Kong will show China that in spite



Infantrymen of "C" Force, Royal Rifles of Canada, aboard HMCS *Prince Robert* en route to Hong Kong, 15 November 1941. At Britain's request, Canada sent reinforcements to Hong Kong, believing that they might deter Japan from further expansion in Southeast Asia. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-166999.*

of other commitments we intend to fight it out at Hong Kong and it will also have salutary effect on Japanese ... Canada, by providing these troops, will be accepting wider commitment in imperial defence similar to that assumed by Australia in Malaya.⁴³

Canadian officials also prepared a draft announcement of "C" Force's arrival in Hong Kong to remind Canadians that the government welcomed this "further commitment" to the war effort and to collective security: "In view of her position as a Pacific Power, Canada has a special interest in the question of security in that area."⁴⁴ On 16 November, Mackenzie King noted in his diary that the timing of the arrival of the reinforcements was good, since they arrived in Hong Kong

just before Kurusu Saburo, the new Tojo government's special envoy, arrived in Washington for talks.⁴⁵ For the Prime Minister, the upcoming talks bolstered the potential deterrent value of the Canadian battalions.

Furthermore, there was no doubt that the residents of Hong Kong welcomed the Canadians. A Dutch construction engineer based in Hong Kong offered the following account: "Somehow, their arrival apparently cinched Hong Kong's complacency. In 1939, nobody had thought Hong Kong could be defended successfully. After the arrival of the few thousand Canadians, everybody felt that the Crown Colony could and would be defended successfully. It was a psychological miracle I am unable to explain."⁴⁶ Perhaps the "miracle" involved basic denial of Japan's military capability, an attitude fostered by government authorities. In any case, the Canadian reinforcements satisfied public opinion in Hong Kong while meeting imperial requirements.

But what exactly were those imperial requirements on the eve of the Pacific War? By late November, it was obvious to Allied observers that war was coming and that no deterrent measures were going to make Japan alter its course of action. After 26 November, according to multiple sources, the Allies anticipated Japanese strikes in Southeast Asia. According to postwar anecdotal evidence, some even anticipated a Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor. To explain why the Canadians remained in Hong Kong on the eve of the anticipated war, we must look at the Allied rationale for stationing them there in the first place. Deterrence was no longer viable by late November, so we are left with British honour and imperial solidarity. In the military culture of the period, Hong Kong could not be abandoned without a fight. One Canadian analyst expressed this view in assessing a Far East intelligence report that suggested that troops should never have been sent to Hong Kong.⁴⁷ In the British Empire of 1941, one did not simply evacuate a doomed outpost, for honour had to be upheld in the face of defeat. In terms of imperial solidarity, the Canadian troops served as an example of collective security and wider participation in the war.

The men in Hong Kong would have to pay a real price for the ideals of honour and imperial solidarity. On Christmas day in 1941, "C" Force, along with its British and Indian counterparts – a total of 14,000 troops – surrendered to the Imperial Japanese Army, which had committed 52,000 troops to the battle for Hong Kong. "C" Force suffered about 40 percent casualties and survivors suffered lengthy imprisonment: of the 1,975 Canadians, 550 never returned home.⁴⁸ For Mackenzie King, the tragedy was the result of Britain's inappropriate request for Canadian troops. For Churchill, who had originally argued against reinforcement, the troops were there to provide defence only in a nominal sense. In Canada, accusations would later be made that the Canadian battalions had not received adequate training, equipment, or intelligence reports, all of which was

quite true, but the cruel fact remained that no token Allied force was going to win the day against a massive Japanese land attack.⁴⁹ Allied assessments had come to that conclusion years before, and by late November 1941 "deterrent measures" had ceased to be an issue. Canadian and British soldiers were in Hong Kong to uphold military honour and to ensure that the anticipated Pacific War was seen as a cause worthy of full Allied participation. They were not alone in this regard: British Malayan forces faced about 100,000 Japanese soldiers, and US forces in the Philippines faced about 50,000. In the end, however, both the British Commonwealth and the United States were committed to maximum effort in the Far East.

Conclusions

Canada participated in Allied strategies to contain Japan provided that these strategies promised deterrence, not provocation. Accordingly, Canada blocked Britain's attempts to establish a system of neutral ship inspections in the Pacific. It also carefully avoided the potentially damaging consequences of Japan's charges of espionage. Canada would not risk being seen as responsible for derailing the diplomatic process.

Meanwhile, the Dominion enthusiastically supported Allied and American economic sanctions against Japan because it could afford to do so, both economically and politically. Canada had already cut most of its trade with Japan, and its participation in further Allied sanctions was more symbolic than material. It was known that the US-led asset freeze, which Canada fully supported, would either bring Japan to terms or compel it to go to war. From the Canadian perspective, the asset freeze might still deter Japan, but in any case would serve as a basis for further US intervention in Far East affairs. Even if the asset freeze led to war with Japan, US participation appeared to be assured. Japan would lose all its imported US oil, about 70 percent of its total requirements, and would regard America, not Canada, as its principal antagonist.

As we have seen, Canada met Britain's request to provide troop reinforcements to Hong Kong because Allied commentators initially believed that doing so would have deterrent value. Some thought that Allied troop placements throughout the Far East might discourage Japan from further expansion. Moreover, the Konoye government sought a rapprochement with Washington during the period when the decision was made to reinforce Hong Kong. In late November, however, when the imminence of war undermined the deterrent value of the troops, it was too late to withdraw because British honour and imperial solidarity were at stake.

While it is clear that Canada supported Allied measures that were thought to have deterrent value, it is questionable whether Britain saw all proposed

measures as deterrence rather than encirclement. Following secret economic and naval conferences with the Americans, which the British had proposed in December 1940, Britain proceeded to pressure Ottawa for neutral ship inspections in the Pacific. If Canada had participated in such inspections and come into conflict with Japan, would the United States have rushed to its side in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and President Roosevelt's Kingston Address? Certainly, Mackenzie King did not think so. Did all Allied strategists want the asset freeze to succeed in deterring Japan? If the outcome was war with Japan, at least there would be a much greater probability of active US participation. We must conclude that some British strategists really did see reinforcement of Hong Kong as a deterrent measure, even if they were later proven wrong. All told, British strategy appeared to involve deterring Japan while exploring every opportunity to secure US co-belligerence through a Pacific incident. Towards that aim, Britain's decision to abstain from the delicate negotiations with Japan in Washington would leave the US solely responsible for any diplomatic breach.

In summary, Canada fulfilled its role as Britain's senior ally in the Commonwealth, supporting Allied strategy in the Pacific far more often than moderating it. After the asset freeze, Canada was free to pursue a more vigorous Far East policy because US participation appeared to be assured. But what choices would Japan make? The next chapter examines Canada's role in Allied strategic planning during the critical months following the asset freeze against Japan, a period that could have ended with a favourable diplomatic settlement, a stalemate, or hostilities in the Pacific.

Reassessing the Far East Crisis after the Asset Freeze, August to October 1941

FOLLOWING THE ALLIED-AMERICAN freeze of Japanese assets in July 1941, Canada and the Allies had even more reason to pay close attention to Japan's actions and to evaluate strategy concerning the Far East: the asset freeze would either deter or provoke Japan. This chapter examines Canada's intelligence and strategic planning related to developments in the Far East from August through October 1941, a period that witnessed Japan's attempts at rapprochement with the United States through renewed talks between Japanese Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, development of the Anglo-American special relationship at the Atlantic Conference, and a Soviet-Japanese war scare. During this period, Canada maintained a high level of awareness through domestic and international intelligence sources, with additional input from Canadian observers situated in the Far East. After careful consideration of US and Soviet influences on Japan's actions, Canadian strategists reluctantly concluded that war with Japan might be unavoidable.

Intelligence Available to Canada

Intelligence arriving in Ottawa after the asset freeze dealt with Japan's domestic politics, foreign policy, troop and naval dispositions throughout the Far East, military capabilities, and possible interest in attacking the Soviet Union. Intelligence during this period also addressed Allied-American defence production, a factor considered relevant to developments in the Far East. Several reports indicated that political tensions were evident in Tokyo, although the Japanese economy was coping for the moment. On 18 August, Pacific Command interviewed George B. Spain, a businessman in Japan who had close ties to Japanese industry, and produced a report a week later. According to Spain, the Japanese were still receiving some oil shipments from the Netherlands East Indies and were using occupied China for agriculture (local Chinese industry was being destroyed). Surprisingly, Spain did not seem to think that the Allied embargo would affect Japan materially or financially, except in the silk industry. He offered the following political assessment: "The Japanese admire the Germans ... and still believe that the Germans will eventually win ... Prince Konoye is the only man holding the country together at this time. There is every indication of dissention in political and Civil Service quarters, between the police and the

militia, and between the Army and the Navy, who are constantly at logger-heads." Spain believed that the recent cabinet shake-up had occurred because some politicians wanted to attack the Soviet Union. He asserted, however, that there was "never any hint in his presence, of an attack on the BC Coast." He also criticized the Japanese public: "The civilians are like sheep. They have to be taught to be loyal and the lessons have to be repeated constantly or they will be forgotten. The man in the street does not dare to express himself." George Spain saw Imperial Japan as a repressive, unimaginative regime, but one that appeared to be self-sufficient.¹

In September, Ottawa received mixed reports about Japanese political tensions. Early in the month, Hume Wrong, still serving at the Canadian Legation in Washington, contacted the British Embassy for information about the Far East and passed it on to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson. Reportedly, Japan wanted to renew negotiations, but Secretary of State Hull was resistant, believing that China would rather fight Japan to the finish than accept a negotiated settlement through US intervention. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye was believed to be reluctant to make official protests about US shipments to Vladivostok because prompt opposition from Washington might cause him to lose face with Japanese militarists. W.P. Hasselman, a Dutch national who had lived in Japan and who had recently been interviewed by Pacific Command, reinforced this view, and also predicted the downfall of the Konoye government, which was not considered "sufficiently aggressive" by Japanese militarists. According to Hasselman, "when this change in government takes place it will be the forerunner to war." In contrast, Colonel B.R. Mullaly, the former military attaché in Tokyo, sensed a lowering of Japanese political tensions. By this time, he was producing regular reports entitled "Comments on Developments in the Far East." On 15 September, he noted the increased "prestige" of the Konoye cabinet, as well as the increased moderation of the Japanese press during the ongoing US-Japanese talks. At month's end, Mullaly reported that the US, supported by the British Empire, would likely drive a hard bargain with Japan, even though Japan had prohibited mass meetings of the extremist, pro-Axis *Tohokai* party and had temporarily halted any southward moves in Southeast Asia. From the Anglo-American perspective, Japan's intentions were difficult to fathom while the Tokyo government remained so divided.²

Canadian observers soon revised their assessments of Japanese domestic politics when militarists came to power in Tokyo. On 16 October, Mullaly reported the resignation of the Konoye cabinet and cautioned that the US-Japanese talks were now the only means of averting war: "We are faced with the greatest crisis in history in the relations between Japan and the British Empire and the

United States, and the next few weeks, or even days, may mark the slide of another quarter of the world into the abyss of war." Two days later, he commented on General Tojo Hideki, the new Japanese Prime Minister, who also retained the War Ministry and Home Office portfolios. According to Mullaly, Tojo was anti-British, pro-Axis, pledged to ending the China Incident, and desirous of completing the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Mullaly suggested that Tojo's first actions might include terminating the US conversations and attacking Siberia: "His character and pro-Axis sympathies make his accession to the Premiership a danger to the peace of the Far East and the future of Japan's relations with the Democracies." E. D'Arcy McGreer, Canadian chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, offered his own appraisal of the new Tojo cabinet, which he regarded as a "stop-gap" rather than a war cabinet. Even so, Japanese militarists now had a greater voice in the Tokyo Diet.³

As for Japan's foreign policy, incoming intelligence pointed to growing Axis associations. On 18 September, the Department of National Defence (DND) in Ottawa received rather disturbing information that later formed the substance of a report entitled "German Inducements to keep Japan loyal to the Tripartite Pact." The report was based on a letter from Shanghai that had been intercepted in Hong Kong and was believed to be the product of a "Chungking Government Intelligence Officer." It outlined the German government's guarantees to Oshima Hiroshi, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin:

- 1 Germany will support Japan with manpower and material resources.
- 2 Germany may send 1,000 planes and pilots to help Japan against China.
- 3 Germany may send a military delegation to Japan to give advice on how to carry out a "lightning war."
- 4 Germany is in agreement with and sympathetic towards the Japanese Co-prosperity in Asia.
- 5 Japan should start military operations in Siberia when Moscow falls into German hands.⁴


Unless the letter was simply an attempt on Chungking's part to attract more allies to its cause, this news represented a serious challenge for Far East diplomacy. Germany appeared to be offering complete military support to Japan, particularly in the event of a Japanese first strike against the Soviet Union. A more general conclusion might be that a war initiated by Japan might bring in Germany, just as British "Special Intelligence" had indicated since August.⁵

British Army staff in London provided more information on Japan's foreign policy in their weekly "Intelligence Notes," which were shared with the Canadian

Legation in Washington. In October, the new Tojo government was seen as being only superficially moderate in terms of its commitment to continuing negotiations with Washington. Despite Tojo's declared support for the Axis nations, however, some reports suggested that German-Japanese relations had deteriorated. British analysts saw Thailand as the object of Japanese interest because of its proximity to the Burma Road: "It may perhaps be significant that *Japan* refused to make a Non-Aggression Pact with *Thailand*, as we did and as she did with *Russia*." It was also reported that Japan sought to increase its Hanoi garrison, although Vichy France refused to permit it. With respect to Japanese-Soviet relations, Japan's outlook kept pace with the Soviet Union's fortunes in the European War: "Although General *Tojo* is said to be an ardent Russophobe, it is hardly likely that Japan will attack Russia, except the latter collapses completely under Germany's invasion, until the China 'incident' has been ended." In essence, British analysts focused on threats facing China and British possessions in the Far East.⁶

Ottawa also received information about Japan's deployment of forces throughout Southeast Asia. In August, External Affairs received a series of circular reports from the Dominions Office that confirmed Japan's military build-up in the region. In French Indochina, Japan had reportedly occupied more aerodromes, moved heavy bombers into Saigon, and stationed two army divisions in the south. It was later observed that Japan continued to reinforce air and naval bases in French Indochina with troops, in accordance with its "agreement" with the Vichy government. Other reports commented on Japan's troop concentrations and additional aircraft along the Manchukuo-Soviet border. On 20 August, the Dominions Office assessed the strength of Chinese and Soviet opposition to a potential Japanese assault. It believed that the Chinese had strengthened their forces along the Indochina border in anticipation of a Japanese attack against the Burma Road at Kunming. The Dominions Office also thought that Japan could not succeed against the Soviet Union unless that country collapsed or withdrew part of its Far East armies, which were considered to be larger than Japan's land forces. Through all these reports, Canadian officials learned that Japan was consolidating its position in Southeast Asia at a time when the Soviet Union was suffering from German advances along the Eastern Front. It was still difficult to decide whether Japan would strike towards the north or south.⁷

In his interview at Pacific Command in September, W.P. Hasselman provided commentary on the disposition of Japan's armed forces. He believed that Japan had "enormous oil storage sufficient for from 2-5 years of total war" (although the actual figure was two years or less). He predicted that Japan's new military



Canadian-made Valentine tanks, bound for the Soviet Union, are loaded onto railway cars at Angus Shops, Montreal, in late 1941. During autumn that year, Canada met Britain's request to supply munitions to the Soviet Union, which had been engaged in fierce combat with Germany since June and now faced the possibility of war with Japan. The Allies regarded Soviet participation as crucial to the war's outcome. *National Film Board of Canada, Library and Archives Canada, PA-174520.*

bases, constructed to secure its position in China and the Far East, would probably be ready in December so that an attack could be launched anytime thereafter, although he believed that the timing depended on developments in the German-Soviet war. In terms of possible battle locations, Hasselman considered the Burma Road to be the main objective, but he also considered the case of Singapore: "If however the U.S. were to disclose the intention of declaring war if Japan were to move in any direction or if the Mediterranean were to be lost to the British the attack would immediately be directed against Singapore." In general, the Hasselman interview pointed to the possibility of Japanese attacks against targets in Southeast Asia, including the Burma Road and Singapore, anytime after December.⁸

Further reports examined Japanese activity near critical borders. In early September, the Dominions Office estimated that Japan had sixty-one divisions throughout Southeast Asia, with about a third of these in Manchukuo, so it might still move north. Later that month, Colonel Mullaly cautioned that Japanese army divisions shifted to Manchukuo posed a threat to the Soviet Union, that the Japanese were conducting "manoeuvres" along the Thai-Indochina border, and that they were infiltrating Thailand using agents posing as businessmen and tourists. He also warned that the Vichy French (for whom he had nothing but contempt) were protesting against Japanese breaches of the Vichy-Japanese joint defence agreement in French Indochina. On a more hopeful note, he reported that the Burma Road was once again in use and that the Chinese Air Force was being reinforced with US aircraft and air crew, apparently without an immediate Japanese response. According to the Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report issued at the end of September, the Far East situation had stabilized for the moment: Japanese naval movements had subsided and the Combined Fleet remained in Japanese waters. The report also noted that activity around Hong Kong had decreased: "Things have remained very quiet on the *Hong Kong* border, where it is believed that the Japanese total about 5,000 men." Despite the reported lull in activity at month's end, most intelligence arriving in Ottawa throughout September suggested that Japanese forces were poised for any kind of action in Southeast Asia.⁹

A few intelligence reports arriving in Ottawa offered assessments of Japan's fighting capability that were based, in part, on racist assumptions. George Spain reported on 25 August that the Japanese Navy was inferior to Allied-American forces because modern naval improvements had not yet reached Japan and "the Japanese were adept at copying but unable to make innovations on their own." In early September, DND circulated its "Notes on the Japanese Army" to officials in both Ottawa and Washington. The DND report assessed Japanese military capability, supply strength, command, and morale. It declared that malnutrition contributed to poor Japanese physique and eyesight: "The common diet of rice and raw fish is neither a bone nor a body-builder; and this physical weakness is common to large masses of the people. The Japanese as a whole have also poor eyesight, which probably derives from generations of unbalanced diet." The report deemed that Japanese training and morale were good, although corruption in the Japanese army in China affected morale on that front. The exact strength of Japan's "Army Air Service" and "Fleet Air Arm" was not known, but the report praised Japanese pilots: "There is no reason to believe that the Japanese are not good fliers and good pilots. They are carefully selected from both the Army and the Navy, and the personnel who qualify are required to fulfil exacting standards." This positive appraisal of Japanese pilots seems quite

unusual in a report that generally subscribed to the racial stereotypes of the period. Overall, incoming intelligence underestimated Japan's naval and military fighting abilities, as well as the physical condition of its people.¹⁰

Pacific Command's interview with Hasselman contained similar flaws. Like many of his contemporaries, Hasselman underestimated Japanese air power. He believed that Japan's air force had improved considerably, "probably under German instructors," but could not match Allied air power: "Fighter planes are definitely poor. There are huge bombers which look good but appear to be slow. The difference between the Japanese Air Force and the U.S. Air Force at Honolulu was most marked. The Japanese Air Force could not stand up against the U.S. or British." In retrospect, it is significant that he compared Japanese air power with US forces in Honolulu, apparently having considered the possibility of action in the mid-Pacific. On Japanese soldiering, Hasselman opined: "The soldier is tough, with enormous powers of physical resistance. He is, however, very slow with no initiative ... Discipline is excellent." Regarding Japanese manufacturing, he stated that "Japan has no inventive genius. Everything must be copied. If Japan were to be isolated for 5 years it would mean a serious setback. With the necessary plans and blueprints Japan is able to produce good material, as is evidenced by the quality of their ships." Needless to say, the performance of Japanese Zeroes, aircraft carriers, and army divisions throughout the Pacific later demonstrated to any observer that the Japanese were highly innovative.¹¹

These incoming reports about Japanese capabilities reflected several Allied misconceptions. The Allies were aware of Japan's growing naval strength but had not seen it demonstrated on a large scale in recent times: the war in China had not involved large naval deployments. They overlooked Japan's development of carrier-based tactics and oxygen-fuelled torpedoes. The Allies believed that in the event of war in the Far East, Japan would dispatch only a small naval force to Southeast Asia as cover for land assaults, retaining most of its fleet in Japanese waters for home defence. They underestimated Japan's military strength because the Japanese Army had faced defeat against the Soviets at Nomonhan in 1939 and was unable to win the war in China. The Allies misjudged Japan's air force because it still used some obsolete aircraft, faced only weak opposition in China, and had lost the air battle at Nomonhan. Furthermore, senior officials far removed from Southeast Asia often ignored on-the-spot reports from staff who had observed improvements in Japanese naval, military, and air capabilities. Compounding the problem, anti-Asian racism distorted the way in which the Allies interpreted intelligence about Japan. Many persisted in believing that the Japanese had "slow brains," weak eyesight, and limited

stamina for combat. Indeed, Winston Churchill compared the Japanese to the Italians when it came to combat, calling them “the Wops of the East.” In sum, the Allies were often better prepared to estimate Japan’s choice of targets than its fighting capabilities.¹²

In October, multiple intelligence sources pointed to a possible Soviet-Japanese war, one that might draw the Allies into direct conflict with Japan. Colonel Mullaly reasoned that the German offensive in the Soviet Union, along with stalled US-Japanese talks, had encouraged Japanese extremists to lobby for an attack on Siberia. He observed that the United States was against appeasement but still hoped to avoid war with Japan. Mullaly believed that Japan’s future actions depended on the war in Russia, the US conversations, and progress in China. Later in the month, he discussed Tojo’s “encirclement” propaganda regarding the American, British, Chinese, and Dutch (ABCD) powers: *Domei*, the official Japanese news agency, advertised the need to subdue China and to complete the Co-prosperity Sphere. Furthermore, Japan was putting more pressure on Thailand. Mullaly also noted that Germany was pushing Japan to enter the war, a move that Japanese militarists were only too keen to make. He explained that a southward move would involve the Allies in a war with Japan, whereas a northward move into Siberia might not produce the same response from the Allies. On the other hand, he observed that the approaching winter season, the strength of the Soviet Far East Army, the “weakness” of the Japanese Air Force, and the “hard diplomacy” of the United States and Britain served to discourage Japanese attacks on Siberia. Any Japanese attack against the Soviet Union would be more likely to take place sooner, rather than later in the full winter.¹³

The Hong Kong intelligence report issued at month’s end also speculated on the prospect of a Far East war. Readers were informed that General Tojo, now serving as Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Home Minister, was in a strong position to mobilize Japan’s national resources. It warned that the Japanese Navy was now “fully mobilized and on a war footing.” Despite these changes, commentators believed that Japan would not act until the Soviet Union collapsed, Britain suffered reverses in the Middle East, or the United States backed down in its diplomacy; the last prospect appeared the least likely. The report assured readers that Japan had overextended its army in China and Manchuria, faced a debilitating winter in Siberia if it moved north, and risked interception of its sea communications by strong Allied submarine forces if it moved south – an Allied victory appeared to be almost a foregone conclusion. The report also commented on a Soviet estimate of Japanese troop strength in the north, where it was claimed that Japan had thirty to thirty-three divisions

in Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin: "This is considered insufficient for more than a localised attack on *Vladivostock*." The confidence expressed in the report was surprising, to say the least. If Japan had committed that number of divisions to an assault on Siberia, then the Soviet Far Eastern Army would have faced a grave challenge. It is possible that British commentators took solace in Stalin's inflated estimates of Soviet strength in the Far East.¹⁴

Several diplomatic reports focused on Japan's ability to strike at the Soviet Union. In mid-October, the Dominions Office informed Ottawa that Japanese shipping activity revealed the effects of Allied-American economic sanctions: since July, the number of Japanese merchant ships outside Japanese waters had fallen from 172 to 40. Over a week later, London expressed trepidation over Japan's ability to strike northward: "Japanese army is holding its own in China without great difficulty ... Japan is now in position to attack Russia on land with some prospect of success if she decides to do so." Another communiqué reported on Japan's troop strength in Manchukuo and the north, now believed to be twenty-eight divisions, and on Japan's naval preparedness: "The navy is now fully mobilized and on a complete war footing." Japan's policy was thought to depend on the outcome of German-Soviet conflict, particularly in Moscow and in the southern areas of the Russian Front. Other reports warned that skirmishes along the Manchukuo-Soviet border might result in a Japanese-Soviet war. On 31 October, however, London informed Ottawa that its ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, and the British military attaché in Tokyo now believed that "indications of a Japanese attack" on the Russian line had decreased since August: Siberia might not be an object of Japan's grand design for the Far East.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Examination Unit in Ottawa made a modest contribution to incoming intelligence, distributing several translated decrypts of messages intercepted between August and October. The unit's turnaround time from initial interception to translated decrypt had gradually improved from months to weeks, but many of its decrypts had limited intelligence value, since they concerned Japanese reactions to Western press reports.¹⁶ One message decrypted in October, however, related to the current war scare between Japan and the Soviet Union. Reportedly, Japanese Minister to Canada Yoshizawa Seijiro had cabled his Foreign Minister in Tokyo to explain Canada's support for the Soviet Union: "Canada has agreed with England's proposal to deliver to the Soviet war materials, including 'cruiser and infantry tanks,' and to manufacture and deliver war materials indicated by the Soviet, including aluminum for airplanes. Canada desires to help the Soviet with all required war materials."¹⁷ Considering tensions along the Manchukuo-Soviet border that month, any aid to the Soviet Union would have troubled the Japanese.

On a related note, some intelligence shared with Ottawa that autumn commented on American and Allied defence production – increasingly important given the threat of war in the Far East, which would tax existing resources to the limit. On 1 October, Royal Canadian Navy Captain Eric Brand commented on war production in his “North American Station Intelligence Report,” which was based on press and trade information. Brand’s sources stated that the trade embargo against Japan would not interfere significantly with either the US economy or its armaments production. In terms of US defence spending, Brand reported that President Roosevelt had prepared a defence bill worth nearly \$6 million for the US armed forces, but also faced an isolationist public: “The American public do not want war. In truth, they are puzzled, irritated and apprehensive over the concerted efforts of pressure groups who are busily laying the foundations for war sentiments.” It would seem that American interventionists, the Roosevelt administration, and William Stephenson’s British Security Coordination (BSC) faced a daunting task in managing public consent. In terms of support for the Russians, Brand noted that ships carrying war supplies from Seattle to the Soviet Union were now using the faster route to Komsomolsk, Siberia, north of the Aleutian Islands, rather than simply relying on the great circle route to Vladivostok, a move that might avoid North Pacific gales and reduce tensions with Japan. It is clear that during the Soviet-Japanese war scare of October, the Roosevelt administration continued to improve defence spending and to supply war materials to the Allies.¹⁸

To summarize, intelligence received in the aftermath of the asset freeze provided Canadian strategists with sufficient information to follow political, diplomatic, and military trends in the Far East. Initially, it appeared as though the asset freeze might still bring Japan to terms: Tokyo wanted to renew negotiations with Washington. Yet Washington’s apparent refusal to negotiate brought Tokyo’s diplomatic policy to a temporary impasse. The Roosevelt administration may have been seeking further concessions from Japan; alternatively, it may have been playing for time in anticipation of an inevitable showdown in the Pacific. Meanwhile, Japan continued its build-up of forces in Southeast Asia while hoping for rapprochement with the West. As the build-up continued, Allied commentators sought to assess not only the disposition of Japanese forces throughout the Far East, which they saw as impressive, but also Japan’s military capabilities, which they saw as limited. Intelligence pointing to the possibility of war between Japan and the Soviet Union raised concerns over the supply of war materials to the Soviets and defensive measures for Pacific shipping. According to later reports, however, tensions along the Manchukuo-Soviet border had finally subsided. What would Japan’s next move be?

General Strategic Discussions

In the immediate aftermath of the asset freeze, the Canadians studied various Allied policies and assessments. Ottawa learned in early August that Dutch officials in Batavia, Java, were disappointed that US economic measures against Japan had not been "wholeheartedly" executed. Batavia wanted more support from Washington: "If the United States expects the Netherlands East Indies to cooperate in stopping oil supplies to Japan, United States must be ready to stand by the Netherlands East Indies if Japan attacks them to seize oil fields." Meanwhile, Hume Wrong in Washington noted that the US public largely accepted the Soviet Union as a new ally, although this had weakened the demand for US intervention in Europe; the new focus was on Japan. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had assured the Soviets of ongoing economic assistance, since support for the Soviets strengthened the Allied-American position in both Europe and the Far East.¹⁹

The subject of deterrence came up once again in mid-August. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies shared his views on the matter with other Dominion Prime Ministers. Not surprisingly, he regarded Singapore and Malaya as vital outposts requiring full air and naval support. He also believed that the Commonwealth should consider any attack on Thailand as a *casus belli*, regardless of America's position, although US support was highly desirable: "If Thailand is abandoned and we delay our action we will be one country nearer to war ... We feel that if we are prepared to fight, America will not, in fact, desert us." Perhaps Japan would think twice about further expansion if the Allies showed determination and unity of purpose. The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand wrote to the Dominions, saying that he shared Menzies's anxiety over the Far East situation, but he was reluctant to regard any attack on Thailand as justification for war and believed that economic sanctions should be given a chance. Messages sent to Ottawa showed that the State Department largely agreed with the moderate position. Not everyone was ready for a showdown in the Pacific.²⁰

Some British strategists made tentative plans for such an eventuality, however. In late August, Ottawa learned of a British plan to use commercial radio broadcasts to warn British subjects of impending hostilities with Japan. Apparently, Whitehall had developed its own version of the Japanese "Winds Messages" system. If hostilities appeared imminent, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) would insert a special code sentence into its Pacific and North American broadcasts: "We hope shortly to include in our programme a talk on the development of air communications in the Far East."²¹ The main purpose of the broadcasts would be to warn the British Ambassador in Tokyo, although the entire Commonwealth would also benefit. Furthermore, on 29 August the Ministry of Economic Warfare produced a report entitled



Roosevelt meets with Churchill aboard HMS *Prince of Wales* off Placentia, Newfoundland, for the Atlantic Conference, August 1941. Mackenzie King was not invited to the conference as it focused on future cooperation between the United States and Britain during wartime, as well as the leaders' postwar aims. *United States, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 67209.*

"Mechanism of Control in the Pacific Ocean for Purposes of Economic Warfare in the Event of War with Japan."²² According to this plan, on receipt of a British war telegram, the Allies would regard the Japanese Empire, including the China coast and French Indochina, as enemy territory. Navigational controls, known as the "navicert system," would be imposed on Far East and Pacific shipping so that British authorities could search for contraband. This would depend on US cooperation, control of Japanese trade with South America, and consultation with Washington and Moscow. In essence, the plan resembled Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement, which concerned shipping controls in any theatre of operations. British officials later distributed copies of the plan throughout the Commonwealth.

The Atlantic Conference between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, held aboard ships off Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, from 9 to 12 August, was an event that Ottawa had to learn about from London rather than from direct participation. Churchill informed Mackenzie King on 6 August that he was attending a secret meeting with Roosevelt near Newfoundland, but said nothing about Canadian participation.²³ The next day, however, Churchill revealed his opinion on the matter to the Lord Privy Seal in London:

It would be a pity if anything happened to lead Mr. Mackenzie-King to join us in Newfoundland. Please make sure Dominions Office give no encouragement to any such plans. I have no reason to suppose he has any idea of coming. Trust all arrangements will be made to receive him with most cordial welcome if he arrives England before I get back.²⁴

As Britain's senior wartime ally, Canada was usually consulted on matters of Allied policy – little wonder if Mackenzie King would not wish to be ignored.

But if the Atlantic Conference dealt with wartime and postwar problems in the context of the United States' future participation in the Grand Alliance, King's absence signified the subordinate role that Canada would play following US entry into the war. In essence, the Atlantic Conference signified the beginning of the Anglo-American special relationship, one that would eventually undermine the importance of the British Commonwealth during wartime and in the immediate postwar years. Indeed, Churchill seemed to underscore that point in a telegram sent to London during the conference. He told the Lord Privy Seal on 11 August that Roosevelt's proposed joint declaration of postwar aims would "prejudice the future of imperial preference" in British trade (because Roosevelt wanted free trade) and would see the maintenance of an Anglo-American air and naval force "for a long indefinite period." For Churchill, who desperately wanted American support for the Allied cause, it was expedient to agree to Roosevelt's terms: "It would be most imprudent, on our part, to raise unnecessary difficulties. We must regard this as an interim and partial statement of war aims designed to reassure all countries of our righteous purpose and not the complete structure which we should [have] after victory." Nevertheless, in exchange for American support during wartime, Britain and the Commonwealth would have to accept American dominance in the postwar period.²⁵

For the moment, however, Canada and the other Dominions were still important allies and London provided full information on the progress that was being made at Placentia Bay. Ottawa received an important update from London on 12 August.²⁶ Roosevelt proposed a thirty-day moratorium on US-Japanese discussions, during which time Britain could reinforce Singapore while full

economic sanctions continued. He wanted the "neutralization" of Thailand and Indochina, even though Japan would not agree until it had resolved the China Incident. Roosevelt also promised to warn Japan against making further encroachments into Southeast Asia, and hinted at possible joint Anglo-American action. Later in the month, Churchill himself informed the Dominion Prime Ministers about the conference, repeating much of this information.²⁷ Furthermore, he announced that Roosevelt had agreed to a joint declaration regarding the "final destruction of Nazi tyranny," and had pledged to continue sending US supplies to both the Soviet Union and Britain. On 30 August, Churchill elaborated on Roosevelt's sense of timing regarding negotiations with Japan:

The President and State Department think it a good thing to gain time, be it 30 days or 90 days, so long as there are no further encroachments, and the Japanese seem disposed to parley on this basis. Our interests are served by a standstill, and the Japanese for their part want to know what is going to happen to Russia.²⁸

Churchill also wanted to place more capital ships in the Aden-Singapore-Simonstown triangle before the end of 1941. Anglo-American strategy appeared to involve delaying conflict with Japan until late 1941, so that Allied defences could be improved in the Far East.

In late August, King travelled to Britain, where he met with Churchill at the British Prime Minister's Chequers country residence. Churchill expressed his belief that Japan would not fight both Britain and the United States. To this end, he had asked Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference to adopt "an inflexible position" regarding Japan, although the President later avoided meeting this request. Churchill now informed King that the text of his upcoming Mansion House speech in London included an assurance of British support for the United States in the event that Japan attacked US possessions. Apparently, he wanted to offer British support to the United States in the hope that such support would be reciprocated. Not surprisingly, King expressed reservations about this pledge: it risked war with Japan without an absolute guarantee of US belligerency. What if Japan attacked the Philippines and the US Congress did not see the attack as sufficient grounds for a declaration of war? King reminded Churchill that US public opinion was still quite isolationist, despite the interest that Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox all had in active US participation. Churchill was more willing than King to take risks, however, probably because he had fewer options, given Britain's tenuous situation in the European War. In King's judgement, Churchill's strategy rested on the questionable assumption that the United States could be brought into the

war through the encirclement of Japan. King remained skeptical that encirclement would necessarily result in full-scale war in the Far East and thus ensure US involvement.²⁹

Churchill seemed to confirm his belief in that strategy during further conversations with the Canadian Prime Minister. In mid-September, King spoke to Jay Pierrepont Moffat, US Minister to Canada, about his recent meeting with Churchill in London. He wanted Moffat to tell Roosevelt that Churchill and his ministers were convinced that Britain could not win the war without US support: "Churchill himself had said he would rather lose several months of supplies and have that declaration of war than to have the additional supplies without any definite word as to the U.S. coming in."³⁰ King told Moffat that, unlike Churchill, he feared that an immediate US declaration of war against the Axis in Europe might bring Japan into the conflict. In short, he thought that Japan should be *kept out* of the war, whereas Churchill thought that Japan would choose to *stay out* in the face of a strong Anglo-American alliance. In support of King's appraisal of Churchill's views, it may be noted that Churchill's correspondence at that time reflected his belief in deterrence in the Far East. Ever mindful of the balance of powers, King and Moffat also considered the Soviet factor: they believed that if the Soviet Union lost its struggle against Germany, Japan would probably enter the war.

Meanwhile, Canadian officials took advantage of reduced tension in Far East affairs to study American attitudes and strategy. On 9 September, Hume Wrong reported on his visit to the British Embassy in Washington, where he learned more about the renewed Hull-Nomura talks.³¹ Cordell Hull apparently believed that the Anglo-American position in the Far East was bound to improve with time so that, even if the Japanese were disingenuous about negotiating in the context of the Nine-Power Treaty (which protected China from attack), avoiding an immediate crisis was still in Allied-American interests. Furthermore, Japanese forces would continue to be tied up in China because Chiang Kai-shek preferred to fight it out so as to gain the most enduring negotiated settlement with Tokyo. Later in the month, External Affairs policy advisor Hugh Keenleyside wrote a note for Norman Robertson in which he expressed concerns about US Ambassador Joseph Grew's idea of offering Japan economic benefits if it abandoned the Axis and economic exclusionism in the Far East: he felt that proof of Japan's sincerity would be needed. Keenleyside favoured the status quo in Washington: "The appeasers in the State Department are still working hard and Canadian views might strengthen the determination of Mr. Hull to adhere to his present policy."³²


In mid-September, Hume Wrong offered a more personal impression of the Washington scene:

I don't like Washington any better. I'm sick of its artificiality. Also, I am getting sick of the U.S. attitude towards the war ... If, as Roosevelt says, they are determined to destroy Hitlerism, let them get busy with destruction. They are in a thoroughly inglorious position, and lots of them are ashamed. Can't we exploit this feeling of shame without giving offence? I feel, however, fairly satisfied at last that F.D.R. has crossed the crucial watershed in his own mind and has decided that this war won't end without U.S. belligerency. I think he only got to this point recently."

To place Wrong's concerns in context, it is important to note that US public opinion still favoured isolationism, despite Allied diplomatic efforts and BSC covert operations.

Wrong wrote to Mackenzie King a week later and reported that the American public's attitude towards the war had improved but that Soviet resistance to Germany had taken pressure off Britain, thereby creating a new sense of indifference in the United States. He added, however, an encouraging note that Charles Lindbergh had become a liability to the isolationist cause: "It is to be hoped that Lindbergh has seriously damaged the isolationist cause by his latest speech, in which he described the Jews, the British, and the Administration as the three forces leading the country into war ... The America First Committee is clearly embarrassed." As a result, Wrong explained, Lindbergh had little support in the American press and had further damaged his reputation in Washington: "The supporters of the Administration will not allow the public to forget his appeal to racial prejudice." BSC-controlled interventionist groups across the United States would also use Lindbergh's remarks to great advantage. Canadian officials monitored American isolationist sentiment quite carefully because it constituted the only restraint on Roosevelt's interventionist sympathies.³⁴

Unfortunately, Mackenzie King ran afoul of US public opinion after press censors misrepresented a speech he had given in London. On 4 September, King and Churchill gave speeches about Allied solidarity at Mansion House, but British press censors omitted a sentence in King's text that revealed Churchill's presence at the function: no one wanted the enemy to know the British Prime Minister's whereabouts. The resulting modified text made it look as though King was asking for a US guarantee of Britain's security, similar to the pledge that Roosevelt had made to Canada three years earlier. As it happened, the omitted line referred to Churchill's pledge of support for the United States: "Your declaration, Prime Minister, that in the Far East, Britain would stand at the side of the United States, is a sure sign of the deepening interdependence of the free world." Hume Wrong reported from Washington a week later that the published speech had received unfavourable comment in the American press. Shortly



Churchill welcomes Mackenzie King to London, 21 August 1941. King's speech at Mansion House in London just a fortnight later created bad press in the United States, where it was believed that he had asked the US to guarantee Britain's security. The Prime Minister was not to blame, however: British press censors had inadvertently altered the meaning of the speech when they edited it for publication. *National Film Board of Canada, Photothèque, Library and Archives Canada, C-047565.*

afterwards, King wrote to Roosevelt and Churchill to convey his anxiety over the matter. In response, Roosevelt admitted that the press reports were damaging and played into isolationist hands, but offered the reassurance that they would not have a long-lasting effect. He reminded King that he had to watch public opinion and Congress "like a hawk" while increasing armed help all the time. From the Canadian perspective, the Mansion House speech would eventually be forgotten and public opinion could once again be managed through careful press releases.³⁵

Tensions along the Manchukuo-Soviet border compelled Ottawa to join Allied discussions over the prospect of using a war telegram in the event of hostilities in the Pacific. London informed the Dominions on 11 October that if Japanese actions fell within the context of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian conversations of February, a "warning telegram" could be issued to all Allied nations. That telegram could be sent if "active military counter measures" were considered. John

Curtin, the new Prime Minister of Australia, heartily agreed with such a plan and emphasized the need for intergovernmental consultation. The Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra later informed Ottawa that the Curtin government intended to cooperate fully with all Allied nations because of concerns that a Pacific conflict might spread quickly to Australia. In Ottawa, Canadian officials accepted the idea of a war telegram, but emphasized that the Cabinet War Committee would make the final decision regarding Canada's participation in a Pacific War. Towards month's end, British officials informed Robertson that further US consultation was essential in the event of war because the European powers could not exert sufficient economic and naval control in the Pacific. Robertson was reminded that Britain, in a show of Allied support, would treat Japanese attacks on Dutch, French, or American possessions in Southeast Asia in the same way as attacks on British possessions. Despite these precautions, it still seemed wise to withhold British and Commonwealth military support for a Pacific campaign until US support was assured.³⁶

Canadian officials also had to consider the Soviet factor throughout October. If the Soviet Union faced conflict with Japan while still fighting Germany, the results could be disastrous for the Allies. There was already friction between Moscow and London. Early in the month, Vincent Massey, Canada's High Commissioner in London, informed Mackenzie King that Stalin had accused the British naval mission in Russia of "indiscretions," which meant espionage. Massey also explained that London regarded the Soviet occupation of northern Persia as an embarrassment. Rather than simply occupying Persia to maintain safe Allied supply routes to Russia, the Soviets appeared to be supporting regional separatist movements in neighbouring Azerbaijan, with a view to possible annexation; the Persians were deeply displeased. Nonetheless, Canada and the Allies had to keep the Soviets in the war, and that meant material aid. As the month drew on, London reminded Ottawa that the Soviet Union had been promised Anglo-American military equipment. In addition, London asked Ottawa to send Canadian wheat shipments to the Soviet Union through both Pacific and Atlantic routes, stressing that Britain could not assist with shipments to Vladivostok; the Canadians later met this request.³⁷

On 31 October, King advised London to delay a declaration of war against Finland, Hungary, and Romania, an action that Moscow had requested the Allies to take, because he felt that it might indirectly affect the situation in the Far East. The Prime Minister argued that a declaration of war against countries attacking the Soviet Union might "pre-judge" a future Allied decision over whether or not to declare war against Japan if that country attacked the Soviet Union – the Allies should not create a precedent. He also argued that a declaration of war might affect US public opinion by virtue of sympathy for

American Finns, Hungarians, and Romanians. London acknowledged his views, although pressure from Moscow persisted. For Mackenzie King, Soviet requests had to be entertained whenever possible, but not at the expense of Far East diplomacy or US participation in the war.³⁸

Meanwhile, Canadian officials made other preparations with respect to the Far East crisis. On 9 October, the Cabinet War Committee officially approved the July report on "Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan," and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff soon added their own approval. Furthermore, Norman Robertson advised the Cabinet War Committee on 21 October of four decisions to be made if war broke out, which he posed in the form of questions. Should the Canadian armed forces engage Japan? Should Canada terminate communications with Japan? Should the RCMP intern a small number of Japanese Canadians "for cause"? Should the Japanese Legation and Consulate be closed? The next day, the Cabinet War Committee met and considered Robertson's advice, but also heard other views. King offered answers to the four questions: receipt of a British war telegram would not be taken as a signal for Canadian forces to attack Japan, unless the Canadians had already been attacked; termination of communications would depend on their nature; the RCMP *should proceed* with internments; and Japanese offices in Canada would be closed if Canadian offices in Japan had to close. Not surprisingly, the Cabinet War Committee adopted all of King's "suggestions." Some committee members also considered Japanese strategy. For example, the Associate Minister of National Defence believed that hostilities would probably commence "without any formal declaration of war, possibly by a Japanese attack on Vladivostock." Canadian officials were now taking the threat of a Pacific War quite seriously.³⁹

Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa also turned its attention towards Allied preparations for a conflict in the Pacific, rather than reporting exclusively on Japanese tactics.⁴⁰ As early as 11 October, British Admiralty "Most Secret" telegrams informed Ottawa that the American-Dutch-British (ADB) agreement might be invoked against Japan and that a "warning message" would be sent to all ADB powers in the event of Japanese aggression.⁴¹ Later in the month, NSHQ informed the Admiralty and the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) in Singapore that its "Japanese merchant shipping intelligence," gathered from D/F (direction finding) and "Y" (cryptanalysis) sources, could be made readily available on request. NSHQ further requested that all ships passing through the Panama Canal from the Pacific make reports on unknown ships directly to British authorities in Panama, rather than simply informing the US Navy. NSHQ also informed intelligence staff in Vancouver, Seattle, and San Francisco that five Soviet ships at harbour in Seattle could receive communications books from Vancouver. The Admiralty informed NSHQ that US naval

authorities in Balboa (Panama Canal Zone) and Honolulu would begin transmitting British shipping messages simultaneously on low and high frequencies. Furthermore, it informed NSHQ and the Pacific intelligence community that a ship crossing from Manila to Hong Kong would be provided with British "cruiser-escort."

Naval messages exchanged between Esquimalt, Ottawa, and Washington indicated that war between Japan and the Soviet Union was possible and might affect North Pacific shipping. On 23 October, the Royal Canadian Navy asked NSHQ to request permission from Washington to establish North Pacific refuge anchorages on the Alaskan coastline for the *Columbia*, a Swedish merchant vessel that planned a great circle routing from Esquimalt to Vladivostok; permission was granted the next day.⁴² All told, Allied naval preparations included the possible implementation of the ADB agreement, improved intelligence reporting, provision for secure maritime communications with the Soviets, US naval communications support in the Pacific, British naval escorts in Southeast Asia, and refuge anchorages in the North Pacific.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of the asset freeze against Japan, Canadian strategists considered war with Japan to be increasingly likely. Incoming intelligence revealed that Tojo's militarists had displaced the moderate Konoye government, and that Japan had consolidated its position in Southeast Asia and could even threaten Russia. Yet active American support for the ADB powers, an Allied objective and the absolute cornerstone of Canada's Far East policy, remained elusive. The Roosevelt administration clearly wanted to intervene in Far East affairs, having already imposed an asset freeze against Japan and issued a fresh warning to Japan about further encroachments, but the powerful American isolationist lobby would simply not acquiesce. Mackenzie King felt its potent force when he faced hostile US press reactions to his Mansion House speech in early September. Canada and the Allies would have to wait, particularly since Roosevelt had promised Churchill a moratorium on Japanese-American negotiations. The escalation of Soviet-Japanese tensions in October only served to drum home the message: even if it had resulted in an early Pacific War, the Allies could not count on American belligerency. Apparently, only a Japanese strike on American targets would bring that about.

The period from August to October 1941 also saw Canada's own strategic role adapt to the requirements of the unofficial Anglo-American alliance. Canada not only maintained constant contact with Britain and the US, often serving as a bridge between the two, but also attempted to dovetail its own policies with those of its allies. Again, Canada would not take any action that prejudiced its

ability to avoid war with Japan until US support was assured, even advising Britain against declarations of war on Finland, Hungary, and Romania for attacking the Soviet Union because such actions would create a precedent. In terms of war preparations, Canada was treated as a full member of the Allied community during discussions over Thailand, economic warfare, and the war telegram, but the Atlantic Conference, which Canada was not invited to attend, indicated that its role as Britain's senior ally was likely to end soon. Once the United States entered the war, Canada would play a more subordinate role, but that moment had not yet arrived. In the meantime, while deterrent measures against Japan continued unabated, Canada would prepare to defend its Pacific coastline.

6

Guarding the Coast: Canadian Defence Strategy for the North Pacific

THE PACIFIC COAST HAD both military and political significance for the government of Mackenzie King during the Second World War. Military strategists had long predicted the possibility of a Japanese or a Soviet North Pacific campaign involving coastal raids, submarine attacks, or island hopping through the Aleutians. Political strategists viewed Pacific Coast defence as a possible means of keeping Canadian troops at home and avoiding the issue of overseas conscription.

This chapter discusses military strategy formed by the Canadian armed services working in conjunction with Ottawa and Washington, including general defence strategy for the Pacific Coast, cooperation between the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) strategy. Canadian strategists considered potential threats from Japan and the Soviet Union, planned for joint Canadian-US defence of the Pacific Coast, and proposed to improve coastal surveillance. They also examined the "problem" of the Japanese Canadians in British Columbia. The Dominion government sought to address public opinion about the Japanese Canadians even as it attempted to maintain a few civil rights for the Asian community. In 1941, Canadian strategists, working closely with their American counterparts, not only prepared for coastal and North Pacific raids by Japan but also sought to reduce opportunities for espionage through the relocation of the Japanese Canadian community, a move that acceded to anti-Asian racism in British Columbia.

Defence Strategy for the Pacific Coast in 1941:

The Japanese and Soviet Factors

Canadian authorities considered the defence of the Pacific Coast on several occasions in 1941, sometimes drawing on British strategic assessments. In early January, the British High Commission in Ottawa sent Prime Minister King a British War Cabinet report entitled "Possible Scale of Japanese Attack on the American Coast." The report explained that a Japanese expedition against the coast was improbable because a 5,000-mile voyage would make huge demands in terms of fuel, food, water, and supplies. The writers believed, however, that "a progressive advance on Canada via the Aleutian Islands" was viable because the Japanese could establish a "shuttle service" to send supplies from Japan to

the Kurile Islands and then to the Aleutians. Even so, they noted that the Alaska route sacrificed initial surprise and invited attack from US naval bases in the Aleutians and in Pearl Harbor. The report suggested that a probable course of enemy action might be Japanese coastal raids using cruisers or even carriers, although Allied air counterattacks would minimize the risk. The report overestimated the forces that Japan was willing to commit to the North American coast, but correctly predicted Japan's interest in coastal raids.¹

Canada also considered the Soviet factor. In April, the Naval Secretary in Ottawa distributed a Royal Canadian Mounted Police report entitled "Ships passing through Bering Straits," written two months earlier, to British intelligence staff in London, Bermuda, Shanghai, and Singapore. The report began with a historical survey of Arctic travel, including the failed Soviet "goodwill flight" in 1937 from Moscow to California over the Arctic Ocean (the airplane went down in the Arctic). More significantly, the report discussed the strategic implications of US, Canadian, and Soviet navigation through the Bering Strait. The Soviets, who used the Strait extensively to supply their Siberian ports, might threaten Alaska and the North American Pacific Coast through bases at Herschel Island and Diomed Island. Mr. R.B.C. Mundy, a former RCMP sergeant performing intelligence duties for the Royal Canadian Navy and Pacific Command in Esquimalt, had attempted to verify rumours about the presence of a Soviet base at Diomed Island, but was unsuccessful. The report observed that "Germany and Russia together control the entire Arctic Coast line from Norway to the Bering Sea, and in view of the fact that Spitzbergen produces enormous coal supplies, this would enable Soviet and German shipping to operate in the Arctic continuously without having to come south even to refuel." It concluded that Alaska and the Northwest Territories were a "wide open door" for invaders, given the Soviet Union's advanced capabilities in the Arctic. Once again, strategists overestimated the forces that an opponent could support and operate along the North American coast.²

Canadian authorities also discussed the movement of US ships and aircraft within Canadian coastal areas, including the Pacific Coast. In early May, the State Department asked the Canadian Legation in Washington to consider having discussions on reciprocal landing rights for each nation's ships and aircraft. Indeed, the Legation later agreed to US-Canadian reciprocal landing rights, including permission for US aircraft to land at Esquimalt and RCAF stations. Later in the month, however, the Legation had to remind Secretary of State Cordell Hull that US naval vessels operating in Canadian waters were to report their movements to Canadian coastal commands. It noted that such vessels were allowed to operate in Canadian zones under the terms of Western

Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2, but that identification was required to prevent false enemy reports and possible offensive action. Not surprisingly, the Canadians did not want any unannounced American voyages within their territorial waters along the Pacific.³

To improve coastal defence capabilities, Canadian air force officials planned to create a "torpedo dropping area" along the Pacific Coast. Such a scheme would allow RCAF pilots and air crew to use aerial torpedoes against practice targets, a technique that might be needed in the event of enemy action along the coast. In late August, External Affairs officials told the Canadian Legation in Washington that "a torpedo dropping area approximately nine miles square is required for the use of No. 25 Operational Training Unit, Patricia Bay" and that the area would be used for both "running drops" and "torpedo camera training." External Affairs instructed Legation staff to seek US permission because the training area overlapped with two square miles of US waters. It seems that Britain's successful use of aerial torpedoes against the Italian fleet at Taranto had made an impact on the Canadians, just as it had on the Japanese.⁴

Further plans were made in October to ensure that the Pacific Coast was defended adequately. Canadian officials had already agreed to US-Canadian reciprocal landing rights for ships and aircraft, but now the Americans wanted to build a coastal highway to Alaska that would run through British Columbia and the Yukon. In response, Highway Commission officials in Canada produced a report on the matter, concluding that the Alaska Highway was necessary for coastal defence and to protect the fisheries, which might be of interest to the Japanese. The Canadians agreed with the US proposal and later participated in plans for construction of the highway.⁵

In late 1941, strategic reports also focused on the Soviet Union's current value as an ally of the Anglo-American powers. Before the German-Soviet war, strategists had seen the Soviet Union as a potential threat to the Pacific Coast, but they now regarded it as a welcome safeguard against Japanese expansionism, one that might limit Japan's ability to threaten the coast. In mid-November, the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence in Ottawa sent the Canadian Legation in Washington a report on the Soviet army. The report portrayed the Soviets as valiant warriors in the Allied cause: "The brightest spots in the picture are the almost incredible determination and unity of purpose of the Soviet peoples." The Soviets were praised for wisely withdrawing machinery and personnel eastward to resume war production while the Allies continued to send war supplies. Moreover, the Soviets were assumed to have a strong presence in the Far East: "Nor is there any reason to believe that the Russian armies which remain in the Far East, are not a fair match in point of numbers and equipment

for any attack which Japan may now undertake." The report expressed every confidence in the Soviets but did not accurately portray their defensive capability in the Far East: the bulk of Stalin's forces were tied down in brutal combat with the Nazi war machine.⁶

On 4 December, just days before Japan's devastating attacks throughout the Pacific, MI2 Military Intelligence in Ottawa reported on the Soviet Union's supposed strength in the Far East. MI2 offered a blunt appraisal of Soviet success: "Stalin himself is the key to Russian Policy. The Soviet Union is exclusively controlled by him and his men ... Stalin is extravagantly ruthless. The Russian Terror was itself a wholesale punitive assault on a class. But it is this same ruthlessness which supplied the driving force behind the immense industrialization of Russia." It also discussed the shipments of Allied armaments to the Soviet Union, as well as Japan's criticism of that action, and emphasized Soviet strength in the Far East: "The Far Eastern Army is self contained, estimated to include some: 30 Infantry Divisions plus the equivalent of 15 Cavalry and Armoured Divisions Plus Corps troops. In all an approximate total strength of 600,000 men. The Russians have always been confident that their Siberian troops will make Japan think twice before attacking." It is possible that Stalin's staff supplied the Allies with the figures – an exaggeration of Soviet Far East forces at the time – in order to placate the Allies and scare Japan.⁷

One of the more insightful passages in the MI2 report concerned the US position in the Far East:

Both Russia and the United States warned Japan; and today there looms the possibility that the United States might enter the war fighting Japan. In any event it is to the United States interests now to go to all possible lengths to keep Russia fighting, no matter what displeasure that aid incurs in Japan. For (it is believed by most observers) that the fall of Moscow would almost certainly embolden Japan in her "expansion" policy in the Far East; to the danger of American interests there.⁸

This observation reflected President Roosevelt's views, given that he was committed to providing support to keep the Soviet Union in the war against Germany for as long as possible. In terms of a war in the Pacific, Japan might never get the chance to conduct nuisance raids along the Pacific Coast if it had to face the Soviet Union in addition to other threats to its domestic security.

Following Japan's attacks throughout the Pacific, the Canadian forces intensified their preparations for possible attacks against coastal areas. Canadian intelligence staff gradually learned that the Soviets were unlikely to enter the war

against Japan in the near future.⁹ Consequently, Canadian authorities not only increased troops and aircraft/naval cover along the Pacific Coast but also considered producing mustard gas for use against Japanese invaders.¹⁰ Ultimately, events proved that Japan could not overcome the vast distances involved in operations against North America: Japanese attacks along the Pacific Coast were limited to submarine torpedo attacks and minor coastal shelling. It is true that Japan temporarily occupied two Aleutian islands in 1942-43, but it was never able to island-hop down the Pacific Coast through the Aleutians, which were "stepping stones to nowhere," just as historian Galen Perras has suggested.¹¹

Canadian-US Naval Cooperation, December 1940 to November 1941

In December 1940, the Royal Canadian Navy created its own operational plan to implement the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan, 1940, which had been created by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The RCN recognized that the PJBD plan provided for the direct defence of the North American continent in the event of any of the following incidents: an Axis victory over British naval and air forces; attacks on the Eastern Seaboard with major portions of the US Navy in the Atlantic; or Japanese control of the Western Pacific, with raids on coastal targets in Alaska, British Columbia, and the north-western states. The Pacific portion of the plan included the defence of naval bases at Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sitka in Alaska, along with army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, as well as the defence of naval bases at Esquimalt, Victoria, Vancouver, and Prince Rupert in British Columbia, complete with coastline patrols from Oregon to British Columbia. US and Canadian service groups had already coordinated aircraft warning schemes and meteorological services, and the two countries had already exchanged naval attachés in Ottawa and Washington. On the United States' entry in the war, a joint command would be established, with an exchange of liaison officers in Ottawa and Washington, and in Seattle and Esquimalt. Furthermore, USN codes and ciphers would supersede the Canadian versions for intercommunication. The RCN ensured that all elements of the PJBD plan received due consideration, including Pacific defence matters.¹²

Building on the PJBD plan, Canadian and American naval authorities developed closer links throughout 1941. From December to February, Esquimalt and Seattle exchanged coastal defence information and planned for joint coastal patrols and convoys. Plans included laying minefields, installing torpedo nets, creating a seaplane anchorage at Alliford Bay, building a "hydrophone listening control hut" on Vancouver Island, designating Port McNeill as an assembly point for Seattle-Alaska convoys, and establishing a transshipment centre at Prince



Royal Canadian Navy personnel launch a minesweeping float from HMCS *Alberni* off the coast of British Columbia, March 1941. As the Far East crisis unfolded, the RCN in Esquimalt prepared for Japanese coastal attacks. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-179942.*

Rupert for supply runs to Alaska. In late February, Lieutenant-Commander Ivan S. Day, RCN Staff Officer (Intelligence) in Esquimalt, reported to his commanding officer on his visit with USN intelligence staff in Seattle, where Day and the Americans had exchanged information on coastal facilities and discussed

wireless telegraphy (W/T) intelligence procedures to prepare for implementation of the PJBD plan. Day also sent a separate report to Director of Naval Intelligence Captain Eric S. Brand in Ottawa, which was normal reporting procedure for RCN intelligence officers. Furthermore, Commander C.S. Freeman, Commandant of the US Navy's 13th Naval District in Seattle, decided in March that Lieutenant-Commander Glenn F. Howell would serve as his District Liaison Officer to Canada.¹³

Howell, along with Captain F.S. Craven, USN, and Harold Swan, British Consul in Seattle, visited Esquimalt on 25 March to discuss possible communications links with Seattle. It was decided that secret correspondence between the two stations would be passed through Swan. In addition, both naval forces made a commitment to improving coastal defences and to monitoring small craft such as fishing boats. Craven argued for improved air patrols and the use of hydrophone buoys to transmit sound data. According to him, the US Navy believed that in the event of war with Japan, it was unlikely that heavy enemy warships would operate on the North American Pacific Coast, although air and submarine attacks were possible.¹⁴

At month's end, the Bermuda station sent Ottawa a detailed report about cooperation with the US Navy in cryptanalysis ("Y") and direction-finding (D/F) activities. The report explained that Lieutenant W.S.L. Bartram, a Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) "Y" officer stationed in Bermuda, had travelled to Washington to assess USN intelligence capabilities. Bartram observed that the US Navy wanted full cooperation on intelligence matters, including the exchange of D/F bearings, as well as further links with the Bermuda station, which was already exchanging weekly "Y" reports for similar USN reports with Commander Laurance F. Safford, head of the Intelligence Section of the USN Office of Naval Communications (OP-20-G) in Washington. He criticized the USN D/F network, which he felt was limited by the use of slow, manually rotated D/F systems, but listed an impressive array of USN stations located in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific Coast, Mid-Pacific, and Asiatic regions. Bartram advocated the sharing of British-made Adcock D/F systems with the US Navy and a greater exchange of D/F bearings, although he felt that the Admiralty should retain control of communications on British bases leased to the Americans under the Lend-Lease Act.¹⁵

Bartram's report drew several dissatisfied comments from Lieutenant-Commander Jock de Marbois, head of the Foreign Intelligence Section at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa. First, de Marbois believed that the US Navy might not appreciate Bartram's efforts "to take the world under his control." De Marbois was highly suspicious of Bartram's motives, as the Bermuda station had already made several attempts to take over Canadian

W/T and "Y" activities. Secondly, de Marbois regarded the USN network as something of a liability: "Results obtained through ... Washington, are, so far, appalling. According to bearings and positions recently sent by the U.S. W/T Intelligence, they appear not to have the faintest idea of what is required of them." He felt that the slow USN D/F equipment was inadequate for "abbreviated enemy W/T procedure." De Marbois urged Captain Brand to have a USN liaison officer appointed to Ottawa for "training," or to send one of his men to Washington to "coach" the Americans. In light of the true capabilities of the USN network in early 1941, de Marbois's comments seem unjustifiably condescending, but the Americans were not yet in a shooting war where speed and accuracy were a matter of life and death. It is also possible that the Americans were not revealing their full intelligence capabilities in order to improve their bargaining position in future exchanges with the British Commonwealth.¹⁶

Meetings throughout the spring of 1941 resulted in improved Canadian-US cooperation. In April, the US Navy requested Canadian assurance that the inside passage between Vancouver Island and the mainland would be secure for convoys. At the same time, it was reluctant to meet a Canadian request that it mine coastal waters or lay anti-torpedo nets in Canadian waters (the RCN itself did not perform these activities yet). The 13th Naval District did, however, assure the Canadians that parts for 2,400 mines were stored in Seattle. Later in the month, Commandant Freeman produced a tentative liaison plan for co-operation between US and Canadian forces prior to and following US entry into the war, including defence of the Pacific and Alaskan coasts. Soon after, Commodore W.J.R. Beech, Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, approved a teletype service between Seattle and Esquimalt. In May, NSHQ informed Beech that the Admiralty now permitted foreign and Allied shipping information to be given to US consuls on a weekly basis, for dissemination to US naval authorities. Towards the end of spring, Beech told NSHQ about Howell's suggestion that a Canadian liaison officer be appointed to Seattle, although the Naval Secretary later rejected this proposal as too political: the USN and the RCN gradually developed closer ties, but the United States' status as a non-belligerent required discretion.¹⁷

Meanwhile, both sides considered the problem of defending the Arctic. Prior to Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June, Howell considered several possibilities, including Soviet aggression against the Allies. He prepared a report for his own commandant in mid-June, one that he later sent to Beech, entitled "Possible air raids in Canada from the Arctic."¹⁸ Howell's report was not without precedent: a month earlier, one US source had informed Ottawa that the Soviets might "attack Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver Canada from north presumably by air in mid-July to detract U.S. attention from Europe and dislocate aid

to Britain.”¹⁹ According to Howell, the British consulate in Seattle had also considered the possibility of a Soviet air raid through the Arctic. The Canadians chose not to take these reports too seriously, given that incoming intelligence pointed to a German-Soviet war in Europe. On a more realistic note, Howell recommended that the US Navy maintain a patrol boat at Point Barrow, Alaska, to guard against Japanese, German, or Soviet air raids on Canada’s Pacific Coast through “base hopping,” since Canada was not patrolling the region.

After Germany launched its new offensive, Howell quickly revised his earlier assessments. In his next letter to Beech, he noted that Hitler’s campaign in Russia might last another four to six weeks and that Hitler might even attempt an invasion of North America in August. He advised that Hitler’s move had surprised the Japanese, who were now uncertain of what action to take, and predicted that the US might enter the war against Germany and Italy on or before 1 September. He also offered an interesting appraisal of Washington politics based on “private information”: isolationist senators, such as Wheeler, Nye and Worth Clark, knew that war was inevitable but were maintaining their position to secure the best possible political trade-offs with Roosevelt. According to Howell, the senators would trade support for US involvement in war for a curb on “foolish New Deal internal expenditures.” Howell himself believed that Roosevelt’s government wasted money at the expense of national defence spending (a view held by most military planners in any country). In relation to Pacific Coast defence, he thanked Beech for US-Canada boundary line information that was required for more extensive planning, confirmed that inshore patrols were being increased and that radio links were being established between Sitka Air Station and Prince Rupert, and pointed out that Seattle was establishing a censorship unit to handle cables, mail, and radio. He also commented that the Americans were considering how to solve the “West Coast Japanese problem.”²⁰

Howell focused even more on American preparations for war in his correspondence with Beech. His letter of 9 July offered Beech a summary of “Washington opinions”:

Germans will win against Russia, and then will propose new peace terms, which will not be acceptable to Britain or U.S. – so the war will go on. This situation tends to delay the entrance of the U.S. into full war, but increases the chances that the U.S. will be drawn into it eventually. Reports of internal dissatisfaction in Germany are received. Secretary of War Knox talked naval war in the Atlantic with the President’s approval. The Army request for freedom to send troops to any part of the world will stir up a row in Congress, and action will be delayed. By October the defense program will really get going on a big scale.²¹

Like many officers in the US armed forces, Howell regarded America's entry into the war as both necessary and inevitable, despite isolationist public opinion. Later in the month, he assured Beech that US naval convoys had been ordered to operate in Iceland within the Canadian-defended sector, relieving the RCN of this chore: "Orders are to shoot to kill."²² Howell's correspondence made it quite clear that the Roosevelt administration wanted to commence a shooting war against Germany.

In a letter on 30 July, Howell reported on command changes in the US forces, heavy-tank manufacturing, plans to expand the US Army to 4 million men, and the extension of military training service. He also noted US blacklisting of more South American firms with Axis ties, but complained that the Roosevelt administration was weak in taking action against labour strikes, and that defence took a backseat to "New Dealer theories." He expressed the hope that economic sanctions would prevent war with Japan but said that "general talk" in Washington pointed to October as the date for the nation's entry into the war. It was still felt that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union, but not before late September, thereby preventing a German invasion of Britain in the autumn. In terms of continental defences, Howell pointed out that US bases in Alaska were being completed, but that the Panama Canal Zone was still a worry: "After we go to war, we feel that attempts may be made to close the Canal by bombing from German suicide planes operating from Africa." Clearly, Howell had an active imagination. He concluded his letter to Beech with the announcement that his office in Seattle would expand to liaise with the US Army as well as the Canadian forces.²³

The new ABC-22 agreement, which Canadian and American staff officers signed in Montreal on 28 July, promised further cooperation. ABC-22, known officially as "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2," built on the existing PJBD and ABC-1 agreements and, like its predecessors, contained provisions for Pacific area defence in the event of war with Japan. According to ABC-22, Canada's Pacific Command and Western Air Command were responsible for defending sea approaches to Esquimalt, Victoria, Vancouver, and Prince Rupert, as well as shipping in coastal and inshore British Columbia waters, whereas the US Navy was responsible for offshore patrols along the Pacific Coast.

Meanwhile, both navies sought to understand Japanese tactics in the Pacific, knowledge that would benefit them as they prepared for war with Japan. Significantly, incoming joint naval intelligence enabled Canadian authorities to study Japan's approach to radio silence. Just a day after Japan's southward advance in French Indochina, British consuls in Seattle and San Francisco observed that Japanese authorities had ordered Japanese ships to observe radio

silence and to avoid US ports.²⁴ The Gordon Head station near Esquimalt reported, however, that some Japanese merchant vessels used the 500 kHz distress frequency as a communications channel, despite the radio silence order.²⁵ Japanese war preparations appeared to include a recall of ships and the imposition of radio silence, although some vessels used reserved maritime frequencies for clandestine communications.

In August, US and Canadian authorities applied the finishing touches to their framework of military cooperation. Several communiqués confirmed that Howell's District Liaison Office had officially expanded. Significantly, Commandant Freeman of the 13th Naval District visited Washington to discuss the refined joint US-Canadian operating plan. Adolf Berle of the State Department also requested official permission from Canada for US aircraft to land at Esquimalt as well as RCAF sites throughout British Columbia; permission was later granted. Both sides were preparing for any threat to the coastlines of North America.²⁶

On the eve of the Pacific War, both navies made their final preparations. On 19 November, Howell sent Beech a report concerning American actions, some of which related to the provisions of ABC-22. The US Navy, which had expanded after taking over the Coast Guard, was arming all merchant vessels and continuing its naval movements and training in Juan de Fuca Strait. In addition, a new degaussing range for ships had been completed at Jefferson Head near Seattle, and the US Army had taken over Unalaska Island in the Aleutians. Howell also offered Beech secret information concerning the departure of US naval transports, carrying four hundred motor vehicles and many troops, from San Francisco to the Philippines. Finally, he said that he planned to visit Esquimalt on 26 November, accompanied by two staff officers.²⁷

For its part, the Royal Canadian Navy revised its routing instructions and discussed implementation of Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement with respect to control of Pacific shipping. In a memorandum of 24 November, Captain Eric Brand reported on the VESCA routing system, which would now be extended to convoy assembly ports, and on the plan to have US port directors (instead of British Commonwealth officers) issue routing instructions after Annex V was implemented. With respect to merchant shipping under Annex V, Canadian naval authorities would also conform to the wishes of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Harold Stark, in Washington. Brand explained that Stark was involved in a proposal to send the British Admiralty a message about invoking Annex V: "Decision as to bringing Annex 5 of ABC-1 into effect is political and C.N.O. proposes discussions which should be exploratory and confined to military aspect." The Allies were anticipating the United States' entry into the war.²⁸



A Royal Canadian Air Force Supermarine Stranraer at Alliford Bay, BC, 10 November 1941. Throughout the year, Western Air Command had planned for improved air reconnaissance along the Pacific Coast. *RCAF, Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-136890.*

RCAF Defence Strategy for the Pacific Coast in 1941

The Royal Canadian Air Force also considered improvements to Pacific coastal defence. In late 1941, it sent several assessments to C.G. "Chubby" Power, Minister of National Defence for Air. In September, Air Vice-Marshal G.M. Croil sent Power "An Appreciation of the Situation likely to arise on the West Coast in the event of a War between the British Commonwealth and Japan, in which Canada is involved." In his cover letter, Croil explained that Japanese attacks on Canada were not likely unless US-Canadian cooperation faltered or the US Navy was defeated. He reminded Power that Japan would attempt to intercept Canadian Pacific trade using submarines, although US involvement would push such attacks back from the BC coastline. Croil wanted to strengthen Pacific Coast bases, increase RCAF personnel along the coast, and provide more aircraft to Western Air Command.²⁹

Croil's secret report made several observations. Japan was focusing on a southward advance but also watched Vladivostok shipments. In the event of war in the Pacific, Canadian shipping and coastal areas would be threatened, possibly through Japanese occupation of Aleutian or northwest coastal bases. Japanese attacks would probably be limited to raids rather than occupation, however, due to the 4,300-mile distance between Japan and British Columbia. Japan was reported to have the ability to launch long-range strikes: "There are known to exist, eight Japanese aircraft carriers capable of carrying from 20 to 60 aircraft each, or collectively 332 aircraft made up of 90 Fighters, 146 Torpedo Bombers, and 96 Day Bombers."³⁰ Croil's information was reasonably good, although it was later discovered that Japan actually had ten carriers. The report noted that US naval support, combined with Canadian Pacific Coast air power, would minimize the Japanese threat. It concluded that Canada's Pacific Coast required more naval and air support to reduce the threat of Japanese naval attacks or sabotage of mainland railways, communications, defence works, stores, and maintenance facilities.

One observation made in Croil's report cast suspicion on the Japanese Canadian community:

The Japanese fisher fleet on the British Columbia coast has long been a worry to Canadians, for among its numbers are known to be many Japanese naval men, whose knowledge of the North American coast can be equalled by few Canadians. These fishermen live in communities which are entirely composed of Japanese and where white men seldom call. Their activities can be watched only by spies of their own race, whose reports cannot be trusted. It would be easy for Japan to make use of such material. There are 28,350 Japanese nationals in British Columbia, approximately one-half in the vicinity of Vancouver, the balance well distributed along the coast.³¹

The report went on to warn that Japanese nationals engaged in fishing could shelter Japanese submarines within "the many inlets on the British Columbia and Alaska coasts," and that Japanese supply ships could also operate along the coast with help from local Japanese agents. Croil noted that patrolling 3,000 miles of coastline between Prince Rupert and Vancouver (a direct distance of only 450 miles) would be a difficult task, particularly since the Pacific Coast weather would hinder Canadian air reconnaissance and aid Japanese clandestine activities.

Croil's report is important to our understanding of Canadian strategy for at least two reasons. First, the report confirms that Canadian strategy regarding Pacific Coast defence largely resembled that of Britain and the United States.

It was thought that Japanese raids across the North Pacific were possible, particularly through the Aleutians or by Pacific Coast "base hopping," although the vast distances involved, along with US naval support to Canada, reduced the threat of such raids. Second, the report reveals Canadian anxieties over the presence of Japanese Canadians along the Pacific Coast because they could serve as cover for clandestine Japanese naval activity or even sabotage. Furthermore, it was believed that no agent of Japanese descent could be trusted to spy on activities in the Japanese Canadian communities. Implicit in these observations was the prospect that such communities would have to be removed from the Pacific Coast area for security reasons. Croil's report foreshadowed the internment of the Japanese Canadians.

In late November, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner sent Chubby Power an "Air Appreciation of the West Coast" as a supplement to a report made a month earlier. It was reported that Japanese attacks might include mine-laying craft, small airborne raiding parties, coastal and inland bombing, and airborne torpedo or gas attacks. The RCAF's role would be to provide air defence for the Pacific Coast and shipping in the event of war in the North Pacific, and to cooperate with Canadian and US forces in providing fighter cover, reconnaissance patrols, and convoy escorts. RCAF squadrons were located at Alliford Bay, Ucluelet, and Patricia Bay in BC, and more were planned for Prince Rupert, Bella Bella, and Coal Harbour. Pacific Coast air bases had been provided with an "initial issue" of bombs, torpedoes, ammunition, and aviation fuel. Breadner concluded by requesting more fighters and Catalina aircraft, along with the completion of aerodromes at Tofino and Hardy Bay. The RCAF wanted to be fully prepared for any conflict in the North Pacific.³²

RCAF strategic plans in the critical week before the outbreak of war remain unknown due to a gap in the relevant archival collection, but it is known that on 7 December, Breadner sent Power a report about the Japanese air attacks, noting that Cavite, Manila, and Pearl Harbor had been bombed. As a result, Breadner provided distances to North America along great circle routes from Japan, Siberia, and Pearl Harbor. Vancouver was about 4,500 miles from Tokyo and 2,000 miles from Siberia: Japanese bombers were reported to have a range of 2,000 to 2,500 miles. Breadner believed that Japanese raids against the Pacific Coast were an unlikely prospect since the distance involved would require the use of aircraft carriers and Japan needed its carriers for other operations: "It appears very doubtful if carriers would be diverted from their normal role of fleet operations to bombing attacks on the Pacific Coast." He also noted that all great circle routes to British Columbia passed over the Aleutian Islands or Alaska, and "hence must come through American Defences." For the air force,

as for the navy, strategic thought concerning Pacific Coast defence included due consideration for vast distances and US support.³³

The Japanese Canadians in British Columbia

In terms of domestic security, the RCMP Standing Committee on Orientals in British Columbia held discussions on the future of the Japanese Canadians. Established by Order-in-Council PC 117 on 7 January 1941, the committee consisted of five members who sought to reconcile differences in opinion between British Columbia and the Dominion government. BC Premier T.D. Pattullo sought to limit the freedom of Japanese Canadians on the Pacific Coast because public opinion there demanded it. Many Anglo-Canadians in British Columbia harboured racist attitudes towards the Asian community and believed that the Japanese and the Chinese posed a threat to culture, security, and economic livelihood. The Dominion government, on the other hand, appeared to adopt a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards the rights of the Asian community. Despite the political tension between Ottawa and Tokyo, it favoured the view that the second generation of Japanese Canadians, or *Nisei*, were well integrated into Canadian society. For Mackenzie King and his officials, the problem was to balance the rights of the *Nisei* with the political pressure exerted by the Pattullo government. The Standing Committee was meant to study this problem and offer recommendations.

In Ottawa, Japanese Minister Yoshizawa Seijiro took a particular interest in the plight of Japanese Canadians. Needless to say, he used Canada's treatment of the Japanese community to deflect criticism of Japan's actions in Southeast Asia, but his protests also struck a chord with the *Nisei*. Indeed, Yoshizawa protested a decision made on 8 January to exclude "Canadians of Japanese origin from participation in compulsory military training," saying he believed this would disappoint them greatly. Editorials in the *New Canadian*, a *Nisei* newspaper published in British Columbia, lent credence to Yoshizawa's concerns. It is ironic that the Japanese Minister to Canada should be defending the right of Japanese Canadians to fight against his country, but Tokyo probably did not consider Canadian troops a threat, so Yoshizawa could comfortably make political capital out of the issue. In any case, he and the *Nisei* had a strong argument: compulsory military service in a modern nation should not be based on racial distinctions. On 1 February, however, King rejected Yoshizawa's arguments; the Prime Minister wished to maintain favour with the Pattullo government.³⁴

In February, the Standing Committee began voicing its opinions in Ottawa. Initially, some members felt that the Dominion government was working against them. External Affairs policy advisor Hugh Keenleyside informed

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson that the committee resented Ottawa's implication that BC politicians were stirring up hostility against Japanese Canadians for political advantage. Keenleyside reported that the committee and Ottawa officials were debating how many Japanese Canadian fishermen operated along the Pacific Coast: Ottawa placed the figure at 1,200, compared with the committee's figure of 2,200. These details were considered important in terms of the perceived threat to Anglo-Canadian control over local trade on one hand and national security on the other. Quite apart from the fishing trade, Japanese Canadian fishermen were seen as a potential "screen" for enemy sabotage or espionage. On 26 February, the committee sent King a report from Vancouver, where it had met with local Japanese Canadian representatives to request the voluntary registration of their people. The committee successfully persuaded the Japanese Canadian community to register voluntarily with the RCMP to avoid compulsory registration. From the committee's perspective, such a move would be an acceptable compromise.³⁵

Despite the agreement, a limited form of compulsory registration was imposed soon after, even if it was presented as voluntary registration in some quarters. Beginning on 4 March, all Japanese people over sixteen years of age were required to register with the RCMP. As of 12 August, all Japanese Canadians who had registered would be required to carry their registration cards, which included a photograph and thumbprint. Thus, Canadian security authorities were poised to assume more control over the community.

Over the course of the year, Canadian authorities in Esquimalt monitored Japanese Canadians along with other groups. Pacific Command collected information on alleged subversive activity among its own army personnel as well as local civilians. Pro-Axis remarks or signs of espionage were recorded in "Weekly Internal Security Intelligence Reports."³⁶ Only a few cases involved Japanese Canadians, a group that appeared to be quite law-abiding and respectable, but in those few cases, Canadian authorities focused on potential espionage. One Japanese family was watched throughout the year and a family member was later arrested at Rossland, BC, for possession of detailed hand-drawn sketches showing industrial activities in the adjacent Warfield-Tadanac area.³⁷ In July, one Japanese individual in Vancouver was under surveillance because of an alleged association with a Japanese group located in Minto, BC, a mining town located inland, in the Coast Mountain range: "This group will not be inactive long and if there is a good lake there for a landing it is possible they may communicate with the outside."³⁸ Some reports concerned the assistance that Japanese forces might receive from German Canadians. In August, for example, one report discussed a certain BC lumber mill with all-German employees who might assist the enemy during an attack and carry out acts of sabotage.³⁹

Nonetheless, the security records appear quite sparse with respect to the *Nisei*. Japanese Canadians were not yet perceived to be a great security risk.

Planning continued, however. As noted earlier, after Japan occupied southern French Indochina in late July, External Affairs held a meeting with a special committee of representatives from government departments, the armed services, and the RCMP, to discuss "Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan." The committee recommended the compulsory registration of "all persons of Japanese race" across Canada, including Canadian-born Japanese, those naturalized since 1922, and Japanese nationals living in Canada: "In principle, Japanese subjects will be treated in the same way as nationals of Germany and Italy."⁴⁰ The committee discussed internment, but did not yet advocate "wholesale" internment for Japanese Canadians. Just the same, some officials anticipated a security problem along the coast in the event of war. As we have seen, for instance, Croil's RCAF report in September suggested that Japanese Canadians might serve as a cover for Imperial Japanese espionage.

In October, Canadian officials sought to allocate responsibility for the management of the Japanese Canadians. S.L. de Carteret, Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, wrote to his counterpart in Naval Services and suggested a course of action: "I am of the opinion that the matter of policy to co-ordinate action between United States and Canada regarding the control of Japanese on the West coast is a matter for the Department of External Affairs and the United States State Department, rather than the Joint Defence Board." De Carteret wanted policy to be directed by civilian government authorities rather than by the armed forces. He also had advice for RCN authorities who had sent reports to Ottawa: "The Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, should utilize the medium of the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, in making further recommendations regarding the control of Japanese on the West coast in the event of war with Japan."⁴¹

Norman Robertson considered official policy in two messages he sent later in the month. He told the Deputy Minister for Naval Services that if Canada received a "war telegram" stating that Britain and Japan were at war, Canadian forces would stand down until Ottawa decided on "the question of action," although Japanese merchant and fishing vessels would not be allowed to sail outside Canadian waters.⁴² He also informed the Deputy Minister of Justice that the Cabinet War Committee had not yet approved compulsory registration of Japanese Canadians, but had approved an internment policy: on the outbreak of war between Britain and Japan, the Department of Justice and the RCMP would intern the Japanese "for cause," but would not indulge in "wholesale" internment.⁴³ According to these policy decisions, Japanese Canadians faced limited internment and a shipping quarantine in the event of war with Japan.

Intelligence reports arriving at Pacific Command reinforced the view that "wholesale" internments might not be necessary. Drawing on his experience as former military attaché in Tokyo, Colonel B.R. Mullaly studied the Japanese Canadian press, particularly the *New Canadian*, and concluded that the *Nisei* would remain loyal to the Crown. On 3 November, he wrote: "The *New Canadian* is, of course, the organ of the Second Generation and there is no doubt that it expresses the sentiments of that community and is perfectly sincere in its declaration that the loyalty of the Canadian-born Japanese lies with Canada rather than with Japan."⁴⁴ Mullaly later observed that one columnist with the newspaper feared "a possible outburst of anti-Japanese feeling" from the public that would "probably be far more serious and more injurious than any official government policy."⁴⁵ If the writer's assessment was correct, political leaders would have to work together to modify public opinion.

To that end, Mackenzie King managed to moderate Pattullo's views on the Japanese Canadians. In a letter to King on 22 November, Pattullo grudgingly accepted the voluntary enlistment of Canadian-born Japanese in the Canadian armed services. In response, the Prime Minister thanked Pattullo for his capitulation on the issue, assuring him that the move was "a step towards the amelioration of the racial situation in British Columbia."⁴⁶ Even so, the enlistment policy contradicted other policy statements. Ottawa had already created an internment policy that drew no distinction on the basis of birth: that policy was based on demonstrated loyalty to the state. Furthermore, all Japanese had been encouraged to register voluntarily with the RCMP as a compromise measure with the Pattullo government, which wanted compulsory registration. On the eve of the Pacific War, Canadian policy makers had made contradictory concessions to both the Pattullo government and Japanese Canadians.

Official policy would become more focused following the outbreak of war. At first, King still adhered to the policy initiatives of November. On 7 December, he sent a telegram to Pattullo in which he reiterated the position of the Dominion government:

There is danger that the unparalleled treachery of the Japanese attack may precipitate irresponsible anti-Japanese demonstrations in Canada. I shall, in the broadcast speech which I shall give tonight (or tomorrow night) emphasize that adequate measures have been taken ... to guarantee full security within Canada at the present time. Japanese who are suspected of disloyalty will be interned, but Japanese who are loyal to Canada and loyal Canadians of Japanese race may rely on adequate protection both as to their persons and as to their property. Action in this sense will accord with a generous interpretation of Canada's aims in the

war and with a sincere condemnation of the racial discrimination practised by the Fascist powers with which we are at war.⁴⁷

He also asked Pattullo to address the BC public in a show of support for the Dominion government. In the evening of 7 December, King released a press statement that offered several assurances: "All measures necessary to national security have been taken. All Japanese in Canada have been registered and fingerprinted, and any individual of Japanese origin deemed dangerous to the state is being apprehended. Japanese nationals in Canada who are loyal will not be molested."⁴⁸ It appeared that all interests would be considered.

Official policy changed rapidly in the following weeks, however. On 17 December, Mackenzie King informed BC politicians and the press that an Order-in-Council issued the day before provided for penalties "in the case of any person of Japanese race who fails to register with RCMP."⁴⁹ For Pattullo and many BC residents, the long-awaited compulsory registration of all Japanese Canadians had finally come.

Ottawa moved towards "wholesale" internment after receiving security reports of clandestine activities along the Pacific Coast amid the Japanese fishing fleet. On 17 December, the US naval attaché in Ottawa informed Rear-Admiral Nelles, RCN, that Japanese fishing vessels were suspected of sending "deceptive W/T messages" and acting as lookouts for Japanese submarines.⁵⁰ As a result, naval authorities boarded and checked suspected vessels. On 13 February 1942, the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, decided that, in view of deteriorating conditions throughout the Pacific, "the continued presence of enemy aliens and persons of Japanese racial origin in the Protected Area constitutes a serious danger and prejudices the effective defence of the Pacific Coast of Canada."⁵¹ A month later, Captain Eric Brand shared an Esquimalt report with the Department of Transport (DOT) in Ottawa: "There is a persistent rumour that the Japanese have in British Columbia one, or more, W/T interception posts, whose logs are cyphered and forwarded by mail to a central espionage bureau in Mexico. This information has been received from a contact in the Chinese Wang Ching Wei Puppet Government Organization in Vancouver and appears to be reliable."⁵² The DOT agreed to investigate the matter and informed Brand that the RCMP had already restricted Japanese people from using cameras and radio equipment in certain areas.⁵³ Ultimately, reports of clandestine W/T activity simply reinforced decisions that the Dominion government had already made on the basis of anti-Asian racism: nearly twenty thousand Japanese Canadians would be interned inland to create a hundred-mile-wide "protected zone" along the coast, and their impounded possessions would be sold off in public auctions.



A Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve officer speaks with a Japanese Canadian family during the confiscation of fishing boats in British Columbia, 10 December 1941. During the Far East crisis, Canada imposed further restrictions on Japanese Canadians, requiring them to register with the RCMP and barring them from military service. Ottawa understood that the Japanese Canadians were little threat to national security, but yielded to anti-Asian racism in BC and protests from the province's political leaders. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-134096.*

Gil Murray, who served in the Number One Canadian Special Wireless Group during the war, has commented on the reasons for the internment of Japanese Canadians. He explained that stations at Gordon Head and Mills Road Camp on Vancouver Island were monitoring signals emanating from "the Japanese-Canadian fishing fleet innocently going about its business in Canadian waters":

Hidden amongst those vessels, Imperial Japanese naval officers in fishermen's clothing were mingling with the Canadian fleet in boats equipped with powerful radios. According to RCMP sources and 1CSWG veteran eavesdroppers, these spies were observing Canadian and U.S. naval movements up and down the west coast, from California to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Canadian operators monitored the floating spies' Japan-bound signals but, even though their radio direction finders (RDF) could pinpoint the sources, there was never enough time for the Mounties to move in before the spies escaped or ditched their radio equipment.³⁴

According to Murray, the problem was solved only when Japanese Canadians, though innocent, were interned inland, thereby exposing the "Imperial Japanese waterborne spies," who "instantly disappeared." At that time, Murray stated, Canadian authorities could not publicly explain the internment because Canada's interception of Japanese signals remained a wartime secret. He concluded that Canadian authorities saw internment as the only "workable solution."

Considering all sources, however, it may be said that the Dominion government interned the Japanese Canadians for three reasons. First, internment would satisfy prevailing opinion in BC, which grew even more hostile following the outbreak of the Pacific War, and provide the provincial government with political capital. For example, reports of Japan's mistreatment of the Hong Kong prisoners increased hostility towards Japanese Canadians. Prime Minister King worried about the repercussions of internment, but believed that the move was necessary to prevent race riots in British Columbia, which, in turn, might bring on even worse treatment of the Hong Kong prisoners.³⁵ In essence, he responded to anti-Asian racist attitudes then prevalent in Canada. Second, internment would stop a small number of Imperial Japanese agents from spying along the Pacific Coast. Third, internment would match US policy, thereby providing the Dominion government with political capital. On 19 February 1942, Roosevelt, who had ordered the relocation of 120,000 Japanese Americans, suggested to King that Canada adopt the same strategy. The Prime Minister complied five days later, when he ordered the evacuation of all Japanese Canadians. Both US and

Canadian officials considered the Pacific Coast Japanese community a shared problem.

In 1942, the Dominion government chose to act expeditiously to satisfy both public opinion and the Canadian armed services. Not surprisingly, many Canadians of the period saw internment as necessary. Many Canadians were conditioned to believe that treachery was an integral part of the Japanese character. From the civilian perspective, Japan's attacks throughout the Pacific were a complete surprise and the internment of Japanese Canadians was a preventative measure. Numerous letters and documents of the period demonstrate the public's growing concern over the threat posed by "enemy aliens" and "subversives."⁵⁶ It would be many years before documents were publicly released that demonstrated the much more pivotal role of failed diplomacy as a cause for the Pacific War, and how considerations of provincial politics were as influential in the decision to intern Japanese Canadians as concerns about "enemy aliens." Within the Canadian armed services, many saw Canada's defence regulations as rather lenient. For example, in June 1942, one officer reporting to Pacific Command lamented the regulations regarding internment: "To date we have been unable to obtain sufficient information to warrant taking any action under Defence of Canada Regulations whereby we could recommend the internment of Marx."⁵⁷ Some military personnel believed that all "aliens" should have been removed from Pacific Coast protected areas.

But internment posed several problems for the Dominion government. Ottawa had to abandon its position (or, more cynically, its pretence) that it was committed to social equality for Japanese Canadians. Also, Ottawa would later be held accountable for relocating Japanese Canadians without offering sufficient explanation: the W/T interception secret was kept for many years. Even when it was later revealed, critics of government policy regarded the internment as out of all proportion to the perceived security threat. It might be suggested that more appropriate solutions could have been found, such as temporarily quarantining Japanese Canadian vessels while permitting people to continue living in their homes. It might also be observed that strategic assessments made in 1941 had discounted the likelihood of Japanese attacks along the Pacific Coast, so no reason could justify "wholesale" internment. Furthermore, Ottawa would later be held accountable for seizing and selling off Japanese Canadian property, an act that had no bearing on wartime security. Worse yet, even after the war ended, Japanese Canadians were not permitted to resettle along the Pacific Coast and some were forcibly repatriated to Japan. Quite simply, Japanese Canadians received far worse treatment than European "enemy aliens" in wartime Canada because of anti-Asian racism. The unjust internment of Japanese Canadians left a legacy that still troubles us today.

Conclusions

In 1941, Canadian strategists attempted to fathom Japan's next move in the North Pacific. The Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force all anticipated Japanese nuisance raids along the Pacific Coast, particularly in the form of submarine attacks, but did not believe that a coastal invasion would occur. Before the German-Soviet war, strategists also considered the Soviet Union a potential threat to continental defence; later, however, they believed that the conflict might serve to confine Japanese forces to the Far East, if only Stalin could be coaxed into a declaration of war against Japan. In terms of measures to defend the North American Pacific Coast, Canadian and American authorities ensured that each other's armed services had put in place shared landing/docking rights for aircraft and ships, and throughout the year both navies maintained very close ties. The RCN also organized other defence measures, including anti-torpedo nets, sono-buoys, and aerial torpedo practice. Significantly, in late November 1941, the two navies discussed the implementation of Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement with respect to control of Pacific shipping. The Dominion government yielded to pressure from British Columbia, registering Japanese Canadians and also exempting them from compulsory military service for much of 1941. It is clear that racist public opinion compelled political leaders to act. The Canadian armed services also saw the *Nisei* as a security risk because it was believed that they could shelter Imperial Japanese agents along the Pacific Coast.

An examination of Canadian defence strategy throughout 1941 shows that Canadian officials fully anticipated war in the Pacific. It is difficult to see how any action Japan took on 7 December 1941 could have surprised Canada. The Dominion improved its Pacific Coast defences in anticipation of Japanese raids and monitored Allied shipping across the North Pacific. Canada adhered to Allied strategy and took its role as a Pacific power quite seriously. Despite all the advance preparations, however, several vital questions still needed to be answered in the month leading up to 7 December. Would Washington's diplomacy encourage or discourage Japan from going to war? If war in the Pacific was inevitable, what targets and timeframe would Japan choose? In the next chapter, we will examine Canada's observations and strategic choices in the critical month of November 1941, when the Pacific powers looked to Washington for deliverance.

Countdown to War: Negotiation and Mobilization, November 1941

CANADA EXPERIENCED SEVERAL Far East war scares in 1941, but in November tensions mounted to epic proportions as Japan and the United States entered the final stages of diplomatic deadlock. The two nations appeared to face irreconcilable differences: Japan would not withdraw from either China or French Indochina and the United States would not trade with Japan. Special envoy Kurusu Saburo joined Japanese Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo in Washington, where they entered into delicate talks with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The Kurusu Mission presented Tokyo's plans for compromise, but was there any hope of a diplomatic resolution, and did anyone really want a peaceful settlement? How could secondary Pacific powers like Canada ensure that they were not pulled into a commitment to war against Japan until the United States entered the fray?

This chapter examines intelligence available to Ottawa during this critical month and comments on the resulting strategic discussions. Incoming intelligence focused on Japan's deployment of forces in the Far East, as well as its increasing interest in southern objectives. More controversially, some evidence shows that Canada received forewarning of the Pearl Harbor attack from British intelligence. During Allied strategic discussions, Canada provided predictions of war, interpretations of the Kurusu Mission, observations concerning the *modus vivendi*, assessments of President Roosevelt's intentions, and advice to Britain during the Kra Isthmus war scare. In November, Canada not only anticipated a war with Japan that involved active American support but also made several preparations for it.

Intelligence Available to Canada

In November, Ottawa received intelligence reports on Japan's domestic conditions, international relations, disposition of armed forces, and military capability, as well as on American preparations for war. Notably, Ottawa received relatively little information on Japan's domestic politics compared with previous months, probably because most Allied agents had less access to information as Japan mobilized for war.

In terms of low-grade intelligence, the censorship summary provided examples of public reaction to living conditions in Japan and its occupied territories over the past months. In late August, a letter from Kyoto to New Westminster, BC, complained of chronic shortages of various supplies in Japan, including rice. In a letter from Shanghai to Vancouver in late September, a Canadian revealed that Japanese authorities discouraged the presence of all foreigners in northern China, including Germans, whose recent campaign against the Soviets had failed to impress Tokyo: "The Nips have announced that they will not allow *any* foreigner to be appointed to the North, be he an Axis friend or one of us!" Later that month, a Canadian in Hong Kong wrote that Japan encouraged the "drug habit" in occupied China in order to subjugate the people and create profit: "Hitlerism in its best form is bad, but to my knowledge it has not hit the inhuman and low methods adopted by the Japs to attain full conquest and control over masses of people." Overall, censorship intelligence indicated that the public perceived the Japanese regime as both desperate and ruthless.¹

More significantly, several incoming intelligence reports commented on Japan's international relations. E. D'Arcy McGreer, Canadian chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, made the following observation on 17 November: "The Diet session opened today in a tense political atmosphere. Both Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the usual complaints against encirclement, being misunderstood and interference of third powers in China. The tone of speeches was far from conciliatory." Tokyo's political rhetoric matched its military actions. British Army Intelligence Notes that month spoke of the Kurusu Mission and its ramifications: "It seems hardly possible that Japan, least of all a Government of the present complexion, can adjust her Chinese policy to meet the minimum requirements of the U.S." The Japanese press accused the United States and Britain of encirclement and interference in "the peace of the Pacific." Towards month's end, according to the Notes, US-Japanese relations were tense and no reply had been made to Secretary of State Hull's proposals.²

On 17 and 18 November, Pacific Command interviewed in Victoria an Allied agent "recently arrived from Japan" and produced a lengthy report on Japanese foreign affairs for circulation to Canadian, British, and American authorities. The interviewers, Lieutenant-Commander Ivan S. Day, RCN, and R.B.C. Munday, a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police sergeant, explained the agent's background: "Informant travelled from Singapore to San Francisco on the same clipper with Kurusu, whom he has known well for some eight years, and who he regards as a personal friend. He considers Kurusu to be sincere in his convictions and desire to find a way of avoiding war with the United States."

Significantly, the agent stated that Kurusu wanted him to serve as an intermediary with the British ambassador in Washington. It is almost certain that the agent also reported to British Security Coordination (BSC), given that the BSC internal history records how the organization had placed a British agent inside the Kurusu Mission.³

Whatever his identity, the agent commented on Japan's ability to check the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism. According to him, Kurusu felt that Communism would prevail in the Far East if Japan were destroyed by Britain and the US. The agent expressed his own concerns that the situation in the Soviet Union was potentially dangerous for the Allies, as a Japanese defeat would allow Communism to spread throughout Asia and, subsequently, Europe. He believed that the Soviets had great air power concentrated near Vladivostok to threaten Japanese cities, but that the Japanese had organized "a special counter air force" to meet that threat. In fact, however, the Soviets were in no position to concentrate much air power in the Far East in late 1941; it is possible that the agent's remarks resulted from a Soviet attempt to bluff both the Japanese and the Allies.⁴

The Day-Munday interview drew swift comment from Colonel B.R. Mullaly. In a memorandum dated 27 November, the former military attaché in Tokyo stated: "The informant has clearly been badly infected with the Communist bug, a common complaint of those who have much to do with the Japanese. The bogey of communism has been played up by the Japanese." Mullaly explained that Kurusu indeed wanted peace, but "planted" in the informant's mind "two of the most important arguments which Japan would like us to swallow - fear of Communism and distrust of the U.S.A."⁵

Examination Unit decrypts showed that Japan's foreign affairs staff also took great interest in its opponents, including Canada's war capacity, dispatch of troops to Hong Kong, and representation in Washington. In early November, Japanese Minister Yoshizawa Seijiro in Ottawa reported on Canadian arms production in his message to the Foreign Minister in Tokyo. He discussed C.D. Howe's report to the Canadian House of Commons, made a day earlier, in which Howe outlined "figures of Arms and Ammunition produced in Canada since the outbreak of war as well as estimates of increased production." Yoshizawa offered complete figures on Canadian shipbuilding, aircraft, tanks, trucks, transport, guns, and ammunition. It is noteworthy that he even considered Canadian arms production as suitable intelligence for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, given Tokyo's likely dismissal of Canada as a minor player in the Pacific.⁶

Conversely, Canada's dispatch of troops to Hong Kong raised considerable concern in Japanese diplomatic circles, according to other intercepted messages.

On 17 November, Yoshizawa sent particulars to his colleagues in Tokyo, Washington, London, and Hong Kong: "Canada dispatched *Brigadier* J.K. Lawson and an unknown number of soldiers under his command, mainly from the provinces of Manitoba and Quebec, including many experienced soldiers who served in the last war. They are chiefly artillery men. The course they took in crossing is a secret, but a telegram from Hong Kong advises us of their arrival." Yoshizawa also explained that Canada's policy of "isolationism" had ended, possibly because British naval forces could now enter the Pacific due to their successes in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, as well as to current US Neutrality Acts, which permitted the release of British battleships to the region. He noted sombrely that "Japan must know the reason for the presence of this Canadian Army at Hong Kong," and the next day contacted the Foreign Minister in Tokyo to summarize Canadian press reaction to the arrival of the soldiers in the Crown Colony. The editorials warned that Japan's militant policy would likely bring Britain and the US into the war, and that soldiers were sent to Hong Kong so that the situation could be settled on land without having to wait for the combining of British and American naval forces: "Canada deems it necessary to arm itself in preparation for eventualities in the Pacific." Yoshizawa's report probably offered Tokyo some insight into Canadian motives, since Canada's wartime press reflected, in part, the views of the Canadian government.⁷

Another decrypt revealed Japan's interest in Canada's representation in Washington. Yoshizawa informed the Foreign Minister in Tokyo on 27 November that "Canada was not represented at the last meeting of the A.B.C.D. powers in Washington," and that "certain people here are discontented over this fact." He also explained that the Canadian Legation in Washington "made connections with the representatives of these powers and have issued an official announcement of their participation in the next meeting." Yoshizawa's message would probably have been of interest to both Tokyo and the Examination Unit: it noted correctly that the Canadians had recently been marginalized in Washington and had taken corrective action.⁸

Multiple intelligence sources pointed to Japan's military and naval movements. Captain Brand's report on press and trade intelligence indicated that a Japanese flotilla, sailing from Honolulu, carried repatriated Japanese nationals from Hawaii, such were US-Japanese tensions. Brand also included the Esquimalt station's report on Hallet Abend, "noted writer-authority on the Orient," who believed that a Japanese attack on Siberia would lead to conflict in Southeast Asia between Japan and Anglo-American forces. Furthermore, Abend had observed that German "sea raiders" had already established a rendezvous at Japanese mid-Pacific islands, and that Japan's twice-daily flying service between

Palau and Timor served as an "observation post for naval traffic" between the Antipodes and Singapore. Not unexpectedly, Brand's sources pointed to Japan's interest in both Southeast Asia and the Pacific.⁹

British Army Intelligence Notes discussed the ongoing threats to the Burma Road. They first reported that Japan might soon advance on the Burma Road through northern French Indochina, where Japanese forces had concentrated. By mid-month, however, reports indicated that flooding and poor weather conditions might delay an advance on Thailand and the Burma Road for two months. Moreover, the Chinese had sent "considerable reinforcements" into southeastern Yunnan.¹⁰

Diplomatic correspondence sent to External Affairs in early November reported on the disposition of Japan's forces as well as the threat to the Burma Road. The Dominions Office first reported that Japan had moved more divisions into Manchukuo, but that "further reinforcement southwards" suggested an operation to cut the Burma Road at Kunming. Soon afterwards, reports indicated that all Japanese ships had returned to Japanese waters, apart from four merchant vessels on trade assignments in South American waters. On 12 November, the Dominions Office expressed the view that Japan would not be likely to attack the Soviet Union unless that nation collapsed completely. Furthermore, it did not appear that attacks on the Burma Road or Thailand were imminent. It was believed that Japan would have to move more troops south to threaten the Burma Road and that this could be accomplished within a month.¹¹

Meanwhile, Colonel Mullaly commented that the situation was tense but unchanged, and that Japan might confine its operations to Yunnan and the Burma Road, since any advance in either the north or the south brought the risk of war with the American-Dutch-British (ADB) powers. According to Mullaly, Japan's ongoing preparations for war included the passage of several "supply" bills by a special session of the Diet and increased mobilization in Indochina. He noted that the Imperial Japanese Navy was now in a favourable position compared with the US Navy, although this advantage was undermined by both the war in China, which drained Japanese resources, and Britain's reinforcement of Singapore.¹²

The Allied agent interviewed by Day and Munday also commented on Japanese naval matters: "With regard to strategy, the Japanese particularly emphasise that it will not be a long accepted or orthodox naval warfare, but that it would be conducted along unexpected lines; exhibiting a pronounced element of surprise."¹³ According to the agent, Japanese policy might include allowing German submarines into the Pacific to attack Allied shipping and the North American coast; outfitting German merchant ships as commerce raiders;

launching Japanese submarine hit-and-run attacks against surface vessels at US and Canadian ports; camouflaging Japanese merchant vessels as naval craft; controlling Vichy French possessions and ports; and destroying the Suez Canal with German support. He offered a further assessment to his interviewers:

Informant understands that the period between Nov. 15, 1941, and Feb. 15, 1942, will represent the time when parity is most favourable to Japan; after that date U.S. construction will begin to exceed that of Japan. Informant emphasized the remark that the Japanese Navy must by no means be underestimated. He says that the morale and training is good, and that the fleet is powerful.¹⁴

Clearly, the agent saw Japan as a formidable naval power that had not only developed several innovative battle strategies but also created a specific time-frame for hostilities.

The Canadians found the agent's remarks concerning Hong Kong even more disturbing: "Informant definitely says that no troops should have been landed there. Rather he says that we should evacuate. He says it is not possible for us to conduct a defence for any length of time. He has learned from Japanese sources that no attempt will be made to capture H.K. by Naval action alone."¹⁵ Apparently, the Japanese were also considering air or land attacks against Hong Kong. Despite the probability of a defeat at Hong Kong, Colonel Mullaly defended the ideal of military honour in commenting on the Day-Munday interview: "Informant may be right but we would never consider giving up Hong Kong without a fight."¹⁶

By late November, intelligence sources pointed to Thailand as a probable target. British Army Intelligence Notes reported that Japanese forces were moving southward in Indochina, and suggested that Japan might be "contemplating an early move against *Thailand* or the *Kra Isthmus*." The Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report reinforced that view in its last edition before the outbreak of war, stating that Japan had finally abandoned plans for a northern strike: "It is clear that Japan has no immediate intentions of moving North against *Russia* ... There are no signs that major operations are in contemplation either in North, Central or South China." Furthermore, Hong Kong observers believed that Japan would not mount an attack on the Burma Road, which left southern objectives, of which Thailand was considered the most likely prospect. As usual, British commentators applied a disclaimer to their analysis, noting that divisions in Japanese leadership might avert an immediate attack on Thailand, although Japan was still likely to drift into war with "the Democratic Powers."¹⁷

British naval intelligence, provided to Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa through Admiralty basegrams and Singapore dispatches, described Japan's ongoing mobilization as well as its declared interest in Thailand and Malaya. On 25 November, Singapore reported on Japan's reinforcement of troops and aircraft in French Indochina. Three days later, the Admiralty reported that the Japanese Minister in Bangkok had assured Thai officials that "Japan would never invade *Thailand* and that if she attacked Malaya it would not be via *Thailand*." The same report mentioned Japan's promise of aircraft to the Thai government, although it appeared that the Thai prime minister was hedging his bets: he had not only requested aircraft from the British and the Americans but had also asked the Allies to inform Japan that any invasion of Thailand would result in an Allied declaration of war against Japan. The Admiralty reported on 29 November that Japan had steadily increased its armaments and had organized a "large expansion of currency and reorganized her economy along totalitarian lines." The report highlighted the "deadlock" in US-Japanese talks in Washington and explained that the US government anticipated the possibility of a Japanese military move within the next few days.¹⁸

Diplomatic correspondence late in the month also focused on a Japanese southward drive, with discussion of the threat to Thailand, the Burma Road, and Hong Kong. On 19 November, the Dominions Office reported on Japanese divisions operating in the south, and speculated on the relative merits to Japan of striking either Thailand or the Burma Road. Another communiqué revealed that all Japanese ships were homeward bound, except for a few local trade vessels operating in Indochina, Thailand, and South America. On 25 November, the Dominions Office reinforced the view that Japan was now interested in southern targets: "Troop movements from north to south Indo China indicate an increased probability of operations against Thailand rather than against the Burma Road." The same report confirmed that the two Canadian infantry battalions, the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada, had arrived with "ancillary troops" in Hong Kong on 16 November. The Canadians were now committed to defending the colony. An ominous question remained: if deterrence failed, would Allied forces be sufficient to repulse a Japanese southward advance? Not surprisingly, diplomatic reports that circulated within the British Commonwealth usually assumed some form of Allied supremacy.¹⁹

And so did several intelligence sources, such as Colonel Mullaly, who attributed the inevitability of war to Japan's national "character":

We are, however, faced with the familiar situation of a nation armed to the teeth and ruled by a gang of arrogant and bellicose militarists and, what is more, a people who labour under a deep sense of injustice and resentment and who, in

the final analysis, display all the dangerous symptoms of a deep-seated inferiority complex ... To throw such a machine into reverse is the most difficult thing in the world, especially for a highly nervous race like the Japanese and the factor of German pressure cannot be discounted in any consideration of probable Japanese action.²⁰

Mullaly expressed attitudes and prejudices that were common among many of his peers in 1941: Japan's "warlike" nature, along with Germany's ample encouragement, made war a certainty lest Japan "lose face."

Mullaly also commented on Japan's air and naval capabilities in his reply to the Day-Munday interview. First, he questioned the viability of Japanese air power:

I very much doubt the "special counter-airforce." A striking force for attack on Russian bases, would obviously be part of the Japanese plan but the Japanese inferiority in the air is such that it is doubtful if it could effect very much against Russia. This is, perhaps, the main factor which will deter Japan from war - her vulnerability to air attack.²¹

But Mullaly respected Japanese naval power: "I agree with the remarks concerning Japanese Navy ... The Navy is the most efficient weapon which Japan possesses ... it will prove a very redoubtable opponent. The views on Naval strategy are interesting and quite likely fairly accurate, assuming that German direction is largely accepted."²²

On 11 November, the Canadian Army issued an RCMP report on Japanese "vulnerable points" to the Canadian Legation in Washington and to British and US army authorities. The RCMP commented on the industry, resources, shipping, and railways at several vulnerable points, including Korea, Yokohama, Kobe-Osaka, Nagoya, Kamata, Kawasaki, Shinagawa, Moji, Yawata, Kasumigaura, and Uno. Canadian authorities must have taken the information seriously, because they reissued the report to the Allies later in the month.²³

Incoming intelligence also addressed American attitudes, war preparations, and diplomacy, all of which were becoming increasingly important to the Allies. According to Captain Brand's press and trade intelligence, support for Britain was still hard to find in the US. Early in November, female peace demonstrators in Detroit hurled eggs and tomatoes at Lord Halifax, calling him a "War Monger." Nonetheless, the press emphasized the United States' preparations for war, reporting on the effectiveness of naval radar, the recruitment of radio technicians, the training of a joint Army-Marine assault force in San Diego, and President Roosevelt's order of 14 November to withdraw US marines from China because

he feared they might be taken as hostages in the event of war with Japan. The Esquimalt station reported that Washington had also taken the precaution of rerouting Soviet aid shipments through the Atlantic rather than the Pacific (other than petrol and oil shipments to Vladivostok).³⁴

Colonel Mullaly commented on Washington diplomatic exchanges, noting Winston Churchill's promise of unequivocal British support for the United States in the event of war, as well as the importance of the Kurusu Mission. On 28 November, Mullaly explained that the "veil of secrecy" over the US-Japanese talks was now lifted and that a "rupture" appeared imminent. He observed that Secretary of State Hull's note to the Japanese reaffirmed American principles concerning the Far East, including the necessity of Japan's withdrawal from China and Indochina, free trade in the region, and Japan's departure from the Axis alliance, but noted that the terms were unlikely to be accepted by the Tojo government. The stage was set for war in the Pacific.³⁵

Intelligence about a Possible Attack on Pearl Harbor

It appears that some intelligence shared with Ottawa in late November also pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor. According to the 1967 sworn affidavit of Colonel Murton A. Seymour, OBE, QC, a Canadian veteran who had assisted with Royal Canadian Air Force recruiting in 1941, he was asked on 30 November to attend a private meeting the next day in Ottawa, where he was informed that British intelligence had told Canadian authorities that a Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor might occur on 8 December.³⁶ On the basis of this intelligence, Seymour was instructed to shut down his covert air force recruitment program in the United States. How was such an estimate even possible by late 1941?

In fact, some American and Allied authorities not only were aware of Japan's interest in Hawaii but also speculated that the Japanese might strike at Pearl Harbor. American military authorities considered a Japanese air strike against Hawaii in a strategic estimate made in March 1941. The US Navy's Rainbow-5 war plan published in late July predicted possible Japanese attacks on "Wake, Midway and other outlying United States possessions," as well as the deployment of raiding and observation forces throughout the Pacific, with submarines in the Hawaii area. In August, British and American intelligence learned that Germany was attempting to collect information on Pearl Harbor for Japan. During a visit to Hawaii in October, Lord Louis Mountbatten warned Admiral Harold Stark that the US Navy's Pacific Fleet based there was vulnerable to aerial attack and should be better defended. In the same month, Lieutenant-Commander C.C. Martell, a British naval attaché in Pearl Harbor, wrote a report on US naval communications and security, commenting that Pearl Harbor

suffered from security leaks. In mid-November, the Australian Legation in Washington sent Canberra some reports it had received from BSC concerning Japanese activities in the Pacific, particularly in Hawaii. At that time, the Americans also learned through decrypted Japanese diplomatic traffic that agents in Hawaii reported to Tokyo on the movements of US naval ships in the vicinity.²⁷

In late November, according to some sources, British intelligence seriously considered the possibility of a surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. British intelligence knew that Japan's history of surprise attacks meant that *all* British and US possessions needed to be on full alert.²⁸ According to the unpublished postwar memoirs of Sir Julian E. Ridsdale, MP, a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) meeting held at 10 Downing Street on 27 November addressed the possibility of a Pearl Harbor strike. In late 1941, Ridsdale served as an MI2 intelligence officer within the War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence in London, and his tasks included liaising with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Far East section, the JIC, and the War Cabinet. Ridsdale recalls the JIC reporting that because of Japanese radio silence, "the Japanese Fleet was now in a position to be considered a major threat to the American Fleet in Pearl Harbour. It was agreed we should alert the President of the United States, and Bill Cavendish-Bentinck agreed to act on the committee's decision. Indeed we agreed that a warning should go out that all Allied ports in the Pacific were liable to attack."²⁹

Ridsdale later spoke to Victor (Bill) Cavendish-Bentinck, who had served as JIC chairman in 1941, and they discussed whether or not the Americans had been informed:

It was inconceivable to us how the Americans had been taken by surprise at Pearl Harbour, especially after we had alerted the President of the United States. In 1987, when I met Bill Cavendish-Bentinck, by then the Duke of Portland, he assured me that he had passed the message on. The only valid reason that Bill and I could find was that Roosevelt had used this as an opportunity to bring the Americans into the War. In his defence, the President could not have possibly known that the Americans based at Pearl Harbour would be caught off guard.³⁰

Cavendish-Bentinck offered much the same account to his close friend writer Constantine Fitzgibbon during the preparation of the latter's book, *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*.³¹

The JIC strategic estimate of 27 November, as reported by Ridsdale and Cavendish-Bentinck, appears to agree with one produced on the same date by BSC in New York. In 1998, Grace Garner, who had served as secretary to BSC

head William Stephenson in 1941, commented on pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence. Her remarks merit careful consideration, since she was privy to some of the most secret intelligence produced by BSC throughout the Second World War. Garner stated that on 27 November BSC sent a telegram to London that contained the following text: "Japanese negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." The BSC internal history confirms that Stephenson sent such a telegram on the date in question. Yet, Garner also explained that BSC shared information with the Americans and the British regarding Japanese plans for a "massive" attack on Pearl Harbor. She stated that such intelligence came from "various sources and observations, and actually watching what was happening in the Japanese embassy in Washington," and from "code intercepts" that conveyed instructions to the Japanese Fleet. Considering Garner's remarks, it is possible that the JIC predicted a Pearl Harbor attack on the basis of intelligence it received from BSC on 27 November.³²

How might such intelligence have been collected? According to the BSC internal history, Stephenson's team had penetrated Japanese diplomatic missions in the United States: "BSC had contacts inside the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the Japanese Consulates in New York and San Francisco. Some success was also had in direct penetration of the Kurusu mission ... The agent employed in this instance was a British subject who had spent fifty years in Japan and spoke the language fluently." Reportedly, the British agent contacted Kurusu's secretary, "Mr. Yuki," and met with him in a Washington flat that had been wired for recording. During several conversations there, Mr. Yuki spoke freely to the agent, explaining that Japan's course was "unalterable" and that "the United States must either give way or face the consequences." Each day, BSC provided information from the recordings to Roosevelt, who observed that Japan's future intentions "were becoming clearer and more alarming as each day went by." At the very least, the clandestine recordings suggested that Japan would wage war before accepting US demands for a withdrawal from occupied territories in the Far East.³³

While information from the transcripts was still arriving at the White House, President Roosevelt, through his son James, sent Stephenson a message containing intelligence unknown to either the British Embassy in Washington or the Foreign Office in London. That message prompted Stephenson to send his telegram to SIS chief Stewart Menzies on 27 November, in which he warned of conflict with Japan within two weeks. According to H. Montgomery Hyde's book on Stephenson, an urgent telegram from London requested Stephenson to confirm the source of his information and he replied "the President of the U.S.A." Apart from strategic assessments anticipating war with Japan in early

December, it is possible that BSC's activities in Washington, combined with communications intelligence, were a source of accurate speculation about an imminent Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.³⁴

Regarding communications intelligence in the Pacific region, some sources suggest that the Allies and the Americans enjoyed a degree of success in crypt-analysis and direction finding (D/F) tracking. British and American naval intelligence staff could partially read the Japanese naval code JN-25B (the 5-Numeral code) in late 1941. Several intercepted JN-25B messages even pointed to a Japanese North Pacific carrier strike against capital ships moored in shallow waters. According to US Congressional hearings, on 30 November 1941 US naval intelligence intercepted a genuine transmission sent from the Strike Force flagship *Akagi* to several *marus* (merchant tankers). The US Navy also intercepted transmissions that used call signs assigned to the Strike Force. In postwar testimony, a Netherlands East Indies (NEI) intelligence officer stated that D/F revealed the presence of Japanese carriers in the Kuriles by late November 1941. As well, according to officers from NEI intelligence unit *Kamer 14*, the Dutch sent several warnings to Washington about a possible attack on Pearl Harbor, based on intelligence gathered from codebreaking. It should be noted that such evidence is in conflict with several traditional historical accounts, which state that Allied-American intelligence could not have predicted the attack due to limited JN-25B reading ability and inadequate D/F bearings, the latter as a result of Japanese radio silence or deception.³⁵

Murton Seymour's affidavit, however, appears at least to confirm that British intelligence shared a strategic estimate with Ottawa. As noted earlier, Seymour described how he learned of the coming Pearl Harbor attack during a private meeting in Ottawa. As president of the Dominion Aeronautical Association Limited, a Canadian Crown corporation formed in January 1941, Seymour recruited US pilots and air crew for service in Britain and Canada. This recruitment program fell under the broad jurisdiction of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), which operated in Canada. On 30 November, Joseph L. Apedaile, a staff member of the Department of National Defence for Air, who served as both Civil Contracts Officer and Treasurer in the Dominion Aeronautical Association, requested that Seymour meet him the next day in Ottawa.

Seymour gave the following account of his meeting with Apedaile at the Chateau Laurier Hotel in Ottawa on 1 December:

Mr. Apedaile informed me that British Military Intelligence had informed Ottawa that it was suspected that the Japanese would make a surprise air attack on Pearl

Harbor on December 8th, 1941 ... Mr. Apedaile then explained to me that if the attack did take place it obviously meant that the United States immediately would be involved in War with Japan, would probably become involved in the War with Germany and Italy and, therefore, they would require all the pilots that they could train and would probably, as did happen, ask Canada to return as many American pilots who were with the B.C.A.T.P. as could be spared. If this were to eventuate Mr. Apedaile said we should be prepared to immediately proceed to close out our activities in the United States and wind up the Canadian Aviation Bureau.³⁶

Apedaile requested that Seymour hold a special meeting as early as possible to advise the directors that the association would close out its activities; no reason was to be given. Seymour held such a meeting with members of the Canadian Aviation Bureau in New York on 6 December. When he explained the purpose of the meeting, Apedaile, who was also present, "professed complete ignorance." Seymour later surmised that Apedaile's information came from either C.G. "Chubby" Power, Minister of National Defence for Air, or S.L. de Carteret, Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air. The Dominion Aeronautical Association ended its US recruiting program in early 1942.

After the war, Seymour made inquiries into Apedaile's information, although discretion and security precluded open discussion. Stanley M. Clark, QC, former secretary of the Dominion Aeronautical Association, agreed to send the association's minute book to Seymour, but strongly urged him not to publish "because of the then delicate political situation existing between Ottawa and Washington."³⁷ No minutes of the 6 December meeting in New York were available: they had not been recorded, according to Clark. At an RCAF banquet in 1964, Chubby Power seemed to avoid a direct discussion of the matter with Seymour.

In 1968, Seymour consulted his friend Lester Pearson, then Prime Minister of Canada, about his affidavit, but received no immediate answer. Finally, in a letter of 31 January 1972, Pearson confirmed what his intelligence sources in "official quarters" had to say on the matter:

As for the truth of the story that "British Military Intelligence" were able to state on December 1, 1941 that Pearl Harbour would be attacked on December 8, there is nothing that I have been able to find in the records of anyone having firm intelligence about the date. But the British (and the Americans) seem to have had enough communications and other intelligence at hand at that time to expect that an attack would be made in the near future on Pearl Harbour, quite possibly in early December.³⁸



Murton A. Seymour (standing, second from left) and Joseph L. Apedaile (standing, centre) visit a British Commonwealth Air Training Plan school in 1942. According to Seymour, on 30 November 1941 Apedaile asked him to attend a private meeting the next day in Ottawa, where he was told to close down Canadian air force recruiting in the United States because British intelligence suspected a Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage 2, M.A. Seymour – Fall Biographical File, D.K. Yorath, detail from PMR 81-282.*

Pearson could not say whether President Roosevelt or US Navy Chief Harold Stark had received such intelligence, and he rejected revisionist ideas about the President, implying that the affidavit might best be left unpublished. Nonetheless, Pearson's sources suggested that both British and US intelligence expected a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in early December 1941.

Quite apart from the official sources that Pearson consulted on Seymour's behalf, Pearson's informed opinion may have drawn on his own wartime

experiences. As a member of External Affairs in 1941, Pearson had contacts within the Canadian High Commission in London, the Canadian Legation in Washington, BSC in New York, and all three Canadian armed services. He also helped staff BSC, created reporting structures for intelligence, and assisted with the creation of the Examination Unit.³⁹ Pearson, in his own right, is a highly credible source.

Seymour's affidavit also appears highly credible when checked against archival sources, all of which show that he correctly described the responsibilities of every cited person and institution, as well as his own position of responsibility in 1941.⁴⁰ Moreover, Apedaile, de Carteret, and Power had been close friends before the war and later served together in the Department of National Defence for Air. It is possible that Power trusted his wartime colleagues with intelligence that he received from the Canadian Legation in Washington, BSC in New York, or British intelligence in London. Linkages existed between Washington, London, and Ottawa through the Canadian Legation, BSC, External Affairs in Ottawa, and finally the BCATP, for which Power and his department were responsible.⁴¹ For example, in June 1941, the Canadian Legation informed BSC that US citizens serving in Canada's armed services would be released for US service in the event of America's entry into the war.⁴² This information may have inspired BSC to inform Power's team, which was recruiting in the US, that an attack on Pearl Harbor was anticipated.⁴³ In any case, it is not unreasonable to assume that important intelligence was shared with Chubby Power, who was responsible for so much strategic planning in Canada in 1941.

Considering all sources, intelligence received in November pointed to the inescapable conclusion that war with Japan was now almost certain. Ottawa monitored Japan's growing Axis ties and its diplomatic failure in Washington, where the Kurusu Mission and the proposed *modus vivendi* had been rebuffed. In addition, reports on Japan's mobilization throughout Southeast Asia finally confirmed that country's interest in a southern target, which at first appeared to be the Burma Road but was later known to be Thailand or Malaya. Furthermore, Hong Kong was seen as vulnerable, despite its recent reinforcement with Canadian troops. In terms of military capability, intelligence analysts saw Japan as a strong naval power but regarded it as limited in air power. In that critical month of November 1941, there were also intelligence reports on American preparations for war and the breakdown in US-Japanese negotiations. Other incoming reports pointed to conflict in the Kra Isthmus, compelling strategists to consider the implications of a pre-emptive British occupation of the region. Finally, British intelligence appears to have informed Ottawa that an attack on Pearl Harbor would likely occur in early December. Canadian officials could now begin considering their own final preparations for the outbreak of war.

General Strategic Discussions

During his meeting with Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 1 and 2 November, Prime Minister Mackenzie King exchanged a number of views regarding the Far East crisis, according to Grant Dexter, a reporter with the *Winnipeg Free Press*. On 7 November, Dexter, who spoke to King's associates about the Hyde Park conversations, recorded that the Prime Minister thought "conscription talk" in Canada was "stupid," because the public focused on Europe while forgetting the Pacific. Dexter noted that Roosevelt had told King that an American-Japanese war was thought to be certain and that it was "almost certain to come within 30 days." The resulting "radical changes in priorities" would require several Canadian divisions to be placed on the Pacific Coast, because Japan would likely "attempt a diversion for the purpose of compelling North America to ease off support for Britain and Russia and thus help Hitler." Dexter noted that King would use the National Resources Mobilization Act to call up many thousands of men for that purpose: "We will have to equip them and therefore will have to cut down to some extent our aid to Britain. The realization of the Pacific peril, Mr. King thinks, will put an end to talk of conscription for overseas service." If we accept Dexter's evidence, then Mackenzie King not only received an estimate as to when hostilities with Japan would commence but also planned to use the Pacific War as a means of solving his conscription crisis.⁴⁴

Historian C.P. Stacey has commented on Dexter's second-hand evidence. Stacey notes that King did not discuss the matter in his diary but suggests that he may not have included all material, under pressure of fatigue. Stacey may have overlooked two diary entries that appear to support Dexter's evidence, however. King recorded his thoughts about the Far East on 6 November: "It is now perfectly clear that Japan intends to fight ... very soon." He also recalled his conversation of 17 November with Lord Halifax: "I said I would be amazed if before the month was out, there was not war with Japan in the Pacific." Despite his doubts about the diary entries, Stacey appeared to accept Dexter's evidence and offered the following explanation:

This would indicate that the policy followed in British Columbia can hardly be called a military policy at all. King's pervading concern with the political question of overseas conscription seems to have been a controlling factor. We have here a striking example of that wishful exaggeration of the direct threats to Canada which was characteristic of King and his civilian advisors.⁴⁵

Mackenzie King was going to fight a war of limited liability, and that meant retaining some Canadian men for home defence, particularly if they were potential overseas conscripts.⁴⁶

The threat of war prompted much more discussion that month. Churchill informed Roosevelt, Stalin, and all Commonwealth leaders that Britain was sending HMS *Prince of Wales* and HMS *Repulse* to the Far East in order to deter Japan. Furthermore, he emphasized the need to maintain supply shipments to the Soviet Union through Archangel, Persia, and Vladivostok because he thought that Japan would not act unless the Soviet Union was broken. South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts also participated in Allied strategic discussions, and Ottawa learned of his full support for Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for assistance from Britain and the United States. Smuts believed that assistance to China was absolutely vital as a check on Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia. He noted that Japan would have to cut the Burma Road before advancing north or south, although such action would invite Anglo-American intervention: "Burma Road is the rubicon for Japan." He also thought that it was necessary to place British and American air support in China, an action that might have other welcome consequences: "Indeed this may be the easier and shorter way to get America actively into the war." Or, to put it another way, American Flying Tigers squadrons serving in China might just secure the Allies their greatest prize: US co-belligerence.⁴⁷

Following Smuts's correspondence, more discussion ensued over the reinforcement of the Far East. Ottawa learned on 13 November that Churchill had contacted Chiang Kai-shek to offer more support and had advised him that Japan might strike southern China at Kunming. In response to Churchill's initiative, Roosevelt pledged to "increase and expedite Lend Lease aid to China" and to strengthen the American volunteer air force. He also believed that reinforcement of Singapore and the Philippines would help deter Japan. In that regard, the Prime Minister of New Zealand reported that American engineers based in his country were establishing US air bases on Christmas Island, Fiji, Western Samoa, and Noumea to provide an "outer route" to Singapore and the Philippines for Allied bombers. It is questionable whether the Roosevelt administration considered these reinforcements as purely deterrent measures. On 14 November, General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, announced at a press conference that the Philippines was receiving reinforcements and that the United States was preparing for an "offensive war" against Japan. Meanwhile, Britain considered reinforcements for Thailand, informing the Dominions that Thailand needed Allied support to keep it independent of Japan, particularly if Japanese forces occupied the Kra Isthmus.⁴⁸

In terms of diplomatic moves, Ottawa learned that London had rejected a Japanese proposal to have British diplomats participate in the Washington discussions as a moderating influence. Both Cordell Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles supported Britain's decision to stay out of the talks.⁴⁹

London offered its own explanation in a telegram sent to Ottawa on 17 November:

When we joined United States and Netherlands at the end of July in imposing freezing measures against Japan, we realized that probable result would be to force her within a comparatively short time to choose whether to make a genuine effort to reach a settlement ... or to undertake the gaining of her ambitions by force ... The maintenance of our present policy admittedly involves a risk of war though with a good prospect of active American participation.⁵⁰

In other words, London had no intention of altering the course of US-Japanese diplomacy that had been established by the asset freeze because US belligerency had to be ensured. Hume Wrong, Counsellor to the Canadian Minister to the United States, wrote to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson from Washington five days later and explained the British view: "They feel that, if war comes in the Pacific after the collapse of these discussions, it is very much in our interest that the complete responsibility for breaking off negotiations should rest with Washington."⁵¹ Mackenzie King had long preached the merits of waiting for guaranteed American support before committing the British Commonwealth to war in the Pacific. Britain and its allies would stay out of the Washington conversations and bide their time.

Even so, Canadian officials continued to receive reports on the talks between Hull and Japanese diplomats Nomura and Kurusu. During a dinner engagement with Mackenzie King, Lord Halifax expressed the view that Kurusu's US visit was really meant to determine whether or not the United States would go to war if Japan continued its aggression. According to Lord Halifax, the Japanese thought that the Americans were bluffing, a statement to which King responded by saying that the present affair was a repeat of Germany's diplomacy just before the outbreak of war in Europe. Several messages from London and Washington on 22 November informed Ottawa that Hull had adopted an intransigent attitude towards the Kurusu Mission and would not compromise over Japan's occupation of China and French Indochina. Hume Wrong reported from Washington that Hull had insisted that Japan leave the Axis: "He had told Mr. Kurusu that the Government of the United States would not go six inches in a thousand years to do anything which would assist the greatest international butcher of all time." Kurusu offered a compromise involving withdrawal of some Japanese troops in exchange for limited US trade, but Hull would have none of that.⁵²

Privately, however, Hull wanted to gain time so that the US could improve its position in the Far East. On 24 and 25 November, Wrong wrote to Robertson explaining what he had learned about Hull's proposed *modus vivendi*. Initially,

Wrong had to rely on information from the British Embassy in Washington, including a telegram that Lord Halifax had sent to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, because Hull failed to invite him to a recent meeting on the subject. According to Wrong, on 22 November Hull met twice with American, British, Chinese, and Dutch (ABCD) representatives, including Lord Halifax, Richard Casey (Australia), T.V. Soong (China), and Dr. Alexander Loudon (the Netherlands). Hull explained that he wanted to gain valuable time, perhaps two or three more months, for reinforcement of the Philippines. To achieve that objective, he proposed a *modus vivendi* that included several actions: Japan would stop its military advances; it would evacuate troops from southern French Indochina and reduce troops in the north; the United States would accept Japanese imports, particularly silk; and Japan would use its export proceeds to buy oil, food, cotton, and medical supplies from the US, Australia, and the NEI. Hull sought the agreement of the ABCD representatives before offering such a counterproposal to Japan, but Mr. Soong was very apprehensive about any compromise: the Chungking government did not want to see Japan gain a free hand to continue its brutal occupation of China. Hull persisted in pursuing the *modus vivendi* despite Soong's reservations.⁵³

Mackenzie King was furious that the Canadian Legation had not been represented at Hull's *modus vivendi* meetings. He reminded Wrong that both press and radio had reported a meeting of the "Pacific Powers" in Washington but that Canada had not been mentioned, and asked Wrong to discuss the matter with Hull because such an oversight was *not* to occur again. On 25 November, Wrong sent Hull a telegram on the subject, and the State Department issued an apology that same day, promising that Canada would be represented at subsequent meetings. Hull explained that he had thought King's close contact with Roosevelt obviated the need for representation, particularly as the meeting had no authority anyway. A few days later, Wrong noted that Hull felt the need to offer a further apology: "He said with his usual southern politeness that he had 'never been more distressed' by anything than by the message which I transmitted to him on November 25th ... and added that he would do everything he could for his Canadian friends, who occupied a very select place in his feelings." Hull's calculated charm aside, it was clear that the State Department knew that the Canadians resented such oversights and wanted the same consideration that they had received throughout 1941. Only twice had Canada missed out on important discussions: at the Atlantic Conference, because it dealt with future Anglo-American cooperation in a postwar context, and at the ABCD *modus vivendi* meetings, because of a simple oversight. All told, the Mackenzie King government would not be marginalized until after the United States entered the war.⁵⁴



H. Hume Wrong, Counsellor to the Canadian Minister in Washington, kept Ottawa informed of the delicate negotiations between Japan and the United States, noting how the Roosevelt administration ultimately rejected Japan's proposals for compromise on 26 November 1941. The US would not lift the asset freeze unless Japan withdrew from China, and war in the Pacific now appeared imminent. Wrong is shown here in a portrait study taken in January 1945. *Yousuf Karsh, Library and Archives Canada, PA-197624.*

Meanwhile, Canadian officials continued to gather information on the Washington talks through their British contacts, although the State Department was at times reluctant to share information even with the British Embassy. Even so, London was able to report on Lord Halifax's interview with Cordell Hull about the proposed *modus vivendi*. Hull emphasized that Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had been pressing him to buy time for the improvement of US defences in the Far East: three months

would be regarded as having "immense value." Hull believed that there was only a slight chance that Japan would accept his proposal but that it was necessary to make the effort. He disagreed with Halifax's view that the Japanese might take action any day next week. On 26 November, however, he suddenly dropped the *modus vivendi* option and issued a final note to the Japanese, a note that was rumoured to be a general declaration of US principles regarding the Far East, or even an ultimatum.⁵⁵

Canadian officials tried to assess the meaning of Washington's sudden diplomatic reversal. A "Most Secret" telegram sent from the Canadian Legation in Washington to Ottawa on 28 November explained that Hull's *modus vivendi* had been dropped "mainly because of strenuous Chinese opposition expressed to the President." Reportedly, the State Department also recognized that British and Dutch officials had not been enthusiastic about the proposal. Moreover, American observers in the Far East had reported large Japanese naval movements near Indochina, possibly in preparation for an attack on the Kra Isthmus: it might be too late for a *modus vivendi*. Canadian officials remarked that Hull's note had not been shown to Allied representatives, although its text might be made public shortly. It was known that it contained "a broad statement of general principles acceptable to Pacific settlement" and that it had been "badly received by Kurusu." That day, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Hugh Keenleyside sent Norman Robertson a memorandum that summarized the US-Japanese negotiations of the past week, particularly Hull's proposed *modus vivendi*, and explained that the turning point in negotiations had apparently come on 27 November, when the Chinese ambassador and Mr. Soong visited Roosevelt. The Chinese representatives had delivered a message from Chiang Kai-shek that explained how the *modus vivendi* would damage Chinese morale and strengthen Japan's hand in China. Reportedly, the message had "greatly disturbed" Roosevelt, who did not wish to propose the *modus vivendi* without complete ABCD approval.⁵⁶

There may have been other messages that "greatly disturbed" the President. In a letter to Robertson on 29 November, Wrong explained that the *modus vivendi* had been mainly defeated by Roosevelt, and that the President had been influenced not only by Chinese representations but also by a message from Churchill, who pointed out on 25 November that Chiang Kai-shek faced a "thin diet" in China without more Allied support. According to Wrong, Roosevelt's Secretary of War had also suddenly changed his mind: "Until a day or two ago Stimson was urging Hull to play for time so that the U.S. forces in the Far East could be strengthened, but he is now saying that they must not let the Chinese down."⁵⁷ Did China's plight inspire such a shift in US policy or did the Americans know something else?

According to personal diaries and memoirs, in the last week of November some Washington officials believed that war with Japan was imminent. Stimson expressed that view in his diary entry for 25 November: "We were likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning ... The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves." On 29 November, Hull offered this explanation to Lord Halifax: "The diplomatic part in our relations with Japan is virtually over ... The matter will now go to officials of the Army and Navy ... Japan may move suddenly and with every element of surprise." Stimson's and Hull's observations suggest that Washington had received some kind of special intelligence regarding Japan's intentions. Revisionists conjecture that the Americans and the Allies may have had forewarning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which would explain Roosevelt's eagerness to halt negotiations, since a Japanese first strike against US territory would ensure America's entry into the war, something Roosevelt had long desired. Alternatively, forewarning of a Japanese first strike against targets in Southeast Asia might have prompted the same response from Roosevelt. All conjecture aside, however, it may be said at the very least that after 25 November Roosevelt abandoned the *modus vivendi* option, ostensibly because it harmed China's interests, and Hull issued his famous "note," which contributed to the end of constructive diplomacy between the United States and Japan.⁵⁸

On 29 November, Ottawa received several messages that commented on the Washington scene. Wrong informed Robertson that he would stop his running commentary on the Hull-Nomura talks because Ottawa was now receiving full reports from London, as demonstrated by documents that Lester Pearson brought to Washington that week. Wrong also reported that Hull was upset over the negotiations and the lack of unanimity over his proposed *modus vivendi*. Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Hull's special advisor at the State Department, was in complete disagreement with Hull and informed Wrong that he saw the Kurusu Mission as simple Japanese manoeuvring designed to gain time while a military build-up proceeded in the Far East. Hornbeck believed that nothing but force would stop the Japanese. Wrong learned from Lord Halifax that Hull was still non-committal about how Washington would respond to a Japanese invasion of Thailand but had promised to give Halifax a copy of his note of 26 November.⁵⁹

That same day, London sent the Dominions a series of updates. One message contained the text of a telegram that London had sent to Lord Halifax, advising him of British policy. Reportedly, London had not been surprised by China's reaction to the proposed *modus vivendi* but had been willing to reach an interim agreement "to avoid war in the Pacific if possible and otherwise to gain maximum time." London hoped that Cordell Hull would take Britain into his

confidence with any new proposals before they were given to Japan. Another message revealed that Sumner Welles had informed the Australian Minister to the United States that "the Japanese had started their military operations at least some days ago." The next communiqué from London reported that Welles had told Lord Halifax that there had been no further developments in US-Japanese diplomacy since the Hull note, but that he thought Japan would probably move in the next few days. Welles could not say what action the US government would take if Japan attacked Thailand.⁶⁰

In the final days before the Japanese attacks, Mackenzie King made certain arrangements. In a telegram to the Canadian Legation in Tokyo on 29 November, the Prime Minister outlined preparations to be made in the event of war with Japan. His telegram made reference to a similar message dating from October 1940, but now there was greater urgency. Legation staff were to place Canadian interests in the hands of the "protecting power" (Argentina), draft the necessary note to the Japanese government, inventory all Canadian government property and then dispose of it, destroy all "cyphers and secret documents," and arrange for the departure of Canadian officials.⁶¹

Several messages on 30 November pointed to US-Allied preparations for war. London informed Ottawa that Japan might attack Thailand and seize strategic points on the Kra Isthmus. The Royal Air Force had begun reconnaissance flights out of Kota Bharu the day before and now requested that the Americans do the same out of Manila. A related message confirmed that the US Navy had agreed to Britain's request for "recon" patrols. British Far East Command requested permission to intervene on the Kra Isthmus if a Japanese invasion appeared imminent, according to an earlier plan called Operation Matador. Lord Halifax spoke to Washington authorities about possible British pre-emptive action in the Kra Isthmus, but did not receive firm US commitment: "In view of United States constitutional difficulties, any prior guarantee of such support is most unlikely." London also informed Ottawa that the US Navy and War Department had issued war alerts to all US bases in the Pacific. It was noted that Sumner Welles had informed Lord Halifax that Cordell Hull's note would be unacceptable to Japan and that the Navy had based its instructions on this expectation. Reportedly, US naval war alerts issued between 24 and 28 November indicated that US-Japanese negotiations had broken down and that Japan was expected to make an "aggressive move" within the next few days. It was believed that Japan might attack the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Isthmus, and possibly Borneo. Furthermore, US naval bases had been warned about acts of sabotage. Considering all these messages, it seems clear that the British wanted pre-emptive action, whereas the Americans wanted to wait on guard for a Japanese first strike.⁶²

In Ottawa, Mackenzie King and his External Affairs staff surveyed all reports that day and reached a number of conclusions. The Canadian Legation in Washington confirmed that US authorities were reluctant to promise support in the event of British pre-emptive occupation of the Kra Isthmus: Roosevelt was away in Warm Springs, Georgia, and said that he would make no decision until he returned to Washington and consulted with his advisors the next day. It seemed as though the US President was applying delay tactics or believed that the Kra Isthmus would not be attacked after all. Keenleyside offered Robertson a summary of the situation: on 27 November, Roosevelt had not made progress in the US-Japanese talks; a Japanese naval force had been moving south since 26 November, which was *before* the talks had reached an impasse; Britain was still pushing to occupy the Kra Isthmus in anticipation of Japanese attacks; and Lord Halifax had asked both US and Canadian authorities for "an urgent expression" of their respective views on the subject.⁶³

Mackenzie King reflected on the impact these developments would have on the prospect of war in the Far East. In his diary, he condemned Britain's plan to intervene in the Kra Isthmus before Japan had even attacked:

I took strongly the view that on no account should Britain allow any action to be taken which would have it appear that the war was between G.B. and Japan rather than the U.S. and Japan, or any step to be taken until the U.S. itself was prepared to begin hostilities. The U.S. have been scrupulously careful to make no commitments. I have said right along that they would be prepared to let Britain begin hostilities but heaven knows when Congress, if at all, would consent to the U.S. going into the war.⁶⁴

The question of American participation weighed heavily on his mind, but King now appeared to believe that war in the Pacific was inevitable. He later noted that he had made a prediction to Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand on Sunday, 30 November: "Dandurand's honed to know what had been done and reminded me that I had said last Sunday that before another Sunday was over, we would be at war with Japan."⁶⁵ The next Sunday would be 7 December 1941.

King finally telegraphed both Churchill and the Dominions Office on 30 November to offer his views: "I cannot express too strongly my view that so long as there is any uncertainty about the degree and immediacy of United States support it would be a terrible mistake to permit any course of action which might result in war between Japan and the British Commonwealth of Nations." He pointed out that US isolationists must be persuaded to see Singapore as an object of strategic importance to both the United States and Britain. Furthermore, he emphasized that Britain should receive public assurances of



View of eastern Hong Kong from HMCS *Prince Robert*, November 1941. The colony welcomed the arrival of the Canadian battalions, but negotiations in Washington later that month suggested that no Allied reinforcements were going to deter Japanese expansionism in Southeast Asia. *Library and Archives Canada, PA-114809.*

support from Washington before even considering any occupation of the Kra Isthmus. The message from Ottawa was crystal clear: US support for the anticipated Pacific War had to be guaranteed and under no circumstances should the British Commonwealth risk any unilateral action. Ultimately, the Allies gained a temporary respite because the Japanese decided not to attack the Kra Isthmus.⁶⁶

Regardless of any such reprieves, the Canadian and Allied armed forces intensified their preparations for a conflict in the Pacific. As early as 7 November, London had sent a Most Secret telegram to Ottawa stating that a new Far East Command had been created as set out in the ABC-1 agreement. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, had been selected to assume the new ABC-1 Singapore command, with the title Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Fleet. In another message to Ottawa that day, London outlined the respective roles of British, Commonwealth, Dutch, and US forces in the Pacific



in the event of war with Japan. Later in the month, Rear-Admiral Percy W. Nelles, Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Canadian Navy, officially informed Canadian commanding officers of the new ABC-1 Singapore command. Significantly, Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa contacted the British Admiralty and its delegation in Washington on 26 November after receiving a letter from the Chief Naval Officer, US Navy, who had requested discussions over the implementation of the ABC-1 agreement. NSHQ wanted to implement Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement with respect to control of Pacific shipping, and to initiate full liaison between US, British, and Canadian naval authorities. Furthermore, an Admiralty basegram distributed throughout Canada that day made the following request: "Report names of all R.N.R. [Royal Naval Reserve] and R.N.V.R. [Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve] officers and ratings who have a knowledge of Japanese and Chinese." On 29 November, the Admiralty informed US Naval

Operations (OPNAV) in Washington and NSHQ in Ottawa that it was implementing the Type X enciphering system on 1 December to report daily ship movements – a wise security precaution. The Allies were preparing for the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.⁶⁷

Conclusions

In November 1941, Canada not only anticipated the coming of the Pacific War but also made important preparations for the conflict. Incoming intelligence highlighted the growing diplomatic deadlock between Japan and the United States over the destiny of China. Reports also indicated that Japan was deploying more troops to critical border areas like Manchukuo and French Indochina, although by mid-November the possibility of attacks against northern targets was seen as low. In terms of southern targets, intelligence initially identified the Burma Road but then focused on Thailand and Malaya, particularly the Kra Isthmus. Once again, intelligence analysts respected Japan's naval power but believed its air force to be weak, and concluded that Japan's overall military capability was less than any comparable Western armed force. More controversially, British intelligence may have predicted a Japanese air strike against Pearl Harbor and shared its estimate with Ottawa officials, who acted on the information and proceeded to shut down their covert air force recruiting operations in the United States.

According to several diary entries, Mackenzie King appeared to be aware in November that war would break out in early December 1941, possibly by Sunday, 7 December. He also knew that Canadian defence requirements on the Pacific Coast might help alleviate a potential crisis over conscription for overseas service. Canadian officials monitored the deterioration in US-Japanese diplomacy, noting that Britain wisely stayed out of the negotiations so as to shift responsibility for a possible conflict onto the United States. Through an oversight, Canadian officials missed Cordell Hull's *modus vivendi* meetings with the ABCD powers but nonetheless learned that the proposed *modus vivendi* was meant to buy the Americans time to send further reinforcements to the Far East. Canadian officials also knew that President Roosevelt suddenly dropped this approach, ostensibly in response to China's protests, and replaced it with a final note to Japan, one that appeared to signal that meaningful negotiations were over. In light of this diplomatic reversal and the Kra Isthmus war scare, King issued final orders to the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, including plans for shutting the office and destroying codebooks, and cautioned Churchill against intervening in the Far East until American support was guaranteed.

In terms of defence preparations for the Pacific War in late November, Canadian authorities invoked Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement with respect

to control of Pacific shipping. If some in Canada anticipated an attack on Pearl Harbor, the concern over North Pacific voyages is even more understandable. All that could be done now was to monitor developments in Washington, if any, and to watch for Japan's final mobilization of forces. In the next chapter, we will examine Canada's deliberations and actions in the final days before Japan's opening salvo in the Pacific War.

The Coming of the Pacific War, December 1941

IN NOVEMBER 1941, OFFICIALS in Ottawa witnessed diplomatic deadlock between Japan and the United States and intensified preparations for an outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific. This chapter examines Canada's final observations and strategy in the fateful month of December, when Japan launched multiple attacks against Allied and American targets throughout Southeast Asia and the North Pacific. In early December, critical intelligence arriving in Ottawa focused primarily on Japan's mobilization for war in Southeast Asia, but according to some American and Allied sources, Japanese ships were detected in the waters of the North Pacific. Canadian strategists, armed with intelligence regarding Japan's intentions, participated in Anglo-American discussions whenever possible and formed plans in the context of Allied objectives. That month, Canada anticipated Japanese attacks against targets in both Southeast Asia and the North Pacific, understood that active American support for the Allies was now assured, and made advance preparations for these eventualities.

Intelligence Available to Canada

In terms of low-grade intelligence, censorship summaries provided to Ottawa officials in December conveyed the public's reaction to Japanese society and policies over the past two months. One letter from early October described conditions in occupied China, where Japanese troops looted and burned villages, but not without reprisals: "There is much unrest and Japanese officers and soldiers are picked off on the streets frequently. They have many hostages bottled up and when those incidents occur they trot out the hostages and kill them in public." Later in the month, a Japanese writer informed his Montreal colleague that little cooperation existed within the Japanese government and advised that it was important to not express any form of criticism in future correspondence: "To conform to the spirit of *Bushido*, everything is supposed to be good, all the time." In a letter the next day from Tokyo, a Japanese writer sought to influence the *Nisei* in Canada: "It is the duty of the second generation in the American continent to do their part in clarifying Japan's policy in East Asia ... I hope and pray that you will have absolute faith in Japan's diplomatic and military measures." The letter was unusual, since most Japanese writers were unwilling to provoke the *Nisei*.¹

Telegrams intercepted in late November revealed public concern over the expected collapse of the Washington talks, which some thought might be hastened by Japanese moves against Indochina or the Burma Road. The telegrams also conveyed public interest in possible US actions, including military intervention in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), further economic sanctions against Japan, and more aid to China. Ottawa would have little difficulty in managing public opinion in the event of war. Censorship intelligence amply confirmed that the public already regarded the Japanese as militarists perpetrating atrocities in China and heading towards war with the West, pending failure of the Washington talks.²

British Army Intelligence Notes for the first week of December described Japanese and Soviet military strength in the Far East. British analysts reported on Japanese divisions in northern French Indochina and Japanese control of coastal railways, as well as the naval base in Cam Ranh Bay; they calculated that Calcutta was "just within extreme bombing range" of Japanese aircraft. Soviet Far East forces were overestimated, to say the least: "It is estimated that the Russian Far Eastern Armies now amount to 21 Infantry divisions, 11 Cavalry divisions, and 11 armoured divisions, with about 1,000 planes."³ In fact, Soviet strength in the Far East had peaked in June 1941 at only 31 divisions, 17 of which had since been transferred to the Eastern Front in Europe. The Notes, sent to the Canadian Legation in Washington, offered insight into the disposition of Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indochina, but demonstrated a British preoccupation with the Burma Road and China.

Admiralty basegrams and Singapore dispatches, which contained British naval intelligence, informed Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa of Japanese movements throughout the week. Singapore offered information on Japanese troops and heavy bombers based in French Indochina, and stated that the majority of Japan's Second Fleet was now located in the Formosa-South China area. The same report commented on US-Japanese diplomacy: "In spite of apparent deadlock Japanese cabinet decided on 1st December to continue Washington conversations." The Admiralty observed that Japan, in reply to President Roosevelt's criticisms, had made it clear that it had been "obliged to increase strength in Indo-China in view of Chinese reinforcements opposite."⁴

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Kra Isthmus war scare a week earlier, diplomatic reports confirmed that Japan would soon strike at southern targets. The Dominions Office informed Ottawa of Japanese troop dispositions throughout Southeast Asia and stressed Thailand's vulnerability: "Japan is in a position to invade Thailand whenever she wishes to do so."⁵ On 2 December, London reported Lord Halifax's account of his recent conversation with Roosevelt, who had shared intelligence regarding Japan's interest in Malaya:

In this connection he told me that they had information that somebody in the Japanese Embassy at Bangkok had advised Tokyo to make the first attack on British territory just south of Malay-Thailand boundary, argument being that this would immediately oblige us to occupy positions on the Isthmus in Thai territory and give the Japanese advantage of making us the first to commit aggression against Thailand.⁶

If Roosevelt's intelligence sources were correct and the Japanese followed the advice, the Allies could expect a Malayan campaign with a possible spillover, in both political and military terms, into the Kra Isthmus. And that is just what happened, except that British forces were in no position to occupy the Kra Isthmus.

The Examination Unit in Ottawa also continued to monitor diplomatic traffic on the eve of the Pacific War. In one of the last messages to be decrypted before hostilities broke out, Canadian officials learned a remarkable piece of information about Japan's naval movements in the Far East. On 6 December, the Examination Unit decrypted a message that had been sent from Rio de Janeiro to Hamburg on 3 December by the German Kempter spy network. German agents had reported on Japan's naval activity: "Our navy authority learned just now from an officer of the U.S.A. Navy Mission here the following: ... A Japanese Convoy, consisting of 70 transports and convoyed by 12 cruisers, with 300,000 men on board, are supposed to be on the way to Indo-China and that it can be counted upon that this convoy will be attacked by the U.S.A. navy." The information was remarkable because it reputedly came from the US Navy, revealed that Japan was moving battle troops to the south, and promised US belligerency in the Far East. The German message apparently prompted Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson to hold a meeting the next morning, 7 December, so that a war declaration speech could be drafted.

Incoming intelligence from diplomatic and naval sources on 7 December confirmed that Japan had finally launched its attacks. The Dominions Office informed Ottawa that, a day earlier, Allied air reconnaissance had spotted two Japanese convoys, escorted by cruisers and destroyers, heading west from French Indochina.⁸ A related Admiralty report noted that "this may be general display of force to induce *Thai* government to accept peaceful Japanese occupation."⁹ Later in the day, however, the Dominions Office informed Mackenzie King that Japan had launched an assault at Kota Bharu, on the east coast of British Malaya, just south of the Thai-Malay border: "Report timed 5:40 p.m., G.M.T. today received from Commander-in-Chief of China that Japanese were attempting to land from five ships at Kota Bharu."¹⁰ The message was significant because it indicated that Japan had attacked a British possession at least forty-five minutes



The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. The bombs and torpedoes that destroyed the US Pacific Fleet also shattered the last vestiges of American isolationism. The Allies could now count on America's active participation in the war. *United States, National Archives and Records Administration, 80-G-32414.*

before it attacked Pearl Harbor. The Pearl Harbor attack occurred at about 7:55 a.m. Honolulu time, which was 1:25 p.m. Ottawa-Washington time and 6:25 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). According to Allied thinking, under no circumstances could the British Commonwealth be at war with Japan until the United States was involved. Therefore, British hostilities could not be declared against Japan until after the United States was attacked, which was exactly what occurred.

The next day, the Admiralty offered a less problematic version of the timing in its brief summary of the Japanese attacks. According to the summary, Japan attacked British possessions sixteen minutes *after* the attack on US forces at

Pearl Harbor and Britain only commenced hostilities against Japan about three hours later: "At 2143 7th hostilities against Japan commenced. At 1846 7th Japanese attempted to land troops *Kota Bahru* [sic] Northeast Malaya ... Pearl Harbour Honolulu heavily attacked 1830 7th by large numbers of aircraft ... At 2130 7th 18 aircraft attacked Singapore Island; no damage H.M. ships or establishments."¹¹ As the Canadians knew, the Admiralty's timekeeping was more political than factual, given the report from the Dominions Office the previous day. In a telegram to Ottawa on 8 December, London's final confirmation of the attacks focused on Pearl Harbor and Singapore.¹² Other reports informed Ottawa that Japanese forces had bombed Hong Kong less than eight hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States and the British Commonwealth were finally at war with Japan.

Following the outbreak of hostilities, Allied service groups attempted further analysis of Japanese tactics and strategy. In late December, Royal Canadian Air Force intelligence staff carefully studied the attack on Pearl Harbor and produced a comprehensive report. Meanwhile, MI2 Military Intelligence in Ottawa considered several field sources and issued a report on "The Powers of the Pacific: Their Territories and Bases." MI2 offered geographic data, military information, strategic analysis, and a history of Japanese expansion since 1931. It also provided a remarkably accurate list of the number of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines in the Japanese Navy. In addition, the number of Japanese aircraft was estimated at about 3,500 with an unknown reserve, although the actual figure was closer to over 3,000 army and navy combat aircraft. Such reports, while general in nature, gave Canadian officials the latest perspective on their new opponent in the Pacific.¹³

Possible Tracking of the *Kido Butai*

Besides intelligence concerning Japanese advances against targets in Southeast Asia, some sources point to Allied-American direction finding (D/F) tracking of the *Kido Butai* (the Strike Force that attacked Pearl Harbor) as it steamed over three thousand miles across the North Pacific from Japan's Kurile Islands to the waters north of Hawaii. The Japanese Strike Force, consisting of thirty-one ships, including six aircraft carriers, was the most powerful flotilla in the world.

British wireless telegraphy (W/T) intelligence appears to have offered specific information in the first week of December. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck declared that the possibility of a Japanese attack on Hawaii was discussed at a British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) meeting on 5 December: "We knew that they changed course. I remember presiding over a J.I.C. meeting and being told that a Japanese fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking 'Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply." Gil Murray, a

Canadian wartime wireless operator, later lent credence to Cavendish-Bentinck's remarks, but added that a radio blackout occurring after 6 December prevented further tracking of Japanese vessels in the mid-Pacific: no one could be certain of naval movements after that date. William Casey, a US wartime intelligence officer who later became Director of Central Intelligence under President Ronald Reagan, confirmed that "the British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east towards Hawaii." Both Cavendish-Bentinck and Casey discuss Japanese naval movements towards Hawaii, and Cavendish-Bentinck notes that the Japanese fleet had changed course by 5 December. It is indeed a fact that by 5 December the *Kido Butai* had changed its course from due east along the forty-second parallel to south-by-southeast towards Hawaii. These statements appear to point to the tracking of the *Kido Butai* across the North Pacific.¹⁴

In terms of Canada's awareness, Jock de Marbois, who commanded the Foreign Intelligence Section at NSHQ in 1941, later stated in a wartime report that his intelligence section "was fully prepared for eventualities in December, 1941, at the outbreak of the Japanese War. Such was far from being the case (in 'Y' work and D/F) with regard to the U.S.N., who had F.C.C., Army, F.B.I., and Navy trying to carry out 'Y' and D/F work on their Pacific Coast, all independently." Although it is possible that de Marbois simply meant that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) had been fully prepared to collect intelligence on the outbreak of the Pacific War, it is notable that he made no mention of being caught off-guard by Japan's actions. We are unable to inspect the relevant D/F logs for the period in question, as these logs do not appear in either Canadian or British archival collections.¹⁵

Other reports, however, suggest that the *Kido Butai* may have been under D/F surveillance in early December 1941. The *Kido Butai* operated under nominal radio silence, but Japanese orders permitted vital transmissions during extreme emergencies or at the discretion of its commanders. The wartime diary of Captain Johan Ranneft, a Dutch naval liaison officer serving in Washington in 1941, indicates that in early December, the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) tracked the eastward movements of two Japanese carriers from Japan to the mid-Pacific, west of Hawaii. According to a 10 December report made by Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS *Lurline*, a passenger ship that had docked in Honolulu on 3 December, he and a fellow radio officer told ONI staff there that they had tracked Japanese ship signals emanating from the North Pacific. Historian Richard Aldrich notes that some British veterans claim that the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) in Singapore shared with London an estimate that predicted a Pearl Harbor attack. Other postwar remarks suggest that by 3 December the Esquimalt station believed that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible, and that by 5 December it believed that such an attack was imminent

and so informed London. Perhaps Esquimalt D/F staff, working with British and US stations, detected Japanese vessels changing course in the North Pacific during that week. Further verification awaits the declassification of D/F logs from the relevant stations.¹⁶

Some sources corroborate the idea that Britain provided further warning in early December. For example, the 17 December entry in the diary of British newspaper proprietor Cecil King reports a conversation that he had on this topic with fellow newspaperman Hugh Cudlipp at a press luncheon in London that day. Cudlipp's "most sensational item" was that the British had given the Americans "five days warning on Pearl Harbor, but he did not know whether the message was ignored in Washington or further along the line."¹⁷ King's diary entry is worthy of consideration, given that both he and Cudlipp had excellent access to the highest levels at Whitehall and regularly saw members of Churchill's cabinet. King's report appears entirely compatible with the remarks made by Cavendish-Bentinck, Murray, Casey, Ranneft, and Grogan. In summary, multiple sources suggest that the Allies and Americans may have detected Japanese ship movements in the North Pacific in early December.

All these reports relating to the Far East and the North Pacific benefited Canadian strategists as they planned Canada's entry into a new theatre of operations. Specifically, intelligence from military and diplomatic sources enabled the government of Mackenzie King to decide how it would respond to the Far East crisis, develop its role within the emerging Anglo-American alliance, and prepare for war with Japan.

General Strategic Discussions

Following the Kra Isthmus war scare in November, Ottawa tried to anticipate US reaction to the developing crisis. On 1 December, London reported that Churchill had contacted Roosevelt to ask that he issue one last warning to Japan. Another communiqué revealed that Lord Halifax was meeting again with Secretary of State Cordell Hull to ask for US support in the event of British intervention in Thailand, which he believed would be forthcoming: "There would be much less difficulty with public opinion over war with Japan than with Germany." In Washington that same day, Hume Wrong, Counsellor to the Canadian Minister in Washington, spoke to Halifax, who relayed Roosevelt's views. Apparently, Roosevelt wanted air patrols over Thai waters to continue and had asked Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to question Japanese envoy Kurusu Saburo about the purpose of Japanese troop movements. Significantly, Roosevelt said that he would support British action "even if this means shooting," although he needed a few days to "shape" the politics.

Furthermore, he believed that Tokyo and Berlin had a "complete understanding" and that Japan was acting at the "dictation of the Axis." Canadian officials could now entertain the possibility that US entry into the war was imminent.¹⁶

Even so, Mackenzie King noted in his diary that day how he had disagreed with the Cabinet War Committee over the prospect of Britain's taking action in the Far East without a more definite promise of US support. Along with C.D. Howe, he believed that Britain could not yet act unilaterally in the Far East, whereas several War Committee members – including Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence for Naval Services Angus Macdonald, and Minister of Finance J.L. Ilsley – believed that Britain had a responsibility to stop Japanese expansionism. For Ralston, the issue was about "incurring a great responsibility" rather than deciding whether or not a particular course of action was a mistake. It may be argued, however, that some War Committee members supported unilateral British intervention in the Far East because they believed that US entry into the war was certain. As we have seen, Canadian officials were aware that the Washington talks had effectively ceased after Roosevelt dropped the *modus vivendi* option, that Japanese forces were on the move in Southeast Asia, and that some reports, according to Murton A. Seymour's affidavit, pointed to a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.¹⁸

For King, however, US participation had to be assured beyond all doubt, and US participation was almost entirely conditional on a Japanese first strike. Prewar intelligence and strategic estimates were one thing, but a guarantee of a Japanese first strike quite another. Despite disturbing reports about Japan's intentions in Southeast Asia and the North Pacific, the Prime Minister awaited a definitive end to US-Japanese diplomacy.

In his diary entry for 1 December, King revealed his sense of despair over the prospect of war in the Far East:

I fear, however, that matters have gone too far, and that Japan herself has come to the conclusion that it is her moment to strike. The U.S. clearly is not ready; will not be for at least another 4 or 5 months, according to their own communication. Britain certainly has her hands more than full. I should think that in every way, the right course was to exhaust every possible means of avoiding war before permitting any step which would precipitate it.²⁰

Mackenzie King was fighting a war of limited liability, but Allied leaders approached the war from other perspectives. Churchill needed the United States as an ally to guarantee Britain's survival during wartime, while Roosevelt needed

an Axis first strike on US territory in order to join the Allies in Europe. The postwar world order was also at stake: America's entry into the current conflict might enable Britain to retain its empire, while guaranteeing US national security, economic prosperity, and global influence. For the moment, all Mackenzie King could do was encourage Britain to let the US or Japan make the first move.

Over the next three days, Canadian officials had to bide their time because the Washington talks were stalled. It also seems that less information was available, although it is difficult to know exactly what exchanges took place because so many archival file collections have gaps for that period. It is known, however, that on 2 December Ottawa received London's account of Lord Halifax's recent meeting with Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, the President's personal envoy. The previous day in Washington, Halifax had spoken to Hume Wrong about the meeting, but London now offered more details. Roosevelt had rejected Japan's request for a renewal of an interim agreement and wanted to plan for different contingencies in the Far East, including action in Indochina, Thailand, and the Philippines. He suggested that a Japanese attack on British or Dutch possessions meant that "we should obviously all be together." Once again, Halifax noted that Roosevelt had offered US support in the event of a British occupation of Thailand, although the President believed that it might take a few days "to get things into political shape" in Washington. Roosevelt had also considered sending a direct communication to Emperor Hirohito. Canadian officials could only wait for events to unfold.²¹

Behind the scenes, Roosevelt apparently attempted to secure the United States' entry into a war with Japan. On 2 December, he ordered the US Navy's Asiatic Fleet to charter three small vessels, all to be established as American "warships," to embark on a "defensive information patrol" across the path of Japanese convoys in the West China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. The vessels *Lanikai*, *Molly Moore*, and *Isabel* were selected for the patrol, but in the end only the *Lanikai* made the voyage. The vessel drew no fire from Japanese ships, which may have been the purpose of its assignment. Complicating matters further, on 4 December Japanese ships had moved southwest of the position latitude 10°N, longitude 100°E, in the Gulf of Thailand – a move that the American-Dutch-British (ADB) agreement, which American officials had signed in April 1941, declared to be an act of war. It appeared that Roosevelt was committed to war with Japan, but preferred that Japan launch the first strike.²²

Related difficulties arose on 4 December, when the *Chicago Tribune* published the US Rainbow-5 war plan, which included a detailed outline for an American invasion of Europe. Historians continue to speculate as to how and why the plan was leaked to *Tribune* columnist Chesly Manly. It is known that when Hitler declared war on the United States a week later, he told the Reichstag that

his decision had been influenced by the American press, which a week earlier had published US plans to attack Germany. Historian Thomas Fleming speculates that Roosevelt himself may have leaked the plan in a bid to ensure a German declaration of war because he knew that, even if Japan attacked the United States, the Tripartite Pact did not require the Axis powers to declare war. Although Fleming's speculation is plausible, there is no firm evidence to link Roosevelt with the *Tribune* story.²³

On 5 December, Ottawa received more strategic assessments from London and Washington. London believed that Roosevelt's assurances now allowed the Allies to enter into a formal military understanding, rather than just an oral understanding, with the NEI. Significantly, London reported that the US government had issued an assurance of armed support for Britain in the event that British forces forestalled a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus by acting first, or if Japan attacked either British or Dutch possessions. In Washington, Hume Wrong confirmed this information and reported to Ottawa: "President told Halifax last night that United States would join in warning to Japan against further aggression, warning includes attack on Thailand, Malaya, or the Netherlands East Indies." Wrong commented that Roosevelt had suggested sending separate warnings to Tokyo, first from Washington and then from London and Batavia. Moreover, the President had authorized sending a message to Thailand guaranteeing support in the event of war. The pledge of support he had given to Lord Halifax in Washington on 1 December had become a fact on 4 December. Surely, Roosevelt anticipated a Japanese attack on US possessions or he would not have declared unequivocal support for the Allies. In terms of British preparations, London sent the Dominions a copy of instructions issued to the British Commander-in-Chief of the Far East: he would coordinate defence plans and assume strategic control over all British land and air forces in British possessions throughout the Far East. Both Britain and the United States were preparing for the Pacific War.²⁴

These preparations compelled Mackenzie King to send a telegram to the Canadian chargé d'affaires in Tokyo. He informed E. D'Arcy McGreer on 5 December that he had asked British authorities to arrange for the Swiss government to take care of Canadian interests in Thailand and occupied China in the event of war with Japan. King still considered Argentina a suitable agent to protect Canadian interests in Japan and Manchukuo, but wanted Switzerland to play a supporting role in other regions, if necessary. His latest message simply complemented the one he had sent to McGreer six days earlier, which concerned steps to be taken when closing down the Canadian Legation in Tokyo. Mackenzie King, a master of inspired procrastination, was finally ready to pull his staff out of Japan.²⁵

Several telegrams arriving on 6 December informed Ottawa of Roosevelt's plans. Lord Halifax advised that a day earlier the President had changed his mind about assurances to Thailand and wanted to wait until he decided on a message to Emperor Hirohito. Halifax was annoyed by the delay but believed that American assurances to Thailand remained unchanged. Hume Wrong made inquiries in Washington: "Hull mentioned constitutional difficulties for the first time to Halifax last night, but this may not reflect President's views. I understand United Kingdom assurance to Thais is being delivered." Apparently, Roosevelt wanted to make one last appeal to Japan to avoid making a promise to Thailand before Japan had committed an overt act – such a promise was possibly unconstitutional. That course of action would also allow him to appear moderate in his diplomacy while waiting for a Japanese first strike.¹⁵

On the same day, the Canadian Legation in Washington sent Ottawa several important messages that appear to have been related to a possible emergency. A Legation record book listing outgoing dispatches to External Affairs shows two dispatches listed under the headings "National Defence-US, 'Office for Emergency Management'" and "World War: Effects on Canadian offices abroad." Gaps in several archival collections related to Canadian diplomacy in late 1941 prevent us from examining all of the Legation's correspondence, but the topic headings suggest that preparations were being made for a possible crisis, including the prospect of closing Canadian offices in a new theatre of war.¹⁷

Meanwhile, in his diary entry for 6 December, Mackenzie King reflected on how the Far East crisis was unfolding. First, he noted that the Cabinet War Committee had finally decided to declare war against Romania, Hungary, and Finland, effective Sunday, 7 December. Given that King had originally opposed such a declaration because it might set a precedent with respect to Japan, it is significant that he now supported the decision: he knew that war with Japan was imminent. He also recorded that, several days earlier, he had asked Norman Robertson to have External Affairs prepare press statements about war with those countries as well as with Japan. In response to a comment by Angus Macdonald that the Allies were drifting into war with Japan in a seemingly casual way, the Prime Minister offered another explanation: "In fact, the fault begins in Britain allowing Japan to get at variance with herself. Secondly, I think she should not have left all negotiations with Japan so exclusively to the U.S. Moreover, she should not have left to the last moment getting defence assurance from the U.S."¹⁸

King also assigned some blame to the Americans for manoeuvring the Allies into the present crisis:

Another thing which impresses one deeply is that far too much of all these matters are left in the hands of far too few men. From the correspondence, they never

have been wholly for pacification ... The real mistake goes back to the breakup of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. For that the U.S. and Nomura have taken full credit. As far as the U.S. is concerned, it is pretty much the story of the League of Nations. They have brought the institution into being but have not, as a nation, been prepared to take on the obligations which their course of action have involved."

King correctly saw that insufficient effort had gone into averting war, but perhaps he misjudged American motives. Unlike the "story of the League of Nations," Washington was prepared to assume many obligations in the event of war with Japan – it was just a matter of waiting until Japan committed the first overt act so that US public opinion would support active intervention in the war. More cynically, it was also a matter of manoeuvring Japan into firing the first shot, something that Allied strategists had considered since late 1940 but implemented by imposing the asset freeze in July 1941.

When the Pacific War broke out on 7 December, Canadian officials dealt with a stream of communiqués. The day began with discussions about Allied-American warnings to Japan. At 1:33 a.m., Ottawa had received a Dominions Office telegram: "Since possibility remains open that immediate destination of the Japanese convoys is another port in Indo China, there may still be time for warning to Japan by United States, Dutch and ourselves." But Norman Robertson planned a Sunday morning meeting to discuss the prospect of war with Japan, on the basis of an important Examination Unit decrypt sent a day earlier. As noted previously, the decrypt revealed that a German spy network had reported on 3 December that its source within the US Navy indicated that US warships would intercept the Japanese convoy heading towards Indochina. Other messages from London informed Ottawa that Roosevelt had taken two important actions on the evening of 6 December: he sent his final warning to Emperor Hirohito, and he informed the Thai prime minister that "the United States will regard it as a hostile act if the Japanese invade Thailand, Malaya, Burma or the Netherlands East Indies." Certainly, Churchill was relieved to hear this and said as much in a telegram to General Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East: "This is an immense relief as I had long dreaded being at war with Japan without or before United States. Now I think it is all right." Roosevelt's actions confirmed that he was expecting a Japanese strike against American and Allied targets.³⁰

British officials also informed Ottawa that they wanted their ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, to deliver a warning note to Japanese officials on behalf of all five Commonwealth governments but the Canadian and the Australian *chargés d'affaires* were welcome to accompany him. Separate warning notes from the Dominions were discouraged: "We very much hope that

Canadian Government will not think it necessary that Canadian Charge d'Affaires at Tokyo should present a similar communication separately from Craigie's." Not surprisingly, Mackenzie King immediately sent telegrams to McCreer in Tokyo and to the Dominions Office in London indicating that Canada *would* deliver its own warning note. King supported British war objectives but would never surrender Canadian independence: even on the eve of the Pacific War, he felt it necessary to demonstrate Canada's sovereignty.³¹

No more warning notes needed to be issued, however. Later that day, as we have seen, the Dominions Office informed King that Japan had attacked Kota Bharu in British Malaya at 5:40 p.m. GMT, almost an hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Robertson then sent two reports to the Prime Minister, each based on information from the Canadian Legation in Washington: Japan had not proffered any declaration of war but had simply launched simultaneous attacks against Malaya, Manila, Hong Kong, and Pearl Harbor, and Roosevelt had ordered war plans against Japan to be made effective at once. Robertson noted that Washington officials were already trying to link Japan's actions with the Axis: "Mr. Hull told Halifax this afternoon that he thought it quite probable that Germany and Italy would declare war against the United States tonight. He felt that Japan's aggression had been concerted with its Axis Allies, and timed to coincide with an initiative on their part."³²

Ottawa responded to news of the attacks with an immediate declaration of war against Japan. At 11 p.m. EST on 7 December, Canadian radio stations broadcast Mackenzie King's press statement announcing the existence of a state of war between Canada and Japan. The resulting Order-in-Council, which received Royal Assent from King George VI the next day, proclaimed that the state of war had existed since 7 December. Thus, Canada was the first nation in the world to declare war on Japan.³³ Why?

To answer this question, we need to examine Mackenzie King's motives. In his capacity as both Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, King directed Canadian foreign policy. He almost never made a decision with respect to war policy until British or Commonwealth officials had set the pace. Indeed, he usually deferred to Allied wartime decisions and took a greater interest in domestic policy, while delivering occasional expressions of Canadian sovereignty within the Commonwealth. But in the case of the Pacific War, his declaration of war preceded those of both Britain and the United States, even though he had been adamant about first securing active American participation.

It is clear that King had anticipated Japanese strikes against American and Allied targets. On 27 November, he had observed: "I feel they will attack Burma



A Canadian sailor prepares to hoist the Union Jack on an impounded Japanese Canadian fishing boat at New Westminster, BC, 29 December 1941. The Japanese Canadians were innocent of any misconduct, but anti-Asian racism and allegations that their community could provide inadvertent cover for Imperial Japanese water-borne agents led to their wholesale internment and loss of possessions. *Canada, Department of National Defence, Library and Archives Canada, PA-170513.*

Road from Indo-China, or possibly Thailand but that war in the Pacific is practically inevitable." On 1 December, an air force official had told Murton Seymour that British intelligence anticipated a Pearl Harbor air attack on 8 December. It is possible that King was privy to that information, but even disregarding postwar anecdotal evidence from a credible witness, contemporaneous evidence shows that the Prime Minister was well aware that the crisis was drawing to an inevitable conclusion. He had told an Ottawa politician on Sunday, 30 November, that "before another Sunday was over, we would be at war with Japan." Between 29 November and 5 December, he had instructed McCreer to prepare for withdrawal from Tokyo. He also knew that Roosevelt had offered concrete assurances of US support to Britain on 4 December and to the NEI on 6 December, a sure sign that war between the United States and Japan was imminent. On 6 December, he had instructed Norman Robertson to prepare a press release about war with Japan. Mackenzie King was as prepared as any Allied leader could possibly have been for the outbreak of the Pacific War on 7 December.³⁴

The Prime Minister offered further explanation in his diary on the day of the attacks. In the afternoon, before the timing of Japan's attacks on British and American targets was clear, he regarded reports about attacks on Manila and Pearl Harbor as examples of a Japanese first strike against America: "It was an immense relief to my mind, however, to know that their attack had been upon the U.S. in the first instance, and that the opening shots were not between Great Britain and Japan." King, unlike Robertson, expressed no surprise or incredulity over the Pearl Harbor attack. Washington's belief that Germany and Italy might declare war on the United States also gave him confidence that US entry into the war was assured: "This is the most crucial moment of all the world's history but I believe the result will be, in the end, to shorten the war." Furthermore, although no British war telegram had been received all day – because London was waiting for Washington to declare hostilities – an evening message indicated that Britain would declare war against Japan on 8 December. Quite simply, Mackenzie King declared war on the 7th to show independence on Canada's part, even while showing solidarity with the British Commonwealth. In other words, Canada was the first to declare war against Japan because Mackenzie King was absolutely sure of US entry into the war, and he wanted to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty.³⁵

On 8 December, the Allies planned their respective declarations of war against Japan. King instructed McCreer to present Tokyo officials with Canada's declaration, which made reference to Japan's attacks on both British *and* US targets but stated that Japan's actions posed a threat to the security of the British Commonwealth, without mentioning US security. The Cabinet War Committee, which had drafted the declaration, wanted to emphasize Canada's ties with the

Commonwealth over its ties with America. King also advised McGreer that Argentina would serve as Canada's "protecting power" in Japan and Manchukuo. Meanwhile, London informed the Dominions that Britain would delay its own declaration of war: "United States hostilities have now broken out. We do not, repeat not, intend ourselves to declare war on Japan immediately." London explained that Britain's declaration would follow that of the United States, which was expected later in the day. Australia and New Zealand decided to postpone their respective declarations until Britain had acted. By the day's end, the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the NEI had declared war against Japan. China, which declared war against all Axis nations, followed suit the next day. With the exception of Canada, the Allies had delivered their declarations of war after the United States, according to Allied strategy.³⁶

We have seen how political officials in Ottawa acted in the week leading up to the Japanese attacks, but what defence preparations were made by Canadian military staff and their Allied counterparts in early December? To begin with, NSHQ continued to monitor Tokyo naval W/T stations, track Japanese merchant ships using D/F, intercept and decrypt weather/position reports transmitted by those vessels, and liaise with the British Pacific network. On 2 December, the China Station conveyed several orders to the Allied Pacific powers: "Withdrawal of all ships north of Hong Kong ... Ships over 4,000 tons to leave Hong Kong to southward ... No ship is to leave Singapore to north eastward without special permission except to parts in Malaya or Borneo ... No Dutch ship is allowed to sail northward of Netherlands East Indies without permission Dutch C. in C." Clearly, Japanese naval action was anticipated in these areas. On the same day, British authorities requested support for an RDF-281 radar set that was being installed at the US naval facility in Puget Sound, near Seattle, so that the Americans would have a "warning unit." On 3 December, NSHQ in Ottawa passed on a message from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to FECB Singapore, requesting Singapore to inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all "suspected persons" departing from the Far East for North America. The request, approved three days later, referred to the RCMP's existing arrangement, whereby the FBI informed Singapore of similar persons travelling in the other direction.³⁷

In the last two days before the Japanese attack, preparations for war included invocation of ABC-1, improvements to Pacific Coast defence, and protection of Allied shipping. On 5 December, the Admiralty issued a message to Washington and Ottawa regarding full implementation of Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement with respect to control of Pacific shipping. The Admiralty, responding to NSHQ's message of 26 November, emphasized that US flagships should hold the same signals books as British and Allied merchant ships, agreed

to the exchange of US and British liaison officers, and suggested that all merchant shipping movements, both US and Allied, be reported to Washington. In addition, NSHQ informed Esquimalt about US plans to lay sono-buoys in Canadian waters and to build a "listening hut" on Canadian territory. It requested that the US Navy use diplomatic channels to complete its planned chain of sono-buoys along the Juan de Fuca Strait on the Pacific Coast, a measure that the US Navy had planned as early as 29 November. Evidently, the Pacific Coast required more protection: also on 5 December, Atlantic Command in Halifax confirmed that it had sent "depth charge throwers" to Esquimalt two days earlier. From 5 to 6 December, Esquimalt made frequent contact with Seattle, San Francisco, Honolulu, Singapore, and HMCS *Prince Robert*, which was crossing the North Pacific. Finally, on 6 December, British authorities placed the entire British and Commonwealth naval network on an emergency alert, enacting nearly twenty "QFA" emergency messages.³⁸

Meanwhile, the Royal Canadian Navy in Esquimalt took measures to protect North Pacific shipping from a naval emergency. On 3 December, the Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, made a request on behalf of the *Komsomolsk*, a Soviet merchant vessel that was due to set sail from Esquimalt to Vladivostok the next day. The commander asked NSHQ in Ottawa to secure US permission for the *Komsomolsk* to use Iliuliuk Bay and Unalaska Bay as refuge anchorages in case of an emergency in the North Pacific; the request was important enough to copy to Canadian naval intelligence staff. The request also made specific reference to a similar occasion in late October, when the RCN had requested and received permission to establish North Pacific refuge anchorages for a merchant vessel planning a great circle routing from Esquimalt to Vladivostok. Ottawa passed on the new request concerning the *Komsomolsk* to naval authorities in Washington on 4 December and permission was granted the same day. It is clear that the RCN took the threat of naval conflict in the North Pacific quite seriously – a war between Japan and the Western powers would have threatened not only Far Eastern ports like Vladivostok but also the great circle shipping routes between North America and the Far East. In addition, any concern over a possible attack on Pearl Harbor would have intensified plans to protect Allied shipping.³⁹

Other vessels plying the North Pacific were also carefully monitored. The San Francisco-Honolulu voyage of the SS *Lurline* was noted in no fewer than five reports from 26 November to 7 December. On 3 December, a message from NSHQ informed FECB Singapore of the San Francisco-Honolulu voyage of the *Jagersfontein*, a Dutch merchant vessel. Between 4 and 5 December, the RCN closely monitored the movements of the *Felix Dzerzhinsky* and the *Uritski*, Soviet merchant vessels that had embarked for the Soviet Union from American west

coast ports. The RCN reported these Soviet ship movements to both the British Admiralty and US authorities.⁴⁰

The movements of HMCS *Prince Robert* across the North Pacific from Hawaii to Canada caused even more concern. On the evening of 4 December, the ship left Honolulu for Esquimalt, a fact that the RCN felt necessary to report the next day to the entire Pacific intelligence community, including the Admiralty in London, naval and intelligence staff in Ottawa, and naval staff in China, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand.⁴¹ That message's wide distribution was most unusual – if not without precedent – for a ship movement report. Most ships never warranted such attention, and the *Prince Robert* was not even heading west to the Far East; it was heading *east* across the North Pacific from Hawaii to Canada. Clearly, the RCN saw that routing as potentially dangerous. Moreover, the *Prince Robert's* deck log shows that the ship made flare contact with a US submarine at 2340 hours on 5 December near the position latitude 28°N, longitude 152°W – about five hundred miles southeast of the *Kido Butai*.⁴² Given that the *Kido Butai* was almost certainly on full radio silence by the time it steamed south to Hawaii, it is very unlikely that either the *Prince Robert* or the US submarine detected its presence. Nonetheless, US submarine reconnaissance in the waters north of Oahu was a wise measure.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the RCN intensified its efforts to protect shipping and to share important intelligence. On 7 December, RCN messages from Esquimalt and Ottawa informed the *Prince Robert* of the Japanese attacks against Pearl Harbor and Manila, explaining that US merchant ships were facing submarine attacks.⁴³ Indeed, a Japanese submarine had sunk the *Cynthia Olsen* just miles from the *Prince Robert*. The *Prince Robert* was ordered to proceed swiftly to Esquimalt and did so using a “zig-zag course” for the next two days, thereby avoiding Japanese submarine attacks. Meanwhile, NSHQ ordered the Soviet merchant vessels *Komsomolsk*, *Felix Dzerjinsky*, and *Uritski* to return to US or Canadian ports. It also reported on 8 December that Japanese submarines were operating a “scout line” eight hundred miles east of Honolulu, and it used both D/F and decrypted “noon position reports” to track the positions of numerous Japanese merchant ships. For the RCN, the very first task of the war against Japan was to maintain constant vigilance in the Pacific.⁴⁴

At this critical time, Canada and its allies also confirmed that all war plans and agreements were in place. NSHQ informed its naval network that the United States had executed the Rainbow-5 war plan against Japan. The Admiralty ordered all merchant ships in the Far East to proceed to British, Dutch, or US ports, although no ships were to go to Hong Kong, Borneo, or Yellow Sea ports. From the Canadian perspective, it was significant that the Admiralty regarded Hong Kong as a risk. On 8 December, NSHQ informed its naval network that



Canadian soldiers man a Bofors anti-aircraft gun on the BC coast, 29 December 1941. The Canadian services invoked full defensive measures along the BC coastline upon the outbreak of the Pacific War. Time would show, however, that the ocean's vast expanse limited Japan's coastal attacks to minor nuisance raids. *National Film Board of Canada, Photothèque, Library and Archives Canada, PA-142684.*

the ABC-22 agreement was now in effect against Japan. On the same day, authorities in Washington informed NSHQ that all US Pacific Coast shipping north of Panama was cancelled, as were all Lend-Lease shipments to Vladivostok. After more than a year of intensive planning, Canada and the United States were fully prepared to invoke defensive measures in both the Far East and the North Pacific.⁴⁵

Japan finally declared war against Canada and the Allies on 9 December. Canadian officials learned that Japan had coerced the Thai government into allowing Japanese troops to pass through Thailand in order to attack Malaya or Burma. The Thai foreign minister stated that Thai troops would not resist British forces, but Allied assurances of support for Thailand were now meaningless in the face of overwhelming Japanese opposition. Nonetheless, London informed

Ottawa that it had asked the Japanese government whether it was prepared to adhere to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of gas and bacteriological warfare, in an attempt to limit the scope of Japanese aggression. Indeed, that request had also been extended to Finland, Hungary, and Romania. Ultimately, the Allies would never face chemical and biological warfare, although Japan used it against the Chinese. In the same message, London revealed that several Latin American nations had declared war against Japan in a show of solidarity with the United States.⁴⁶

On the same day as Japan's declaration of war, Ottawa received a US press release in which Roosevelt linked Japanese aggression and strategy to that of Germany and Italy. Furthermore, Roosevelt's "fireside chat" broadcast that evening assured Americans that Germany and Italy considered themselves at war with the United States, just as they were with Britain and Russia. During the chat, Roosevelt said that he regarded the hostilities as a world war, "apart from any formal declarations of belligerency." It seems quite clear that, like Churchill and Mackenzie King, Roosevelt was preparing the public for a US declaration of war against the Axis because it was not yet certain that the Axis would declare war on the US. American participation in the Far East war was now guaranteed, but the primary object of Allied strategy was to gain such participation in Europe.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, news of the devastation at Pearl Harbor reached Ottawa. The Allies would later learn that the *Kido Butai* had launched 353 aircraft that sank or damaged eighteen American ships, including eight battleships, and destroyed 188 aircraft while damaging many others. The attack claimed 2,403 American lives and left another 1,178 wounded. Japanese losses were slight: 29 aircraft, one submarine, five midget submarines, and less than one hundred lives. Japan achieved an outstanding tactical success at Pearl Harbor, although the course of the Pacific War would later prove it to have been a strategic failure. For the moment, however, incoming reports provided only a few details of the attack. On 9 December, C.G. "Chubby" Power, Minister of National Defence for Air, received a message concerning the losses at US Navy and Army bases in Hawaii. Prime Minister King read the message to his colleagues and reflected on the losses: "When shown to me first by Power I felt it was an appalling blow, one which might well signify a sweep through the British and American possessions in the Orient, like that of Hitler's army through Europe, that it certainly would bring a long extension of the war."⁴⁸ Even though King had not expressed surprise when the Pearl Harbor attack was first announced, he was now taken aback by the extent of the destruction Japan was able to inflict. Allied observers had accurately anticipated Japan's choice of targets but had underestimated Japan's capabilities in military operations.

In a series of communiqués on 11 December, Canada and the Allies discussed the prospect of widening the alliance against the Axis powers. London informed Ottawa that Chiang Kai-shek had urged the United States to join in a common declaration of war against Germany and Italy. In terms of the war against Japan, Chiang wanted a common military alliance, under American leadership, among China, the Soviet Union, the US, the NEI, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Chiang buttressed his point by highlighting the apparent duplicity of the Japanese: "This latest act of international brigandage on the part of Japan has taken even us by surprise." Not surprisingly, Soviet support in the Pacific would have to wait: London informed Ottawa that the Soviet Union had shown no inclination to declare war against Japan. London also reported Churchill's statement in the House of Commons concerning Axis collusion: "It seems to me quite certain that Japan when she struck her treacherous and dastardly blow at the United States counted on the active support of the German Nazis and of the Italian Fascists. It is therefore very likely that the United States will be faced with the open hostility of Germany, Italy and Japan." Churchill's remarks had substance, given that British decrypts of Axis diplomatic traffic sent in early December confirmed that Japan was working on an Axis treaty with Germany and Italy. That very day, Allied expectations were borne out when Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.⁴⁹

Over the next few days, the Dominions Office informed Ottawa of Latin America's growing support for the Allied cause. Chile maintained neutrality with the US, whereas Paraguay declared pro-American "solidarity." Argentina maintained neutrality with Canada and Britain but safeguarded their interests in Japan and Manchukuo. Nicaragua declared war on Japan, while Cuba, Honduras, and El Salvador declared war on Germany and Italy. Mexico severed relations with the Axis powers and joined Venezuela and Honduras in imposing an asset freeze. Brazil imposed controls on Axis banks but did not declare war. Latin America's various declarations provided the Allies with political rather than military support; they also had some economic value because Axis trade in that region was now more restricted.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, Canadian officials learned of further efforts to strengthen the alliance against Japan. Hume Wrong reported in mid-December that Cordell Hull expected the "loss of the Philippines and perhaps Singapore" and that Roosevelt now wanted full Anglo-American cooperation.⁵¹ The Americans had not changed their expectation about the loss of the Philippines in light of Japan's recent successful attacks – US strategists had predicted the temporary loss of the Philippines during the ABC-1 talks in February. Unfortunately, their British counterparts had usually expressed the view that Singapore was impregnable,

a view the Japanese would soon prove to be incorrect. Wrong also informed Ottawa that officials in Washington were trying to secure "Soviet belligerency," particularly with respect to Soviet raids against Japan launched from Vladivostok, but those efforts were in vain. Later in the month, London reported a failed attempt by the British to secure a Soviet declaration of war against Japan.³² Stalin remarked that the Soviet Union was not ready for a long struggle in the East, and that such a conflict would be more popular with the Soviet people if Japan declared war first. Ultimately, Japan and the Soviet Union held to their Neutrality Pact, and the United States had to shoulder most of the burden of the destruction of the Japanese Empire.

In addition, Hume Wrong recorded his impressions of the war's outbreak from his vantage point in Washington. Although the attack on Pearl Harbor had eased tensions over the question of active American participation, Wrong explained it was the Axis declarations of war that had brought relief to everyone in Washington. He expressed satisfaction that the United States was being brought into the European war in such an "unequivocal way," and noted that Roosevelt, Hull, and others "had all assured us they had been expecting it." To everyone's satisfaction, the Axis declarations did not alarm the American public: "The news was taken calmly; the Japanese attack had made the public ready to accept further shocks." Wrong observed, however, that British military officials were privately critical of the Americans, saying that they thought in terms of continental (rather than global) defence and were "grabbing" planes and ships from everywhere, notably the Atlantic, to repair the damage at Pearl Harbor. That said, he learned from Lord Halifax that Roosevelt and Hull wanted a more daring approach, beyond mere defensive measures. According to Halifax, the Allies needed to get the Soviets to join the war against Japan, to decide on an immediate course of military action, and to "ensure unified strategy on a more permanent basis." Halifax also revealed that "important visitors" (Churchill and staff) would soon arrive in Washington. But Wrong noticed how quickly British attitudes towards Canada had changed since the US had entered the war: "I fear that Halifax thinks of the war now as a U.S.-U.K. affair, with Russia as a distant partner on our front. He leaves Canada out as a principal. We deserve this, but it irritates me." Canada had been Britain's senior wartime partner, but after Pearl Harbor it became a subordinate member of the alliance.³³

Month's end brought news of setbacks along with news of the developing alliance against the Axis. On 22 December, Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada in London, informed Mackenzie King that London presumed the fall of Hong Kong to be imminent and had asked the Swiss government to assume care of British interests there. The next day, King asked Swiss authorities



Churchill addresses the House of Commons in Ottawa, 30 December 1941. Churchill quickly capitalized on US entry into the war and met with Roosevelt in Washington soon after this photo was taken. Japan's multiple attacks throughout the Pacific had led to the "Grand Alliance." America's welcome support meant, however, that Canada's role as Britain's senior ally was finally over. *Library and Archives Canada, C-022140.*

to take care of Canadian interests in Hong Kong also. On Christmas Day, Canadian, British, and Indian forces in Hong Kong surrendered to the Imperial Japanese Army, signifying the beginning of Britain's withdrawal from the Far East. As one intelligence summary noted: "The moral effect of the fall of Hong Kong, which has been for a century the embodiment of British power in the Far Eastern area, is bound to be great both in China and Japan." The Allies were planning in earnest for a stronger coalition of forces, however. Churchill arrived in Washington on 22 December to discuss war strategy with Roosevelt over the next three weeks in the "Arcadia Conference." A week later, Hume Wrong informed King about the final draft of the "United Nations" joint declaration,

which subscribed to the objectives of the Atlantic Conference. In total, twenty-six nations, including Canada, agreed to defeat the Axis and to establish a new world order. The Pacific War had originated in disagreement between Japan and the Anglo-American powers over the destiny of China and the resources of the Far East, but now served as a means of uniting democratic powers in a campaign against totalitarianism. The modest price would be acceptance of American foreign policy and trade for years to come.⁵⁴

Conclusions

In the aftermath of the Kra Isthmus war scare at the end of November 1941, Canada made its final preparations for a war that all informed observers considered inevitable. Incoming intelligence continued to point to Japanese attacks against Malaya or Thailand at the Kra Isthmus, while the Royal Canadian Navy continued to watch the North Pacific. According to several diary entries, Mackenzie King was apparently aware that war would break out early in December, possibly by Sunday, 7 December. Canadian officials were aware that President Roosevelt promised active US support to Britain on 4 December and to Thailand on 6 December, commitments that made US entry into the war practically certain. Accordingly, King planned for the withdrawal of Canadian staff from Tokyo, ordered the preparation of press statements concerning war with Japan, and met with his staff on the morning of 7 December to discuss the prospect of war.

As we have seen, Canada became the first nation to declare war against Japan because King believed active US participation in the Pacific War to be certain, and because he wanted to demonstrate Canada's independence as a sovereign nation. Relevant intelligence, careful strategic assessments, and cautious policy decisions all contributed to Canada's timely declaration of war. Britain waited for the United States to declare war on 8 December, even though British Malaya had been attacked before Pearl Harbor. Canada's preparations for war included improvements to Pacific Coast defence, the protection of Allied shipping in the event of naval emergencies in the North Pacific, and the invocation of the ABC-1 agreement. Significantly, the Royal Canadian Navy set up refuge anchorages for the Soviet merchant vessel *Komsomolsk* when the ship sought to traverse the North Pacific just days before the outbreak of war, and reported the Honolulu-Esquimalt voyage of HMCS *Prince Robert* to the highest Allied intelligence authorities. Clearly, the RCN believed that the North Pacific deserved as much vigilance as the Far East.

As an important member of the Allied community in 1941, Canada prepared for all eventualities in the Far East and North Pacific. Like its allies, however, it underestimated Japan's capabilities as a Pacific power: Japan's stunning military

successes across the Pacific took Canadian authorities by surprise, even if its timing and choice of targets did not. But Japan's attacks secured the entry of the United States into the war, the greatest Allied prize of all. Throughout 1941, Canada studied the Far East crisis not only because it anticipated war with Japan but also because it knew that the crisis would create the conditions necessary for the formation of the Grand Alliance.

Conclusion: Canada's Response to the Pacific Challenge

DURING THE CRISIS THAT led to the Pacific War, the government of Mackenzie King relied on diplomacy and deterrence to avoid conflict with Japan until American co-belligerence was assured, even while anticipating action in Southeast Asia and the North Pacific, and making a range of preparations for national and imperial defence. It is vital to summarize the study presented in this book to emphasize how Canada coped with the crisis in terms of intelligence and strategy, but our present understanding of Canada's response to the Far East crisis also raises questions that merit further discussion. In view of this, the significance of this study will be discussed with reference to new findings, the relationship between intelligence and strategy, and the extent of Canada's adherence to Allied strategy during the Far East crisis. Alternative interpretations of the evidence will also be considered with respect to traditionalist and revisionist models. Finally, suggestions for further research will be offered to historians of the Second World War.

A Summary

The Far East crisis presented Canada and the Allies with enormous challenges throughout 1941. Disputes over the destiny of China and the control of resources in the Far East compelled the Pacific powers to adopt strategies and alliances that made war appear inevitable. Japanese militarists were committed to resolving the China Incident on their own terms, and favoured expansion into Southeast Asia while the Allies faced setbacks in Europe. The Allies were exposed in the Far East and could not afford to face the Empire of Japan without active support from the United States. Moreover, Allied strategists knew that both China and the Soviet Union had to be kept in the war as a check against Japan's ability to wage unrestricted war throughout Southeast Asia. At times, no immediate or expedient solution presented itself. American isolationism remained a potent force during that critical year. Soviet endurance was deemed critical to the war's outcome, but until late 1941 it remained unclear whether or not Soviet troops could hold out against the German war machine. Despite these unresolved questions, the Allies intensified their preparations for a Pacific War. Apart from concerns over security in the Far East, Allied strategists regarded the Pacific as the key to American co-belligerence in the greater global

conflict. All the while, Canada sought to understand the Far East crisis on its own terms, using its domestic and international intelligence networks.

It is clear that Canada was in no way operating on the periphery of Allied intelligence operations as the Pacific War approached. It benefited from participation in several intelligence networks, including Britain's Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation and Far East D/F Organisation. Along with the other British Dominions, Canada produced and exchanged direction finding (D/F) intercepts, call sign data, radio propagation data, ship movement reports, and intelligence assessments. The Royal Canadian Navy network included three Pacific D/F stations, eight Atlantic D/F stations, and seven "Y" cryptanalysis stations. Canadian intelligence networks used techniques such as wiretapping, postal censorship, press and trade analysis, radio interception, and cryptanalysis. Notably, the Examination Unit in Ottawa decrypted Japanese, German, and Vichy diplomatic traffic. In addition, External Affairs and the Department of National Defence (DND) supported British Security Coordination (BSC) operations in North America, which included a forgery workshop in Toronto, a communications centre at Camp X in Whitby, Ontario, anti-Axis propaganda programs, and a covert campaign against American isolationism. Canadian, British, and American intelligence authorities established strong links between Ottawa, London, New York, and Washington. Participating service groups included the Canadian Department of Transport, National Research Council, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, and Examination Unit; the Admiralty, British Army, and British Security Coordination; and the Coordinator of Information, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and US Navy. Canada was well inside the Allied information loop.

Canada's domestic intelligence networks revealed Japan's interest in Southeast Asia and the approach of war in the Pacific. Postal censorship as well as trade and press analysis provided some information about public reaction to the Far East crisis, but agents recently arrived from the region furnished superior information to Canadian authorities, thereby enabling Pacific Command to produce timely and relevant intelligence assessments. Allied agents monitored Japan's preparations for war, predicted strikes against the Burma Road, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies, saw that Hong Kong was highly vulnerable, and believed that Japan might launch surprise attacks, including nuisance raids along the Pacific Coast. One agent even considered the prospect of an attack on Hawaii, but concluded that Japanese air power was no match for US forces there. Decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages furnished information about Japan's growing concern over conflict with the Allies, as well as Tokyo's concern over American attitudes and Canada's war production, support

for the Soviet Union, and reinforcement of Hong Kong. On 6 December 1941, Canada learned from decrypted traffic that the Germans believed that the US Navy would attack a Japanese convoy heading to Indochina. A Pacific War appeared imminent.

Canada also received a considerable amount of intelligence from its allies and its own diplomatic missions abroad. Reports from Hong Kong, the British Army, and the Admiralty all discussed Japan's preparations for war and confirmed in late November that Japan had decided on southern targets in Southeast Asia. But Ottawa benefited more from diplomatic intelligence collected in London, Washington, and Tokyo on a daily basis. This was furnished mainly by the Dominions Office or Canadian Legations abroad, and provided timely, detailed information about the January-February war scare, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, China's resistance to Japanese occupation, and Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Canada also received advance warning of Japan's occupation of southern French Indochina. Incoming reports commented on the Japanese-Soviet war scare of October, the motives of the Tojo government, and the deterioration in US-Japanese diplomatic relations. Significantly, Canada's external sources provided advance warning of Japan's attack on Malaya, which heralded the coming of the Pacific War. Canada benefited from its global diplomatic contacts and its full membership in the Allied intelligence community.

It is also possible that Canada and the Allies predicted the Pearl Harbor attack in late November. Multiple contemporaneous primary sources demonstrate that the Allies became aware of Axis and Japanese interest in the Hawaii area between August and November 1941. Murton Seymour's postwar affidavit claims that British intelligence told Ottawa in late November that it believed Japan would launch an air strike against Pearl Harbor. According to Seymour, this intelligence caused the Canadians to shut down their covert air force recruiting program in the US. His account is also confirmed by several eyewitnesses, including Sir Julian Ridsdale, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Grace Garner, and Lester Pearson. We have noted how predictions may have resulted from any combination of strategic analysis, human intelligence, D/F activity, or cryptanalysis, the latter of which must explain the *Akagi* intercept noted in US Congressional Hearings.

Moreover, contemporaneous and postwar accounts from veterans of wartime intelligence and covert operations suggest that the Allies and the Americans may have tracked the *Kido Butai* (Strike Force) in early December. Johan Ranneft's war diary entries for early December, Leslie Grogan's record of 10 December, Cecil King's diary entry for 17 December, as well as postwar accounts from both Cavendish-Bentinck and William Casey, collectively point to that

conclusion. Historians are not yet in a position to use archival records to verify or refute claims that D/F activity or cryptanalysis revealed the presence of the *Kido Butai* in the North Pacific, but it seems rather simplistic to dismiss all those accounts as the mere product of hindsight or self-aggrandizement. Even those who conclude that the traditionalist thesis has the stronger case need to consider this primary evidence and deal with it in their accounts.

For the most part, intelligence arriving in Canada was correct, complete, and timely, even though interservice rivalry and misconceptions about Japanese capabilities sometimes undermined its value. Rivalries were at play not only when British intelligence compelled the Examination Unit to drop Herbert Yardley from codebreaking activities but also when the RCN competed briefly with the Bermuda Station for control of shipping intelligence. Canada and the Allies underestimated Japan's fighting capabilities because the latter's forces had faced defeat at the hands of the Soviets at Nomonhan and had failed to win their war in China. The Allies often overlooked Japan's recent naval, air, and military advancements, even though they acknowledged the growing power of the Japanese Navy. Allied commentators also regarded the Japanese as racially inferior to Western peoples. Despite these limitations, Ottawa understood the general trend of Japan's intentions and actions in both Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Considering the evidence in its entirety, Canada was able to make informed decisions as it developed its own Far East policy. Ottawa sent observers to Allied-American conferences in Princeton and Washington to place its own interests in a wider perspective. Through the ABC-1 and later ABC-22 agreements, it prepared for war against Japan, but on condition of active American participation. Canada refrained from making concrete war preparations during the January-February war scare, but could rely on contingency plans made in October 1940 if necessary. Strategists worried about Japan's free hand in the Far East following the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, and especially after Germany's assault on the Soviet Union in June. The question that remained was whether Japan would move south or north. Japan's movement into southern French Indochina made it clear that American, Dutch, and British possessions, as well as Thailand, were as vulnerable as the Burma Road. For the moment, strategists could not be sure that the US would check Japanese expansionism: American isolationism remained strong, despite the best efforts of the Roosevelt administration, Allied diplomacy, and BSC covert operations.

As a result, Canada participated in Allied strategies to contain Japan provided that these strategies promised deterrence rather than provocation. To that end, Canada avoided outright confrontation with Japan until American support became more assured. In early 1941, for example, it blocked Britain's plan to

intercept Japanese and Soviet vessels in the North Pacific. Moreover, Canada sought to avert the potentially damaging consequences of Japan's charges of espionage against both the Canadian Legation and the British Embassy in Tokyo, maintaining a façade of constructive diplomacy because it was not yet prepared to face conflict with Japan.

The turning point in Canada's commitment to Allied containment strategies against Japan came during the American-led asset freeze. In offering immediate support for the freeze, Canada had little to lose either economically or politically. The Dominion had already stopped exporting wood, wheat, and strategic metals to Japan. Furthermore, Canada's enthusiasm for a measure that some strategists believed would either bring Japan to terms or compel it to go to war owed much to the fact that the Roosevelt administration had finally demonstrated its resolve. The Mackenzie King government had always favoured US cooperation and usually took the view that Canada was more an American nation than a British Dominion. British objectives that had been placed on hold could now be implemented with the United States' full backing. In addition, the Atlantic Conference, held only a fortnight later, promised more US support for the Allies, even if it also demonstrated that Canada's role as Britain's senior ally would eventually lapse. This is not to say that the US isolationist lobby had suddenly vanished. Much to his regret, Mackenzie King faced sharp criticism from the lobby during the debacle over his Mansion House speech, when the American press incorrectly reported that he wanted the US to guarantee Britain's security. Despite this setback, however, it was clear to Canadian strategists that active US support for the Allied cause was now more likely in the aftermath of the asset freeze and the Atlantic Conference.

In terms of military strategy, Canada eventually agreed to Britain's request for Hong Kong troop reinforcements, but only because this move was presented as having deterrent value. At one point during the Far East crisis, strategists believed that Allied and American troop placements throughout Southeast Asia would check Japanese expansionism. By the time conflict with Japan was certain, the twin principles of honour and imperial solidarity made it impossible to withdraw the troops from Hong Kong, even if the colony was indefensible.

Canadian strategists also prepared for conflict in the North Pacific. All three armed services anticipated Japanese nuisance raids along the Pacific Coast, although an actual invasion was not considered a likely prospect. Canadian and American authorities ensured that each country's aircraft and ships had reciprocal landing/docking rights along the coast. The RCN established a range of Pacific Coast defence measures, often in consultation with the US Navy, including anti-torpedo nets, sono-buoys, depth charge throwers, and aerial torpedo practice. More controversially, Canadian authorities registered the Japanese

Canadians and made plans for their internment in the event of war, prompted by racist public opinion in British Columbia and military reports indicating that Imperial Japanese agents were hiding among the *Nisei* community and engaging in espionage along the coast. In November 1941, Canada invoked Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement in anticipation of conflict in the Pacific. In the days leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, the RCN reported Pacific shipping movements to the highest intelligence authorities, including the *east-bound* journey of HMCS *Prince Robert* from Honolulu to Esquimalt, and set up refuge anchorages in the Aleutians for the Soviet vessel *Komsomolsk* when it sought to cross the North Pacific. Canadian authorities believed that the North Pacific demanded as much vigilance as the Far East.

Finally, in November and December 1941, Ottawa officials anticipated the coming of the Pacific War and made important preparations. Following the Soviet-Japanese war scare in October, its strategists focused on the mounting crisis in US-Japanese diplomatic relations. It was clear that Washington regarded the Kuru Mission with great suspicion, even if the new Tojo government portrayed it as an expression of diplomatic earnestness. Ottawa watched the Washington proceedings as carefully as possible, because it was known that a final breach might occur at any moment. Through a simple oversight on the part of the State Department, Canadian officials were not invited to Secretary of State Cordell Hull's *modus vivendi* meetings, but soon learned the purpose of the meetings through their American and British contacts. The *modus vivendi*, based on Japan's second plan for compromise, was meant to buy the Americans time to send further reinforcements to the Philippines, but Canadian officials learned that Roosevelt suddenly dropped the *modus vivendi*, replacing it with a final note to Japan. China's protestations and Churchill's 25 November correspondence appear to have inspired this sudden shift in policy.

The Canadians acted quickly in the face of the United States' diplomatic reversal as well as the Kra Isthmus war scare. Mackenzie King planned for the withdrawal of staff from Tokyo, advised Churchill against intervening in the Far East until US support was guaranteed, and ordered the preparation of advance press statements concerning war with Japan. He predicted that war would break out by Sunday, 7 December. This appeared to be confirmed when Canada was told that Roosevelt had offered active US support to Britain on 4 December and to Thailand on 6 December. US belligerence was now completely assured. Canada's declaration of war against Japan on the very first day of hostilities was the result of sound intelligence, absolute preparedness, and a desire to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty. Canadian analysts had accurately predicted Japan's choice of targets and its timetable for war, although Canada, along with its allies,

underestimated Japan's military capability, due in part to racist sentiments. Above all, however, Canada had steered a careful course through Far East affairs until active American participation was assured. The Grand Alliance was now complete.

The Significance of Canada's Response to the Far East Crisis

This book has presented several new findings, demonstrated that intelligence affected strategic planning, and explained how Canada, as a minor Pacific power, met its Allied commitments while maintaining a degree of influence during the Far East crisis. In terms of new findings, or observations that have not been emphasized in the relevant historiography, several important aspects of the Canadian experience during the Second World War are worthy of note. Canada received a wealth of information about the Far East crisis from an extensive array of intelligence networks. According to multiple sources, Canada received forewarning of Japan's intentions in Southeast Asia and its interest in Pearl Harbor. Canada participated in secret Allied conferences concerning the containment of Japan and knew that the American-British Conversations (ABC-1) was *originally* convened to discuss Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific rather than the Nazi threat. Canadian officials believed that clandestine Japanese transmissions along the British Columbia coastline necessitated the internment of the Japanese Canadians. It has also been shown that the Royal Canadian Navy made many preparations for a conflict in the North Pacific, including the invocation of Annex V of the ABC-1 agreement on 26 November 1941. These findings contribute to our understanding of Canada's response to the Japanese challenge in Asia and the Pacific.

We have also seen that intelligence played a significant role in Canadian decision making. Information gathered during the Far East war scare of early 1941 compelled Canada to engage in more cautious diplomacy and to plan for the evacuation of Canadian nationals from the Japanese Empire. Advance knowledge of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact led to a timely analysis of Japan's renewed interest in southern objectives. Intelligence concerning Germany's assault on the Soviet Union compelled strategists to reconsider Japan's intentions in both the north and the south. Early warning of Japan's intended move into southern French Indochina led to timely preparations for a freeze of Japanese assets. Knowledge of Japan's military preparations spurred Canadian military planners to improve Pacific Coast defences. Intelligence concerning a possible Soviet-Japanese conflict in October led to the establishment of emergency anchorages in the Pacific for Allied vessels, a plan that was used again during the crisis in early December. Information about the course of US-Japanese

negotiations in late November compelled Canadian strategists to invoke the ABC-1 agreement, increase surveillance in the North Pacific, and plan further improvements to Pacific Coast defences in consultation with the Americans. Incoming intelligence concerning a possible Japanese move into the Kra Isthmus led to Canadian warnings against a pre-emptive British advance into the region. According to Colonel Murton A. Seymour, a prediction of the Pearl Harbor attack caused an Ottawa official to instruct him to close down his covert air force recruiting program in the United States. Intelligence collected in the first week of December prompted Canadian officials to convene a special emergency meeting in the morning of 7 December, to discuss the prospect of war with Japan. Intelligence influenced strategy at several key moments during the Far East crisis.

It is also clear that Canada, as a minor Pacific power, met its commitments to the Allies during the Far East crisis, usually following Allied strategy but sometimes influencing it. The RCN coordinated all merchant shipping intelligence in the Pacific for the British Commonwealth, sharing its reports with both the Admiralty and the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) in Singapore. The Gordon Head station near Esquimalt monitored Japanese naval traffic and reported its findings to the Admiralty. The RCN shipping control service rivalled BSC as the largest Allied intelligence network operating in North America in 1941. The RCN also sent advisors to Washington and Seattle to assist the US Navy with intelligence gathering. External Affairs exchanged intelligence with BSC and assisted with its staffing. Canadian representatives shared their views at several international conferences on Pacific affairs, including the Princeton Conference, ABC-1, and several economic summits. Canada imposed the strictest economic sanctions against Japan within the British Commonwealth, and Canadian troops shared responsibility for the defence of Hong Kong. Canada blocked Britain's plan to intercept neutral ships in the Pacific, however, thereby reducing the chances of an Anglo-Japanese conflict at a time when US intervention was unlikely. Canada also refused Britain's request to participate in a joint declaration of war against Japan and made its own declaration, an action that briefly undermined Commonwealth solidarity but enhanced Canadian sovereignty.

Canada's response to the Far East crisis also raises questions for future studies concerning democracies at war. How do domestic factors limit the range of war policies that are politically possible? How does the balance between executive authority and public accountability define the manner in which war may be waged? In the case of "enemy aliens," can the state ever justify the suspension of civil rights to satisfy public demand or even to protect the greater public

interest along utilitarian lines? How did Canada's role within the Anglo-American alliance develop throughout the entire course of the Second World War? Historians may wish to explore these political and strategic issues in forthcoming studies.

Other Interpretations of the Evidence Presented in This Book

No doubt some historians will interpret the evidence presented in this book in other ways. Let us first consider how traditionalists might view matters. Traditionalists will probably accept many of the cited intelligence reports because, for the most part, these concern Japan's intentions in Southeast Asia and are not controversial. It is clear that Allied intelligence authorities fully anticipated war in Southeast Asia and had identified many of the targets, including the Burma Road, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, the NEL, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. The cited documents are contemporaneous primary sources and are largely beyond question. Similarly, Allied reports that underestimate Japan's capabilities or present a negative racial stereotype of Japanese people will be accepted as confirmation of the prevailing historical view that war-time Europeans and Americans grossly misjudged Asian peoples. Traditionalists may, however, question the meaning of primary sources concerning the North Pacific. It is clear that Canada and the Allies prepared for the possibility of conflict in the North Pacific, but in traditionalist circles this tends to be seen as preparedness for a Pacific War originating in the Far East rather than in Hawaii. For traditionalists, Allied preparations throughout the Pacific indicate awareness that war with Japan was imminent, rather than specific foreknowledge of Japan's choice of targets.

The evidence suggesting that Canada and the Allies may have predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor provokes more intense disagreement, and traditionalists will most certainly take exception to its implications. They cannot easily deny, however, that the Allies became aware of Japan's interest in the Hawaii area in August-November 1941, according to available primary sources. Considering the 1941 accounts offered by Cecil King, Leslie Grogan, and Johan Ranneft, the thesis that Allied officials had the *ability* to gauge the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack is one that some traditionalists may accept. Yet, they will correctly note that the case for firm predictions or specific foreknowledge is based mainly on postwar accounts. For traditionalists, multiple postwar sources are not enough to support the revisionist position. They will nonetheless have to explain why several direct participants in wartime intelligence and covert operations made such claims, all quite independently. Traditionalists will have to work very hard to attribute hindsight, self-aggrandizement, or pure

error to remarks made by such participants. It is clear that an entire class of evidence cannot simply be ignored in support of a traditionalist thesis.

The most effective way for traditionalists to deal with pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence is to adopt a "signal and noise" thesis, which Roberta Wohlstetter advanced in her classic work, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962).¹ They could argue that Allied strategists ignored signals heralding the Pearl Harbor attack because an overwhelming amount of contrary information pointed to a Japanese first strike in Southeast Asia. Incoming "noise" may have compelled key decision makers or entire departments to adopt a strategic outlook that focused exclusively on Japan's objectives in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, a consensus in strategic outlook may have been perpetuated by any combination of strong leadership, shared rationalization, or fear of ostracism. To build on this argument, traditionalists may consider other variables that affect the decision-making process, such as interpersonal and interdepartmental rivalry, communications structure, command hierarchy, and institutional bureaucracy. These variables affect how intelligence is evaluated and disseminated by people, departments, or institutions entrusted with intelligence duties.

On the question of Canadian strategy, traditionalists will probably support most of the findings presented here. Indeed, Canada's principal deterrent measures against Japan, including economic sanctions and the reinforcement of Hong Kong, have received a rather orthodox treatment in this study. Economic sanctions were initially intended to deter Japan, although the asset freeze may have increased the likelihood of war. Traditionalists may question this book's interpretation of Britain's motives in proposing secret Allied economic conferences in December 1940: these could be regarded as instruments of deterrence rather than encirclement. On Hong Kong, traditionalists will agree that Allied strategists believed at one point that troop reinforcements might have deterrent value against Japan. This book marks no significant departure from conventional Hong Kong historiography. Regarding the Japanese Canadians, most historians would agree that the way they were treated was greatly disproportionate to the actual security threat to the Pacific Coast in 1941-42. This book offers new evidence showing how Canadian intelligence authorities believed in the threat of clandestine transmissions along the Pacific Coast, but concludes that resident Japanese Canadians were completely innocent of any transgression and were the object of intense anti-Asian racism. It is difficult to imagine historians viewing the situation otherwise.

Traditionalists will also accept primary evidence demonstrating Canada's state of preparedness for conflict in the Pacific. It is clear that Canada improved its coastal defences, protected shipping in the North Pacific, invoked the ABC-1

agreement, and predicted war with Japan in early December 1941. Once again, however, traditionalists will interpret these actions as preparations for a war originating in the Far East rather than in the North Pacific. Moreover, they will regard Mackenzie King's comments about the imminence of war in early December (or, for that matter, similar comments made by Roosevelt or Churchill) as accurate predictions rather than as specific foreknowledge. This book takes no exception to either view, but suggests that the latter explanation is more plausible.

Let us now consider how revisionists might view matters. For them, this book's interpretation of prewar intelligence might seem too conservative. They may interpret most of the intelligence reports as expressions of Allied foreknowledge rather than as a combination of predictions, informed opinion, and foreknowledge. They may accept that the Allies grossly misjudged Japan's capabilities, if not its intentions. Revisionists will not only accept the view that the Allies fully anticipated war in Southeast Asia but also advance the proposition that Allied preparations in the North Pacific were related to specific foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. For them, such preparations were a sign of preparedness for a Pacific War originating in both the Far East and Hawaii.

Revisionists may attempt to show that the Allies had formed an encirclement strategy against Japan at quite an early date. Some may see such strategies emerging as early as 1931, when Japan entered Manchuria, or 1937, when it began its war in China. Others may see Allied encirclement strategies as beginning in earnest after the fall of France in June 1940, or after the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September that year. In this book, Allied contingency plans, which were drawn up in late 1940 to address the possibility of Pacific naval deterrence and economic sanctions against Japan, are presented more as expressions of insecurity over vulnerability in the Far East as well as the need to contain Japan, than as an early attempt to engineer a conflict in the region. This book demonstrates that such contingency plans began to be used as a basis for collective Anglo-American agreement after December 1940, but reached their ultimate expression only in the asset freeze of July 1941, which was a direct response to Japan's further encroachment in Southeast Asia. Revisionists may, however, regard Allied contingency plans formed in 1940 as evidence of a grand design to bait Japan into war as a means of securing active US participation in the Allied cause in both the Far East and Europe. Some may even argue that Allied intelligence operations sought to reveal Britain's vulnerability in the Far East so as to embolden Japan. For example, revisionists may attempt to portray the *Automedon* incident (see Chapter 1) as a planned leak of documents, although this seems rather speculative.

Revisionists may regard all Allied measures taken against Japan in 1941 as encirclement or provocation rather than as deterrence. This book argues that Allied economic sanctions, which Canada supported enthusiastically, had originally been conceived as deterrent measures, although the Allies knew that the asset freeze carried the risk of war. For revisionists, economic sanctions were *always* intended to provoke Japan. In terms of military measures, revisionists may see the reinforcement of Singapore, the Philippines, and Hong Kong as provocative measures that also promised better defence when the anticipated war broke out in the Far East. Yet, they will also agree with the observation here that at one point Anglo-American strategists saw both the Philippines and Hong Kong as indefensible in the short term: strategists planned to retake those territories at a later stage during a war with Japan. Revisionists who reject the concept of deterrent measures will therefore conclude that troop reinforcements were sent to those territories to ensure public sympathy for the Allied cause when Japan overran the area. In terms of Canada's troop reinforcements, some may present the fall of Hong Kong as a planned public relations exercise, one calculated to increase Commonwealth support for a new theatre of war, but this is a rather controversial view given the loss of life involved.

In summary, revisionists will endorse the view that Canada and the Allies were fully prepared for all eventualities on 7 December 1941. They will build on the evidence presented here to argue that the Allies had complete foreknowledge of Japan's intentions in both Southeast Asia and Hawaii. They will also attempt to show that predictions made by King, Churchill, and Roosevelt were the product of specific foreknowledge. It should be clear that this study avoids several of these revisionist conclusions, even though it may raise certain questions and serve as a foundation for further inquiry.

Further Archival Research for Historians of the Second World War

This book also demonstrates that further archival research is necessary. It is evident that several relevant collections have been censored or withheld from public access in times past. Researchers might consider using Access to Information Act requests to retrieve missing documents from the following Canadian file groups: Examination Unit histories and records; RCN/Pacific Command messages; Gordon Head station records and logs; External Affairs records (Japan); Mackenzie King Papers (Japan); and C.G. Power Papers (Japan).³

British and American archival collections also deserve attention. From British collections, researchers might pursue the release of 1941 BSC files. Other relevant British documents yet to be seen include all existing 1941 FECB files, Japanese

message decrypts, and Far East D/F logs. In terms of American archival collections, researchers might pursue the release of the following 1941 documents: original reports and logs from the SS *Lurline*; existing US Navy D/F logs from Pacific stations; JN-25B worksheets and decrypts; and texts from intercepted messages alleged to be products of Japanese radio deception.

On the basis of future archival releases, historians will continue to reassess the causes and course of the Second World War. The very essence of historical scholarship is to integrate the majority of available evidence and to revise and correct: we are all “revisionists” in this regard. Intelligence studies offer a unique insight into the decision-making process. The methodological challenge lies in demonstrating a causal link between warning and decision, but it is clear that some decisions made by our protagonists make much more sense in light of particular information. This book has considered a wide range of sources in an attempt to explain how intelligence operations affected strategic planning in Canada during the Far East crisis, but further research is necessary.

Closing Remarks

In examining Canada's response to the Far East crisis in 1941, it is clear that Canada not only approached the crisis with remarkable insight but also recognized how the anticipated Pacific War would alter its role within the Anglo-American alliance. Throughout the crisis, it stood as Britain's senior ally, sharing intelligence and strategic assessments with the Commonwealth. Canada and the Allies understood Japan's designs in Southeast Asia and anticipated how Japan might launch its opening offensives across the Pacific. Canada also developed strong links with the United States, a nation that had so much to offer the Allied cause. The Pacific War, which resulted from disagreement over the destiny of China and the Far East, transformed the global conflict that Canada and the Allies first faced in 1939. With the coming of the Pacific War, Canada's role as Britain's senior partner finally faded, but only because the Allies had achieved their greatest political objective: the participation of the United States in the Grand Alliance. For Canada, this success was not without cost: the spectre of the dead in Hong Kong would haunt the government for years to come, and the unjust internment of the Japanese Canadians would have long-lasting political and social consequences. Yet, Canada was a vital player in the Allied effort to end totalitarian rule in both Europe and the Far East. Canada also participated in the creation of a new world order, one that sought to prevent total war from ever again engulfing the world's peoples, from Europe to Asia and across the vast expanse of the Pacific.

Glossary of Names

The Canadians

- Apedaile, Joseph L. – Treasurer and Civil Contracts Officer, Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd., 1941
- Beech, Commodore W.J.R. – Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, RCN (Esquimalt), 1941
- Brand, Captain Eric S. – Director of Naval Intelligence, RCN, 1941 (Brand had served in the RN before his transfer to the RCN)
- Breadner, Air Marshal L.S. – Chief of Air Staff, 1940-43
- Christie, Loring C. – Canadian Minister to the United States, 1939-41
- Crerar, Lieutenant-General H.D.G. – Chief of General Staff, 1940-41
- Croil, Air Vice-Marshal George M. – Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 1941
- Day, Lieutenant-Commander Ivan S. – RCN officer performing intelligence duties at Pacific Command (Esquimalt), 1941
- de Carteret, S.L. – Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, 1941-44
- de Marbois, Lieutenant-Commander John M.B.P. (Jock) – Head of Foreign Intelligence Section, RCN, 1941
- Drake, Captain E.M. – Commanding Officer, Rockcliffe W/T Station, RCCS (Ottawa), 1940-41
- Garner, Grace – Secretary to William Stephenson at British Security Coordination (New York), 1941
- Grassett, Major-General A.E. – Commanding Officer, Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force (Hong Kong), 1938-41
- Howe, C.D. – Minister of Munitions and Supply, 1940-45
- Jolliffe, F.E. – Chief Postal Censor, 1941
- Keenleyside, H.L. – Counsellor, External Affairs, 1940-41; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-44
- King, W.L. Mackenzie – Prime Minister of Canada, 1921-26, 1926-30, 1935-48; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1921-26, 1926-30, 1935-46
- Lapointe, Ernest – Minister of Justice and Attorney General, 1935-41
- Lawson, Brigadier J.K. – Commanding Officer of “C” Force in Hong Kong, 1941
- Macdonald, Angus – Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 1940-45

- Mahoney, Merchant – M. Counsellor, Canadian Legation in the United States, 1938-45
- Massey, Vincent – Canadian High Commissioner in Great Britain, 1935-46
- McCarthy, Leighton – Canadian Minister to the United States, 1941-43
- McGreer, E. D'Arcy – Charge d'Affaires, Canadian Legation in Japan, 1938-41
- Munday, R.B.C. – Former RCMP sergeant performing intelligence duties at Pacific Command (Esquimalt), 1941
- Murray, Lieutenant-Colonel W.W. – Canadian Army W/T intelligence, 1940-41
- Nelles, Rear-Admiral Percy W. – Chief of Naval Staff, 1938-44
- Pearson, Lester B. – Counsellor and Secretary, Canadian High Commission in Great Britain, 1939-41; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-42
- Pope, Colonel Maurice A. – Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1939-40
- Power, Charles G. – Minister of National Defence for Air and Associate Minister of National Defence, 1940-44
- Ralston, J.L. – Minister of National Defence, 1940-44
- Read, John E. – Legal Advisor, External Affairs, 1929-46
- Reid, Escott – Second Secretary, Canadian Legation in the United States, 1939-41; Second Secretary, External Affairs, 1941-44
- Robertson, Norman A. – Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-46
- Seymour, Murton A. – President of Dominion Aeronautical Association Ltd., 1941
- Skelton, O.D. – Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1925-41
- Stephenson, William S. – Head of British Security Coordination (New York), 1941-45
- Stone, T.A. – First Secretary, External Affairs, 1939-43
- Wrong, H. Hume – Special Economic Advisor, Canadian High Commission in Great Britain, 1939-41; Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation in the United States, 1941-42

The British

- Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert – Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, 1940-41
- Cadogan, Sir Alexander – Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1941
- Campbell, Sir Gerald – British High Commissioner in Canada, 1938-41

Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor – Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1939-45

Churchill, Winston S. – Prime Minister of Britain and Minister of Defence, 1940-45

Craigie, Sir Robert L. – British Ambassador to Japan, 1937-41

Cranborne, Viscount – Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1940-42

Denniston, Commander Alastair – Operational Head of GC&CS (London, Bletchley Park), 1919-42

Eden, Anthony – Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1940-45

Godfrey, Rear-Admiral John H. – Director of Naval Intelligence, Royal Navy, 1941

Halifax, Viscount – British Ambassador to the United States, 1941-46

Hankinson, W.C. – Principal Secretary to the British High Commission in Canada, 1939-41

MacDonald, Malcolm – British High Commissioner in Canada, 1941-46

Menzies, Stewart G. – Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 1939-52

Mullaly, Colonel Brian R. – British Military Attaché in Tokyo, 1941;

Intelligence Analyst at Pacific Command (Esquimalt), 1941

Phillips, Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas – Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, 1939-41; Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, 1941; Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Fleet (Singapore Command), 1941

The British Commonwealth

Curtin, John – Prime Minister of Australia, 1941-45

Fraser, Peter – Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1940-49

Menzies, Robert G. – Prime Minister of Australia, 1939-41

Smuts, General Jan Christiaan – Prime Minister of South Africa, 1939-48

The Americans

Berle, Adolf A. Jr. – Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-44

Donovan, William J. – Coordinator of Information, 1941-42

Freeman, Commander C.S. – Commandant, US Navy 13th Naval District (Seattle), 1941

Grew, Joseph C. – US Ambassador to Japan, 1932-41

Hopkins, Harry L. – Secretary of Commerce, 1938-40; Personal Envoy to President Franklin Roosevelt, 1940-45

Hornbeck, Stanley K. – Special Advisor to Cordell Hull, State Department, 1937-44

Howell, Lieutenant-Commander Glenn F. – District Liaison Officer to Canada, US Navy 13th Naval District (Seattle), 1941

Hull, Cordell – Secretary of State, 1933-44
Knox, Frank – Secretary of the Navy, 1940-44
Marshall, General George C. – US Army Chief of Staff, 1939-45
Mauborgne, General Joseph – Head of US Army Secret Intelligence Service, 1941
Moffat, Jay Pierrepont – US Minister to Canada, 1940-43
Morgenthau, Henry Jr. – Secretary of the Treasury, 1934-45
Roosevelt, Franklin D. – President of the United States, 1933-45
Stark, Admiral Harold R. – Chief of Naval Operations, 1939-42
Stimson, Colonel Henry L. – Secretary of War, 1940-45
Welles, Sumner – Under Secretary of State, 1937-43
Yardley, Herbert O. – Director of the Examination Unit (Ottawa), 1941

Other Allies

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo – Director-General of Kuomintang in China, 1938-49
Stalin, Joseph – General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1929-53

The Japanese

Hirohito (Emperor Showa) – Emperor of Japan, 1926-89
Konoye Fumimaro, Prince – Prime Minister of Japan, 1940-41
Kurusu Saburo – Japanese Ambassador to Germany, 1939-41; Special Envoy in Washington, 1941
Matsuoka Yosuke – Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940-41
Nomura Kichisaburo, Admiral – Japanese Ambassador to the United States, 1940-41
Tojo Hideki, General – Prime Minister of Japan and Minister of War, 1941-44
Tomii Shu, Baron – Japanese Minister to Canada, 1938-40
Yoshizawa Seijiro – Japanese Minister to Canada, 1940-41

The Axis

Hitler, Adolf – Chancellor of Nazi Germany, 1933-45
Mussolini, Benito – Prime Minister of Fascist Italy, 1922-43

Chronology of Events, 1922-42

1922

- 6 February The Washington Naval Treaty limits Japan's navy to 60 percent of the size of either the US Navy or the Royal Navy.
- 6 February The Nine-Power Treaty guarantees China against invasion.

1930

- 22 April The London Naval Treaty regulates submarine warfare and limits naval shipbuilding.

1931

- 18 September Japan attacks Mukden and begins its invasion of Manchuria, which it later renames Manchukuo.

1933

- 25 March Japan withdraws from the League of Nations.

1934

- 25 March Japan abrogates its naval treaties with the West.
- 21 October Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces in China begin their "Long March" to Shensi province; the march ends one year later.

1936

- 25 November Japan joins Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

1937

- 7 July Japan attacks Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge, thus beginning the "China Incident," which results in an eight-year war.
- 14 December Japan takes Nanking.

1938

- October Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government withdraws to Chungking.

1939

- May to September Battle of Khalkhin Gol (the Nomonhan Incident) between Japan and the Soviet Union.
- June to August Tientsin Crisis between Japan and Britain.

1940

- June Defeat in Western Europe leaves the Allies exposed in the Far East.
- July to October Britain closes the Burma Road because of pressure from Japan.
- August Japan proposes a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."
- 23 September Japan occupies bases in northern French Indochina.
- 26 September The US imposes an embargo on iron and scrap steel to Japan.
- 27 September Japan signs the Tripartite Pact.
- October The Canadian government considers both voluntary and compulsory repatriation schemes for Japanese Canadians.
- 11 November A German merchant raider sinks the British vessel SS *Automedon* and captures documents indicating Britain's weakness in the Far East; the Germans share the documents with the Japanese a month later.
- December Britain proposes secret Allied-American conferences concerning the economic containment of Japan as well as Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Pacific.

1941

- January The Anglo-American Pacific Naval Conference begins in Washington but talks expand into general war strategy concerning both Europe and the Far East; the talks become ABC-1 (American-British Conversations).
- January The US Pacific Fleet becomes officially based at Pearl Harbor.
- 8 January Japanese Canadians are excluded from military service.
- 31 January Thailand and French Indochina accept Japanese mediation in their border dispute.
- February ADA (Anglo-Dutch-Australian) Conversations are held in Singapore.
- 13 February Canada restricts wheat shipments to Japan.
- 4 March Registration of all Japanese Canadians.

- 14 March Canada rejects Britain's plan for neutral ship inspections in the Pacific.
- 27 March The ABC-1 agreement is signed in Washington.
- 13 April The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact is signed in Moscow.
- 27 April The ADB (American-Dutch-British) agreement is signed in Singapore.
- 22 June Germany attacks the Soviet Union; Japan considers further expansion in the Far East.
- 24 July Japan occupies bases in southern French Indochina.
- 26 July A US-led asset freeze against Japan begins; the British Commonwealth and Netherlands East Indies offer full support.
- 28 July The ABC-22 agreement between the US and Canada is signed in Montreal.
- 9-12 August Roosevelt and Churchill meet at the Atlantic Conference and decide on mutual war aims; Roosevelt proposes a moratorium on negotiations with Japan.
- 12 August Japanese Canadians are required to carry registration cards with thumbprint and photo.
- 17 August Roosevelt warns Japan against further encroachment in the Far East.
- August to September Japan accuses Canadian officials of espionage but later drops the charge.
- 2 October Canada informs Britain that Canadian troops will reinforce Hong Kong.
- 17 October Tojo replaces Konoye as Prime Minister of Japan.
- October Soviet-Japanese war scare at the Manchukuo-Soviet border.
- 5 November A Tokyo Imperial Conference decides on continuing war plans but sets 25 November as a diplomatic deadline; the deadline is later extended to 2 December.
- 16 November Two Canadian battalions ("C" Force) arrive in Hong Kong.
- Mid-November Japanese envoys Kurusu and Nomura offer the Americans Plans A and B; Plan B forms the basis of Secretary of State Hull's *modus vivendi*, which is meant to buy time.
- 26 November Hull issues a final note to Japan after Roosevelt rejects the *modus vivendi*.
- 30 November Kra Isthmus war scare, although Japan does not invade.

- 1 December Murton Seymour is told to shut down Canadian air force recruiting in the US because British intelligence suspects Pearl Harbor will be attacked on 8 December.
- 4 December Roosevelt promises US support for Britain in the event of Japanese attacks.
- 6 December Roosevelt promises US support for the NEI in the event of Japanese attacks.
- 7 December Japan attacks Malaya, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Guam, Wake Island, and Pearl Harbor; Japan enters Thailand at the Kra Isthmus.
- 7 December Canada declares war on Japan.
- 8 December The US, Britain, and the Commonwealth declare war on Japan.
- 8 December Twelve hundred Japanese Canadian fishing boats are impounded; Japanese newspapers and schools close.
- 9 December China officially declares war on Japan and the Axis powers.
- 9 December Japan declares war on the Allies.
- 10 December Japanese forces sink HMS *Prince of Wales* and HMS *Repulse*.
- 10 December Japan captures Guam.
- 11 December Germany and Italy declare war on the US.
- 11 December Japan attacks Burma.
- 17 December Japanese forces land in British Borneo.
- 20 December Japan attacks the NEI.
- 24 December Wake Island falls to Japanese forces.
- 25 December Hong Kong surrenders to Japanese forces.

1942

- 1 January Twenty-six "United Nations" sign a joint declaration based on the Atlantic Charter that pledges to defeat the Axis powers and to establish a new world order.
- 11 January Japan invades the NEI.
- 8 February Japanese forces take Rangoon.
- February British Malaya falls to Japanese forces.
- 15 February British forces surrender Singapore.
- 19 February Japan bombs Darwin, Australia.

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| 26 February | A mass evacuation of Japanese Canadians begins in order to create a hundred-mile-wide protected zone along the British Columbia coast. |
| 9 March | Dutch forces surrender in Java and the NEI falls under Japanese control. |
| 13 March | Japan occupies the Solomon Islands. |
| 9 April | Bataan falls to the Japanese in the Philippines. |
| 8 May | US forces surrender in Corregidor and the Philippines comes under Japanese control. |
| 20 May | British forces surrender in Burma. |

Notes

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

A&WI	Americas and West Indies Squadron (Bermuda)
ACNB	Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
BAD	British Admiralty Delegation (Washington, DC)
BARM	British Admiralty Repair Mission
BHC	British High Commission (or Commissioner)
BNLO	British Naval Liaison Officer
C/S	Captain on the Staff
CAC	Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College (Cambridge, UK)
CCNF	Commodore Commanding the Newfoundland Force (St. John's, Newfoundland)
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
CINCAF	Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Manila, Philippines)
CMJ	Canadian Minister in Japan (Tokyo)
CMUS	Canadian Minister in United States (Washington, DC)
CNA	Chief of Naval Air (USN)
COAC	Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (Halifax, NS)
COI	Coordinator of Information (Washington, DC)
COPC	Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (Esquimalt, B.C.)
CSE	Communications Security Establishment, Canada
DDSD (Y)	Deputy Director of Signals Division (Y) (Admiralty)
DHH	Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence (Ottawa)
DMO & I	Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (Ottawa)
DND	Department of National Defence (Ottawa)
DNI & P	Director of Naval Intelligence and Plans (Ottawa)
DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence (British and Commonwealth)
DS	Director of the Signal Division (Admiralty)
FDRL	Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, NY)
FECB	Far East Combined Bureau (Singapore)
GSO	General Staff Officer
HCCA	High Commissioner for Canada in Australia (Canberra)
HCCGB	High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain (London)
HCCNZ	High Commissioner for Canada in New Zealand (Wellington)
HKIR	Hong Kong Intelligence Report
LAC	Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa)
MMRB	Modern Military Records Branch (at NARA)
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD)
NASIR	<i>North American Station Intelligence Report</i>
NCSO	Naval Control of Shipping Office (US)
NID	Naval Intelligence Division (British and Commonwealth)

NRC	National Research Council (Ottawa)
NSHQ	Naval Service Headquarters (Ottawa)
NZNB	New Zealand Naval Board
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, USN (Washington, DC)
PRO	Public Record Office (Kew, Surrey, UK)
QUA	Queen's University Archives (Kingston, ON)
RG	Record Group
RMC	Royal Military College of Canada (Kingston, ON)
SDO	Staff Duty Officer
SCM	St. Catharines Museum (St. Catharines, ON)
SO(I)	Staff Officer (Intelligence)
SPENAVO	Special Naval Observer (British and Commonwealth)
SSDA	Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (London)
SSEA	Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa)
USSEA	Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa)

Introduction

- 1 Hatano Sumio, "Japanese-Soviet Campaigns and Relations, 1939-45," in *Oxford Companion to World War II*, ed. I.C.B. Dear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 634-37.
- 2 Plan A involved withdrawing most troops from China and all troops from French Indochina on a diplomatic settlement with China. In short, Japan would end the "China Incident" on its own terms, withdraw troops, and later expect trade relations to resume with the United States and the Allies. Plan B, a final option, promised no further southward advances and a withdrawal of troops from French Indochina if the United States restored full trade relations and stopped sending aid to China. See Akira Iriye, *Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays* (Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), 38-40, 73-77.
- 3 Lend-Lease provided a quarter of all British munitions and a tenth of all Soviet munitions. Significantly, oil comprised two-thirds of all shipped US supplies: the Allies needed fuel to stay in the war. These measures inevitably had financial implications. Britain had problems paying for US imports and Canada had developed a trade deficit with the US, but the US-Canadian Hyde Park Declaration of 20 April 1941 solved those problems. In essence, the US would purchase more Canadian defence materials while sending Lend-Lease materials to Britain through Canada and its industries, a scheme that would create a "lasting integration" of economies. Canada would produce defence items for Britain using components that the US had supplied to Britain under Lend-Lease, thereby allowing Britain to accumulate a sterling debt with Canada. See "USA," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 1180-82; and J.L. Granatstein, "Canada," in Dear, *ibid.*, 184.
- 4 The texts of three Allied-American agreements, ABC-1, ADB, and ABC-22, are found in United States, 79th Congress, *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 39 pts. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pt. 15, 1485-1593. For a contemporary report on the Atlantic Charter, see SSDA to BHC (Ottawa), circular Z258, 12 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); and Churchill to Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, telegram T530, 30 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/42A/39-41.
- 5 F.H. Hinsley, with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy*, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1979-83), vol. 1, 454, and vol. 2, 75-77; James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II* (Old Tappan, NJ: Simon and Schuster, 1992);

- Antony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor* (London: Routledge, 1995), 190-92; Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 86-88; and Antony Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
- 6 For traditionalist views, see Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); Gordon Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981); Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway - Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985); and David Kahn, "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor," *Foreign Affairs* 70, 5 (Winter 1991/1992): 138-52. For revisionist views, see John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982); Robert Stinnett, *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Timothy Wilford, *Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001); and George Victor, *The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable* (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2007).
 - 7 For the RCN, see Marc Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements in the Second World War* (Ottawa: DND, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1981). For Hong Kong intelligence, see Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-1963* (Ottawa: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981), 374. For Canadian signals intelligence, see Peter St. John, "Canada's Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community 1940-45," *Conflict Quarterly* 4, 4 (Fall 1984): 5-21; Wesley K. Wark, "Cryptographic Innocence: The Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22 (1987): 639-65; and John Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* (Toronto: Lester, 1993), 93-94. For BSC, see David Stafford, *Camp X* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1986); Thomas E. Mahl, *Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-44* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1998); Bill Macdonald, *The True Intrepid: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents* (Surrey, BC: Timberholme Books, 1998), 288-89; and Sir William S. Stephenson, ed., *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945*, Introduction by Nigel West (New York: Fromm International, 1999), 88-94, 98-100.
 - 8 Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937-41* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa, 1981); Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); John Costello, *Days of Infamy* (New York: Pocket Books, 1994); and Jonathan Marshall, *To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
 - 9 For Canadian strategy, see James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970); and Gregory A. Johnson, "North Pacific Triangle?: The Impact of the Far East on Canada and Its Relations with the United States and Great Britain, 1937-1948" (PhD thesis, York University, 1989), 10. For Canadian-Japanese diplomacy, see John D. Meehan, *The*

- Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-41* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). For Hong Kong, see Brereton Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe, 1941-1945 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997). For Pacific Coast defence, see W.A.B. Douglas, *The Creation of a National Air Force*, vol. 2 of *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force*, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Michael Whitby, "The Quiet Coast: Canadian Naval Operations in Defence of British Columbia, 1941-1942," in *Canada's Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful or Peripheral*, ed. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1999), 68-69; and Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003). For the Japanese Canadians, see Patricia Roy et al., *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); and Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991).
- 10 Jones to Drake, 17 August 1945, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29167, WWII-33: "Miscellaneous Wartime and Immediate Post-War Correspondence (1945-46)."
 - 11 Top Secret Cream six-page report, 19 October 1946, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29165, WWII-15, pt. 1: "Joint Discrimination Unit-Organization (1942/01-46/12)," NRC (Communications Branch).
 - 12 Radcliffe Report, quoted in R.V. Jones, *Reflections on Intelligence* (London: Heinemann, 1989), 81. Jones advocated the judicious use of both personal testimony and public records. See his section on "Memory and History," 258-61.
 - 13 Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance*, 358.

Chapter 1: Prelude to War

- 1 For detailed accounts of the origins of the Pacific War, see Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987); and Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard, *Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War*, rev. 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
- 2 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 612.
- 3 Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway - Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 29. See also Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 70-73.
- 4 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 767-95; and Gordon Daniels, "Japan," in *Oxford Companion to World War II*, ed. I.C.B. Dear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 608.
- 5 Daniels, "Japan," 606-7; and Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 927.
- 6 Japan's chemical and biological program is discussed in Calvocoressi et al., *ibid.*, 1201-6. The Anti-Comintern Pact is discussed in Stephen E. Pelz, *The Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 174-76.
- 7 Mushakoji Kinhide, "The Structure of Japanese-American Relations in the 1930s," in *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, ed. Dorothy Borg and Okamoto Shumpei (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 597; and Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 49, 64-67.
- 8 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 803-5, 820-21.

- 9 Mushakoji, "Structure of Japanese-American Relations," 596. As early as 1932, the US imposed a "moral embargo" on Japan. In 1933, Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union, perhaps as a means of limiting Japan's influence in the Far East. On 5 October 1937, he responded to Japan's actions with his "Quarantine Speech," in which he denounced aggressor nations and called for collective action. John Buchan, Governor General of Canada, had links with British Intelligence and later wrote that Roosevelt's speech was "the culmination of a long conspiracy between us." Quoted in Thomas E. Mahl, *Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-44* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1998), 4.
- 10 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 858-67.
- 11 Daniels, "Japan," 617, 624.
- 12 Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor*, 202-11.
- 13 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 907-8, 915-16.
- 14 Lyman P. Van Slyke, "China," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 210-24.
- 15 For examples of Kameron 14 intelligence activities, see Layton et al., *And I Was There*, 149, 206.
- 16 Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, "USSR," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 1207-11, 1217.
- 17 "USA," in Dear, *ibid.*, 1177-83. See also, Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy: The US Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007). Depending on which wartime GNP figures are consulted, Japan's national income in 1941 may be seen as ranging anywhere from six to seventeen times less than America's national income.
- 18 See relevant statistics cited in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin, 1988), 296, 299, 324, 330, 332, 354, 355.
- 19 Rita James Simon, *Public Opinion in America: 1936-1970* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1974), 125, 137.
- 20 Robert Smith Thompson, *Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 68.
- 21 William Lyon Mackenzie King, "The Ogdensburg Agreement," House of Commons speech, 12 November 1940, CAC, CHUR 2/7/102. See also J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1991), 138-44.
- 22 Calvocoressi et al., *Total War*, 219.
- 23 M.R.D. Foot et al., "UK," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 1129-59.
- 24 War Cabinet, "The Situation in the Far East in the event of Japanese intervention against us," 31 July 1940, 3-5, PRO, CAB 66/10, COS (40) 592.
- 25 James Rusbridger, "The Capture of the Automedon and the Sinking of the Nanking," *Encounter* 64, 5 (May 1985): 8-16. The Automedon documents apparently influenced Japan's strategy in the Far East. See Hatano Sumio and Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Decision to Move South, 1939-41," in *Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War*, ed. R. Boyce and E.M. Robertson (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1989), 393-94.
- 26 SSDA to SSEA, circular 84, 17 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4).
- 27 "Beaver" (Washington) to "External" (Ottawa), telegram no. 336, 23 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2453, file: "UK-US Naval Conference, 1941."
- 28 T.B. Miller, "Australia," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 78-90.
- 29 W. David McIntyre, "New Zealand," in Dear, *ibid.*, 796-801.
- 30 Ian Phimister, "South Africa, Union of," in Dear, *ibid.*, 1024-27.

- 31 Canadian wartime statistics are found in "Canada's War Record: Revised to September 1, 1941," and McCarthy to Roosevelt, 17 October 1941, both in FDRL, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, box 25, file: "Canada, 1941," Director of Public Information (Ottawa). See also J.L. Granatstein, "Canada," in Dear, *Oxford Companion*, 182.
- 32 For more information about the RCN during wartime, see James A. Boutillier, ed., *The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982); and W.A.B. Douglas, ed., *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988). The "Fishermen's Reserve" had been established in 1938 to patrol the inner coastline of British Columbia. See Michael Whitby, "The Quiet Coast: Canadian Naval Operations in Defence of British Columbia, 1941-1942," in *Canada's Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful or Peripheral*, ed. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1999), 63-64.
- 33 For Conservative Party views of the government's conduct of the war, see J.L. Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), chs. 4 and 5, 58-112.
- 34 C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 47-48.
- 35 For Mackenzie King's views on Japan's growing power, see his diary entries for 30 November 1939, as well as 28-29 April, 31 May, 26-27 September, and 8 October 1940 in J.W. Pickersgill, ed. *The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 1, 1939-1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 30, 112, 114, 121, 145, and 149-50.
- 36 John Herd Thomson, with Allen Seager, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 39-40, 49, 307.
- 37 Quoted in Gregory A. Johnson, "Canada and the Far East in 1939," in *A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939*, ed. Norman Hillmer (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), 282.
- 38 See the correspondence in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1748, vol. 723, file 64: "China - Dispute with Japan (1931-1939)"; and LAC, RG 25, A2, reels T1809 and T1810, vol. 806, file 579: "League of Nations - Canadian Interests (1927-1941)."
- 39 "Imperial Conference, 1937: Report of Technical Committee on the Pacific Pact," E (37) 33, June 1937, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2453, file: "International Relations: Pacific Pact, 1937." For a contemporary British assessment of Japan's disposition, see *ibid.*, Dodds (Tokyo) to Eden (London), 12 July 1937. Dodds offered this explanation: "Japan is young in the world and is still finding her feet. She is intensely suspicious of the foreigner and not without reason. She is still suffering from an inferiority complex, nor is the fundamental hostility of the yellow races for the white a factor to be ignored. She is conscious of her vitality and capacity, and still believes that in many ways she can beat us at our own game. She is in a mood for expansion which may last for years. All these are influences which tend to stimulate in her the growth of a fierce nationalism and a refusal to tolerate advice or interference from abroad. She chiefly respects force. It is hardly logical to suppose that anything but force will persuade her to disarm."
- 40 James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 177-78, 213-22; and Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 3-4.
- 41 SO(I) (Esquimalt) to DNI & P, 1404/20, serial no. 2456, 20 July 1939; DNI (Admiralty) to DNI & P and C/S (HMS Tamar), 1544/21, serial no. 2462, 21 July 1939; C/S (HMS Tamar) to C-in-C China et al., 1946/1, serial no. 2510, 1 August 1939; C-in-C China to R.A. Yangtse 818 et al., 1139/3, serial no. 2511, 3 August 1939; Capt. in Charge (Esquimalt) to NSHQ, 0951/5, serial no. 2519, 5 August 1939; DNI & P to C/S (HMS Tamar), 1416/8, serial no. 212,

- 8 August 1939; C/S (HMS Tamar) to Admiralty et al., 1528/12, serial no. 2549, 12 August 1939; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12131.
- 42 Quoted in Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 9. See also Stacey's comments on p. 48. Canadian strategists also studied Hitler's likely course of action in Europe, as well as US public opinion and isolationism. See LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2353, file: "Secret Files, 1939."
- 43 Keenleyside, "Memorandum for Dr. Skelton: Canadian Legation in Japan," 3 September 1939, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For further insight into Keenleyside's views as a policy advisor, see Hugh L. Keenleyside, *Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside*, vols. 1 and 2 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981-82).
- 44 A.D.P.H. (Cabinet War Committee), Most Secret report, 22 January 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel 2208, vol. 826, file 726; Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 165, 168-69, 171-72, 175; and Hull to Roosevelt, 22 April 1940, FDRL, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Papers as President, President's Secretary's Files, box 25, file: "Canada: 1940."
- 45 Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) to Japanese Consul (Vancouver), Mackay Wireless, message no. 2, 22 February 1940, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2453.
- 46 Ibid., Robertson to Christie, 14 March 1940.
- 47 Ibid., Christie to Robertson, 20 March 1940.
- 48 SSDA to SSEA, circular D279, 21 June 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 49 Ibid., British Embassy (Washington), "Aide Memoire," 27 June 1940.
- 50 Antony Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 165.
- 51 For Canadian correspondence concerning Far East affairs in June 1940, see Skelton to Power, 21 June 1940; CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 132, 21 June 1940; and CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 46, 20 June 1940; all in QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 49, file: "Japan 1940."
- 52 Mahoney to Skelton, 2 July 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
- 53 Ibid., Keenleyside to Skelton, 25 July 1940.
- 54 Ibid., External Affairs, "Notes on Far Eastern Situation," n.d. (ca. late July 1940).
- 55 See the correspondence in LAC, RG 25, A2, vol. 2959, file B-16: "Miscellaneous Collections."
- 56 Skelton, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 14 September 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). "C.C.F." refers to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a Canadian socialist party founded in 1932.
- 57 SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 176, 30 September 1940, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2453, file 128. See also *ibid.*, SSDA to SSEA, circular M58, 4 September 1940; and HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1652, 2 October 1940. Winston Churchill, following consultation with Cordell Hull, announced in the House of Commons that the Burma Road agreement would expire on 18 October 1940.
- 58 Ibid., HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1652, 2 October 1940.
- 59 Ibid., SSDA to SSEA, circular D496, 3 October 1940.
- 60 For correspondence concerning Canada's proposed wheat restrictions, see Skelton to Wilgress, 12 October 1940; and HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 2063, 11 December 1940; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. For Japanese reactions to Canadian trade sanctions in 1940, see Skelton, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Re Baron Tomii," 11 April 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); and Skelton to King, 28 August 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 61 SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 179, 11 October 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.

- 62 HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1756, 19 October 1940, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 52A, file: "Anglo-Dutch-American Technical Conversations, 1940."
- 63 For an account of anti-Asian racism in BC, see Patricia E. Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1989); and Patricia E. Roy, *The Oriental Question: Consolidating a White Man's Province, 1914-1941* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
- 64 Baron Tomii to Skelton, 10 June 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 65 Ibid., Keenleyside, "Memorandum for Dr. Skelton: Baron Tomii's Memorandum on Alderman Wilson," 11 June 1940.
- 66 Keenleyside, "Memorandum for Dr. Skelton: Discrimination against Canadians of Oriental Racial Origin in Military Training Scheme," 28 September 1940; Skelton, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 30 September 1940; King to Pattullo, 25 October 1940; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 573. Skelton to Harrison, 30 October 1940; Keenleyside to Skelton, 5 November 1940; Skelton to Keenleyside, 7 November 1940; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 67 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *The Canada Year Book 1941: The Official Statistical Annual of the Resources, History, Institutions, and Social and Economic Conditions of the Dominion* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941), 25, 42-44; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 529-31; and Eyars, *In Defence of Canada*, 8-11, 28-39. The Canadian services appointed the following attachés to Washington: Air Commodore W.R. Kenny, Air Attaché; Rear-Admiral V.G. Brodeur, Naval Attaché; and Brigadier H.F.G. Letson, Military Attaché.

Chapter 2: The Allied Web

- 1 The FECB is discussed in P. Elphick, *Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945* (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 1997), 70-86; and Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 26. Shanghai is discussed in B. Wasserstein, *Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War* (London: Profile Books, 1998). The JIC is discussed in Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Heinemann, 1985), 432-37.
- 2 The FECB network is discussed in Elphick, *Far Eastern File*, 153-57; Aldrich, *Intelligence*, 75; H.M.S. Anderson and Special Intelligence in the Far East, 4, PRO, ADM 223/496; and Foster to de Marbois, "Report on Visit to Admiralty," n.d. (ca. late August 1941), Appendix 6, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1). The Admiralty's request to Esquimalt is discussed in Capt. in Charge (Esquimalt) to NSHQ, 0951/5, 5 August 1939; and DNI & P to C/S (HMS Tamar), 1416/8, 8 August 1939; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12131. The accuracy of wartime D/F bearings ranged from about 1° for strong signals to 5° for weak signals. See C.H. Waddington, *O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), 96-97; and Timothy Wilford, *Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), 55.
- 3 Godfrey (DNI), The Far East Combined Intelligence Bureau, Singapore, 30 March 1940, PRO, ADM 223/495; and Jozef Straczek, "The Empire Is Listening: Naval Signals Intelligence in the Far East to 1942," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 35 (December 2001), e-journal (www.awm.gov.au/journal/j35/straczek.asp), 12 pp.
- 4 ADB Conversations, 27 April 1941, in United States, 79th Congress, *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 39 pts. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pt. 15, 1578.

- 5 Fleet estimates are discussed in Lamplough (for DNI), Organization of Japanese Fleet, NID 02344/41, 19 June 1941, PRO, ADM 223/495; and Fabian (Fort Mills) to CINCAF (Manila), 15 June 1941, NARA, MMRB, RG 80, Pearl Harbor Liaison Office Records, entry 167F, box 41. RCN tracking is discussed in Marc Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements in the Second World War* (Ottawa: DND, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1981), passim. Australian and FECB codebreaking is discussed in DNI (Melbourne) to C/S (FECB Singapore), NID 43/81, 30 July 1941; and Harkness (FECB Singapore) to DNI (Melbourne), 1006/040.C/3, 3 September 1941; both in PRO, ADM 223/496. JN-25B intelligence is discussed in Antony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor* (London: Routledge, 1995), 178.
- 6 Head of "Z" Section (Flowerdown) to Head of Naval Section (BP), RFP/TINA/R/E Report for month of October 1941, 7 November 1941; Minshall (RNVR), distribution DSD9, R/E: Its Application and Importance, May 1941; both in PRO, HW 18/206. Operationally, R/E consisted of a radio receiver, an oscilloscope, and a camera. An intercepted radio signal was displayed as a waveform on the oscilloscope and photographed. A range estimate was produced after analysis of the waveform's frequency and phase properties with respect to local propagation characteristics. An Allied radio intelligence conference later explained: "R/E is a method of calculating the distance of a transmitter by measuring the time interval between the receipt of reflected waves from various layers of the ionosphere and a knowledge of the virtual heights of the latter." See "Final Report: British-Canadian-American Radio Intelligence Discussions, Washington, D.C., April 6-17, 1942," Appendix i, 19, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29167, WWII-32. For a Canadian assessment of the conference, see Skarstedt and McDiarmid, "Visit to Washington," eight-page memo, 1 August 1942, NARA, MMRB, RG 38, Crane - Inactive Stations, box 21, 3270/1: "Canada - Canadian/British Evaluation of U.S. HFDF Operations; 16 Jul 41 - 1 Apr 45," NSHQ to DDSD (Y). The writers concluded that the conference was useful, although "the Canadian organization is more advanced, no doubt owing to longer experience in this particular type of work."
- 7 Naval Section, distribution ADIC, Memorandum on R.F.P. and TINA (German), Z284, 8 September 1941; Head of "Z" Section (Flowerdown) to DSD9 (Admiralty), R.F.P./TINA/R/E Report for July, 1942, 21 August 1942; both in PRO, HW 18/206. Mackenzie (RNVR) to DD (NS), R.F.P. AND TINA EFFORT ON GERMAN U-BOATS, NS IV.A/No. 11, 9 March 1944, PRO, HW 18/89, N.S. IV-D file. Many Admiralty wartime reports show that RFP identified about a quarter of all intercepted transmissions. Yet, in terms of "classifiable" intercepted transmissions (referring to transmissions from stations that had previously been logged and recognized), RFP enabled over three-quarters of transmissions to be identified. For example, in April 1942, Capt. H.R. Sandwith, RN, reported that "84 per cent of the classifiable results are correct ... One hundred per cent classifiable results were obtained in Singapore ... The radio fingerprint in England has been of great assistance to the cryptanalyst by identifying transmitters." See "Final Report," Appendix iii, 27, LAC, RG 24, vol. 29167, WWII-32.
- 8 "Chronology of Canadian Intelligence Developments, 1939-1945," LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29167, WWII-33 (pt. 3); and "History of 'Z' in Canada," ca. 1945, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29163, WWII-4 (pt. 7), file: "OIC 7" In December 1941, the RCN received a "Marconi undulator for TINA" to complement its "Mark 2 RFP set," which had been received earlier. In January 1942, the RCN experimented with TINA, and in March began using RFP to identify enemy vessels. From May to December 1942, the RCN's TINA and RFP classifications ranged from 7 to 25 percent of all enemy transmissions.
- 9 NSHQ to COPC, 1526Z/28, 28 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152. NSHQ asked the Esquimalt station how the Honolulu readability report, ordered on 11 November, would be forwarded to Ottawa.

- 10 RFP is discussed in NSHQ to COAC, 1928Z/30, 30 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151; NSHQ to COAC, 1606Z/1, 1 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149; and Admiralty to NSHQ, 1454A/4, 4 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12155. The topic of cosmic data is discussed in BAD to Admiralty, 1103R/26 and 1805R/26, 26 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149; and Admiralty to BAD, 1832A/29, 29 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. FECB comments are discussed in C/S (FECB Singapore) to COPC and NSHQ, 0827Z/25, 25 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12142.
- 11 Admiralty to BAD and NSHQ, 1249A/28, 28 November 1941; SPENAVO (London) to OPNAV (Washington) via NSHQ, 1101/28, 28 November 1941; A/DSD to Ottawa W/T, 2205Z/5, 5 December 1941; NSHQ to OPNAV (Washington), 2124Z/5, 5 December 1941; and NSHQ to COAC, CCFN et al., 1656Z/5, 5 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152.
- 12 Thomas E. Mahl, *Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-44* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1998), 10. Menzies, who became head of SIS in November 1939, originally assigned Stephenson the task of establishing links between SIS and the FBI, but BSC soon became involved with many other US organizations.
- 13 Bill Macdonald, *The True Intrepid: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents* (Surrey, BC: Timberholme Books, 1998), 269.
- 14 Mahl, *Desperate Deception*, 11-15. BSC anti-isolationist front groups included the following: the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, the League for Human Rights, Friends of Democracy, Fight for Freedom Committee, American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor, Committee for Inter-American Co-operation, and America Last. BSC also had ties with the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), which was supported by American film star Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.
- 15 Ibid., 16-19; and Macdonald, *The True Intrepid*, 86. According to Macdonald, the COI was formed on 11 July 1941 but did not have an operational New York office until 9 August. On 24 October, Roosevelt told Churchill that Donovan was starting a COI office in London.
- 16 David Stafford, *Camp X* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1986), 32-33.
- 17 BSC's Canadian activities are discussed in Macdonald, *The True Intrepid*, 86, 269, 317-20; Stafford, *Camp X*, 33-35; and Sir William S. Stephenson, ed., *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945*, Introduction by Nigel West (New York: Fromm International, 1999), 104-5.
- 18 Stephenson, *British Security Coordination*, 58. BSC strategies regarding Japan are discussed on pp. 88-94 and 98-100.
- 19 Ibid., 69-70.
- 20 Ibid., 71.
- 21 Rita James Simon, *Public Opinion in America: 1936-1970* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1974), 125, 137. For a complete survey of American public opinion regarding entry into the war, see Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, eds., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 954-55, 961, 966-78, 1135-37.
- 22 Naval intelligence is discussed in Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements*, 10-11, 15; Brand, "Annual Report of Director of Naval Intelligence, Ottawa, for Year 1939," 3, DHH, 81/145, vol. 1 of 4 vols.; and Brand, ed., "Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence Centre in Canada," 10 September 1945, 3-4, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29163, WWII-03. De Marbois and Little are discussed in John Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* (Toronto: Lester, 1993), 9-10; and Little, "My Early Days in Naval Intelligence 1939-41," 29 May 1983, DHH, Little, C.H., Biographical File. Military intelligence is discussed in Drake, "Historical Narrative: MI2 of DMI, 1939-44 (Drake)," n.d., 1-4 (606-9), LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE),

- vol. 29163, WWII-02. The RCN operated intercept stations at Sydney, Halifax, Saint John, Quebec, Vancouver, Esquimalt, Prince Rupert, and Yorke Island. At the Esquimalt station, many staff had originally trained in Japanese code interception at Singapore and Stonecutter's Island. The RCN had kept file cards on Japan's merchant ships since 1934, on Germany's since 1938, and on Italy's since 1939.
- 23 Jolliffe's visit is discussed in Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret*, 16. Aircraft surveillance is discussed in W.A.B. Douglas, *The Creation of a National Air Force*, vol. 2 of Norman Hillmer, ed., *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 403. RCN-RCCS liaison is discussed in John S. Moir, ed., *History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1903-1961* (Ottawa: RCCS, 1962), 61-62, 218-25. RCN summaries are discussed in Milner, *Canadian Naval Force*, 33. Gordon Head operations are discussed in Brand, "Annual Report of Director of Naval Intelligence, Ottawa, for Year 1940," 6, DHH, 81/145, vol. 1 of 4 vols. Atlantic D/F control and NRC funding are discussed in Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret*, 25-26, 44. Admiralty instructions sent to Gordon Head were not always passed on to NSHQ, which meant that RCN officials were not always sure about what Japanese "Y" and D/F work was in progress. Even so, Gordon Head sometimes airmailed intercepts to NSHQ, where they were checked before being sent on to the Admiralty by safe hand. As well, RCN officials could inspect the Gordon Head station at will, even if they were not always sure of its Admiralty assignments. See de Marbois to DNI (Ottawa), 15 October 1940; and Little to DNI (Ottawa), 24 January 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1). See also de Marbois to Asst. Chief of Naval Staff, "Orange 'Y' in Canada," 18 February 1944, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 2); and "Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence Centre in Canada," 10 September 1945, 27, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29163, WWII-03.
 - 24 For External Affairs' specific role, see "Military Intelligence: 1939-45," Appendix E, 3, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29167, WWII-33.
 - 25 de B. Robinson, ed., "A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945," July 1945, 12, in DHH, 86/555, NRC Examination Unit, Canada, "Decrypt activities in Canada: Germany, Italy, Japan and Vichy France, 1941-42."
 - 26 Ibid., 12-18. For an account of Yardley's life and times, see David Kahn, *The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
 - 27 The Examination Unit staff grew from four in June 1941 to fifty at its peak in the summer of 1944.
 - 28 SSEA to HCCGB, letter no. 864, 5 June 1941, DHH, 86/555.
 - 29 Ibid., Osborn, "Memorandum for Secretary of Examination Unit," 30 June 1941.
 - 30 For other details about the unit's formation, see *ibid.*, de B. Robinson, "A History," 18; and Robertson (Ottawa) to Massey (London), 7 July 1941. Regarding incoming intercepts, Jock de Marbois noted as early as 1940 that "Esquimalt is keeping watch for Commercial and Diplomatic traffic between Japan, Mexico and Germany." See de Marbois to DNI (Ottawa), "W/T Intelligence and H/F D/E, Period 15th October to 14th December, 1940," 16 December 1940, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1).
 - 31 de B. Robinson, "A History," 137, DHH, 86/555.
 - 32 Ibid., Pearson (Ottawa) to Massey (London), 22 August 1941.
 - 33 Ibid., Osborn, "Memorandum for Chairman, Supervisory Committee," NRC report no. 5 (16 August to 15 September 1941), 15 September 1941.
 - 34 Ibid., Robertson (Ottawa) to Wrong (Washington), 22 November 1941.
 - 35 Ibid., Pearson (Ottawa) to Massey (London), 9 December 1941.

- 36 Details about the Washington visit are found in *ibid.*, Pearson, "Memorandum on Visit to Washington to Enquire into the Situation regarding H.O. Osborn," 28 November 1941; and NSHQ to BAD, 1639Z/27, 27 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12142. The available records offer very little information about Captain Belben, RN, but he appears to have been assigned liaison duties in Washington and Ottawa.
- 37 Drake (Ottawa) to GSO 1 Intelligence, "Japanese Battle Communications," 27 December 1941, DHH, 86/555.
- 38 Little to Denniston, 18 April 1942, LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29165, WWII-15 (pt. 3): "Examination Unit-Organization (1942/01-42/07)." Little proposed that Anglo-American authorities provide Canada with relevant intelligence about Japan to avoid the need for Canada to duplicate Allied decryption efforts. In June 1942, BSC reviewed the Canadian Army's W/T and "Y" capabilities with respect to Japanese military traffic: "The Ottawa cryptographic section had neither the staff nor the equipment necessary for the study of Japanese operational cyphers and its knowledge of traffic analysis was rudimentary." It should be noted, however, that BSC did not report on RCN and RN activities at the Gordon Head monitoring station. See Stephenson, *British Security Coordination*, 483.
- 39 FIS developments are discussed in Macdonald to de Marbois, 20 June 1945, NARA, MMRB, RG 38, Crane – Inactive Stations, box 21, 1000/1: "Canada – Personnel Available for the War Effort (1945)." More FIS details are found in RCN, "F.I.S. Report," 2 December 1941; and Foster to de Marbois, "Report on Visit to Admiralty," n.d. (ca. late August 1941); both in LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1). Canadian Pacific Coast HF/DF stations intercepted much of the same traffic that British stations intercepted in the Far East because HF signals propagate well over great distances. As de Marbois explained to Brand in October 1940: "It is interesting to note that 90 percent of bearings from Arawua, Kranji, Jandakot etc. are taken simultaneously with our own units. This fact proves that H/F D/F control is superfluous." See de Marbois to DNI (Ottawa), 15 October 1940, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1).
- 40 Robertson to Murray, DMO & I, 27 March 1941, DHH, 86/555.
- 41 *Ibid.*, Robertson (Ottawa) to Wrong (Washington), 18 July 1941.
- 42 Brand to Stone, 23 September 1941; Stone to Brand, 29 September 1941; BSC anonymous requests in de B. Robinson, "A History," 22; all in DHH, 86/555. Maidment and BSC intelligence exchanges are discussed in LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29165, WWII-15 (pt. 3), file: "Examination Unit-Organization (1942/01-42/07)," *passim*; and NSHQ to DNI (Wellington) and DNI (Melbourne), 2159Z/8, 8 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. A complete understanding of BSC's cooperation with the Examination Unit may have to await the future declassification of relevant sources. Letters from 16 September to 5 December 1941 are missing from the file, "Staff-Examination Unit (1941/05-44/02)," in LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29165, WWII-20 (pt. 1). Letters from 25 July to 7 December 1941 are missing from LAC, RG 24, vol. 29165, WWII-15, pt. 3. Indeed, the released version of de B. Robinson, "A History," in DHH, 86/555, has eight pages severed (139-46) and an entire section on Japanese message decryption in 1941 completely deleted (Section 15). In contrast, its sections on German and Vichy French message decryption are intact.
- 43 Nelles (Ottawa) to C-in-C A&WI (Bermuda), "H/F D/F and 'Y' Organization in Canada and Newfoundland," 13 February 1941, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-32 (vol. 1). Nelles listed the following HF/DF facilities: Botwood (Newfoundland), fourteen operators and three receivers; Hartlen Point (Nova Scotia), fourteen operators and six receivers; St. Hubert (Quebec), four operators and two receivers; and Gordon Head (BC), eight

- operators and one receiver. Nelles also listed the following "Y" facilities: throughout Newfoundland, fourteen operators and eight receivers; Ottawa (Ontario), ten operators and five receivers; Forrest (Ontario), four operators and three receivers; Strathburn (Ontario), four operators and three receivers; Esquimalt (BC), twelve operators and five receivers; and Vancouver (BC), eight operators and three receivers.
- 44 Brand, "Annual Report of Director of Naval Intelligence for Year 1941," 4, DHH, 81/145, vol. 1 of 4 vols. Specifically, the six FIS sections included: W/T I (enemy and potential enemy W/T "Y" traffic); D/F A (for D/F plotting and distribution by NSHQ); FEI (Far Eastern intelligence recovered from D/F, W/T, and "Y" intercepts, including Japanese, Korean, and Chinese translations); FIS (R) (a research section working with NRC and US research centres on D/F, "Y," and technical innovations); FIS (FO) (field officers in charge of D/F stations); and FIS (School) (an operators' school opened in Ottawa in November 1941).
 - 45 Pacific D/F stations in British Columbia included Gordon Head, Ucluelet, and Coal Harbour. Atlantic D/F stations included Harbour Grace and Botwood (Newfoundland), Hartlen Point (Nova Scotia), Pennfield Ridge (New Brunswick), Cap d'Espoir and Montreal (Quebec), Ottawa (Ontario), and Rivers (Manitoba). "Y" stations were located at Harbour Grace, Hartlen Point, Ottawa, Strathburn, Forrest, Point Grey, and Esquimalt.
 - 46 Canadian Legation (Washington), minute sheets, 25 February and 10 March 1941, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2163, file 160: "Shipping: Pacific Coast, 1941 (file 1: January-April)." In early 1941, American support for Canadian censorship activities was still limited: the Canadian Legation in Washington reported that the State Department was hesitant to divert mail to Vancouver for Canadian scrutiny.
 - 47 Canada, Censorship Co-ordination Committee, "Radio Broadcasting Censorship: Directives, 1940-42," Ottawa, Carleton University Library, Documents Division, DDV,CA1.CCC.39C22. The collection does not contain any censorship directives from 7 November to 8 December 1941; perhaps none were issued during that period.
 - 48 Brand, "Annual Report of Director of Naval Intelligence for Year 1941," 5, DHH, 81/145, vol. 1 of 4 vols.
 - 49 *Ibid.*, 21.
 - 50 Captain O.M. Read served as USN naval attaché in Ottawa. Read's new assistant naval attaché, Commander E.W. Strother, was appointed to Ottawa in May 1941. Read returned to Washington in September 1941, and Strother succeeded him as naval attaché in Ottawa.
 - 51 Brand, "Annual Report of Director of Naval Intelligence for Year 1941," 20-21, DHH, 81/145, vol. 1 of 4 vols.

Chapter 3: Developing a Far East Strategy, December 1940 to July 1941

- 1 Brooke Claxton later wrote to Mackenzie King that "Lindbergh was only there for the first day, unfortunately, as the discussion on policy the second day would have done him good." See Claxton to Mackenzie King, 25 February 1941, LAC, Ottawa, MG 26 J1, reel C4861, vol. 302.
- 2 Claxton to Robertson, "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Pacific," 25 February 1941, 1, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571: "Japan-Canada-Relations."
- 3 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 2-3, 5, 9, 11.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 8, 11-14.
- 6 "Beaver" (Washington) to "External" (Ottawa), telegram no. 336, 23 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2453, file: "UK-US Naval Conference, 1941."
- 7 *Ibid.*, "Beaver" to "External," telegram no. 338, 24 December 1940.

- 8 Ibid., Roosevelt's remarks in "Beaver" to "External," "Re: Forthcoming conversations on Pacific defence," telegram no. 25, 17 January 1941. German's appointment as observer is found in ibid., "External" to "Beaver," telegram no. 23, 27 January 1941; and "Beaver" to "External," telegram no. 38, 27 January 1941. German's background is mentioned in de Marbois (Ottawa) to Hart (Esquimalt), 8 August 1940, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 1).
- 9 BG (Barry German, Washington) to CNS (P.W. Nelles, Ottawa), letter no. 2, 31 January 1941, LAC, RG25, B3, vol. 2453, file: "UK-US Naval Conference, 1941."
- 10 Ibid., Reid (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 1 February 1941, and BG to CNS, letter no. 3, 1 February 1941.
- 11 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 4, 4 February 1941.
- 12 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 5, 6 February 1941.
- 13 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 10, 8 February 1941.
- 14 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter nos. 7 and 11, 8 February 1941.
- 15 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 12, 11 February 1941.
- 16 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 14, 12 February 1941; letter no. 15, 15 February 1941; and letter nos. 22 and 23, 20 February 1941.
- 17 Ibid., BG to CNS, letter no. 24, 21 February 1941.
- 18 Ottawa also received, on a delayed basis, Weekly Political Intelligence summaries from the British Foreign Office as well as Weekly Résumés of the war situation from the British Cabinet, but benefited more from daily diplomatic traffic. Copies of the Weekly Political Intelligence summaries, nos. 51 to 125, 25 September 1940 to 25 February 1942, are found in LAC, RG 25, F7e, vols. 2511 and 2512. Researchers may inspect the original British War Cabinet Weekly Résumés, nos. 67 to 121, 12 December 1940 to 25 December 1941, in PRO, CAB 66/14-20.
- 19 Feaver (Tokyo) to Skelton (Ottawa), 11 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 20 Both men published memoirs on their respective experiences in Japan. See Sir Robert Craigie, *Behind the Japanese Mask* (London: Hutchinson, 1945); and Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944).
- 21 Feaver (Tokyo) to Skelton (Ottawa), 11 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 22 SSDA to SSEA, circular D620, 19 December 1940, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 52, file: "USSR, 1940-1941"; SSDA to SSEA, circular DW565, 15 January 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #5"; and SSDA to SSEA, circular D46, 30 January 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 23 McGreer (Tokyo) to Keenleyside (Ottawa), 10 February 1941; McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 31, 10 February 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261304-13 and 261314-16. SSDA to SSEA, circular DW601, 10 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #6." SSDA to SSEA, circular M25, 19 February 1941; SSDA to SSEA, circular D85, 22 February 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 24 Major R.M., SO(I), Hong Kong, "Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report" (HKIR), no. 1/41, 31 January 1941, 1-3, DHH, 593.023 (D1). The author had these reports declassified through the Access to Information Act (Canada).
- 25 Hankinson, BHC (Ottawa) to King (Ottawa), circular Z408, 13 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); SSDA to SSEA, circular DW578, 23 January 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #5"; SSDA to SSEA, circular DW604, 12 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #6"; and HKIR, no. 2/41, 28 February 1941, 1-2, DHH, 593.023 (D1).

- 26 Hankinson to King, circular Z46, 14 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4).
- 27 SSDA to SSEA, circular D91, 25 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 28 Even so, on 28 February, Massey informed King that British sources indicated Japanese interest or designs on the BC coastline. See Gregory A. Johnson, "North Pacific Triangle? The Impact of the Far East on Canada and Its Relations with the United States and Great Britain, 1937-1948" (PhD thesis, York University, 1989), 192n123.
- 29 Hankinson to King, circular Z38, 7 February 1941; Hankinson to King, circular Z43, 12 February 1941; Hankinson to King, circular Z47, 14 February 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4). According to British naval intelligence that month, Japanese diplomats in London were ordered to limit their interaction with the British and "to be prepared to quit London at short notice." See Report on First Volume of Special Intelligence Summaries Nos. 6-548, 21st September, 1940 to 31st December, 1941, Section 10: Japanese Policy and Intentions, History, 1940-1945, PRO, ADM 223/296, NID 12.
- 30 Skelton (Ottawa) to Canadian Legation (Tokyo), 7 January 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309.
- 31 Skelton (Ottawa) to Feaver (Tokyo), 20 January 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 32 Keenleyside, "Memorandum for Mr. Robertson," 4 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 8 February 1941; Craigie to Dr. Rodolfo Moreno (Ambassador for Argentina), 14 February 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4). In his report, Craigie emphasized the need to protect official property, offices, furniture, and about 2,000 British subjects resident in the Japanese Empire. For British strategy during the February war scare, see Antony Best, "Straws in the Wind: Britain and the February 1941 War Scare in East Asia," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 5 (1994): 642-65.
- 33 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, 1 March 1941; McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 78, 1 April 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261324 and 261358-59. McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 54, 5 April 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 89, 31 May 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261417; and HKIR, no. 5/41, 1 June 1941, 1, DHH, 593.023 (D1). Founded in 1901, the Black Dragon Society was an ultranationalist Japanese organization committed to driving Russia out of East Asia. Known for its history of espionage, sabotage, and assassination, the society later developed into a more mainstream political entity, critical of both liberal and leftist thought. During the Second World War, it had a number of international agents serving its interests.
- 34 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 36, 11 March 1941; McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 68, 15 March 1941, both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261331 and 261346. McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 59, 14 April 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); and SSDA to King (Ottawa), circular Z187, 28 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
- 35 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 63, 14 March 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261334.
- 36 SSDA to SSEA, circular Z147, 24 April 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 37 HKIR, no. 4/41, 1 May 1941, 1, DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 38 Ibid., A7.
- 39 Allied misconceptions are discussed in Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 63-65; and Antony Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in*

Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 166-67. Japan's air force was underestimated in other Canadian reports. See, for example, Cree to COPC, "Conference with Colonel Mullaly, ex Military Attache, Tokio," 6 August 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file: PC 09-6-I, "Comments on Developments in the Far East." Mullaly believed that Japan's air force was weak, its navy strong, its army mechanized, and its intelligence services quite poor.

- 40 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, letter no. 166, 26 May 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261411-13.
- 41 HKIR, no. 5/41, 1 June 1941, 1, DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 42 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 94, 5 June 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); and SSDA to SSEA, circular Z209, 11 June 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1124, 17 June 1941; CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 104, 26 June 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). CMJ to SSEA, letter no. 217, 2 July 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261444-46.
- 43 HKIR, no. 6/41, 1 July 1941, 1, Appendix II (1-2), N2, DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 44 McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 109, 4 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 12 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, vol. 2960, file 10; HCCA to SSEA, telegram no. 54, 14 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3); SSDA to SSEA, circular DW816, 14 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #7"; Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 15 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571; and McGreer (Tokyo) to SSEA, telegram no. 117, 17 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Some of London's reports were based on decrypted Japanese messages, which confirmed Japan's decision to occupy bases in southern French Indochina. See PRO, ADM 223/321, Special Intelligence no. 278, 15 July 1941.
- 45 HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1309, 22 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). SSDA to SSEA, circular DW826, 23 July 1941; SSDA to SSEA, circular DW829, 25 July 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #8."
- 46 SSDA to SSEA, circular DW831, 27 July 1941; SSDA to SSEA, circular DW836, 31 July 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #8." HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1357, 30 July 1941; HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1372, 31 July 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 47 HKIR, no. 7/41, 1 August 1941, 1-2, N4, DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 48 Cree to COPC, "Conference with Colonel Mullaly, ex Military Attache, Tokio," 6 August 1941, LAC, RG24, D11, vol. 11764, file: PC 09-6-I, "Comments on Developments in the Far East." Mullaly noted that Japanese moderates and militarists had created political tension within the Diet, although Prince Konoye moderated this conflict. He explained that Japan was trying to acquire foreign exchange, possibly owing to a currency crisis: the war in China had exacted a heavy economic toll. Mullaly emphasized Germany's influence in Tokyo and its encouragement of Japan's entry into the war. He observed that Matsuoka demonstrated his pro-Axis tendencies during his European tour and "engineered" the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact as a face-saving diplomatic move. As well, he believed that the German attack against the Soviets had surprised the Japanese, who were now preparing for a move either north or south depending on the outcome in Russia.
- 49 SSDA to SSEA, circular Z66, 11 March 1941; SSDA to SSEA, circular Z142, 24 April 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 50 Ibid., SSDA to SSEA, circular M93, 22 May 1941, and Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 30 May 1941.

- 51 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 85, 30 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 52 Most Secret reports and letters, 3-6 June 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261118-39.
- 53 SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 1039, 16 June 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel 1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 54 Ibid., Keenleyside to Robertson, "Possible Effects of the Russo-German Conflict on the Policy of Japan," 23 June 1941.
- 55 Ibid., "Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Prospective Effect of the Russo-German Conflict on the Policy of the United States," unsigned and undated six-page document (most likely written by Keenleyside in late June 1941).
- 56 SFR/MM (External Affairs, Ottawa), "Canadian Comment on Recent Developments in Canadian-Russian Relationships," 30 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1810, vol. 808, file 597: "Russia - Political and Economic Situation (1919-1946)." Australia also saw the need to support the Soviet Union, although Prime Minister Robert Menzies held back immediate military aid because his government was still monitoring the nature of Communist "subversive activity." See HCCA to SSEA, telegram no. 55, 14 July 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4861, vol. 301, 255159.
- 57 King to Roosevelt, 25 June 1941, FDRL, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, box 25, file: "Canada: 1941."
- 58 Ibid., Roosevelt to King, 1 July 1941.
- 59 Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 15 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571; and CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 119, 20 July 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261459.
- 60 Menzies/King correspondence, 23 July to 11 August 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4867, vol. 312, 263951-82.
- 61 Prime Minister (Australia) to SSDA et al., telegram no. 6, 30 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 62 Read (External Affairs, Ottawa), "Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan," 28 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. A special committee, chaired by Read, produced the report.

Chapter 4: Avoiding Confrontation with Japan

- 1 SSDA to SSEA, circular D25, 14 January 1941; Hankinson, BHC (Ottawa), to Skelton, Secret letters, 25 January 1941; Keenleyside to Skelton, "The Diversion of Japanese Vessels to the Port of Vancouver," 26 January 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T2208, vol. 826, file 730: "Proposed Interception of Neutral Vessels (1941)."
- 2 Ibid., SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Washington), telegram no. 24, 28 January 1941. See also King Diary, 28 January 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 3 SSDA to SSEA, circular D60, 9 February 1941; CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 51, 10 February 1941; Mahoney (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 10 February 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T2208, vol. 826, file 730. There were anti-Russian elements in the State Department, however. According to Mahoney, John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the State Department's European Division, believed that British policy towards the Soviet Union, which seemed to be anti-Russian, was in line with the European Division. It amused Hickerson that Sir Stafford Cripps, Britain's ambassador to Moscow, had recently taken the opposite position when speaking to the US ambassador to Moscow.
- 4 Keenleyside, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Proposed Interception of Russian Vessels," 11 February 1941; Cabinet War Committee, extract of minutes: "British Blockade

- Policy, Interception of Neutral Vessels," 11 February 1941; SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 23, 11 February 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T2208, vol. 826, file 730. Mahoney (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 22 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T2208, vol. 826, file 726: "Canadian Trade with Russia (1940-1941)."
- 5 King Diary, 5 March 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
 - 6 SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 42, 14 March 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T2208, vol. 826, file 730.
 - 7 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 13, 3 February 1941; CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 70, 7 May 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3): "War – Japan, Japan – Political and Economic Situation." For examples of Imperial Japan's persecution of Canadian missionaries before the Pacific War, see John D. Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-41* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 110-11, 129-32, 160-61, 185-86.
 - 8 Robertson to King, 5 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Japanese police allegations are described in McGreer (Tokyo) to King (Ottawa), letter no. 251, 30 July 1941; and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (Hakodate) to McGreer (Tokyo), 20 July 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261472-76. Mackenzie King's telegram to McGreer is in SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 104, 5 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For the Cabinet War Committee meeting, see "Extract from minutes of Cabinet War Committee, August 6, 1941," LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Fournier's reduced sentence is mentioned in CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 164, 5 September 1941; SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 128, 18 September 1941; and Terazaki Taro (Tokyo) to McGreer (Tokyo), undated letter with attached Japanese report, ca. September 1941; all in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261501.
 - 9 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 139, 11 August 1941; SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 128, 18 September 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261484. For a collection of telegrams concerning the evacuation of Canadians from Japan and northern China in 1940-41, see LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4).
 - 10 Hornbeck's remarks are found in Thorald (Washington) to Mahoney (Washington), 19 December 1940; Mahoney's message to King is found in Mahoney (Washington) to SSEA, letter no. 2741, 21 December 1940; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
 - 11 Campbell, BHC (Ottawa), to King, 20 December 1940; Campbell to King, 27 December 1940; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
 - 12 Wrong, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 13 February 1941; King (Ottawa) to Wrong (Washington), letter no. 150, 13 February 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
 - 13 SSDA to SSEA, circular 84, 17 February 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4).
 - 14 Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Export of Wheat and Flour to Japan and China," 31 January 1941; Keenleyside, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 1 February 1941; Extract from Cabinet War Committee minutes, "Sale of Canadian Wheat to Japan," 11 February 1941; J.A.G. (External Affairs), "Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Export of Wheat to Japan," 10 June 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
 - 15 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 35, 10 March 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
 - 16 King, dictation: "Re: Canadian-Japanese Trade, Wheat and Wood," 28 April 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, vol. 2960, file 10.

- 17 Ibid., 29 and 30 April 1941.
- 18 SSEA to SSDA, 25 April 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571; and SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 71, 3 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4). For an example of BC protests against Canadian exports to Japan, see Nanaimo Junior Chamber of Commerce to Allan Chambers, MP, telegram, 16 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. Nanaimo officials complained that 90,000 tons of scrap iron and other war materials had been shipped over the last six months from Victoria to Japan; they wanted Ottawa to stop the trade.
- 19 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 97, 6 June 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261434.
- 20 Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 15 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571.
- 21 SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 124, 15 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 22 Ibid., SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 132, 23 July 1941.
- 23 Prime Minister (Australia) to Prime Minister (Canada) et al., telegram no. 4, 23 July 1941; CMUS to SSEA, messages 305 and 306, 24 July 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Cadogan is quoted in Roland H. Worth Jr., *No Choice but War: The United States Embargo against Japan and the Eruption of the Pacific War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995), 74. For the Roosevelt press conference, see Robert Smith Thompson, *Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 92-93.
- 24 Treaty termination is discussed in Prime Minister (Australia) to Prime Minister (Canada) et al., telegram no. 5, 25 July 1941; Robertson to King, 25 July 1941; CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 125, 26 July 1941; SSEA to CMJ, telegram no. 96, 26 July 1941; and SSEA to CMUS, 26 July 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). See also, SSEA to Japanese Minister to Canada (Ottawa), 26 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. For the External Affairs report, see T.A.S. (External Affairs), "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 29 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. Statistics on Canada's trade are found in Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun*, 11, 159.
- 25 King, dictation: "Interview with Minister of Japan," 27 July 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, vol. 2960, file 10.
- 26 Japanese Minister (Ottawa) to External Affairs (Ottawa), 5 August 1941; Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 5 August 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 571. Yoshizawa to King, 20 September 1941; SSEA to Japanese Minister (Ottawa), 30 September 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271841-43.
- 27 Ministry of Economic Warfare, Enemy Resources Department, "Japan - Major Industrial and Raw Material Position," 7 September 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. This report was distributed to the Dominions Office, Colonial Office, India Office, Burma Office, and Joint Intelligence Committee.
- 28 Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 29 Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
- 30 Quoted in Brereton Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong: *A Canadian Catastrophe, 1941-1945* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 6.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid., 10.
- 33 Ibid., 11.
- 34 Ibid., 10.

- 35 Ibid., 10-11.
- 36 Ibid., 7.
- 37 Ibid., 15. Greenhous quoted from Sir Lyman P. Duff, *Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942), 14. See also J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 98-99.
- 38 Quoted in Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong, 16. See also John Ferris, "Savage Christmas: The Canadians at Hong Kong," in *The Valour and the Horror Revisited*, ed. David J. Bercuson and S.E. Wise (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 116-17.
- 39 Major-General C.G.S. to the Minister, HQS 8873: "Canadian Battalions - Hong Kong," 24 September 1941, DHH, 112.3M2 (D251), file: "Hong Kong Forces, Oct. 41/Oct. 45." This report also discussed how reserve battalions were going to be rotated into position within Canada so that coastal defence could be maintained after the Hong Kong battalions departed. See also ibid., Col. DMO & I to CGS, HQS 8873: "Replacement of Units Selected for Service in Hong Kong," 2 October 1941.
- 40 Quoted in Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong, 17.
- 41 King Diary, 18 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 42 Gibson, "Action by D.M.O. & I. In Respect of The Despatch of The Force to Hong Kong," 23 February 1942, DHH, 112.3M2 (D251).
- 43 Quoted in Ferris, "Savage Christmas," 117.
- 44 DesRosiers, Acting Deputy Minister (Army), to USSEA, HQS 20-1-20, FD7, 10 November 1941, DHH, 112.3M2 (D251).
- 45 King Diary, 16 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 46 Quoted in Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong, 35-36. Greenhous quoted from J.H. Marsman, *I Escaped from Hong Kong* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942), 9.
- 47 Mullaly, "Comments on Interview by Lt.-Cmdr. DAY and R.B.C. Munday with a person recently arrived from Japan," 27 November 1941, article 15, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 48 King Diary, 18 and 29 December 1941, 22 and 28 January 1942, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 49 George Drew, a Canadian MP serving in the opposition Conservative Party, complained of untrained troops and an unsuccessful voluntary recruitment plan (Drew's party was committed to conscription). Drew also believed that the Canadian government should have reconsidered the plan to reinforce Hong Kong in October 1941, when Tojo Hideki assumed control of Japan. Despite Conservative opposition, Mackenzie King won a parliamentary vote of confidence over Hong Kong on 28 July 1942. See J.W. Pickersgill, ed. *The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 1, 1939-1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 403-7; and J.L. Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 119-24.

Chapter 5: Reassessing the Far East Crisis after the Asset Freeze, August-October 1941

- 1 Intel Section, General Staff, "Memorandum Re Japan," 25 August 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156), "Japan, Memorandums dealing with Japan, Aug-Dec 1941."
- 2 Wrong (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 9 September 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. Hasselman's remarks are found in Pacific Command, "JAPAN, Information received from a reliable source," November 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156). Mullaly's views are found in Mullaly (Pacific Command), "Comments on Developments in the Far East," 15 and 27 September 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 09-6-1. Pacific Command interviewed Hasselman in September but reissued his notes in November, forwarding them to the Canadian Legation, the British Embassy, and the US War Department, all in Washington.

- 3 Mullaly, "Comments," 16 and 18 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 09-6-I; and CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 196, 18 October 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261540.
- 4 DMO & I to Canadian Legation (Washington), "German Inducements to keep Japan loyal to the Tripartite Pact" (original dated 18 September 1941), 13 December 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156). The report was produced in September for officials in Ottawa, but was sent to the Canadian Legation in Washington on 13 December, when staff there considered Japan's relationship with Germany in the aftermath of the Pacific attacks. Despite reports about Germany's promises of support for Japan, Hasselman believed that Japan did not trust Germany as a result of its breach of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. He cited three reasons for Japan's mobilization in June and July: to prevent Germany from getting Vladivostok, to expand to the south, and to strengthen its position in China in the event of an Anglo-German armistice, which Japan feared. See Pacific Command, "JAPAN," November 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 5 For example, see Special Intelligence no. 313, 25 August 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321. The intelligence summary revealed German overtures of support for Japan: "The Japanese Ambassador, Berlin told Tokyo on the 15th Aug. that if there was war between Japan and U.S.A., Germany would declare war on U.S.A."
- 6 "British Army Staff, Intelligence Notes," no. 4, week ending 11 October 1941, 2; Thailand discussed in "Notes," no. 5, week ending 18 October 1941, 2; General Tojo as Russophobe is discussed in "Notes," no. 6, week ending 25 October 1941, 3; all in DHH, 314.009 (D151).
- 7 SSDA to SSEA, circular DW838, 2 August 1941; DW839, 3 August 1941; DW842, 6 August 1941; DW847, 10 August 1941; DW857, 19 August 1941; DW858, 20 August 1941; DW860, 21 August 1941; and DW866, 27 August 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #8."
- 8 Pacific Command, "JAPAN, Information received from a reliable source," November 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156). As noted, the original report had been produced in September 1941 but was later reissued.
- 9 SSDA to SSEA, circular DW874, 3 September 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #8;" Mullaly, "Comments," 27 September 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 09-6-I; and Major R.M., SO(I) (Hong Kong), "Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report (H.K.I.R.)," no. 9/41, 1 October 1941, 1, Appendix II (2), DHH, 593.023 (D1). Researchers should note that HKIR no. 8/41, which contains intelligence collected in August 1941, is missing from DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 10 George Spain's remarks are found in Intel Section, General Staff, "Memorandum Re Japan," 25 August 1941, 2; DND remarks are found in "Notes on the Japanese Army," 29 August 1941, 3, 6; both in DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 11 Pacific Command, "JAPAN, Information received from a reliable source," November 1941, 2, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 12 For a discussion of how the Allies misjudged Japanese capabilities, see Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 60-65; Antony Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 164-68; and Douglas Ford, *Britain's Secret War against Japan, 1937-1945* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 31-41. Churchill is quoted in Aldrich, *Intelligence*, 64.
- 13 Mullaly, "Comments," 10 and 21 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 09-6-I.
- 14 HKIR, no. 10/41, 1 November 1941, 1-2, Appendix II (4), DHH, 593.023 (D1).

- 15 On Japanese merchant ships, see SSDA to SSEA, circular DW920, 12 October 1941; on Japan's "position to strike Russia," SSDA to SSEA, circular DW931, 22 October 1941; on Japan's "complete war footing," SSDA to SSEA, circular DW939, 29 October 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #9." Craigie's remarks are found in SSDA to SSEA, circular M343, 31 October 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. A British "Special Intelligence" summary of 22 October reinforced the war scare, stating that Japanese consuls in Singapore and Batavia were returning shortly to Tokyo, and that Germany had assured Japan that it would soon defeat Britain and Russia, so it was essential that Japan "remove the Russian danger in the north" and simultaneously seize key points in Southeast Asia. See Special Intelligence no. 372, 22 October 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321.
- 16 For examples, see Nomura (Washington) to Foreign Office (Tokyo), D-85, 19 August 1941 (filed 15 October); and Muto (San Francisco) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-58, 18 September 1941 (filed 8 October); both in LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29173, WWII-40 (pt. 19), file: "Second World War Decrypts - Japanese (1941/07-45/10)." The messages did contain some useful information. The Canadians learned that Japan had been aware of Roosevelt's "meeting at sea" in August (the Atlantic Conference), and that Japanese leaders were concerned with Western press reports that portrayed them as warmongers.
- 17 *Ibid.*, Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-95, undated (filed 17 October 1941).
- 18 Brand, North American Station Intelligence Report (NASIR) no. 10, 1 October 1941, 576, 581-82, 584, 588, 615, 617, 652, 654-55, DHH, 112.3M1009 (D129), "RCN North American Station Int. Reports, Oct 41/Jun 42." Brand's sources criticized Canadian labour strikes for undermining war production, and Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn for undermining the Mackenzie King government through "his apparently opportunistic criticism of its policies" and war effort. Hepburn had given a radio address and press conference in New York City, where he blamed the King administration for Canada's war deficiencies. Although somewhat discredited, he was seen as a potential threat because he had "mob-appeal" and might become a "quasi-fascist leader in times of grave crisis." The report also criticized US labour strikes for undermining the production of war materials for Britain.
- 19 Batavia is discussed in HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 1393, 5 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Welles is discussed in Wrong (Washington) to SSEA, 8 August 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271648-51.
- 20 Prime Minister (Australia) to SSDA et al., telegram no. 8, 11 August 1941; and Acting Prime Minister (New Zealand) to Prime Minister (Australia) et al., telegram no. 7, 13 August 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Wrong (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 13 and 14 August 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271670-76.
- 21 SSDA to Government of Australia, letter no. 560, 12 August 1941; BHC (Ottawa) to SSEA, letter no. 41, 30 August 1941; Cossette (Ottawa) to COPC, 3 September 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11763, file PC04-43-1. Ultimately, there is no record that the British commercial broadcasting scheme was ever used. Japan planned to warn its officials overseas of impending war with the US, Britain, or the Soviet Union using code phrases inserted into commercial weather broadcasts. For example, if Japan went to war against the US, the phrase "East Wind, Rain" would be inserted into the broadcasts. The Allies referred to the system as the "Winds Messages." Between 25 and 28 November 1941, British and US intelligence staff intercepted the "Winds Set-Up" message, in which Tokyo told its overseas staff how the system would work. See Special Intelligence no. 429, 25 November

- 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321; and Intelligence Report no. 97, 28 November 1941, NARA, MMRB, RG 80, Pearl Harbor Liaison Office Records. Archival evidence shows that British authorities in Hong Kong intercepted a "Winds Execute" message on 7 December 1941, just before the Japanese attacked Malaya that day. See Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge*, 185-86. For possible US interception of a "Winds Execute" message on 2 December, see the anecdotal account in John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), 195-98, 286-87, 352-53.
- 22 MacLennan, BHC (Ottawa) to Robertson, Most Secret letter with attached report, 3 November 1941, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 59, file D1030: "Event of War with Japan, War Plans, Estimates of Japan's Intentions."
 - 23 BHC (Ottawa) to King, 6 August 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261173-74.
 - 24 Churchill to Lord Privy Seal, Tudor no. 6, 7 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/48/2.
 - 25 Churchill to Lord Privy Seal, Tudor no. 15, 11 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/48/5-6.
 - 26 SSDA to BHC (Ottawa), circular Z258, 12 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). See also Churchill to Foreign Office, Tudor no. 19, 12 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/48/9-10.
 - 27 Churchill to BHC in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, telegram T508, 24 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/42A/10-13.
 - 28 Churchill to Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, telegram T530, 30 August 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/42A/39-41.
 - 29 King Diary, 23 and 24 August 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
 - 30 Ibid., 18 September 1941.
 - 31 Wrong (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 9 September 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271677-78.
 - 32 Keenleyside to Robertson, 22 September 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
 - 33 Wrong (Washington) to unknown addressee, 13 September 1941, LAC, MG 30, series E101, vol. 8.
 - 34 Wrong (Washington) to SSEA, 19 September 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271762-66.
 - 35 Details on the speech are found in King Diary, 4 September 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13. For US press reaction, see Wrong (Washington) to SSEA, 11 September 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271679-83. King (Ottawa) to Churchill (London), telegram no. 193, 23 September 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/43/14-15, Prime Minister's Personal Telegrams (T606). King (Ottawa) to Roosevelt (Washington), 22 September 1941; and Roosevelt (Hyde Park) to King (Ottawa), 27 September 1941; both in FDRL, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, box 25, file: "Canada: 1941."
 - 36 SSDA to SSEA, circulars M319 and M320, 11 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11763, file PC 04-43-1. Curtin's remarks are found in Prime Minister (Australia) to SSDA et al., telegram no. 11, 17 October 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4862, vol. 303, 256442 (researchers should note that there is a gap in this file collection from 14 November to 8 December 1941). Canadian High Commission (Canberra) to SSEA, telegram no. 86, 20 October 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Remarks to Robertson are in Hankinson, BHC (Ottawa) to USSEA, 25 October 1941, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 59, file D1030.
 - 37 For alleged espionage, see HCCGB to SSEA, A422, 2 October 1941; Persian affairs, HCCGB to SSEA, A421, 30 September 1941; military equipment, SSDA to SSEA, Z288, 17 October 1941; wheat shipments, SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 185, 25 October 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1810, vol. 808, file 597.

- 38 Government of Canada (Ottawa) to Dominions Office (London), telegram nos. 255 and 226, 31 October 1941, both in PRO, CAB 66/19; and Macdonald, BHC (Ottawa) to King (Ottawa), 27 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261214.
- 39 Chiefs of Staff (Navy, Army, Air) to Cabinet Ministers (Ottawa), 18 October 1941; Robertson, "Memorandum for Cabinet War Committee," 21 October 1941; Extract from Minutes of Cabinet War Committee: "Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan," 22 October 1941; all in QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 IId, box 59, file D1030.
- 40 NSHQ to Admiralty, 1234Z/23, 23 October 1941; NSHQ to SO(I) Vancouver, Seattle, and San Francisco, 2103Z/23, 23 October 1941; Admiralty to NSHQ and BAD, 1555A/23, 23 October 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12082. NSHQ to Climate 2, 1601Z/24, 24 October 1941; and Admiralty to C-in-C China, NSHQ, et al., 0553A/24, 24 October 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12091.
- 41 SSDA to SSEA, circular M319, 11 October 1941; and SSDA to SSEA, circular M320, 11 October 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 572: "Japan – Strategic Position in Far East (1941)." Researchers should note that there is a gap in this file collection from 12 October to 11 December 1941.
- 42 COPC to NSHQ, 0056Z/23, 23 October 1941; and NSHQ to BAD, copied to COPC, C-in-C China, and Admiralty, 1529Z/23, 23 October 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12082. CNA (Washington) to NSHQ, copied to BAD, COPC, C-in-C China, and Admiralty, 2112Z/24, 24 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12091.

Chapter 6: Guarding the Coast

- 1 Campbell, BHC (Ottawa) to King (Ottawa), 7 January 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4): "War – Japan, Japan – Political and Economic Situation (1939-1941)." On Campbell's attached report, see Phillips, "Possible Scale of Japanese Attack on the American Coast," War Cabinet Report, COS (40) 970, 22 November 1940.
- 2 Larsen, RCMP St. Roch (Walker Bay, NWT) to Officer Commanding, RCMP "G" Division (Ottawa), Secret report, "Ships passing through Bering Straits," 16 February 1941; and Cossette (Ottawa) to COPC, 19 April 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 09-6-3, "Bering Straits, Ships Passing Through."
- 3 For State Department request, see Berle to McCarthy, 6 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2151, file 133: "National Defence: Western Hemisphere, 1941," sub-file 1; for the Legation's later agreement, see Wrong to Hull, letter no. 577, 13 September 1941, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2151, file 133, sub-file 11; for ship identification, see Wrong to Hull, 17 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2151, file 133, sub-file 1.
- 4 External Affairs (Ottawa) to Canadian Legation (Washington), 23 August 1941, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2151, file 133, sub-file 1.
- 5 British Columbia, Yukon, Alaska Highway Commission Canada, "Report on the proposed highway through British Columbia and the Yukon Territory to Alaska," 15 October 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261591-99.
- 6 Intelligence Section, General Staff (Ottawa), "The Russian Army and the Present Campaign," Secret report, 18 November 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D160), file: "Notes on Russian Army, Etc., Nov 41-Jan 42, DMI Files."
- 7 MI2 Military Intelligence, General Staff (Ottawa), "Russia," Secret report, 4 December 1941, 3, 11, DHH, 112.3M1023 (D9), file: "Int. Survey of Russia, DMI d/4 Dec 41."
- 8 *Ibid.*, 15-16.
- 9 See, for example, Anthony Eden's conversation with Stalin on 16 December 1941, as reported in Intelligence Section, General Staff, "The Russian Campaign," lecture at RMC, Kingston, 7 January 1942, DHH, 314.009 (D160).

- 10 Some Canadian officers considered producing mustard gas for use against any Japanese invaders who might initiate chemical warfare. In January 1942, one report explained that "Japan has used gas in China ... Germany is collecting stocks of gas on invasion coasts." Yet, neither side ever resorted to gas attacks along the BC coastline. See Chiefs of Staff (Canada), "Chemical Warfare," 20 January 1942; and Joint Services Committee (Pacific Coast), meeting no. 17: "Dealing with Japanese in Coastal Areas in the Event of an Emergency," 20 February 1942; both in DHH, 193.009 (D4).
- 11 A complete understanding of Pacific Coast defence and security preparations in late 1941 awaits the declassification of certain files. For example, the following files are restricted in terms of content from late 1941: LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11768, file PC S-019-2-8, pt. 1 (1941-42): "Flag Officer Pacific Coast – Security Intelligence Reports, MD11"; and file PC S-019-2-11, pt. 1 (1942-45): "Flag Officer Pacific Coast – Weekly Reports, Esquimalt" (no associated file from 1941 has been released). It is known, however, that Canadian officers later met their American counterparts and considered using Alaska as a base from which to launch Allied attacks against Japan, a measure that might also forestall a Japanese occupation of the Aleutians. Even so, a meeting on the subject in March 1942 produced these conclusions: weather conditions prevented North Pacific operations from occurring until the spring/summer; the Americans could not launch an offensive because of limited aircraft; and the Soviet Union would be unlikely to "intervene on the Pacific while involved on the European front." See "Report of Meeting held at Headquarters, 13th Naval District Seattle, at 1000 hours, Friday, 6 March, 1942," 2, DHH, 193.009 (D5). In June 1942, the Japanese occupied two Aleutian Islands, Attu and Kiska, but the arrival of a US-Canadian task force in May 1943 compelled them to abandon both islands by the summer. About thirty thousand Americans and five thousand Canadians formed the joint task force that liberated Attu and Kiska. In May and June 1943, the Japanese fought at Attu before surrendering, but in August they simply abandoned Kiska without a fight.
- 12 LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9-1: "Operational Plan of R.C.N. to implement 'Joint Can.-U.S. Basic Defence Plan, 1940,'" Cossette, NSHQ to COPC, 31 March 1941.
- 13 COPC to Naval Secretary, NSHQ, 13 December 1940; COPC to SO(I) (Esquimalt), 13 January 1941; Cossette (Ottawa) to COPC, 3 February 1941; and COPC to Naval Secretary, NSHQ, 20 February 1941; for Day's report, see Day, SO(I) (Esquimalt), to COPC, 24 February 1941; for Howell's appointment, see Craven (Seattle), to COPC, 3 and 14 March 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9: "Joint Defence Liaison with U.S. Authorities – General Policy and Definitions." Commodore W.J.R. Beech served as Commanding Officer Pacific Coast at Esquimalt.
- 14 COPC to Naval Secretary, NSHQ, "Liaison with U.S. Naval Authorities," 9 April 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9.
- 15 Kennedy-Purvis (Bermuda) to Admiralty, copied to Naval Attaché (Washington) and NSHQ, "Y" and D/F Co-operation with U.S. Navy," 28 March 1941, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3805, file 1008-75-12 (vol. 1): "D/F and 'Y' Co-operation with US Navy."
- 16 De Marbois, FIS (Ottawa) to DNI (Ottawa), 18 April 1941, NARA, MMRB, RG 38, Crane – Inactive Stations, box 21, 3270/1, "Canada – Canadian/British Evaluation of U.S. HFDF Operations; 16 Jul 41-1 Apr 45."
- 17 For secure passage for convoys, see Howell (Seattle) to Beech (Esquimalt), 24 April 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9. For Freeman's liaison plan, see Freeman (Seattle) to Thirteenth Naval District officers, report no. 123344, 23 April 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9-1. For teletype service, see Beech (Esquimalt) to Howell (Seattle), 27 April 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9-2. For shipping information, see NSHQ to COPC, 1433/Z, 10 May 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9. For Howell's suggestion, see COPC to Naval Secretary (Ottawa), 26 May 1941; Naval Secretary

- (Ottawa) to COPC, 7 June 1941; Beech (Esquimalt) to Howell (Seattle), 19 June 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9.
- 18 Howell (Seattle) to Beech (Esquimalt), 28 June 1941, with enclosed report dated 14 June 1941, "Possible air raids in Canada from the Arctic," LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9.
 - 19 NSHQ to Robertson, RCMP et al., 23 May 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1810, vol. 808, file 597.
 - 20 Howell (Seattle) to Beech (Esquimalt), 25 June 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9.
 - 21 Ibid., Howell to COPC, 9 July 1941.
 - 22 Ibid., Howell to Beech, 26 July 1941.
 - 23 Ibid., Howell to Beech, 30 July 1941.
 - 24 Seattle to NSHQ, 0032Z/25, 25 July 1941; COPC to NSHQ, Singapore, Admiralty, and Kingston, 0411Z/25, 25 July 1941; Consul General (San Francisco) to Foreign Office (London), Washington, Tokyo, and DNI (Ottawa), 1951Z/25, 25 July 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12085. Other British naval intelligence that day dealt with Japanese assistance to a disabled German raiding vessel anchored at Easter Island. See *ibid.*, Consul (Los Angeles) to DNI (Ottawa), 1411Z/25, 25 July 1941.
 - 25 Ibid., COPC to NSHQ and C/S (FECB Singapore), 1953Z/25, 25 July 1941.
 - 26 Freeman (Seattle) to Heads of Dept. and Staff HQ, 6 August 1941; Howell (Seattle) to Beech (Esquimalt), 13 August 1941; Berle (Washington) to Canadian Legation (Washington), 16 August 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file PC 010-9.
 - 27 Ibid., Howell (Seattle) to COPC, report no. 133, "General Report on U.S. conditions which may interest the Commanding Officer Pacific Coast," 19 November 1941.
 - 28 Brand, 1017-10-35, "Existing System of Routeing - November, 1941," 24 November 1941, DHH, 81/520/1440-127, file: "Naval Control Service."
 - 29 Croil to Power, I.G.S500-1-8-1, 11 September 1941, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, Archive no. 2150 IID, box 59, file D1030: "Event of War with Japan, War Plans, Estimates of Japan's Intentions."
 - 30 Ibid.
 - 31 Ibid.
 - 32 Ibid., Breadner to Power, 22 November 1941.
 - 33 Ibid., Breadner to Power, S.15-1-133-158, 7 December 1941. File D1030 lacks documents from 26 November to 2 December and from 4 to 7 December.
 - 34 Yoshizawa to King, 25 January 1941; King to Yoshizawa, 1 February 1941; both in LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271837-39.
 - 35 Keenleyside, "Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Mr. Tom Reid, M.P., and the Report of the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia," 25 February 1941; RCMP (Vancouver) to SSEA, "Re: Chinese and Japanese in British Columbia," 26 February 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
 - 36 LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11768, file PCS-019-2-8, pt. 1, vol. 2 of 2 vols., Flag Officer, Pacific Coast, "Security Intelligence Reports - Military District No. XI," pt. 1, vol. 1, which contains reports dating from before March 1942, has not been released. The author has therefore relied on pt. 1, vol. 2, which contains reports dating from 26 March 1942 onward (these reports also mention cases from 1941). Researchers may wish to consult another file that contains "Security Intelligence Officer's Weekly Reports" issued by RCN Esquimalt between late 1942 and early 1945. See LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11768, file PCS-019-2-11, pt. 1, "Weekly Reports - Esquimalt," 30 November 1942 to 12 March 1945. The author originally obtained these files through the Access to Information Act (Canada).

- 37 Ibid., Pacific Command, Mil. District no. 11 (Esquimalt), "Weekly Internal Security Intelligence Report," no. 71, week ending 21 March 1942 (sub-report G221).
- 38 Ibid., no. 80, week ending 23 May 1942 (sub-report G98).
- 39 Ibid., no. 84, week ending 20 June 1942 (sub-report G14). For other examples of reports concerning German Canadians on the Pacific Coast, see *ibid.*, no. 74, week ending 11 April 1942 (sub-report A105); and no. 76, week ending 25 April 1942 (sub-report A105).
- 40 Read, External Affairs (Ottawa), "Measures to be taken in the event of War with Japan," 28 July 1941, Appendix A (15), LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
- 41 De Carteret to Deputy Minister, DND Naval Services, 7 October 1941, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 Ild, box 59, file D1030.
- 42 Read (for USSEA) to Deputy Minister, DND Naval Services (Ottawa), 29 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11763, file PC04-43-1.
- 43 Ibid., USSEA to Deputy Minister of Justice (Ottawa), 29 October 1941.
- 44 Mullaly, "Japanese Press," GSO 22, 3 November 1941, DHH, 322.009 (D158), file: "Japanese People, Notes on Characteristics, 1941/Nov 1944, DMI Files."
- 45 Ibid., Mullaly, "Japanese Press," GSO 39, 28 November 1941.
- 46 King (Ottawa) to Pattullo (Victoria), 26 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
- 47 Ibid., King to Pattullo, 7 December 1941.
- 48 King, "Information on Japan given press by p.m., Dec. 7 (Mears' report)," 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 49 King (Ottawa) to Hume (New Westminster, BC), 17 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4863, vol. 306, 259050.
- 50 USN Attaché to Nelles, 17 December 1941, DHH, 81/520/1440-127, Naval Control Service, "Summary of File 1017-10-35 (2 vols.): Defence of Canada: Schemes and Plans: Co-operation between Naval Control Service of Canada and U.S. Authorities," vol. 1, 1/3/41 to 21/11/42, item 6.
- 51 Joint Services Committee - Pacific Coast (HQ, Pacific Command), Minutes of meeting no. 15, 13 February 1942, DHH, 193.009 (D5).
- 52 Brand, DNI (Ottawa), to Rush, Controller of Radio, DOT (Ottawa), 11 March 1942, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3805, file 1008-34-6 (vol. 1): "Suspicious Wireless Stations."
- 53 Ibid., Rush to Brand, 12 March 1942.
- 54 Gil Murray, *The Invisible War: The Untold Secret Story of Number One Canadian Special Wireless Group, Royal Canadian Signal Corps, 1944-1946* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 22.
- 55 King Diary, 19 February 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 56 For example, see the letters and documents from 1939 to 1944 that are found in QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files II, 2150 Ild, box 70, file D2030: "Internal Security - Intelligence and Espionage Generally."
- 57 Pacific Command, Mil. District no. 11 (Esquimalt), "Weekly Internal Security Intelligence Report," no. 84, week ending 20 June 1942 (sub-report G148), LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11768, file PCS-019-2-8, pt. 1, vol. 2.

Chapter 7: Countdown to War

- 1 August letter in DND, Censorship Intelligence Summary No. 113, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 24-30 November 1941, 19; first September letter in No. 112, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 17-23 November 1941, 32; second September letter in No. 113, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 24-30 November 1941, 18; all in DHH, 314.009 (D152), file: "Intelligence Summaries, Trade and Political, Nov-Dec 41."

- 2 CMJ to SSEA, telegram no. 211, 17 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261544; and "British Army Staff, Intelligence Notes," no. 8, week ending 8 November 1941, 3, DHH, 314.009 (D151).
- 3 Day and Munday, "Joint Interview by Lieut. Commander Day of Canadian Navy and R.B.C. Munday at Victoria, BC, with person recently arrived from Japan, name not disclosed herein," 17-18 November 1941, 5, DHH, 314.009 (D156). BSC's agent is discussed in Sir William S. Stephenson, ed., *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945, Introduction by Nigel West* (New York: Fromm International, 1999), 217-18.
- 4 Day and Munday, "Joint Interview," 1, 4, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 5 Mullaly, "Comments on Interview by Lt.-Cmdr. DAY and R.B.C. Munday with 'a person recently arrived from Japan,'" 27 November 1941, articles 2 and 18, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 6 Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-198, 5 November 1941 (filed 19 November), LAC, RG 24, Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29173, WWII-40 (pt. 19), file: "Second World War Decrypts - Japanese (1941/07-45/10)." On 16 November, Yoshizawa also informed Tokyo that the Canadian Parliament discussed conscription and that "Arthur Meighen, a former prime minister, accepted the appointment as head of the Conservative Party and declared himself as favoring the sending of soldiers anywhere." See *ibid.*, Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-231, 16 November 1941 (filed 1 December). Several intercepted messages also dealt with Japanese reaction to Western press items, including reports about the new Tojo government, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, and ABCD containment policy. See *ibid.*, Nomura (Washington) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-178, 20 October 1941 (filed 13 November); Japanese Legation (Chicago) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-213, 24 October 1941 (filed 26 November); Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-212, 4 November 1941 (filed 26 November).
- 7 *Ibid.*, Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Tokyo, Washington, London, and Hong Kong, D-226, 17 November 1941 (filed 30 November); and Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-240, 18 November 1941 (filed 4 December).
- 8 *Ibid.*, Yoshizawa (Ottawa) to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), D-248, 27 November 1941 (filed 6 December).
- 9 Brand, North American Station Intelligence Report (NASIR) no. 11a, 1 December 1941, 731-32, 796-97, DHH, 112.3M1009 (D129), file: "RCN North American Station Int. Reports, Oct 41/Jun 42." Oddly, the 1 December report has been numbered "11," just like the 1 November report. For convenience, I have cited the 1 December report as "11a."
- 10 "British Army Staff, Intelligence Notes," no. 7, week ending 1 November 1941, 3; no. 8, week ending 8 November 1941, 3; no. 9, week ending 15 November 1941, 2; no. 10, week ending 22 November 1941, 3-4; and no. 11, week ending 30 November 1941, 1-2; all in DHH, 314.009 (D151).
- 11 SSDA to SSEA, circular DW947, 5 November 1941; circular DW951, 8 November 1941; circular DW955, 12 November 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #9."
- 12 Mullaly (Pacific Command), "Comments on Developments in the Far East," 4 and 12 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file: PC 09-6-1.
- 13 Day and Munday, "Joint Interview," 2, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 14 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 16 Mullaly, "Comments on Interview by Lt.-Cmdr. DAY and R.B.C. Munday," 27 November 1941, article 15, DHH, 314.009 (D156).

- 17 "British Army Staff, Intelligence Notes," no. 11, week ending 30 November 1941, 2, DHH, 314.009 (D151); and Major R.M., SO(I), Hong Kong, "Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report (H.K.I.R.)," no. 11/41, 1 December 1941, 1, DHH, 593.023 (D1).
- 18 C/S Singapore to FEW 58, 1007Z/25, 25 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12142; Admiralty Basegram to NSHQ, 1902A/28, 28 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152; and Admiralty Basegram GR131 to NSHQ, 1829A/29, 29 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151.
- 19 SSDA to SSEA, circular DW964, 19 November 1941; circular DW968, 21 November 1941; and circular DW978, 25 November 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #9."
- 20 Mullaly, "Comments on Developments in the Far East," 28 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file: PC 09-6-I.
- 21 Mullaly, "Comments on Interview by Day and Munday," article 17, DHH, 314.009 (D156).
- 22 Ibid., articles 7 and 8.
- 23 DMO & I to Canadian Legation (Washington), "Supplement to RCMP Memorandum: 'Information Re Vulnerable Points In Japan,'" 11 November 1941, DHH, 314.009 (D156). The reissued report of 26 November is also in this file.
- 24 Brand, NASIR no. 11a, 1 December 1941, 743, 749, 775, DHH, 112.3M1009 (D129).
- 25 Mullaly, "Comments," 28 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11764, file: PC 09-6-I.
- 26 Seymour, "IN THE MATTER OF THE Attack on Pearl Harbour, Hawaii on 7th December, 1941," 6-7, SCM, Accession No. 1997.168 (donated by Elizabeth Seymour), The Statutory Declaration of Murton Adams Seymour, 7 December 1967. Regarding the anticipated date of attack, 8 December 1941, Seymour explained to Stanley M. Clark in a letter of 9 August 1963 that "British Military Intelligence had informed Ottawa that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbour on December 8th which, because of the International Date Line, turned out to be December 7th." See Exhibit 7 of Seymour's affidavit. The twelve-page affidavit also has nine attached exhibits, including minutes of meetings of the Dominion Aeronautical Association, as well as correspondence with Stanley M. Clark, QC, former secretary of the association. The museum received the affidavit from Elizabeth Seymour on 10 October 1997, but released it publicly in May 2001. The donated collection also includes a biographical file concerning the life and times of Murton Seymour (1892-1976).
- 27 For the US strategic estimate (Bellinger-Martin report), see Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway - Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 246-48. For the Rainbow-5 plan, see Hart Inquiry exhibit no. 16, Navy Plan O-1 (WPPac-46), 25 July 1941, in United States, 79th Congress, *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 39 pts. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pt. 26, 500. For Germany's interest in Pearl Harbor (using agent Dusko Popov), see J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 79-81, 196-98. For Mountbatten's warning, see Richard Hough, *Mountbatten, ca. 1980* (New York: Random House, 1981), 135, 142-43. Martell, Assistant Naval Attaché (Pearl Harbor), "Report on U.S.N. Communications including Notes on Security," October 1941, PRO, ADM 223/505. For BSC interest, see Antony Best, *British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 186. For Japanese diplomatic traffic, see SRH-012, 158, NARA, MMRB, RG 457, entry 9002, box 9.
- 28 "Pearl Harbor and the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse," Top Secret ten-page handwritten report (ca. 1945), 1, PRO, ADM 223/494. The report offers examples of previous Japanese surprise attacks: Port Arthur (1904), Mukden (1931), Shanghai (1932), and Peking (1937).

- 29 Memoirs of Sir Julian Ridsdale, Chapter 1, Part 4, 42, CAC, RIDs, box 1. The date of 27 November 1941 is derived from Ridsdale's statement that the JIC meeting occurred ten days before the attack on Malaya (which took place on 7 December 1941).
- 30 Ibid., 43.
- 31 C. Fitzgibbon, *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 255.
- 32 Garner quoted in Bill Macdonald, *The True Intrepid: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents* (Surrey, BC: Timberholme Books, 1998), 288-89. For the BSC account, see Stephenson, *British Security Coordination*, 217-18.
- 33 Stephenson, *ibid.* This British agent may have been the one whom Day and Munday interviewed at Pacific Command on 17 and 18 November 1941.
- 34 H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson* (London: H. Hamilton, 1962), 213-14.
- 35 For USN JN-25B reading ability, see Lietwiler (Fort Mills, Philippines) to Parke (Navy Dept., Washington), 16 November 1941, 1, NARA, MMRB, RG 38, Crane-Inactive Stations, box 15, 3200/1 - NSRS Philippines, Operations Summaries; and Timothy Wilford, "Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysis and the Challenge of JN-25B in 1941," *Northern Mariner* 12, 1 (January 2002): 17-37. For British JN-25B reading ability, see Barham, "Japanese Cyphers - Notes," 10 July 1942, 3, PRO, ADM 223/496. For direct recovery of Japanese diplomatic and naval codes by safecracking, see NARA, MMRB, RG 457, SRH Series, entry 9002, SRH-149; Ladislav Farago, "POSTSCRIPT: New Lights on the Pearl Harbor Attack," in *The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor*, by Ladislav Farago (New York: Bantam, 1968), 392; and Layton et al., *And I Was There*, 284. For Japanese messages heralding the attack, see Frederick D. Parker, "The Unsolved Messages of Pearl Harbor," *Cryptologia* 15, 4 (October 1991): 295-313. For the *Akagi* transmission, see Proceeding of the Hewitt Inquiry, in United States, 79th Congress, *Hearings*, 206, 515; and Communications Intelligence Summary, 30 November 1941, NARA, MMRB, RG 38, Crane - Inactive Stations, box 3, 5510/4, "NAVSECGRU, Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit - Traffic Intelligence Summaries: 16 July to 31 Dec 1941." For USN intercepts of call signs assigned to the Strike Force, see Timothy Wilford, *Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), 72-73; and Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford, "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, 4 (August 2006): 546-47. For D/F on Japanese carriers in the Kuriles, see anecdotal evidence in Layton et al., *And I Was There*, 206. For Dutch warnings about Pearl Harbor, see anecdotal evidence in John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), 290-91, 317-18; and John Costello, *Days of Infamy* (New York: Pocket Books, 1994), 316, and 416-17nn57-58. For traditionalist accounts of pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence, see Stephen Budiansky, "Too Late for Pearl Harbor," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (December 1999): 47-51; and Philip Jacobsen, "Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force," *Intelligence and National Security* 19, 4 (Winter 2004): 695-718. For criticism of Jacobsen's methodology, see Villa and Wilford, "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor," 520-56.
- 36 Seymour, "IN THE MATTER OF the Attack on Pearl Harbour," SCM, Accession No. 1997.168, 6-7.
- 37 Ibid., 9.
- 38 Right Honourable L.B. Pearson to Colonel Murton A. Seymour, OBE, QC, 31 January 1972, SCM, Accession no. 1997.168 (donated by Elizabeth Seymour). The letter is not mentioned in Pearson's memoirs. See Lester B. Pearson, with John A. Munro and Alex I.

- Inglis, eds., *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972-75).
- 39 Macdonald, *The True Intrepid*, 269; John Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* (Toronto: Lester, 1993), 40-41, 77-80, 85-89, 91-92; Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-63* (Ottawa: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981), 86, 91; DHH, Little, C.H., Biographical File, 5; Wesley K. Wark, "Cryptographic Innocence: The Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22 (1987): 639-65.
 - 40 Dominion Aeronautical Association, Ltd., 6-10, DHH, 181.003 (D3639), RCAF file 10; and Recruiting in the United States of America, 545-47, 572-74, DHH, 74/7, RCAF Personnel History III.
 - 41 Canadian officials running the BCATP were also linked to Donovan and his Coordinator of Information (COI) staff. Donovan offered great assistance to the Canadian Aviation Bureau in New York, which recruited Americans for the Allied air services. The bureau, which had originally been known as the Clayton Knight Committee, a clandestine recruiting centre operating out of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, had commenced official operations on 16 August 1941. Eventually, the former "cover" of the Clayton Knight Committee was dropped because American neutrality had become "a mere nominal factor." See Dominion Aeronautical Association, Ltd., 7-9, DHH, 181.009 (D3639), RCAF file 10.
 - 42 Canadian Legation (Washington) to Canadian Consulates et al., circular no. 3, June 1941, QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 Ild, box 65, file D1097.
 - 43 As another example, intelligence was sometimes passed through the Canadian Legation under the cover of the British Purchasing Commission, which sometimes fronted BSC operations. The record book "Legation Despatches to External Affairs, 1941" shows that about three dispatches a month were sent from Washington to Ottawa under the heading "British Purchasing Commission." One of those dispatches was sent on 28 November, a date that is quite compatible with Apedaile's 30 November request for Seymour's Ottawa visit, but this is speculation. See Canadian Legation (Washington), Record Book: "Legation Despatches to External Affairs, 1941," entry for dispatch no. 3575, 28 November 1941, 120, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2456. The Legation also sent External Affairs a dispatch on 5 December listed under the topic heading of US "Coordination of Information." Perhaps Donovan and COI had something important to pass on to the Canadians. The topic heading was subsequently stricken out and replaced with the heading "Strategic Materials." See *ibid.*, entry for dispatch no. 3636, 5 December 1941, 122.
 - 44 Dexter quoted in C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-45* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 47.
 - 45 Stacey, *ibid.*, 48.
 - 46 King Diary, 6 and 17 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
 - 47 For Churchill's actions, see Churchill to BHC in New Zealand and South Africa, telegram T765, 31 October 1941; Former Naval Person to President, telegram T773, 1 November 1941; Churchill to Stalin, telegram T776, 4 November 1941; and Churchill to BHC in Canada, telegram T789, no. 1920, 5 November 1941; all in CAC, CHAR 20/44/119, Prime Minister's Personal Telegrams. For Ottawa's reports on Smuts's views, see HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 2057, 6 November 1941; and Robertson to Power, 7 November 1941; both in QUA, C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial Files C, 2150 Ild, box 46, file: "China, 1940-44." For Smuts's remarks, see BHC in South Africa to Churchill, telegram T789, no. 1351, 7 November 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/44/126-7, Prime Minister's Personal Telegrams.

- 48 For Churchill's remarks, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M360, 13 November 1941; for Roosevelt's remarks, see SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 195, 14 November 1941; for US air bases, see HCCNZ to SSEA, telegram no. 56, 14 November 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For Marshall's remarks, see Robert Smith Thompson, *Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 96-97. For Thailand reinforcements, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M365, 17 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 49 SSDA to SSEA, circular M362, 13 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pt. 1-3).
- 50 Ibid., SSDA to SSEA, circular M364, 17 November 1941.
- 51 Ibid., Wrong (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 22 November 1941.
- 52 For Halifax's remarks, see King Diary, 17 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13. For Hull's views, see SSDA to SSEA, circulars M374 and M375, 22 November 1941; for Hull's remark to Kurusu, see Wrong to Robertson, 22 November 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 53 Wrong to Robertson, 24 and 25 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 54 SSEA to CMUS, 24 November 1941; CMUS to SSEA, 25 November 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. For Hull's remarks, see Wrong (Washington) to Robertson (Ottawa), 29 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271799-804.
- 55 SSDA to SSEA, circular M388, 26 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 56 Ibid., CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 523, 28 November 1941; and Keenleyside to Robertson, "The United States and Japan," 28 November 1941.
- 57 Wrong to Robertson, 29 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271799-804. Researchers should note that there is a gap in this file collection from 30 November to 11 December 1941, inclusive. The original "thin diet" message is found in Churchill to Roosevelt, 25 November 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/45/100-103.
- 58 Stimson quoted in Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret*, 97-98. Hull quoted in Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian*, 214. Historian John Costello explains that Churchill's "thin diet" message of 25 November may have been accompanied by another message, presumably still classified, in which Churchill offered Roosevelt more specific information concerning the Far East crisis. See Costello, *Days of Infamy*, 311-12, and 415n37. Some revisionists conjecture that such a message may have compelled the President to terminate diplomacy with Japan and to prepare for war in the Pacific. Others suggest that such a message, which may have been based on a decrypt of Admiral Yamamoto's order for the Strike Force to rendezvous in the mid-Pacific, warned of a strike on Pearl Harbor. Historian Charles Beard argued that in November 1941 Roosevelt manoeuvred Japan into firing the first shot when he rejected Japan's proposal for a *modus vivendi*, in which Japan offered to abstain from further aggression in the Far East, a proposal that was actually in keeping with Roosevelt's earlier declaration to Japan on 17 August 1941. See Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948), 556.
- 59 Wrong to Robertson, 29 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4872, vol. 320, 271799-804.
- 60 For the reaction of London and China, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M402, 29 November 1941; for Welles and Australian Minister, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M404, 29 November 1941; for Welles and Halifax, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M405, 29 November 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).

- 61 Ibid., SSEA to Canadian Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), message no. 169, 29 November 1941.
- 62 Ibid.; for Thailand attack, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M406, 30 November 1941; for reconnaissance patrols, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M408, 30 November 1941; for US constitutional difficulties, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M406, 30 November 1941; for US war alerts, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M407, 30 November 1941. As early as 1937, Major-General William Dobbie, Officer Commanding Malaya, had noted that enemy landings could be made on the east coast of Malaya and the Kra Isthmus during the monsoon season from October to March. He had predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Thailand, and at Kota Bharu in Malaya. In August 1941, Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief of British Far East Command, incorporated those ideas into a plan entitled "Operation Matador," in which British forces would advance across the Malay-Thai border into the Kra Isthmus if Japanese landings there appeared to be imminent. There were certain obstacles to using the plan, however: in 1940, Britain and Thailand had concluded a non-aggression pact, and in January 1941, requests from Far East Command for additional military resources (which the plan called for) had not been approved. On 5 December 1941, London finally gave Brooke-Popham permission to decide whether or not to use the plan, but he ultimately decided not to launch a pre-emptive move into the Kra Isthmus. Politically, his decision ensured that Britain would not appear as an aggressor in the Far East at a moment when the Allies were still waiting for America's entry into the war. Militarily, however, his decision was unfortunate, as Japanese forces later overran the Kra Isthmus and Malaya.
- 63 Ibid., CMUS to SSEA, telegrams 530 and 531, 30 November 1941; and Keenleyside to Robertson, "The United States and Japan," 30 November 1941.
- 64 King Diary, 30 November 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 65 Ibid., 7 December 1941.
- 66 SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 242, 30 November 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 67 For new Far East Command, see SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 193, 7 November 1941; for respective roles, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M.353, 7 November 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D11, vol. 11763, file PC 04-43-1: "Dominion Affairs-Circular Letters." For NSHQ views on ABC-1, see NSHQ to Admiralty 307 and BAD, 2238Z/26, 26 November 1941; for request for language specialists, see Admiralty Basegram GM969 to AIG1-840A, SDO (Ottawa) et al., 1515A/26, 26 November 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149. For Type X system, see SPENAVO (London) to OPNAV (Washington) et al., 1222/29, 29 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151.

Chapter 8: The Coming of the Pacific War, December 1941

- 1 For occupied China, see DND, Censorship Intelligence Summary No. 114, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 1-7 December 1941, 21; for spirit of *Bushido*, see No. 116, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 15-21 December 1941, 15; for second generation, see No. 114, Trade and Political (Part 2: Postal), period 1-7 December 1941, 23; all in DHH, 314.009 (D152), file: "Intelligence Summaries, Trade and Political, Nov-Dec 41."
- 2 Ibid., No. 114, Trade and Political (Part 1: Cable, Wireless and Telegraph), period 1-7 December 1941, 17-18.
- 3 "British Army Staff, Intelligence Notes," no. 12, week ending 6 December 1941, 3, DHH, 314.009 (D151).
- 4 Capt. in Charge (Singapore) to FEW 59, 0951Z/2, 2 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147; and Admiralty Basegram GM079 to NSHQ, 1913A/6, 6 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149.

- 5 SSSA to SSEA, circular DW995, 2 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #9."
- 6 SSSA to SSEA, circular M412, 2 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). According to the memoirs of Sir Julian Ridsdale, who in 1941 had served as an intelligence officer with the War Cabinet, SIS, and JIC, the British also predicted an attack near the Thai-Malay border, specifically at Kota Bharu: "On the 5th December 1941 I was Night Duty Officer in the War Office, when a telegram marked Top Secret was placed in front of me. The telegram read 'The Japanese will be landing at Kota Baharu [sic], North Malaya, in the early hours of 7th/8th December for an attack on the Malayan Peninsula.'" See Sir Julian E. Ridsdale, "The Unpublished Memoirs of Sir Julian Ridsdale," Chapter 1, Part 4, 42, CAC, RIDS, box 1. See also Special Intelligence no. 450, 3 December 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321.
- 7 John Bryden, *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* (Toronto: Lester, 1993), 93-94. Bryden cited Examination Unit decrypt no. 295, 6 December 1941, which concerned message nos. 423, 424, and 425.
- 8 SSSA to SSEA, circular DW1004, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #10."
- 9 Admiralty Basegram to NSHQ, 2022A/7, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149.
- 10 SSSA to SSEA, circular DW1005, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #10."
- 11 Admiralty Basegram GR189 to NSHQ, 1948A/8, 8 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. Brian Villa has uncovered documents in other archival collections that also demonstrate Britain's interest in reporting a Japanese first strike against American rather than British targets. I am grateful to Professor Villa for sharing his observations on the matter.
- 12 SSSA to SSEA, circular DW1006, 8 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, F7b, vol. 2003, file: "D.W. Telegrams #10."
- 13 RCAF report in DHH, 181.009 (D541), EAC file 22-2, vol. 2, "Intell Air"; and M12 report in RG 24, D11, Vol. 11764, PC 09-6-9, "Intelligence Reports, 'The Powers of the Pacific.'" M12 listed the Japanese Navy as having 3 seaplane carriers, 7 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 44 cruisers, 126 destroyers, and 70-80 submarines. Those estimates closely matched the actual figures for 1941: 10 carriers total, 10 battleships, 38 cruisers, 112 destroyers, and 65 submarines.
- 14 Cavendish-Bentinck is quoted in C. Fitzgibbon, *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 255; Gil Murray, *The Invisible War: The Untold Secret Story of Number One Canadian Special Wireless Group, Royal Canadian Signal Corps, 1944-46* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 24-25, 44-45; William Casey, *The Secret War against Hitler* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 7; and the position reports of the Strike Force 3rd Battleship Division in Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, eds., *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, ca. 1993* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2000), 258-59. Apart from W/T activities, British human intelligence may also have revealed the presence of the Strike Force in early December 1941. According to Peter Shepherd, who in 1941 had served as an RAF technician in Malaya, he informed British intelligence on 5 December that he had learned from a Japanese engineer that a Strike Force based in Hitokappu Bay was bound for Pearl Harbor. See Peter J. Shepherd, *Three Days to Pearl: Incredible Encounter on the Eve of War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 118-27.
- 15 De Marbois to Asst. Chief of Naval Staff, "Orange 'Y' in Canada," 18 February 1944, LAC, RG 24, D1b, vol. 3807, file 1008-75-44 (vol. 2). In 1944, de Marbois held the rank of Captain.

- 16 Japanese radio silence policy is discussed in Timothy Wilford, "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl Harbor," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, 4 (Winter 2002): 147-50. Ranneft's remarks are found in Ranneft War Diary, 2 and 6 December 1941 (English translation by Ranneft), FDRL, John Toland Papers, Series V: Infamy, box 122, file: "Ranneft, Johan E.M." According to Toland's 1980 interview with Ranneft, on 6 December 1941, when Ranneft asked ONI staff about the current location of the Japanese carriers, they pointed on the map to a position less than 300 miles from Honolulu. Some historians may reject Ranneft's postwar remarks, but his contemporaneous diary entry clearly references the carrier positions to Honolulu. Grogan's account is discussed in Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford, "Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai," *Northern Mariner* 11, 2 (April 2001): 1-17; and Ladislav Farago, "POSTSCRIPT: New Lights on the Pearl Harbor Attack," in *The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor*, by Ladislav Farago (New York: Bantam, 1968), 379-402. The FECB estimate is discussed in Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 88. Claims that the Esquimalt station learned of the threat to Pearl Harbor are beyond verification at present as the relevant Gordon Head D/F logs are unavailable. For examples of direct communications from Esquimalt to the Admiralty, however, see SO(I) (Esquimalt) to Admiralty, 0401Z/30, 30 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151; and Esquimalt to Admiralty, 0401Z/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152. The message of 30 November reports the route of the merchant vessel *Salabangka* across the North Pacific to Hong Kong. That route crossed the track of the *Kido Butai*, but it is unclear from the message what dates the *Salabangka* was sailing. Considering other postwar accounts, a veteran crew member of HMCS *Prince Robert* suggested that the Americans may have been aware of the threat to Pearl Harbor, although his account should be treated with caution as he made several questionable claims. See "Report of Interview with Lieutenant Edward Arnold MacFayden, Royal Canadian Navy (Retired) in Victoria, British Columbia," 31 July 1985, DHH, MacFayden, E.A., Lt., Biographical File.
- 17 Quoted in David Irving, *Churchill's War: Triumph in Adversity* (London: Focal Point, 2001), 215n50. Cecil King's diary is held at the Boston University Library and has been closed to researchers due to a change in trusteeship. I await an opportunity to inspect the diary.
- 18 For Churchill's request, see SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 208, 1 December 1941, and SSEA to CMUS, telegram no. 489, 1 December 1941; for Halifax's remarks, see SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 409, 1 December 1941; for Roosevelt's views, see CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 534, 1 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Roosevelt's assumption was not unfounded. On 2 December, a British "Special Intelligence" summary, based on message decrypts, indicated that the Japanese were definitely seeking German and Italian support in the event of war, which now looked certain in the aftermath of failed negotiations between Japan and the United States. See Special Intelligence no. 446, 2 December 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321.
- 19 King Diary, 1 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 SSDA to SSEA, circular M412, 2 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). See also Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds., *War Diaries, 1939-45: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 205-6. On 3 December 1941, Alanbrooke attended a Cabinet Defence Committee meeting in which Halifax's report concerning Roosevelt's promise of support generated some discussion: "Here we

discussed means of ensuring that the USA comes into Far East war in event of Japanese aggression.”

- 22 For the *Lanikai* patrol, see Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 246-48. For the ADB reference, see ADB Conversations, 27 April 1941, in United States, 79th Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 pts. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pt. 15, 1564.
- 23 Thomas Fleming, *The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 35-45.
- 24 For formal understanding with NEI, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M425, 5 December 1941; for US assurance of armed support, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M424, 5 December 1941; for Wrong's report on Roosevelt, see CMUS to SSEA (London), telegram no. 547, 5 December 1941; and for Britain's Commander-in-Chief Far East, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M429, 5 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 25 SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 170, 5 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261546.
- 26 For Roosevelt and Hirohito, see SSDA to SSEA, circulars M434 and M435, 6 December 1941; and for Wrong's remarks, see CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 553, 6 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). According to the war diary of Captain Johan E.M. Ranneft, Netherlands Naval Attaché in Washington, Admiral Turner at the US Navy Department believed that “a sudden Japanese attack on Manila” could start at any moment. See Ranneft War Diary, 6 December 1941 (English translation by Ranneft), FDRL, John Toland Papers, Series V: Infamy, box 122, file: “Ranneft, Johan E.M.”
- 27 Canadian Legation (Washington), Record Book: “Legation Despatches to External Affairs, 1941,” entries for dispatch nos. 3657, 3658, and 3662, 6 December 1941, 123, LAC, RG 25, B3, vol. 2456.
- 28 King Diary, 6 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 For early morning telegram, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M438, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For Roosevelt's actions, see SSDA to SSEA, circulars M442 and M443, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For Churchill's remarks, see War Office to General Auchinleck, dispatch 1825/7/12/41, 7 December 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/46/37, Prime Minister's personal telegrams (T933). On 7 December, until it was known that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, the British Chiefs of Staff continued to discuss means of ensuring America's entry into the war. See Alanbrooke's remarks in Danchev and Todman, *War Diaries*, 208-9.
- 31 For Britain's request, see “Telegram dictated by Mr. Shuckburg,” 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570. For King's response, see SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 172, 7 December 1941; and SSEA to SSDA, telegram no. 253, 7 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 32 Robertson, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister” (two documents, each with the same title), 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 33 For war declaration, see SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), telegram no. 175, 7 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 309, 261547. For press statement, see “Information on Japan given press by p.m., Dec. 7 (Mears' report),” 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3).
- 34 King Diary, 27 November and 7 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13.
- 35 Ibid., 7 December 1941.

- 36 For Canada's declaration, see SSEA to Charge d'Affaires (Tokyo), 8 December 1941; and HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 2309, 8 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). For King informing Churchill, see Prime Minister (Canada) to Prime Minister, 8 December 1941, CAC, CHAR 20/46/43, Prime Minister's personal telegrams (no. 254). For Britain's delay, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M444, 8 December 1941; for Australia, see HCCA to SSEA, telegram no. 107, 8 December 1941; for New Zealand, see HCCNZ to SSEA, telegram no. 69, 8 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). Canada's declaration of war read: "I am instructed by my Government to inform you that news of the wanton and treacherous attack by Japanese armed forces on British territory and British forces and also on United States territory and United States forces reached Canada on December 7, and that Japan's actions are a threat to the defence and freedom of Canada and the other nations of the British Commonwealth. Consequently, I have the honour to inform the Imperial Japanese Government, in the name of His Majesty's Government in Canada, that a state of war exists between Canada and Japan as and from the seventh day of December, 1941."
- 37 For tracking of Japanese merchant ships, see COPC to NSHQ, 0538Z/28, 28 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152; and NSHQ to Admiralty et al., 1351Z/1, 1 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149. For more details on merchant ships, see COPC to NSHQ, 0013Z/3, 3 December 1941; Admiralty to NSHQ et al., 1844A/3, 3 December 1941; and SO(I) Jamaica to Admiralty, DNI (Ottawa), et al., 1520R/3, 3 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. For China Station orders, see C-in-C China to Admiralty et al., 0353Z/2, 2 December 1941; for radar set, see BNLO Navy Yard (Puget Sound) to BARM (Washington), 0025Z/2, 2 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. For RCMP request, see NSHQ to C/S (FECB Singapore), 1835/3, 3 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151; and C/S Singapore to NSHQ, 1023Z/6, 6 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149.
- 38 For ABC-1, see Admiralty to BAD and NSHQ, 0146A/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152. For sono-buoys, see NSHQ to COPC, 1536Z/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152; and COPC to NSHQ, 2051Z/29, 29 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. For depth charge throwers, see COAC to NSHQ, 1330Z/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152. For Esquimalt contact, see messages 0003X/5, 1853Z/6, 1955Z/6, 2131Z/6, 2156Z/6, and 2345Z/6, 5-6 December 1941, all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12154. For QFA messages, see ACND (London) to Admiralty et al., 2055Z/6, 6 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149.
- 39 For Komsomolsk request, see COPC to NSHQ, 2252Z/3, 3 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. For granting of permission, see NSHQ to CNA (Washington), copied to COPC and DNI, 0235Z/4, 4 December 1941; and CNA (Washington) to N.O1/C (Esquimalt), copied to NSHQ and DNI, 2034Z/4, 4 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12155.
- 40 For SS *Lurline*, see messages 2345Z/26, 0324Z/1, 2057Z/6, and 2034Z/7, 26 November to 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149; and NSHQ to DNI (Wellington), 2139Z/30, 30 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. For *Jagersfontein*, see NSHQ to DNI (Wellington) and C/S, HMS *Sultan* (FECB Singapore), 2044Z/3, 3 December 1941; NSHQ to HBM Consul General (San Francisco), 2042Z/3, 3 December 1941; and SO(I) (Esquimalt) to NSHQ, 2047Z/3, 3 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151. For Soviet vessels, see Seattle to NSHQ, 2248Z/4, 4 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152; and Portland (Oregon) to NSHQ, copied to Admiralty, 2135/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12155. Soviet vessels are also mentioned in messages 1541/26 and 2027Z/26, 26 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149; and 2231Z/3, 3 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol.

12151. As a further example of North Pacific reporting, NSHQ informed Wellington, Melbourne, and FECB Singapore on 29 November that the merchant ship *Hawaiian Planter* was due shortly in Honolulu. See NSHQ to DNI (Wellington), SO(I) (Melbourne), and C/S (FECB Singapore), 1528Z/29, 29 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12151.
- 41 COPC to Admiralty, C-in-C China, NOI/C Hong Kong, NSHQ, ACNB, NZNB and C-in-C A&WI, 2208Z/5, 5 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12152. The *Prince Robert* left Vancouver on 27 October to deliver two Canadian battalions to Hong Kong, arriving there on 16 November after stops in both Honolulu and Manila. On 19 November, the ship left the ill-fated Canadian battalions in Hong Kong and steamed east towards Hawaii, landing at Honolulu on 3 December.
- 42 HMCS *Prince Robert* Deck Log, 13 October 1941 to 8 January 1942, LAC, RG 24, D2, vol. 7752. The deck log entry for 5 December 1941 reads: "2340-Flare bearing Red 100°-American Submarine." At 2000 hours on 5 December, three hours and forty minutes before the *Prince Robert* had flare contact with the American submarine, the ship reported its position as 27°19'N, 152°45'W. For the position of the *Kido Butai* on 5 December, see the position reports of the 3rd Battleship Division in Goldstein and Dillon, *The Pearl Harbor Papers*, 258-59.
- 43 COPC to HMCS *Prince Robert*, 2031Z/7, 7 December 1941; NSHQ to HMCS *Prince Robert*, copied to COPC, 2158Z/7, 7 December 1941; and NSHQ to OPNAV and BAD, copied to A/DSD, 2244Z/7, 7 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149. According to message no. 2031Z/7, the *Cynthia Olsen* sent distress reports indicating that the enemy submarine was located at 33°42'N, 145°29'W at 1902 hours on 7 December. The *Prince Robert's* position, according to its deck log, was 33°30'N, 145°30'W at 2000 hours on 7 December. If these figures are correct and if the Japanese submarine remained in the vicinity, the *Prince Robert* may have been less than fifteen miles away from enemy action – she was fortunate to still be afloat. In message no. 2244Z/7, NSHQ in Ottawa told OPNAV and the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington that the *Prince Robert's* approximate position at 2000 hours on 7 December was 34°N, 141°W, but the cited longitude differs by several degrees from the *Prince Robert's* deck log entry.
- 44 For recall of Soviet vessels, see NSHQ to Russian ship *Uritskii*, 2049Z/8, 8 December 1941; and NSHQ to SO(I) (Shanghai) and C/S, HMS *Sultan* (FECB Singapore), 2127Z/8, 8 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. For Japanese submarines, see NSHQ to DNI (Wellington), 1413Z/8, 8 December 1941; and NCSO (San Francisco) to NSHQ et al., 0245Z/8, 8 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. For Japanese merchant ships, see COPC to NSHQ, 2016Z/7, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149; and NSHQ to C-in-C A&WI et al., 0236Z/8, 8 December 1941, and COPC to NSHQ, 0528Z/8, 8 December 1941, both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. The tracked merchant vessels, also known as *marus*, included *Belgian*, *Kobe*, *Naruto*, *Nissyo*, *Palao*, *Sinyo*, *Tatuta*, *Terukawa*, and *Toa*. Japanese strategy called for submarines to support battleships, to serve on reconnaissance missions, and to ambush enemy vessels on occasion. Within two weeks of the Pearl Harbor attack, nine Japanese submarines had been in action on the coast between Juan de Fuca Strait and San Diego, sinking five merchant ships and damaging others. See Michael Whitby, "The Quiet Coast: Canadian Naval Operations in Defence of British Columbia, 1941-42," in *Canada's Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful or Peripheral*, ed. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1999), 68-69.
- 45 For the Rainbow-5 war plan (WPL 46), see NSHQ to COAC, 1930Z/7, 7 December 1941; for merchant ship orders, see Admiralty to NSHQ, 2100Z/7, 7 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12149. For ABC-22, see NSHQ to COAC et al., 2100Z/8, 8 December

- 1941; for Washington's message, see Washington to NSHQ, 2023Z/8, 8 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 24, D20, vol. 12147. For a discussion of Canadian military planning in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attacks, see J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 225-26.
- 46 For Thailand, see SSDA to SSEA, circular M455, 9 December 1941; for Geneva Protocol, see SSDA to SSEA, circular D730, 9 December 1941; both in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). The Geneva Protocol, a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, was first signed in 1925 and came into force in 1928. Britain and the Dominions became signatories in 1930.
 - 47 Early, Secretary to President Roosevelt, "Press Release," 9 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 308, 260809-15. For fireside chat, see Foreign Office (Political Intelligence Dept.), "Weekly Political Intelligence Summary," no. 114, 10 December 1941, 1, 17-21, LAC, RG 25, F7e, vol. 2512. US public opinion was also reported as being totally in support of war. According to the intelligence summary, only Senator Nye remained "intransigent" as he believed that "the Japanese attack is just what Britain planned for us. Britain has been getting ready for this since 1938."
 - 48 King Diary, 9 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J13. Following its initial attacks on 7 December, Japan conquered most European and American possessions in the Far East. Its forces occupied Guam on 10 December and Wake Island a fortnight later. On 25 December, Canadian and British troops surrendered Hong Kong to the Imperial Japanese Army. On 8 February 1942, Japanese forces took Rangoon in Burma. Soon afterwards, Japanese forces completed their conquest of Malaya, and on 15 February General A.E. Percival surrendered Singapore. On 2 March, Japanese forces took Batavia in Java, and a week later Dutch forces surrendered the Netherlands East Indies. With the fall of Bataan on 9 April, Japanese forces had conquered all of the Philippines except Corregidor, which surrendered a month later.
 - 49 For Chiang Kai-shek's remarks, see SSDA to SSEA, telegram no. 216, 11 December 1941; for Soviet views, see SSDA to SSEA, circular D732, 11 December 1941; for Churchill's statement, see SSDA to SSEA, circular D735, 11 December 1941; all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1792, vol. 776, file 365 (pts. 1-3). On 8 December, a British "Special Intelligence" summary indicated that the Japanese ambassador in Berlin had told Tokyo on 5 December about a proposed Axis treaty, soon to be ratified, whereby Germany and Italy would declare war on the US following the outbreak of war between Japan and the US. See Special Intelligence no. 468, 8 December 1941, PRO, ADM 223/321. British intelligence also learned that Germany and Italy honoured their commitments to Japan. See Special Intelligence no. 469, 8 December 1941.
 - 50 SSDA to SSEA, telegrams, 11, 13, and 15 December 1941, all in LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1809, vol. 805, file 570.
 - 51 CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 579, 13 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 308, 260826. See also *ibid.*, CMUS to SSEA, telegram no. 582, 15 December 1941. Roosevelt spoke to Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek about the possibility of an "Inter Allied Military Conference" as well as the posting of Allied representatives at Chungking and Singapore.
 - 52 SSDA to SSEA, circular M480, 24 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1810, vol. 808, file 597.
 - 53 Wrong to unknown addressee, 14 December 1941, 4, LAC, MG 30, series E101, vol. 8, file: "Hume Wrong - Personal Notes."
 - 54 For Massey's message, see HCCGB to SSEA, telegram no. 2458, 22 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, A2, reel T1793, vol. 777, file 365 (pt. 4). For intelligence summary, see Foreign Office (Political Intelligence Dept.), "Weekly Political Intelligence Summary," no. 117, 31 December

1941, 15, LAC, RG 25, F7e, vol. 2512. For United Nations declaration, see CMUS to SSEA, 30 December 1941, LAC, MG 26 J1, reel C4865, vol. 308, 260917-19. The participating nations included Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, UK, USA, USSR, and Yugoslavia.

Conclusion: Canada's Response to the Pacific Challenge

- 1 Wohlstetter's "signal and noise" thesis postulated that US authorities experienced information overload: "Signals announcing the Pearl Harbor attack were always accompanied by competing or contradictory signals, by all sorts of information useless for anticipating this particular disaster ... In short, we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones." See Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 3, 387.
- 2 This study shows that several documents need to be located. From DHH, 86/555: "A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-45," severed pages 139-46 and deleted Section 15. From LAC, RG 24: Examination Unit Records (CSE), vol. 29165, file WWII-20 (pt. 3), missing letters from 16 September to 5 December 1941, and file WWII-15 (pt. 3), missing letters from 25 July to 7 December 1941; RCN Messages, D20, vol. 12155, missing COPC-COM13 message texts from December 1941; Pacific Command Records, D11, vol. 11768, file PC S-019-2-8 (pt. 1), is missing vol. 1, which contains Pacific Coast security intelligence reports dated before March 1942, and file PC S-019-2-11 (pt. 1) has no associated file of Esquimalt weekly reports from 1941; and finally, missing Gordon Head station records and logs from 1941. From LAC, RG 25: External Affairs Records, A2, vol. 805, file 572: "Japan - Strategic Position in Far East," missing documents from 12 October to 11 December 1941. From LAC, MG 26 J1: Mackenzie King Papers, vol. 303, missing documents from 14 November to 8 December 1941, and vol. 320, missing documents from 30 November to 11 December 1941. From QUA: C.G. Power Papers, Ministerial files C, 2150 Ild, box 59, file D1030: "Event of War with Japan," missing documents from 26 November to 2 December and from 4 to 7 December 1941; and box 52, file: "USA, 1940-43," missing documents from 9 November to 9 December 1941.

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